The Crisis of Rome

by Gareth Sampson

  Such an act was technically against the law, with there being a ban on consulships within ten years of each other, though this had been laid aside for the benefit of Scipio Aemilianus (see Chapter 1). In such an emergency, however, whether the Senate were that enthusiastic about this or not, by ending the Jugurthine War there was only one clear choice for command of the Northern War: Marius. By his return to Rome, with Jugurtha in chains, he had already been elected as consul for 104 BC and, in an unprecedented situation, was to continue to be re-elected consul another four times (103–100 BC), though it is unlikely this was ever discussed at this stage. He entered office spectacularly on 1 January by celebrating his triumph over Jugurtha. Though the Romans did not yet know it, the brief Age of Marius had begun.

  The Age of Marius

  (104–100 BC)

  Chapter 9

  The Northern Wars: The War in Spain and the Battle of Aquae Sextiae (105–102 BC)

  The Return of Marius

  Having been given this extraordinary position in such a time of national emergency, Marius’ return to Rome and entry into his second consulship was stage-managed to perfection. He timed his army’s return to Rome to coincide with his first day of office (1 January 104 BC) and entered Rome to both celebrate his triumph over Jugurtha and his assumption of the consulship. To the people of Rome, such a triumph must have been a welcome sight after the news of Arausio. At the head of the triumph was the figure of Jugurtha himself, along with his two sons, visible proof of both Roman and Marian military success. Marius continued this theme by convening the Senate on the Capitol and entering whilst still in triumphal dress. This was the first time this had been done and is detailed by Plutarch thus:

  After the procession was over, Marius called the Senate into session on the Capitol, and made his entry, either through inadvertence or with a vulgar display of his good fortune, in his triumphal robes; but perceiving quickly that the Senators were offended at this, he rose and went out, changed into the usual robe with the purple border, and then came back.”341

  Having been a senator for at least fifteen years and with an array of advisors, it is inconceivable that Marius made this gesture by mistake.342 There was a clear message, namely that he was the man for the moment and that he was an ‘outsider’, but a highly successful one, who they needed right now.

  Following Arausio, the few surviving sources swiftly move on to the year 102 and the first battle between Marius and the tribes. However, although the sources manage this in a sentence, we are left with the years 104 and 103 BC to understand, as they form a crucial backdrop to the battles that were to come, for a number of reasons. It is clear that Marius left Rome with his army soon after his triumph and headed north for southern Gaul. As it happened, the tribes did not make an attempted invasion of Italy, but dispersed. Again, we have no clear chronology for this, but by early to mid-104 BC, it appears that Marius had established a defensive position on the Rhone, based at Arles, where he awaited the return of the tribes. As it turned out, he would have to wait until 102 BC.343

  Again, what few sources we have inform us of the Cimbri, but not their allies the Teutones or Ambrones. It is possible that the three tribes separated, with the Teutones or Ambrones going off either together or separately to some other part of Gaul. It is also possible that the other two tribes had not yet become involved in these wars.

  The Cimbric Invasion of Spain (105–103 BC)

  Following the victory at Arausio in October 105 BC, the Cimbri moved on once more, not invading Italy, as many in Rome expected, but instead turning west and invading Spain. This was an important new development and one that requires some discussion, even though it is little covered in the sources.344 There are several questions that need discussing. Firstly, why did the Cimbri not invade Italy, something that they later attempted? Secondly, with reference to our earlier discussion of the possible evolution of the Cimbric tactics, why did they not settle in the region of southern Gaul, now that it had been ‘freed’ from Roman rule?

  In both cases, the ultimate answers to these questions lie forever in the discussions of the Cimbric leaders at the time and will never truly be known. Nonetheless, we can briefly afford ourselves some speculation on their possible motives. As to the first question, regarding Italy, the Cimbri would have known that any invasion of Italy would have been met with continued Roman resistance and that it would have resulted in a fight to the finish for one side or the other. At the time, the defeat of the Roman armies at Arausio had given them a valuable breathing space from Roman resistance and there were still other options available. As to the issue of remaining in Gaul, as events showed, yet another Roman army soon turned up in Gaul with revenge in mind and again no settlement would ever be free from Roman interference. Furthermore, they had already marched through central Gaul and been driven out by the native tribes. With the north, east and south (the Mediterranean) all discarded, the west was an attractive and nearby alternative.

