Sniper in Action

by Charles Stronge

  BILLY SING AND ABDUL THE TERRIBLE

  William Edward Sing (1886–1943), who was of mixed Chinese and English descent, joined the Australian 5th Light Horse Regiment and served in the Gallipoli Campaign of 1915–16. Between May and September 1915, Sing was credited with at least 150 Turkish casualties, for which he was awarded the British Distinguished Conduct Medal (DCM). Sing usually worked with a spotter, one of whom was Ion Idriess, who later became a well-known author.

  Billy Sing’s routine was to take up position with his observer before dawn. This was a time when the enemy would be least likely to detect any movement. Having moved inconspicuously into position, Sing and his observer would lie in wait. The challenge for the sniper is to be both motionless and alert and to maintain a monastic discipline with regard to food and water. Eventually, the target would fleetingly appear and Sing’s finger would be ready to squeeze the trigger.

  As the casualties mounted, the Turks came to the conclusion that the only way to deal with the Australian sniper was to pit an equally effective sniper against him. Cue “Abdul the Terrible,” a German-trained Turkish sniper with a fearsome reputation. Being the expert that he was, Abdul went about his preparation with the forensic skill of a top detective. Each time a Turkish soldier was shot, Abdul would carefully analyze the corpse to work out the likely direction of the shot through following the angle of the entry and exit wounds. Gradually, Abdul narrowed down the area in the enemy front line from which the shot had come. Eventually, Abdul got a fix on a small rise near Chatham‘s Post. Having found his adversary‘s lair, Abdul set about building his own position and lying long hours in wait for his opportunity. He was too wise to shoot at other soldiers who occasionally presented themselves as targets, lest he should give away his position.

  Billy Sing was the most famous and effective Australian sniper in the Gallipoli campaign. His reputation was such that the Turks deployed a super-sniper to neutralize him.

  As Sing and his observer set about their daily observation routine one morning, the observer spotted Abdul with a powerful naval telescope. Sing looked down the telescope and found himself looking directly into the face and down the rifle barrel of Abdul the Terrible. What happened next was a matter of life and death for both snipers. Snipers know that the first shot must count – you do not normally get a second chance. That, however, is for a target that is unaware of the sniper‘s presence. In this case, both snipers would be aware of each other‘s presence and both would be almost staring down each other‘s rifle barrels. As Sing pushed back the loophole and pushed his rifle through, ready for firing, he knew that he would have to get it right the first time or be a dead man. Abdul noticed the movement and took aim. As Abdul squeezed the trigger a bullet from a Lee-Enfield traveled over the barrel of his rifle and hit him between the eyes.

  Having failed to neutralize Sing, the Turks next tried to get him by plastering his post with artillery shells, and he again had a narrow escape.

  It so happened that Australian and New Zealand infantry were training in Egypt prior to being sent to the Western Front. The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) was formed and re-routed to Gallipoli. Once the ANZAC, British and French troops had landed, operations in the Gallipoli peninsula, despite a series of battles, often settled down into static trench warfare. Here the snipers on both sides kept careful watch for movements in enemy trenches and exacted a steady toll on anyone who was unwise enough to show their head above the parapet.

  SNIPING AT THE END OF THE WAR

  Richard Travis VC, DCM, MM, Croix de Guerre, served in the New Zealand Expeditionary Force in World War I, as part of the 2nd Battalion Otago Regiment. When the regiment was posted to Flanders, Travis organized the sniping and observation section and went out on night patrols in No Man’s Land.

  By the time the British had caught up with the Germans and established regular training for snipers, the two sides had roughly an equal number of snipers pitted against each other along the various fronts. About ten British snipers might be facing about ten German snipers and there would probably be one sniper and one observer for every twenty or so yards of the front line. Taking into account the observers, scouts and other specialists to back up the snipers, this meant that, despite its characteristically solitary nature, sniping was in fact carried out in considerable density. It also showed why the smallest mistake by someone in the trenches could be immediately and ruthlessly punished.

