The Pope and Mussolini

by David I. Kertzer

  19. ACS, MI, FP “Gemelli,” informatore n. 390 (=Arrigo Pozzi), “Gli umori del nuovo papa verso padre Gemelli. Una scena pietosa con Pio XI,” Milano, 10 marzo 1939.

  20. In the first weeks of 1939, La Civiltà cattolica also ran an article renewing the charge that the Masons were the great foe of Christian civilization, allied with “cosmopolitan Judaism, which has no allegiance to any country.” Antonio Messineo, “L’internazionalismo cosmopolita e l’essere nazionale,” CC 1939 I, pp. 7–20, cited in Vian 2011, pp. 131–32.

  21. Venini 2004, p. 251. Venini makes no mention of any friction between the pope and Gemelli.

  22. Riccardi 1996, p. 536. Italy had 274 dioceses, each headed by a bishop or archbishop.

  23. Pignatti, informed of this exchange by Pacelli, immediately reported it to Ciano with a request that the two meet to discuss it. ASMAE, AISS, b. 101, fasc. 1, Pignatti a Ciano, 11 gennaio 1939.

  24. Monsignor Montini, knowing how sensitive Mussolini was to reports of papal unhappiness with the Italian government, sent Pignatti a copy of the Vatican newspaper. But Pignatti was not pleased and told him that the subject was not one that should be dealt with humorously. The Vatican should have issued a formal denial instead. ASMAE, APSS, b. 44, fasc. 2, Pignatti a Ciano, 11 gennaio 1939. From January 11 to 14 both Ciano and Mussolini were distracted by a visit to Rome by the British prime minister and foreign minister. DBFP, 1919–39, series 3, vol. 3, n. 500, pp. 517–30, R 431/1/22, “Conversations between British and Italian Ministers, Rome, January 11–14, 1939,” and n. 502, pp. 531–540, R 546/1/22, “The Earl of Perth (Rome) to Viscount Halifax (Received January 23),” January 19, 1939. The two British visitors had a brief audience with the pope on January 13. Chamberlain described the pope as “in fairly good health.” “British Statesmen Confer with Pope,” NYT, January 14, 1939, p. 5.

  25. In the Christmas issue of The New York Times, a front-page headline read, “Pius XI Deplores Fascist Hostility, Reveals Incidents” (December 25, 1938, p. 1). The article is not entirely accurate, as most papers in the United States, France, and Britain were eager to portray the pope as an implacable foe of the racial laws and of the Fascist regime, eliding the distinctions that were actually being made in the pope’s protests.

  26. DDI, series 8, vol. 11, n. 56, Pignatti a Ciano, 14 gennaio 1939.

  27. On the nineteenth, Borgongini asked Buffarini, Mussolini’s undersecretary for internal affairs, how the government planned to mark the tenth anniversary. The Fascist leader snapped, “How should we celebrate given this state of affairs?” But when the nuncio pointed out how much joy the Conciliation had produced among the Italians a decade earlier, and how they were certain to expect a major celebration, Buffarini admitted, “Yes, yes, you’re right, we have to do something.” ASV, ANI, pos. 24, fasc. 14, ff. 174r–177r, Borgongini a Pacelli, 19 gennaio 1939.

  28. These events are recorded in Tardini’s account: ASV, AESS, pos. 576, fasc. 607, ff. 15r–15v, 17r.

  29. Sale 2009, p. 45.

  30. How the original draft, along with the work that Rosa had done on it in the previous several weeks, got back to Ledóchowski, we do not know. Father Rosa may well have told the secret to his successor as journal editor, and in that case he would certainly have gathered up the material immediately to send to Ledóchowski. If not, the Jesuit general, on hearing of Rosa’s death, must have sent word to bring it to him.

  31. Sale 2009, pp. 45–47. Father Sale, who first reported the existence of this correspondence in his 2009 book, defends Ledóchowski and Rosa from the charge of trying to prevent the pope from issuing an encyclical denouncing racism and anti-Semitism. He argues (Sale 2009, p. 47) that their problem with the draft was that LaFarge, being unfamiliar with the peculiar style of papal encyclicals, had not followed the proper form. That this was their main concern is very difficult to believe.