  Thus, we have the short note from the Periochae of Livy:

  The Cimbri devastated all the land between the Rhone and the Pyrenees, crossed through a pass into Spain and there after devastating many districts…345

  As Evans has pointed out, we have no other evidence for this devastation, but this may have resulted in the destruction of the Roman colony at Narbo, severing the land link between Italy and Spain.346 We have little clear idea of the state of Spain at this time, again poorly served by our few remaining sources, with the focus being elsewhere, as we have seen. Nevertheless, it appears that Rome was once again at war with the Lusitanians (see Chapter 1). The Praetor of 109 Q, Servilius Caepio, is recorded as fighting them between 109 and 106, when he returned to Rome to celebrate a triumph.347 However, it appears that whoever succeeded him in Spain met with disaster, as Obsequens records this for the year 105 BC (based on Livy):

  A Roman army was slaughtered by the Lusitanians.348

  The only surviving narrative history for Spain in the period is Appian, who has one section on the period in question.

  After this time [the Numantine War] there were other revolts in Iberia and Calpurnius Piso was chosen general.349 Servius Galba succeeded him, but as the Cimbri were invading Italy [101 BC], and Sicily was also embroiled in the Second Servile War [see Appendix II], they [the Romans] did not send an army to Iberia, because they were so preoccupied with these matters, but sent legates to put an end to the war by whatever means possible. Once the Cimbri had been driven away, T. Didius came and killed 20,000 Arevaci, and moved Termessus, a large city, which had always been disinclined to obey the Romans…350

  Furthermore, around 102 BC, we find an M. Marius, possibly the younger brother of the consul, commanding a Roman force in Spain:

  There lived in another city near Colenda a mixed race of Celtiberians, whom M. Marius had settled there five years earlier [c.102 BC], with the agreement of the Senate, after they had fought with him against the Lusitanians.351

  We can see that at the start of the Cimbric invasion of Gaul, Spain appeared already to be unsettled, and that after the Northern Wars had been concluded a major campaign was required to restore Roman rule. If we are to believe the Obsequens reference then as well as a defeat in Gaul at Arausio, another Roman army had been destroyed in Spain. We have no other details, but throughout the period of 113–105 BC, Roman military effort was focused primarily on Gaul and Macedon, not Spain, and successive defeats only served to undermine Rome’s position in Spain, much as it had done in Gaul. Thus it appears that the Lusitanians at least had taken advantage of Rome’s defeats elsewhere to revolt once more. During this period all the evidence points to the Romans after 105 BC being unable to send troops to quell the rebellious peoples of Spain and having to co-opt friendly tribes to their service, as seen with M. Marius using the Celtiberians of Colenda against the Lusitanians.

  Added to this mixture of rebellion and inter-tribal fighting came a massive Cimbric invasion. Whilst the Cimbri may have believed that Spain offered
them the best location to settle and defend themselves from Rome, once again they underestimated the reaction of the natives to this new threat. Whilst the phrase ‘the enemy of my enemy is my friend’ has always been a valid one in warfare, this did not extend to ‘friends’ settling in your homeland and the Cimbri found themselves under attack from the Celtiberian natives, repeating the reception they had received throughout Gaul. Again we have no details of the fighting which occurred, but the Periochae of Livy line quoted above, ends thus:

  The Cimbri devastated all the land between the Rhone and the Pyrenees, crossed through a pass into Spain, and there after devastating many districts, were routed by the Celtiberians. They returned to Gaul and in the land of the Vellocasses joined the Teutones.352