  By the end of World War I, therefore, the sniper had established himself as a force to be reckoned with. He had graduated from a co-opted gamekeeper with a borrowed rifle to a highly trained specialist for whom gunmakers and others would design evermore sophisticated weapons and sighting equipment. The sniper had truly arrived.

  A Soviet sniper awaits his chance on the Kalinin Front in the winter of 1942. He is armed with a Tokarev SVT40 semi-automatic rifle with a 3.5 PV telescopic sight. The SVT40 was an effective rifle in the right hands, though it required greater maintenance than the Mosin-Nagant.

  THE MARKSMAN AND MANEUVER WARFARE

  Although the sniper had truly made his mark in World War I, in the intervening period until World War II sniper training waned in the German Army, such as it was under the constraints of the Treaty of Versailles, and did not receive much attention in the armies of other countries either. The exception that proved the rule was the Soviet Union. Arguably, however, it was the British who reminded the Germans of the effectiveness of a method of warfare that the Germans themselves had played such an important part in establishing during World War I.

  It seems somehow appropriate that snipers came to the fore in World War II when the British Army was in danger of being wiped out altogether as it retreated to Dunkirk in May 1940. Once the British Army was safely back in Britain, the British set up a sniper school at Bisley–The Small Arms School, Sniping Wing–and also ones in Wales and Scotland. The purpose of the school was not merely to teach good shooting but also all the skills concomitant with sniping, including fieldcraft, stalking and camouflage.

  Sniping was proving to be a particularly useful tool for an army in retreat for slowing down a pursuing army. The Soviets would learn this lesson quickly during the German advance into their homeland in Operation “Barbarossa.” So important was sniping in the Soviet Army that both men and women were trained for the task.

  THE WINTER WAR, 1939–40

  In the Winter War against Finland, the Soviet Army discovered to its cost how effective sniping could be in holding down large bodies of infantry. They would put this lesson into practice when it was their turn to face an invading army–the Germans.

  The Soviet Army invaded Finland on November 30, 1939. The pretext for the invasion was that the Soviet Union wanted to take over part of the Karelian Isthmus to protect Leningrad, to establish a naval base at Hanko and also to take over some strategically important islands in the Gulf of Finland. Not unnaturally, the Finns refused.

  It should have been a walkover for the Red Army. The Soviet Union had an estimated nineteen rifle (infantry) divisions and five tank brigades. The Finns, under the command of Marshal Karl Gustav Mannerheim, had only nine divisions. Approximately a hundred and twenty thousand Finnish troops faced four hundred and twenty thousand Soviet troops supported by 800 aircraft. The Finns, however, had a major ally–their knowledge of their own landscape. Well-placed snipers drawn from men who knew the country well wrought havoc among the Soviets and forced them to withdraw. In the first offensive the Soviets lost 27,500 dead against 2700 Finnish casualties. The Soviets returned in February 1940 with forces of overwhelming superiority, estimated at over three to one across the board, and, despite losing many more casualties, with sheer weight of numbers and firepower they eventually prevailed, and the Finns capitulated on March 12.

  SIMO HÄYHÄ (1905–2002)

  During the Winter War, the Finns distinguished themselves by their extraordinary fieldcraft and fighting skills against overwhelming odds. Finnish marksman Simo Häyhä
was one of the best-known snipers of World War II because of his extraordinary record during the Winter War. He is reputed to have killed more than 700 enemy soldiers in less than four months–a feat not matched elsewhere in the history of sniping. Remarkably, Häyhä’s record was achieved at a time of year when daylight was limited to just a few hours a day.

  “White Death”

  Nicknamed “Belaya Smert” (White Death) by the Soviet Army, Simo Häyhä was born in the town of Rautjarn in either 1905 or 1906. He joined the Finnish Army in 1925 and rose to the rank of corporal in a bicycle unit. After a year, he moved to the Civil Guard reserve where he remained until the outbreak of war in late 1939. Häyhä, whose abilities as a marksman had already been recognized, was assigned to Jaeger Regiment 34, which was deployed on the Kollaa River. In this sector Häyhä certainly had no shortage of targets, for the Soviets outnumbered the Finns by a hundred to one!

