The Crisis of Rome

by Gareth Sampson

  This almost-comic Numidian attack ended as almost as soon as it started when the elephants became entangled in the undergrowth between the two forces, disrupting the Numidian advance. The accompanying Numidian infantry apparently broke and fled for the safety of higher ground leaving the elephants to be slaughtered. Here Sallust provides the only figures for the battle, with forty Numidian elephants killed and four captured.213 With Bomilcar routed, Rutilius then set off to rejoin the main force, by which time night had fallen. Sallust increased the drama of his narrative by having both Roman forces mistaking the approach of the other for the enemy; with battle narrowly being averted thanks to the scouts sent out by both sides. Following the battle we are told that Metellus remained in camp for four days, to rebuild his army, whilst Jugurtha set about raising a fresh one.

  What are we to make of the second battle of the Jugurthine War and the first one to receive anything approaching a detailed description in Sallust? It is clear that despite having chosen his ground and tactics perfectly, Jugurtha and the Numidians had been clearly defeated by Metellus, thanks to the quality of the Roman forces. Despite a superior position and the excellent use of his missle weapons (bows and slings) and cavalry on both occasions when faced with Roman legionaries in close quarters, the Numidian troops fled from the battlefield. Naturally, this was aided by the calm and steady leadership of Metellus who had confidence in the superiority of his own forces and the knowledge that this would tell in the final outcome.

  II. The Battle of the Muthul River - Stage 2

  The overall effect is interesting to consider. One the one hand, the Romans had won a clear victory, restoring Roman pride and the balance of power between the respective forces. The superiority of the Roman military machine had clearly been demonstrated and the weaknesses of the Numidian one made all too plain to see. Nevertheless, we must ask ourselves just how bitter a defeat was it for Jugurtha? Although we have no figures for casualties, Sallust’s narrative makes it clear that the bulk of his forces survived, although he did lose a considerable force of elephants. More importantly, as long as the king himself remained free then the war would continue. However, Sallust does make one important but odd point as a postscript to the battle. He states that despite the reactively low Numidian casualties, the majority deserted Jugurtha, who had to recruit a force of untrained peasants to rebuild his army. Sallust ascribes this to being a quirk of the Numidian culture.214 However, it would perhaps be more logical to see it as the first signs that, although Jugurtha intended to fight on, the Numidian military knew when they were beaten.

  Nevertheless, despite his victory, Metellus was left with a serious problem, namely how to bring the war to a speedy conclusion. Jugurtha had been defeated militarily, but until he was in Roman hands the war would continue. In many respects this was the type of warfare that most vexed the Romans; the enemy had been defeated militarily, but the figurehead remained. With Hannibal, they had forced him into exile and, after two decades on the run, eventual suicide; whilst with Viriathus, they had resorted to assassination. With no other option, Metellus began a campaign of denying Jugurtha access to the resources of Numidia, by the country’s total subjugation. This process is best described by Sallust:

  He (Metellus) therefore marched into the most fertile parts of Numidia, laid waste the country, captured and burned many strongholds and towns which had hurriedly been fortified or left without defenders, ordered the death of all the adults and gave everything else to his soldiers as booty. In this way he caused such terror that many men were given to the Romans as hostages, grain and other necessities were furnished in abundance and garrisons were admitted wherever Metellus thought it advisable.215

  Although this was an admirable strategy in terms of denying Jugurtha access to resources, it would have turned the Numidians against Rome, especially when you consider that Metellus had started this campaign being welcomed by the local inhabitants. Furthermore, if anything, it would have increased support for the flagging campaign of Jugurtha. Another side effect of this policy was that it spread Metellus’ forces over a wide area. This presented an opportunity for Jugurtha, who responded by shadowing Metellus’ main force and mounting lightning strikes with his cavalry against any stray Roman units he came upon. Sallust records that one such unit was ambushed and slaughtered.216 This tactic forced Metellus to adopt more caution when campaigning in the Numidian countryside, with his army split into two main forces, one commanded by him, and one by Marius, with the two shadowing each other. This set the tone for the rest of the campaign of 109 with Metellus and Marius’ forces attacking the various Numidian towns and Jugurtha shadowing them with his cavalry and impeding the Roman progress whenever he could, through spoiling crops or poisoning water sources, but not giving battle.

