Fallen Founder

by Nancy Isenberg

  Troup’s confusion stemmed from his black-and-white view of partisan politics. In his mind, Burr’s conduct on defense “showed strong symptoms of a wish to change his ground.” He meant a wish to change party affiliation. But Burr’s record in the Senate suggests otherwise. He had strongly backed the military before; in 1792, he sided with Federalist Rufus King, supporting the expansion of the army for the Indian Wars in the western territories. And for six years he ably served on numerous military and veteran committees.116

  His position had not changed. When working for the tax bill to pay for the new fortifications, Burr never came close to endorsing the Federalist agenda. In the final wording of the bill, he eliminated references to a war with France, stating that the defensive measures were for the possibility of war with any foreign nation. He saw the threat from the British to be equal to, if not greater than, that from France. In June 1798, as a member of the Democratic Society of New York, he drafted a message to Congress urging action against British attacks on American shipping. He had no “wish to change his ground,” displaying instead his consistency on military matters and foreign policy.117

  It is amazing how poorly Burr’s former friend knew him. That he supported John Burk was not at all uncharacteristic. He had avidly defended the democratic clubs, and pushed the Senate to lift the veil of secrecy surrounding the Jay Treaty; he was calling again for greater transparency in government. Burr had also come to understand that the Republican Party required printers with pointed pens, those willing to provoke debate.

  Burk had replaced Princetonian Philip Freneau as editor of The Time Piece, a literary paper which Burr had helped his former classmate to set up in 1798. Under the leadership of Burk, a Burr protégé, the paper took a decidedly radical turn. Burr had just helped Burk prepare and publish his play Bunker-Hill, which the Irishman had dedicated to his generous sponsor. Later, in a letter to Jefferson in 1801, Burk enthusiastically noted that Burr was “a friend and father” to him. Burr did more than rescue Burk from jail at the end of 1798, for the release was made contingent on Burk’s leaving the country; and yet, instead of sailing for Europe, he headed for Virginia. It was, in fact, Burr who made Burk’s escape and asylum possible. In a letter to James Monroe, Burr praised the young man’s “enthusiasm in the cause of liberty,” asking the Virginian to take Burk under his wing and protect him from further prosecution.118

  The Burk case was a sign of the times. As anti-French sentiment intensified in response to the “XYZ Affair,” the effective Federalists pushed legislation through Congress. The Alien and Sedition Acts were designed to counteract the imagined French Revolutionary influence over American minds by physically removing French and other foreign, socially disruptive troublemakers from American shores; and, more generally, to severely restrict American citizens’ right to dissent from administration policies. Inappropriate speaking, as well as writing, was punishable by jail terms.

  Though he was prosecuted for sedition for criticizing the president in print, John Burk’s status as a foreigner subjected him to deportation. This was the penalty for “dangerous aliens” under the Alien Act. There were in fact three anti-alien acts: the Naturalization Act, the Alien Enemies Act, and the Act Concerning Aliens. The first increased the length of residence needed for aliens to become citizens; the second forced enemy aliens to leave the country in time of war; and the third gave the president broad powers to deport and imprison any aliens considered dangerous to public safety. The Sedition Act had even more far-reaching consequences, in prohibiting “false, scandalous and malicious writing” against the government. Those convicted faced up to $5,000 in fines and prison sentences of up to five years.119

  Madison and Jefferson agreed that the legislation was detestable, for it was aimed at nothing less than crushing the Republican Party. Burr’s once-embattled friend, foreign-born Albert Gallatin, and fellow New Yorker Edward Livingston were the most articulate opponents in Congress, when they took the lead in battling the partisan acts. Meanwhile, still angry over his dismissal, the recent minister to France, James Monroe, predicted that the Federalists’ aggressiveness would backfire on them. In the short term, however, the repressive Alien and Sedition Acts were quite successful, because they shut down Republican presses. The most outspoken critics, those considered provocateurs, were arrested.120