  32. “Un’Omelia dell’E.mo Patriarca di Venezia,” OR, 19 gennaio 1939, p. 2.

  33. ASMAE, AISS, b. 102, “Notizia fiduciaria,” Roma, 19 gennaio 1939.

  34. DDI, series 8, vol. 11, n. 102, Pignatti a Bastianini, 24 gennaio 1939.

  35. ASV, AESS, pos. 576, fasc. 607, ff. 22r–23v, Tardini appunti, 22 gennaio and 1 febbraio 1939.

  36. Ciano 2002, p. 184 (February 1, 1939).

  37. Mussolini communicated this via Pignatti. ASMAE, AISS, b. 101, Pignatti a Ciano, n. 414/133, 3 febbraio 1939. Pacelli’s account of the meeting is found in ASV, AESS, pos. 576, fasc. 607, f. 19r, 3 febbario 1939.

  38. ASV, AESS, pos. 576, fasc. 607, f. 20r, 4 febbraio 1939.

  39. “If, despite your presence in St. Peter’s,” Pignatti advised Ciano, “the pope still gives vent to his ill temper, the Catholic world and all right-thinking people cannot but take note of the correctness of the royal government even if the pope responded rudely.” ASMAE, AISS, b. 101, Pignatti a Ciano, n. 439/144, 4 febbraio 1939.

  40. Bottai 2001, p. 141.

  41. ASV, AESS, pos. 576, fasc. 607, f. 21r, 6 febbario 1939. Charles-Roux provided his reflections on the decision to send Ciano in his February 8 report to Paris. MAEI, vol. 267, 165–66.

  42. Papin 1977, p. 49.

  43. Confalonieri 1957, pp. 385–86.

  44. Tardini recorded the pope’s words. ASV, AESS, pos. 576, fasc. 607, f. 102r.

  45. Ibid.

  46. Fattorini 2007, p. 213.

  47. Venini 2004, p. 254.

  48. Ciano 2002, p. 187 (February 9, 1939).

  49. Camille Cianfarra, “Pope Pius Is Dead at the Age of 81; Cardinals at Bedside in the Vatican,” NYT, February 10, 1939, p. 1. Such secondhand reports of a pope’s last words are, of course, notoriously unreliable.

  50. “Death of the Pope,” The Times (London), February 11, 1939, p. 12.

  51. Chiron (2006, 463–64) describes the pope’s last hours.

  CHAPTER 28: A DARK CLOUD LIFTS

  1. Charles-Roux 1947, pp. 243–44.

  2. Ciano 2002, p. 188 (February 10, 1939). The dramatic timing of the pope’s death, a day before he was to give the speech to all of Italy’s bishops that Mussolini feared might denounce him, has inspired a variety of conspiracy theories. The key figure in such speculation has been Clara Petacci’s father, Francesco, a senior physician in the Vatican health office. For a multitude of reasons, tied not only to Clara but to her brother—he was involved in a number of questionable financial affairs, taking advantage of the family’s links to Mussolini—Francesco was arguably subject to blackmail. Noting that in the pope’s last days his own personal physician, Aminta Milani, was sick and bedridden, proponents of this theory argue that somehow the elder Petacci took advantage of his position to push the ailing pope over into the next life before he could give the much-feared address on the tenth anniversary of the Lateran Accords. In a front-page story in 1972, The Times of London reported that Cardinal Tisserant had told his close colleagues that he believed the pope had been murdered and that he suspected Petacci. As further evidence, it was alleged that Petacci had been placed in charge of preparing the pope’s dead body for the funeral and so could have removed any signs of poisoning. “Support for Theory of 1939 killing of Pope,” Times, June 23, 1972, p. 1. In 2005 the Italian historian Piero Melograni revived the theory. Antonio Carioti, “La morte sospetta di Pio XI. Stava per condannare il Duce,” Corriere della sera, 11 luglio 2005, p. 25. Although the timing of the pope’s death lends itself to suspicion, there is in fact no good evidence to suggest he died of other than natural causes. But the story is so sensational that it keeps reappearing, most recently in Mauro Suttora, “Pio XI fu assassinato dal padre di Claretta?” Corriere della Sera, 17 maggio 2012.