  Thus, once again, the Roman army became bogged down in a long and drawn-out war against an ‘invisible’ guerrilla enemy. The effects on Roman morale can be seen by Sallust again referring to the existence of groups of Roman deserters. Metellus determined to bring Jugurtha to battle once more by attacking the city of Zama, which he hoped would force Jugurtha to make a stand to save the city. It has to be said that this was a vain hope at best and showed just how lacking in ideas the Romans had become. Unfortunately for Metellus, Jugurtha learnt of this plan from a group of Roman deserters who had switched sides and was able to use his greater speed to reach Zama first and make preparations. Zama’s defences were duly bolstered, aided by the presence of the Roman deserters to defend the town. Jugurtha, however, had no intention of being pinned down in one location and swiftly took his cavalry force back into the hills.

  Once again, Jugurtha’s superior military intelligence showed through, as he learnt that Marius had taken a small force to the nearby town of Sicca to gain additional supplies. He therefore moved his cavalry force and ambushed Marius as he was leaving the town, planning to surround Marius by having the inhabitants of the town attack Marius from the rear. Marius though, kept his head and advanced swiftly at the enemy, thus escaping from being surrounded and again testing the nerve of the Numidians in front of him. Again, when faced with Roman soldiers charging them, the Numidians broke, and the ambush failed, with few casualties on either side.217

  Once more, a familiar pattern was repeated, with Jugurtha’s brilliant tactical ability being negated by the poor quality of his troops.

  Despite losing the element of surprise, Metellus continued with his siege of Zama. Jugurtha again, however, proved to be a master of the unexpected and attacked the lightly-defended Roman camp behind Metellus’ army. Once again this resulted in initial success with the Roman guards scattering rather than standing and fighting, the majority of whom were slaughtered. However, Sallust reports that just forty men held firm and defended a ridge or hill-top, long enough for Metellus and Marius to realize the situation and come to their aid.218 Jugurtha, after surprising and embarrassing the Romans once more, had to retreat when faced with overwhelming odds and thus the stalemate continued.

  The war continued in this vein, with Metellus continuing with the siege of Zama and Jugurtha ambushing and harrying the Roman lines wherever he could. Sallust preserves a good account of the siege, obviously taken from a first-hand account. In many ways the siege of Zama became a microcosm for the war itself. Overwhelming Roman military might was not enough to take the city, and Jugurtha continued to ambush the Roman forces without being brought to battle and continued to be driven off. In the end, with the onset of winter, Metellus was forced to abandon the siege of Zama and took the bulk of his army back to Roman Africa to winter there. He naturally left garrisons in a number of Numidian towns.

  Thus, the campaign of 109, despite the brilliant victory at Muthul River, had ended in stalemate and the war dragged on into a fourth year, with still no obvious Roman success in sight. As on so many occasions, Roman military superiority, in both numbers and quality, could not defeat an enemy who refused to give battle and continued to harry them. Certainly, Metellus had restored Rom
an pride and military superiority in battle, but had no obvious military strategy to bring the war to an end.

  Therefore, with no other option, Metellus once again attempted to end the war by diplomacy through the subversion of Jugurtha’ deputy, Bomilcar, whose position, as he fully understood, was a precarious one. As Sallust points out, Bomilcar, having been Jugurtha’s agent in the murder of the Numidian prince Massiva in Rome, would have been handed over for Roman justice if there were any settlement between Rome and Jugurtha then Bomilcar.219 Furthermore, he must have realized that ultimately the Numidians would not win this war and again he would find himself at the mercy of Roman justice. Therefore, a separate deal between himself and the Romans was the only way of ensuring his own survival. Bomilcar thus attempted to persuade Jugurtha to come to terms with the Romans, successfully as it appears, and negotiations were opened.