  No one was spared. Thomas Greenleaf’s widow, Ann, who had inherited New York City’s Republican Argus after her husband’s death in 1798, found herself, at Hamilton’s urging, prosecuted and put out of business. Similarly, Margaret Bache, the widow of Benjamin Franklin’s grandson Benjamin Bache, was viciously slandered with crude sexual slurs in the Federalist press, while her husband’s successor, William Duane, was harassed by libel suits, and beaten up by a group of Federalist soldiers. Her Philadelphia newspaper, the Aurora, headed the Adams administration’s enemies list. For aiding Burk, Burr was accused of not only harboring a traitor, but being one himself—since the “seditious foreigner,” his critics claimed, was merely a “mouthpiece” of a larger infestation of conspirators lurking in the United States.121

  Elected politicians were dragged into court and tempers produced ugly personal encounters. In 1798, for some harsh remarks published about President Adams, Congressman Matthew Lyon of Vermont was sent to jail. The Irish-born Republican radical was the perfect target. On the House floor earlier that year, Lyon spat in the face of Connecticut Federalist Roger Griswold after an exchange of insults. Several days later, Griswold armed himself with a cane and beat Lyon twenty times about the head; Lyon famously fended off the attack with fireplace tongs. Imprisoned for four months after his sedition conviction, Lyon still had defenders, prominent among them Burr and Gallatin, both of whom sent Lyon the money he needed to cover his $1,000 fine. Defiantly, the voters rallied to his cause, reelecting Lyon to Congress while he sat in prison.122

  Burr became a voluble opponent of alien laws in his own state. In early 1799, the legislature weighed a constitutional amendment to bar naturalized foreigners from elected offices: the presidency and Congress. Once passed in Massachusetts and several other New England states, it eventually made its way to New York. There, in the assembly, a debate ensued, and as the Albany Register reported, Burr gave a speech “of considerable length, and with peculiar eloquence.”123

  The main thrust of Burr’s argument was this: The amendment was illogical and illiberal because fear of foreign influence had no basis in fact. In that the existing laws made sure that no one could be elected who was not “of approved talents and virtue,” the current system demanded no radical changes. With a sense of the dramatic, Burr proceeded to offer evidence to the contrary: Many foreigners held important posts in the military or sat on the Supreme Court, justifying the “confidence” that the government had already placed in those not of native birth. He asked the members of the assembly if there had yet been “any instance of conspiracy or treason” not instigated by natives. In what must have been a moment of breathless anticipation and indeed supreme irony, given Aaron Burr’s ultimate political fate, the accomplished politician contended: “Was Arnold a foreigner, is not Blount an American?”124

  Arnold, of course, was the traitorous Benedict Arnold, whose name remains infamous to this day. Blount was the Tennessee favorite who had lost his Senate seat only a short time before, because he had dreamt out loud and plotted a land grab in Spanish America, conducting his own foreign policy. Conspiratorial schemes were often enough homegrown.

  Burr’s poignant remarks emphasized a recurrent theme for him since the debate over the Jay Treaty: greater transparency in government. If treason was to occur anywhere, he reasoned, it would be in the military and in the Supreme Court—two powerful institutions whose activities tended to be hidden, and resistant to public oversight. As to the Supreme Court, he noted that it was “completely screened from [congressional] observation.” The elective national legislature, in contrast, carried out its deliberations in the
open, in the public’s view: “every word and action are open to the inspection, censure, or approval” of the people. This was the central tenet of republican governance.125

  The Albany Register heralded Burr’s expressiveness, paraphrasing his language:

  America stood with open arms and presented an assylum [sic] to the oppressed of every nation; we invited them with the promise of enjoying equal rights with ourselves, and presented them with the flattering prospect of presiding in our councils and arriving at honour and trust; shall we deprive these persons of an important right derived from so sacred a source as our constitution[?]126

  To pass the amendment would be to betray the Revolution and the Constitution.