  3. Caviglia 2009, p. 227 (10 febbraio 1939).

  4. Over the previous weeks Pignatti had advised that the regime do nothing to strengthen the hand of the anti-Fascist forces among the cardinals. But even as the pope lay dying, Achille Starace, the PNF head, had demanded that the government lodge a new protest: certain Catholic Action groups were engaging in political activity. The
day after the pope’s death, Pignatti wrote to Starace, telling him he was not eager to bring the matter to the Vatican at that moment. In the absence of a pope, it would have to be referred to the Sacred College of Cardinals, the very men who would be voting on the pope’s successor. Apparently even the super-Fascist Starace appreciated the ambassador’s logic and that evening sent a telegram saying he understood. ASMAE, APSS, b. 42, Pignatti a Starace, 11 febbraio 1939, n. 545; ibid., Pignatti a Ciano, 12 febbraio 1939, n. 553.

  5. Ciano 2002, p. 189 (February 12, 1939).

  6. Petacci 2011, pp. 52–53 (12 febbraio 1939).

  7. ASV, ANI, pos. 1, fasc. 7, ff. 7r–9r, Borgongini a Monsignor Vincenzo Santoro, segretario del Sacro Collegio, 13 febbraio 1939. Santoro replied two days later confirming that no such secret document had been given to the bishops. Ibid., f. 10r, Santoro a Borgongini, 15 febbraio 1939. Pignatti had asked Pacelli about the rumor as well and got the same denial. ASMAE, AISS, b. 101, Pignatti a Ciano, 13 febbraio 1939, n. 557.

  8. Fattorini (2011, pp. 210–15) provides an English version of the full text, having published the original Italian version in Fattorini (2007, pp. 240–44). For her analysis of Pacelli’s decision to conceal the speech, see pp. 187–93 of the English edition. The document is found in ASV, AESS, pos. 576, fasc. 606, ff. 147r–153r.

  9. ASV, AESS, pos. 576, fasc. 607, f. 165r, appunto Tardini, “Materiale preparato da S.S. Pio XI per l’adunanza del 12 febbraio 1939,” 12 gennaio 1941.

  10. ASMAE, AISS, b. 101, Pignatti a Esteri-Gabinetto, 22 febbraio 1939, n. 23.

  11. “Mentioned to Succeed Pius,” BG, February 11, 1939, p. 3. The Los Angeles Times speculation focused on Pacelli and Schuster as the two top contenders for the papacy at the time of Pius XI’s death. “Italian Seen as Successor,” LAT, February 11, 1939, p. 1.

  12. “Nine Leading Candidates,” NYT, February 12, 1939, p. 43. The following day The New York Times (“5 Cardinals Lead in Vatican Contest,” February 13, 1939, p. 1) amplified this theme, arguing that “the chances of the Curia putting forward a successful candidate for the papacy are slight,” and adding, “If by some coincidence the next Pope should happen to be one of their number, Cardinals Massimi and Tedeschini are the most likely.” For its part, The Times of London thought the new pope would most likely be Italian but chosen from those deemed “non-political.” Further, the pope would be chosen not from the Vatican Curia but from among the residential archbishops. “Choosing a Pope,” Times, March 1, 1939, p. 15.

  13. ACS, MCPG, b. 169, Roma, 16 febbraio 1937.

  14. ACS, MCPG, b. 170, Roma, 24 febbraio 1938. On Dalla Costa’s powers to work miracles, see Cardinal Verdier’s comments in Papin 1977, pp. 53–54.

  15. ASV, ANI, pos. 1, fasc. 7, Borgongini a Santoro, 16 febbraio 1939; ibid., f. 15r, Cardinal Belmonte a Borgongini, 18 febbraio 1939.