  It was no surprise that before the war Häyhä had been a farmer and hunter with a reputation for marksmanship. He was a master of camouflage and concealment, in snowy conditions dressing in a white camouflage overall and took special care not to give away his presence.

  A Finnish sniper works the bolt of his Mosin-Nagant M28 sniper rifle. Finnish snipers such as Simo Häyhä made full use of their hunting experience in their work as snipers.

  He would operate in temperatures ranging between -20 and -40 degrees Celsius (-4 to -40 °F) and used techniques such as putting snow in his mouth to prevent his breath condensing in the cold air and giving his position away. To add insult to injury, Häyhä used a Finnish adaptation of a Russian rifle, the Mosin-Nagant M28. This rugged 7.62mm (0.3in) caliber rifle was designed for general infantry use but it was also adopted by snipers, both in Finland and later in the Soviet Union. In order to keep as low as possible against the ground Häyhä preferred to use open iron sights on his rifle as opposed to a telescopic sight. This testifies to his remarkable shooting skills, achieved without the advantage of telescopic magnification.

  Hit and run at the Battle of Kollaa

  The Battle of Kollaa was fought along the Kollaa River between December 7, 1939 and March 13, 1940. The invading Soviet troops had to contend with extensive man-made fortifications on the Mannerheim Line as well as thick forests and lakes. The Finnish winter brought thick carpets of snow, making movement even more difficult. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Soviets chose, where possible, to move by road. This, however, made them vulnerable to ambush tactics. The Finns developed a special tactic known as “Motti” by which they cut the Soviet forces on the narrow roads through the forests and isolated them in manageable chunks. The Soviet columns gradually became strung out as some vehicles failed to keep up with others or when obstacles in the road slowed them down.

  Once the trapped Soviet units were considered to be weakened enough, the Finns would carry out lightning raids on skis, with sub-machine guns and grenades. If the Soviets tried to escape, snipers such as Häyhä would cut them down. Häyhä was also adept in the use of the sub-machine gun if the situation warranted. Large numbers of Soviet soldiers floundering in the snow would have been dealt with more quickly with the use of a sub-machine gun. The conditions of the Winter War and the tactics employed by both the Soviets and Finns were ideal for a sniper such as Häyhä.

  Soviet troops man their trenches during the Winter War, January 1940. Ordinary Red Army soldiers were little match for expert marksmen like Simo Häyhä. Soviet casualties during the short campaign numbered more than 250,000 killed or wounded.

  Hunter is the hunted

  Häyhä possessed all the skills of the good sniper: superb natural marksmanship backed by hours of practice; the hunter’s instinct for use of ground and camouflage and the patience and endurance to remain concealed for long periods in extreme temperatures. These skills enabled him to achieve 505 confirmed kills with a sniper rifle. Häyhä was also handy with the Suomi KP/-31 sub-machine gun and his score rises to over 700 if his use of this weapon is also taken into account. Like any good Special Forces soldier, Häyhä was a one-man army.

  On one occasion Simo Häyhä set out to track down a particular sniper from the Soviet 56th Infantry Division. This man had been responsible for killing a number of Finnish soldiers, including three officers. On this particular day, the Russian sniper had claimed yet another Finnish victim but unfortunately for him he now had one of the most skillful snipers in the world on his trail.

  An experienced hunter, Simo Häyhä was a patient man. He had to wait a long time for his opportunity but he was well equipped with a warm winter uniform, mittens and enough food and sugar to keep up his energy levels. He also had a knife and some hand grenades for emergencies.

  The Soviet sniper had been in action for many days and, as the sun set, with no further targets in prospect, he rose slightly from his prone position. Little did he know that Häyhä was scanning the snowy landscape. As he caught the glint of the Russian’s telescopic sight, he fired and the bullet crashed through the forest and found its target.

  A rare photograph of Simo Häyhä armed with his cherished Mosin-Nagant M28 rifle. Häyhä was just 1.6 meters (5ft 3in) tall, and preferred the slightly more compact M28 model because it was less cumbersome for his small physique.