  We have to question whether Jugurtha had suddenly had a change of heart brought about by Bomilcar or whether this was nothing more than a continuation of his earlier tactic of negotiating with the Romans to muddy the waters. Metellus convened a council of his senior men and sent initial terms to Jugurtha of 200,000 pounds of silver, all his elephants and a number of horses and weapons, along with the return of all Roman deserters, all of which were complied with. It was only when Jugurtha himself was ordered to appear before the Romans, at Tisidium, that he broke off negotiations.

  Given that he handed over a considerable portion of his resources to Metellus, we have to consider that Jugurtha was genuinely trying to seek a settlement with Rome. However, following his victory and humiliation of the Romans at Suthul, he must have known that the Romans would never have allowed him to remain as King of Numidia, and in fact it was unlikely that the Romans would have let him remain alive at all. What this incident shows, if anything is that both sides were tiring of this war, with no victory in sight for either party. Thus the war continued into a fourth year (108 BC) with Metellus remaining in command of the campaign as proconsul, which was hardly a surprise given his reputation, accomplishments and formidable political support in the Senate.

  Treachery in the Winter of 109/108 BC

  However, this support back in Rome came in contrast to his position in Africa. Another year had passed and Jugurtha, despite the set-piece defeat, was still in the field with his army and could act with impunity, striking against the Romans seemingly at random. The war was to drag on into a fourth year, with no obvious military solution in sight and negotiations for a peace had broken down once again. Added to that was the military failure to capture the city of Zama. On the ground, this lacklustre Roman performance had resulted in desertions, as we have seen. With a number of deserters being handed over by Jugurtha, Metellus was at least able to make an example of them and discourage any further such actions. However, it was at a higher level that Metellus faced the most danger, when this discontent found a figurehead, in the shape of his own deputy, Caius Marius. Marius’ background will be examined shortly (Chapter 7), but at this particular time he found himself in an ideal position. That Rome would win the war was inevitable, at least in a military sense, yet the campaign was dragging on and Marius found himself in a position that many deputies find themselves in, being convinced that he could do a better job than his superior.

  With the Roman army wintering in the province of Africa, Marius apparently requested of Metellus that he be given leave to return to Rome and stand for consul. For Metellus there were a number of obvious reasons to refuse such a request. For a start Marius was a serving officer on an important campaign and should not be released for personal political reasons. Secondly, it was obvious that Marius was angling to take Metellus’ own command away from him. Thirdly, was the fact that, as Metellus saw it, Marius did not possess the attributes to be elected consul and would fail utterly. Despite his military and political record, he had no real powerbase or allies of his own and had only achieved what he had through being a client of the Metelli. Furthermore, he was an Italian nobleman (albeit with Roman citizenship) but was not a Roman one, an important distinction in the eyes of the Roman aristocracy. For these reasons, it is not a surprise that Metellus refused Marius’ request. Nonetheless, Metellus was now faced with a potentially rebellious deputy to contend with as well.

  With the failure of the negotiations, the Romans spent the rest of the winter in their African province, regrouping their forces for the next campaign. This left Jugurtha a relatively free hand in Numidia (Roman garrisons excepted) and he used it to his advantage. He assembled a new army and spent the rest of time trying to win back the towns and cities that had gone over to the Romans (mostly unwillingly) and even trying to subvert the Roman garrisons left behind in a number of towns. Success came in the form of the town of Vaga, one of the first Numidian towns to turn to Metellus in 109 and with a Roman garrison. During a public festival the officers of the garrison were invited to dine with the town’s dignitaries, during which they were murdered. With the garrison leaderless the townspeople attacked the soldiers, cut them off from their citadel and fell upon them in the streets, massacring them. Suspiciously only the Roman commander, T. Turpilius Silanus survived.220