  Revisiting the role he had decisively assumed in the Senate in 1794, Burr again took the position of defending his Swiss-born friend Albert Gallatin. Many Republicans believed that the federal Alien Act had been directed at Gallatin; it was the Federalists’ second attempt to remove him from office, this time from his seat in the House of Representatives. And so, in his speech before the New York Assembly, Burr rebuked his colleagues for their slander of Gallatin, a man who was, he insisted, “most eminently distinguished for virtue and talents.” More philosophically, Burr contended that place of birth was no guarantee of virtuous conduct, for that depended “solely on the character of the person. . . . A man of innate virtue and honour, whether born in Paris or at London, is a man of virtue and honour in every part of the world.” Burr subtly exposed the faulty logic of the Anglophilic/Francophobic party. London and Paris were not as different as the Federalists imagined. England (and its former colonies) were not the only countries that produced virtuous citizens: character could as well be found across the Channel in France.127

  Burr’s activism drew attention both inside and outside New York. Always the watchdog, Troup took careful note of his remarks, concerned about Burr’s contention that the “only instances of corruption we have had are a corruption in our own countrymen.” It was a jab at the party in power. The mouthpiece of the Republican cause, Philadelphia’s Aurora, published Burr’s speech, proving that even though he no longer held national office, Burr could still reach a national constituency. His standing among Republicans was high, as the critical election of 1800 approached.128

  “Twin sons.” Premature newspaper commentary, announcing the success of the presumed Jefferson-Burr ticket

  Chapter Six

  THE STATESMAN AND THE SOLDIER

  I shall conclude by recommending [Burr] as a General far Superior to your Hamiltons, as much so, as a Man is to a Boy & I have but little doubt this State through his means & planning will be as Republican in the appointment of Electors as the State of Virginia.

  —James Nicholson to Albert Gallatin, 1800

  Mr. Jefferson is President. Our opposition was continued till it was demonstrated that Burr could not be brought in and even if he could, he meant to come in as a Democrat.

  —James Bayard to Allen McClane, 1801

  The election of 1800 is arguably the most controversial presidential contest in American history. It played a crucial role in the shaping of political parties. Like the election of 2000, it could not be resolved for weeks after the national vote was taken, and it was marked by invective, charges, and countercharges. Historians and political scientists continue to debate its significance, some emphasizing its revolutionary character, others seeing it as the first peaceful transition of power from a ruling party (Federalist) to the opposition party (Democratic Republican). On one issue, however, there is general agreement: Burr’s maneuvering behind the scenes, his apparent willingness to steal the election from Jefferson, made him the closest thing to a villain in the common narrative of events over the period of November 1800–February 1801.

  Burr has had his defenders. Writing about the charges of intrigue against him, the popular nineteenth-century biographer James Parton remarked that “no accusation made against a politician was ever so slenderly supported by evidence, or refuted by evidence so various, so unequivocal, so lavishly superfluous in quantity.” But the problem goes deeper. Burr serves as a convenient scapegoat, allowing historians to simplify, or explain away, the division, disorder, and mayhem of the election crisis.1

  Unraveling the crisis must begin with Burr’s activities leading up to the controversial election. His prominence in New York—as a member of the state assembly and as a member of the bar—gave him the edge he needed to sustain his national reputation after having lost his Senate seat. How he became Jefferson’s running mate had to do with his ability to effectively maneuver within the fractious political environment of his home state. As with everything in Burr’s career, the partisan battles waged in Washington had their roots in local politics, and this was never more true than in the bitter contest for the presidency waged in 1800–01.