  16. Fattorini (2007, pp. 221–22) also points this out.

  17. Next in number, though distant, were the six French cardinals. Germany had four; Spain and the United States each had three; no other country had more than a single cardinal, and of these only four came from outside of Europe: a Canadian, an Argentinean, a Brazilian, and a Syrian. Power in the Sacred College was heavily concentrated in Rome: twenty-four of the cardinals lived there, all but one of whom—Eugène Tisserant—were Italian, most with positions in the Curia, at the center of Vatican power. ASMAE, AISS, b. 95, 10 febbraio 1939; Annuario Pontificio 1940, pp. 71–72. Pius XI had created seventy-seven cardinals, fourteen of whom had come from the Vatican diplomatic service, and another twenty from the Curia. Most of the rest had been residential archbishops whose archdioceses typically merited a cardinal as archbishop. Not all of them were alive at the time of the conclave. Agostino (1991, pp. 29–30) writes that twenty-seven were resident in Rome, but I here use the figure (twenty-four) drawn from examining the addresses listed in Annuario 1940.

  18. Monsignor Montini, unhappy about a number of offensive articles in the Nazi press, had been planning to have L’Osservatore romano print a story criticizing them. But when Pignatti complained to Cardinal Pacelli about it, he intervened to prevent publication. That Bergen followed up on Pignatti’s advice can be seen in the telegram he sent to the German foreign minister in Berlin later that day, reporting his conversation and urging that the German press tone down its criticism of the recently deceased pope and any of the cardinals whose goodwill they needed. DGFP, series D, vol. 4, n. 470, Bergen to foreign ministry, February 18, 1939.

  19. One reason for Bergen’s optimism was that since Pius XI’s death, he had noticed a much more sympathetic atmosphere in the Vatican. A number of cardinals had made clear that they hoped they could reach an agreement with the Reich. ASMAE, AISS, b. 95, Pignatti a Ciano, 18 febbraio 1939; also published in DDI, series 8, vol. 11, n. 197. Pignatti’s report to Ciano of this conversation was sent to Mussolini.

  20. ASMAE, AISS, b. 95, Pignatti, 21 febbraio 1939.

  21. Ibid., Pignatti a Ciano, 25 febbraio 1939.

  22. Ibid., Pignatti a Ciano, 26 febbraio 1939. On February 27 Pignatti met with the German ambassador to compare notes. Two of the German cardinals had recently assured Bergen that they would take a “conciliatory attitude” at the conclave. Pacelli, speaking recently to one of the German cardinals, had expressed “unequivocal intentions in favor of conciliation” with both the German and the Italian governments. Pignatti asked again what the Nazi government’s view was of Pacelli’s candidacy. Bergen replied he had informed the German Foreign Office of his strong preference for Pacelli “and did not receive any contrary instructions.” From this he concluded that his government took a favorable view of the former secretary of state. For his part, the Italian ambassador shared his concern about what the Italian cardinals would do at the conclave. He had met with many of them, he said, and they were not terribly fond of Pacelli. ASMAE, AISS, b. 95, Pignatti a Ciano, 27 febbraio 1939.

  23. Baudrillart 1996, pp. 963–65, 968 (20 février, 22 février, 24 février 1939).

  24. This is Verdier’s account of the conversation, in Papin 1977, pp. 56–57.

  25. Two of the cardinals were too ill to make it into the Sistine Chapel, so they cast their ballots from their Vatican bedrooms. On the arrival of the North and South American cardinals, see “Liner to Be Held,” NYT, February 11, 1939, p. 1; Camille Cianfarra, “Vatican Door Shut on 62 Cardinals as Conclave Opens to Elect Pope,” NYT, March 2, 1939, p. 1.

  26. Ventresca 2013, p. 136.

  27. A number of people close to the pope have testified that Pius XI had wanted Pacelli to succeed him. Among them was Pacelli himself, who shortly after his election confided in Cardinal Verdier: “Twice Pius XI had told me, ‘You will be my successor.’ I thought I should protest, but the Holy Father added drily, ‘We know what we are saying.’ ” The new pope went on to tell Verdier that he believed Pius XI had sent him on his missions abroad in order to improve his chances of election. Papin 1977, p. 62.