  Given that Plutarch dates their return to Gaul in late 103 BC, we can see that the Cimbri spent nearly two years in Spain, adding to the rebellions in progress and probably stoking up many more, reducing Spain to a wreck of a province with a three-way fight between the Romans and their allies, the rebels and the Cimbri. When the Cimbri were finally defeated and driven out of Spain by the natives, the province must have been in ruins and for all intents and purposes out of Roman hands, along with southern Gaul and Sicily at this time (see Appendix II).353

  104–103 BC: The Cold War in Gaul and Domestic Unease

  Whilst Spain bore the brunt of the Cimbric invasion, it did provide Marius with an invaluable opportunity to prepare. Whilst the Cimbric plan was to settle in Spain, in Roman eyes it was only a matter of time before they returned and attempted what all enemies of Rome attempted: an invasion of Italy. Whilst ultimately the Romans proved to be correct and the Cimbri did return, at the time this was by no means a certainty. Had the Cimbri been successful in their attempts to settle in Spain, then ultimately Marius, or his successor, would have had to lead this northern Roman army into Spain to dislodge them.

  One important question concerns the nature of the army that Marius took command of. Given his reforms of the recruitment criteria in 107 BC (see Appendix I), it has been suggested that Marius again raised fresh forces from Italy by this method. Furthermore, there is a reference in Diodorus to him requesting fresh troops from overseas.354 Regrettably, Plutarch ignores this issue. The clearest evidence comes from a short passage of Frontinus:

  When Caius Marius had the option of choosing a force from two armies, one of which had served under Rutilius, the other under Metellus and later under himself, he preferred the troops of Rutilius, though fewer in number, because he deemed them of trustier discipline.355

  On the face of it this seems strange, given that Marius had gone to great lengths to assemble a large force for his war in Numidia and that those troops were now battle-hardened veterans, rather than raw recruits thrown together in the panic after Arausio.

  Furthermore, he apparently deliberately chose the smaller of the two armies to face the Cimbri (under the expectation that they would soon be attacking Italy). One possible solution to this problem is the fact that Frontinus could be referring to the forces which he inherited from Metellus who had been taken to Numidia in 109 BC. Thus Marius discharged those men who had served the longest and added Rutilius’ men to those he raised in 107 BC. Ultimately, however, there is no clear answer to this conundrum.

  Regardless of this, the absence of the Cimbri gave Marius vital breathing space. Having been given this time without an immediate opponent, Marius utilized it to maximum benefit in training and modifying his army (the details of which will be discussed in Chapter 11). Nevertheless, despite the few details provided by our remaining sources for these years, they represented a golden opportunity for Marius to integrate his army of fresh recruits and veterans, train them up and hone his tactics for what the Roman saw as the inevitable battles to come with the Cimbri. Inevitably, this would lead to slack periods, with Marius having to find work to keep his men occupied, as noted by Strabo, when he tells us that Marius had his men dig a canal from the Rhone to the Mediterranean to ease his supply route.356

  On a more positive note, both the absence of the northern tribes and the presence of the Roman army must have helped stabilize Roman influence in the region. Whilst Plutarch, in his biography of Marius, is equally impatient to move onto the battle of 102 BC, in his biography of Sulla he actually offers us some details of the lesser military and diplomatic activities of the Romans during the period 104–103 BC.

  Having served as Marius’ deputy in the Jugurthine Wars, Sulla continued this role in the Northern Wars, first as a legate then as a military tribune. Plutarch records that as legate in 104 BC, Sulla captured the chieftain of the Tectosages tribe, a man named Copillus. Thus it seems that whilst he was waiting for the return of the northern tribes, Marius had his army subdue the rebellious local tribes and secure the region for Rome once more. Frontinus adds the following story:

  During the war with the Cimbri and Teutones, the consul Caius Marius, wishing to test the loyalty of the Gauls and Ligurians, sent them a letter, commanding them in the first part of the letter not to open the inner part, which was specially sealed, before a certain date. Afterwards, before the appointed time had arrived, he demanded the same letter back, and, finding all seals broken, he knew that acts of hostility were afoot.357

  This brief story not only confirms that Marius spent this period ensuring the loyalty of the local tribes, but also the extent of the potential rebellion against Rome, for this is the only evidence that the Ligurians (who occupied the Alpine region joining Gaul and Northern Italy, and had only been subdued by Rome less than a century earlier358 were also disloyal to Rome. Though we have no evidence that the Ligurian tribes joined the Cimbri, it is important to understand that Northern Italy and Southern Gaul were now potentially hostile territory for the Romans. These two years Marius had would have been invaluable in ensuring that when the tribes did eventually move on Italy the locals had been re-subjugated.