  Upon hearing of the disaster at Vaga, Metellus set out at once and crossed the border with a large Roman force intent of avenging the loss. Upon reaching the town, the inhabitants made a fatal mistake. Metellus’ force contained a large number of Numidian cavalry, which had gone over into Roman service (itself a clear sign of Numidian discontent). As the cavalry reached the town before the Roman infantry, the townspeople assumed that they were from Jugurtha and opened the gates and went out to greet them. Naturally, taking advantage of this stroke of fortune the Romano-Numidian cavalry slaughtered the inhabitants and took the gates before they could be closed. Despite some resistance the town fell easily, with inhabitants being slaughtered and the survivors enslaved. Sallust dates the whole rebellion to two days in length.221

  The most prominent victim was the garrison commander T. Turpilius Silanus, who was condemned by a military tribunal and scourged and executed.222 What made the matter worse was that Turpilius was a friend of Metellus and only there at his request. Plutarch claims that at the tribunal, Marius pushed for Metellus to sentence his friend to death, which Metellus reluctantly had to do. Plutarch claims that this increased the tension between Metellus and Marius. He then goes onto add that soon after the execution the charge was found to be false and Turpilius was actually innocent. Thus, for Plutarch at least, Marius had got Metellus to execute his friend on trumped-up charges.223 Exactly how Turpilius could be innocent is never stated by Plutarch, nor could we imagine how it could be the case. Even if he did not conspire with the inhabitants then he was at least guilty of gross negligence. As we find none of this in Sallust’s account, we must exercise caution.

  Though the rebellion had been swiftly and brutally crushed, ensuring that a repetition was unlikely, it did show the weakness of the Roman position and was another setback for Metellus, showing the danger of Roman inactivity during the winter months.

  Jugurtha, however, still faced discontent within his own ranks, again in the form of Bomilcar. Still fearful of his own position and the inevitability of a Numidian defeat, he plotted to remove Jugurtha in a coup. To these ends, he enlisted the help of a Numidian nobleman and army commander, Nabdalsa, who commanded the Numidian forces on the border of Roman Africa. However, on the appointed day Nabdalsa’s nerve cracked and he withdrew from the plot. Bomilcar compounded this failure by writing a letter to him, berating him for his lack of nerve and entreating him to join his plot as it was inevitable that Jugurtha would lose the war. As usually happens in these cases, the letter found its way into the hands of another, Nabdalsa’s secretary, who took it straight to the king. When Nabdalsa found out about the letter’s loss he managed to make it to Jugurtha first and admitted the whole plot. Bomilcar and the rest of his conspirators were rounded up and executed immediately. Nabdalsa was spared, probably due to his position and Jugurt
ha’s desire to limit the spread of this rebellion. We know the details of this plot thanks to Numidian deserters, probably some of those associated with the plot itself, who made their way to the Roman lines.224 Though the plot had been dealt with, Jugurtha’s weak position in Numidia had been clearly exposed. The inevitability of his defeat seemed to be widely accepted, yet he could not surrender nor could the Romans bring the war to an end.

  Thus the campaign of 108 BC began with both sides facing internal divisions and the prospect of another year of stalemate. Whilst Jugurtha rid himself of Bomilcar by a swift execution, Metellus rid himself of Marius by finally acceding to his demand to return to Rome, accepting that it was better to remove a source of discontent from Africa than to let it fester. He did this safe in the knowledge that there was no real chance of Marius being elected consul. Unfortunately for him, however, this safety was only in his own mind, as will be detailed in the next chapter.

  The Campaign of 108 BC and the ‘Second Metellan Battle’

  The campaigning for 108 began, as was usual, with a Roman invasion of Numidia, yet on this occasion Jugurtha gave battle. Once again Sallust’s limitations as a historian come to the fore as the details of this battle are relegated to just a handful of lines.