  28. Baudrillart 1996, pp. 973–76 (1 mars, 2 mars 1939); NARA, M1423, reel 2, Phillips to U.S. secretary of state, report n. 1316, March 3, 1939.

  29. DDI, series 8, vol. 11, n. 240, Pignatti a Ciano, 2 marzo 1939.

  30. Ciano 2002, pp. 195–96 (March 2 and 3, 1939); Tranfaglia 2005, p. 159.

  31. Pius XII also reminded Bergen of remarks he had made the previous year at a Eucharistic Congress in Budapest: “It is not the business of the Church,” Pacelli had said (in German), “to take sides in purely temporal affairs and in the accommodations between the different systems and methods which may arise for overcoming the urgent problems of the present.” DGFP, series D, vol. 4, n. 472, Bergen to foreign ministry, March 5, 1939.

  32. DGFP, series D, vol. 4, n. 473, Bergen to foreign ministry, March 8, 1939.

  33. Morgan 1944, pp. 159–60.

  34. ACS, MI, PS, Polizia Politica, b. 210, informatore n. 52, Roma, 15 agosto 1938. In a report six months later, informant n. 571 added another charge: “As for Vatican circles, the best known pederasts
would be Cardinals Pizzardo and Caccia Dominioni. Pizzardo is said to have intimate relations with male youths from Trastevere.” ACS, MI, FP, FP “Pizzardo,” 20 febbraio 1939. As this is the only informant (of whom I am aware) who made this charge against Cardinal Pizzardo, it must be regarded as unproven.

  35. NARA, M1423, reel 2, Joseph Kennedy, London, to U.S. secretary of state [Cordell Hull], March 17, 1939. William Phillips, the U.S. ambassador to Italy, recalled in his memoirs that each winter he gave a large dinner dance in honor of Ciano and his wife, Edda Mussolini. Despite the presence of the top foreign diplomats in Rome, recalled Phillips (1952, p. 218), Ciano devoted all his attention to the young attractive women who had been invited, “paying little or no attention to ambassadors and their wives or to the distinguished Italians present.”

  36. “Of all the ‘facts’ that took place in these fatal years,” wrote Dino Grandi (1985, p. 459), “this was the most crucial one.”

  37. Ciano 2002, pp. 203–4 (March18, 1939); Chenaux 2005, p. 273; De Cesaris 2010, pp. 251–53; Casella 2010, p. 290. The following month, reporting the new pope’s decision to remove Pizzardo from the position and to create the commission of archbishops, Charles-Roux observed that the impression in Rome was that the pope had made the move to put himself “in the good graces of the Fascist regime.” MAEI, vol. 267, 172–73, Charles-Roux à Bonnet, 13 avril 1939. The reports of the bishops on relations between Fascist authorities and local Catholic Action groups are found in ASV, AESS, pos. 576, fasc. 607, ff. 179r–190v.

  CHAPTER 29: HEADING TOWARD DISASTER

  1. Emmanuel Mounier, quoted in Ventresca 2013, p. 149.

  2. ASMAE, APSS, b. 42, Pignatti a Ciano, 21 aprile 1939.

  3. Morgan 1941, pp. 241–42; Chadwick 1986, p. 56.

  4. Fattorini 2007, p. ix.

  5. ASMAE, APSS, b. 43, Ministero degli Affari Esteri a Pignatti, 26 aprile 1939. At the same time Ciano’s office received a report from the Italian consulate in Munich, telling of the dramatic change in the local press attitude toward the new pope. Previously, the consul reported, the German press had been suspicious of Pacelli, thought to be too close to the old leadership of the Center Party from his days in Munich and Berlin, and nostalgic for the days when the Church was the dominant political influence in Bavaria. But now, in light of his first actions as pope, he was being presented in a positive light. ASMAE, APSS, b. 43, “Atteggiamento nazionalsocialista nei confronti del nuovo Pontefice,” Munich, 27 aprile 1939.