  Nevertheless, despite all this, Marius would have faced a political problem as 104 BC passed, concerning his position for 103 BC. He had been elected as consul for 104 in the face of an expected Cimbric invasion of Italy, which then had not materialized. Although it appears that his army was actively pacifying the region, it cannot have been the glorious victories that either he, or the people of Rome, had in mind. Under normal circumstances, Marius’ command would have become a proconsular one and two fresh consuls would be elected. Yet this is not what happened; instead, we find Marius being elected to a second consulship in a row (his third overall). Plutarch explains this as being due to the expected arrival of the northern tribes in the spring of 103, though whether this was based on genuine intelligence or rumour, possibly even spread by Marius’ own supporters, we will never know. In any event, Marius set another milestone with back-to-back consulships, a far more unprecedented act than two consulships in a decade. His colleague for 103 BC was an L. Aurelius Orestes, about whom little is known.

  However, as 103 BC passed, still with no sign of the tribes, Marius’ position became more open to criticism, with the defeat at Arausio now two years in the past and still no sign of an invasion of Italy. Again the only military activity we hear of comes from Plutarch’s biography of Sulla, who as military tribune this year apparently persuaded the tribe of the Marsi to ally with Rome, though the identity of this tribe is open to question.359 However essential this work was to Rome, it was not what he had been elected for, at least in the eyes of the people.

  The death of his colleague during the year meant that he had to return to Rome to hold the consular elections for 102 BC. This gave him a wonderful opportunity to secure his position further, by reconnecting with the people of Rome first hand. Once in Rome it appears that Marius reverted to his old tactic of finding a popular tribune to agitate on his behalf. On this occasion he chose L. Appuleius Saturninus (see Appendix I). Plutarch reports:

  L. Appuleius Saturninus, who had more influence with the people than any other tribune, was won over by the flattering attentions of Marius,
and in his harangues urged the people to elect Marius consul. Marius affected to decline the office and declared that he did not want it, but Saturninus called him a traitor to his country for refusing to command the armies at a time of such great peril. Now it was clear that Saturninus was playing his part at the instigation of Marius, and playing it badly too, but the masses, seeing that the occasion required the ability as well as the good fortune of Marius, voted for his fourth consulship, and made Catulus Lutatius [Q. Lutatius Catulus] his colleague.360

  Thus Marius was able to secure a fourth consulship in a row, but it was clear that without forthcoming military success his support was diminishing. It was at this point, 102 BC, that the tribes made their return to southern Gaul.

  The Tribal Alliance against Rome

  With the defeat of the Cimbri in Spain, the bulk of the tribes crossed the Pyrenees once more and returned to Gaul. As always we have no idea of how many of the Cimbri actually crossed into Spain, nor what their losses were. Upon this return from Spain, however, it is apparent that the Cimbri evolved their strategy in a bold and decisive manner. Having been repulsed from Central Europe, Gaul and now Spain, it is clear that they decided upon the final course of action open to them: the invasion of Italy. Whilst they had suffered setbacks at the hands of the other tribes, they had on three occasions proved to be superior to the Roman military. Italy was fertile and had been the location of previous Gallic migrations, showing it to be a viable and defensible location. To accomplish this, though, required the total defeat of Rome and the dismantling of the Roman system. It is also possible that the Cimbric leaders assumed that once they had defeated Rome and settled there then Rome may have become accustomed to their presence, though ultimately we will never know.