  Wounded

  Not surprisingly, the Soviets did their best to get rid of Häyhä. They tried artillery strikes and counter-sniper operations involving teams of Soviet snipers. Eventually a Soviet sniper did manage to get a bead on him: he was shot in the face on March 6, 1941. He spent the next nine days in a coma. By the time Häyhä had regained conciousness, peace had been declared. Although his jaw was crushed and his left cheek blown away, Häyhä recovered and was promoted from a lowly corporal to a second lieutenant. He went on to live as a hunter and national hero until the age of ninety-six.

  OPERATION “BARBAROSSA”

  On June 22, 1941, Germany and its Axis allies began the largest offensive in military history. The German General Franz Ritter von Halder observed with some satisfaction in his diary that not only had the Soviets been caught by surprise but their defending forces were too widely dispersed along the 2900km (1800-mile) front. “The enemy has been taken unawares by our attack. His forces were not tactically in position for defense.” General Heinz Guderian, mastermind of the Blitzkrieg that had taken Europe by storm, commented: “Detailed study of the behaviour of the Russians convinced me that they knew nothing of our intentions.”

  Although things would now go well for the Germans in high summer as they made huge inroads into Soviet territory, they would have done well to take note of the significant timing of their invasion. It was only two days away from the anniversary of Napoleon’s invasion of Russia on June 24, 1812. Then, as now, never had so large an army been assembled for an invasion. Then, as now, the opposition seemed to crumble before the swift and glorious advance.

  Although the Soviets had been taken by surprise, their resistance was both stubborn and skillfull. General Guderian commented, “the enemy continued, as always, to resist stubbornly. His battle technique, particularly his camouflage, was excellent.”

  Another German commentator wrote: “The Russians again proved their mastery in forest fighting. With sure instinct they moved among the impenetrable undergrowth. Their positions, not on the forest edge but deep inside, were superbly camouflaged. Their dugouts and foxholes were established with diabolical cunning, providing field of fire only to the rear. From the front and from above they were invisible. The German infantryman passed them unsuspecting, and were picked off from behind.” If there was ever a testament to the advances made by the Red Army in formal sniper training and practice, this was it.

  When the German 465th Infantry Regiment attacked a densely wooded area in September 1941, they suffered casualties of seventy-five dead and twenty-five missing due to the skilled work of Red Army “tree snipers” who carefully selected their targets before moving back to a new firing position.

  Specialist snipers />
  In the Soviet forces, the distinction between snipers and more general sharpshooters was sometimes blurred but their policy of training up to six million soldiers because the Voroshilov Sharpshooter Badge bore fruit for, whether they were sharpshooters or snipers, their tactics were extremely effective. The adaptability of the Soviet snipers and sharpshooters in many ways represented the adaptability of the Soviet forces as a whole to the invasion. It was this ability to take body blows and yet still survive and come back for more that drew the German forces inexorably into the grasp of another ally that had helped to defeat Napoleon–the Russian winter. From October 20, the good weather gave way to rain and the German advance was held up by a sea of mud.

  The Germans might have taken heart when the mud froze but the weather was far colder than they had ever imagined and the Germans did not have enough warm clothing. Not only did the Germans have to cope with the effects of the Russian winter on their own bodies, it also seriously affected their telescopic sights. When taken from the relative warmth of their quarters to the sub-zero temperatures prevailing outside, the lenses would almost invariably cloud and become opaque.

  On top of this, lubricants such as grease for the precise working parts would become glutinous and the adjustment mechanisms would seize. Although the Germans tried a number of methods to overcome these challenges, it made their task against the highly skilled Soviet snipers even more difficult. By December the pendulum had swung. Soviet forces, well clothed in fur-lined and quilted uniforms, started to counter-attack.

  A German sniper of the SS Totenkopf division on the Eastern Front fires from a standing supported position. He is armed with a Mauser Karabiner 98K with a Zeiss ZF42 telescopic sight. The sight is mounted high to allow movement of the bolt. The Karabiner 98k rifle had an effective range up to 800 meters (875 yards) when used by a skilled sniper.