  HE “HAS DONE A GREAT DEAL TOWARD REVOLUTIONIZING THE STATE”

  Burr served two terms in the state assembly leading up to the election of 1800, and it was here that he acquired the influence that made him a leader of the New York Republicans. In January 1798, he arrived in the state capital of Albany, where he resided while the assembly was in session. He was joined there by his daughter, Theodosia, who drolly observed: “Albany is not as much like purgatory as I had expected to find it.” Her father continued to pursue his legal career, while making local politics his life: hobnobbing with colleagues and carefully maneuvering behind the scenes to ensure successful passage of important bills, he steered the course of several crucial debates on the floor, and drafted key pieces of legislation. He became an indispensable power broker.2

  Almost immediately, his Federalist enemies grew alarmed. By the time Burr was voted out of office in 1799, Robert Troup reported that if he had stayed much longer he would have turned the entire state Republican. “By his arts and intrigues,” Troup angrily acknowledged, Burr “has done a great deal toward revolutionizing the state.”3 Still he faced a formidable challenge. In spite of Governor Clinton’s long tenure in office, the legislature remained firmly in Federalist hands. When Burr was elected to the assembly in 1797, John Jay was governor; of New York’s ten congressmen, six were Federalist. At this point, the real political battleground was Burr’s home turf of New York City. Here Federalists held the reins of power over municipal politics. The mayor’s office, Chamber of Commerce, and Common Council were all Federalist-dominated institutions. Not until the year Burr won his seat did Republicans begin to make their presence felt by capturing the city slate for the assembly.4

  The Republicans understood that they were being tested. To reap significant gains in the assembly elections, they had to improve their commercial image. Unlike their southern Republican allies, the New Yorkers had to stop appearing to represent only the yeoman farmer if they were to retain power. This was easier for Burr to do than Governor Clinton, who had risen to power by relying on rural voters. The party was now obliged to reach out to those with decidedly commercial interests, a constituency that had gravitated toward Burr as early as 1792. Former Clintonians Melancton Smith, Marinus Willett, and David Gelston (all New York City merchants and speculators) had been part of Burr’s inner circle since that time.

  But wooing merchants was not enough. To control the assembly, it was just as crucial to secure support from the mechanics (the equivalent of today’s blue-collar workers). To this point, the powerful urban constituency of master craftsmen, who worked in the building, manufacturing, and maritime trades, had overwhelmingly supported the growth-oriented Federalists; so had even the poorer mechanics, journeymen, and petty tradesmen. Master craftsmen and mechanics fell into two categories of voters: the £100 freeholders who could vote for state senators and the governor, and the 40 shilling renters allowed to vote for assemblymen. In 1800, two thirds of Republican voters in the city came from the lower classes, including the lowly cartmen who made their living by hauling goods through the streets. It was this group, the mec
hanics, who tipped the scales in favor of the Republicans in 1800.5

  How did Burr win them over? As a leader of the assembly, he shaped a progressive commercial agenda that promoted internal improvements, a fairer tax system, liberal banking practices, lower municipal taxes, and debtor relief. The philosophy behind this legislation was utilitarian and liberal, aimed at encouraging commercial growth and extending material benefits to ambitious Republicans as well as moderate Federalists, while reducing the tax burden on those in the poorer wards of the city. Burr introduced bills for bridges, roads, waterworks, and fortifications that appealed widely to these groups. He promoted lower and fairer taxes in the assembly in 1799; this gained him support from struggling laborers, especially because municipal taxes at this time were flat taxes by which rich and poor paid the same amount.6

  Robert Swartwout became an important ally of Burr’s during his time in the assembly. He was an ambitious merchant and a relative of Melancton Smith’s, who had moved from Poughkeepsie to New York City. When Smith died during the yellow fever epidemic of 1798, Swartwout took his place as Burr’s right-hand man. He had been elected to the assembly on a ticket with Burr, and shared his commercial interests and larger political vision. Together, in 1799, they secured a charter from the state legislature for the Cayuga Bridge Company, and Swartwout owned much of the stock. When the bridge was completed the following year, the 132-foot-wide structure across one of the Finger Lakes was the longest bridge in the world and considered a modern marvel of engineering. It was not just ingenious but also quite profitable.7