Sniper in Action

by Charles Stronge

  Apart from the sniper rifles and their personal weapons, if things got really nasty and they were assaulted by a large body of insurgents, the snipers kept an L7 General Purpose Machine Gun as a standby. The “Gimpy,” as it had been called by British soldiers since the 1960s, could put down 750 rounds of 7.62mm (0.3in) a minute, making any assailant wish he had planned something else for the day.

  However, the snipers were not always in static positions. Sometimes they were called out to rescue soldiers on patrol who were trapped by enemy gunfire. On one occasion, members of a mortar platoon were trapped at a road junction, with a wounded man and no escape options due to the weight of fire. There were probably only two available options in this scenario: for a Warrior armored vehicle to come to the rescue; or for a sniper team to take out the gunmen.

  As it happened, it turned out to be a mixture of both. British snipers were immediately deployed to a rooftop from where they could scan the area where the insurgents were firing from. The observer and the sniper scanned the area, using all their training and experience to try to discern where an enemy sniper might hide and trying to suppress the urge to rush caused by the urgency of the appeals of the men who were trapped and wounded. At last they spotted the position of an AK47. The only problem was that the range was over 800m (875 yards). The sniper adjusted his sights for range and left the windage adjustment as there was barely a breeze. Then he went through the calming breathing routine and slowly squeezed the trigger. The round sped to its unseen target and the AK47 fell silent. The trapped soldiers took advantage of the break in the firing and fired back before Warriors arrived to rescue them.

  IMPROVED BRITISH SNIPER TRAINING

  The requirement for snipers in both Afghanistan and Iraq was growing exponentially and the British decided to step up their sniper program. Regiments such as the Irish Guards and Black Watch arrived in Iraq with their own sniper units and they were soon extremely busy.

  Having been regarded as something of an optional extra in previous conflicts of the twentieth century, snipers found themselves overbooked. In view of this, the British extended sniper training in order to bring regular army snipers closer to the levels of excellence of Special Forces snipers. Part of the training would incorporate the L115A1 rifle, which up to 2007 had been restricted to Special Forces use. The course also marked the doubling of snipers in the British Army, totalling around three hundred. Protracted warfare in Afghanistan and Iraq had revealed that the sniping rifle was often the ideal weapon to counter insurgents who often protected themselves by mixing among the civilian population, thus creating a situation where attacking them by conventional means would risk serious collateral damage. The presence of a devastatingly powerful sniper rifle such as an L115A1 or a 12.7mm (0.5in) Barrett acted as a powerful deterrent because the insurgents never knew where the bullet might come from. The course set up in the Brecon Beacons in Wales echoed the course set up by Hesketh-Prichard in World War I as it taught snipers not only how to shoot but to infiltrate into enemy territory without being detected and to exfiltrate successfully when the job was done.

  A British soldier fires the new L115A3 Accuracy International .338 Lapua sniper rifle in Warminster, England. The rifle was brought in as part of the Sniper System Improvement Program in 2008 and replaced the previous L96 sniper rifle. The rifle has a 5–25 x 56 Schmidt & Bender sight and spotting scope. It is fitted with a noise and flash suppressor and has a folding stock and bipod.

  A sniper from 51st Squadron RAF Regiment aims an Accuracy International L96 sniper rifle from the top of a Land Rover in southern Iraq, 2003.

  Operation “Phantom Fury”

  The city of Fallujah became a bête noir for occupying forces in Iraq after an incident involving 82nd Airborne Division on April 2003 when a crowd protested against the occupation of a primary school by the U.S. troops. After shots were fired, the situation went downhill. By March 2004, after much fighting with insurgents, American forces had withdrawn from the city. On April 1, the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force was ordered to conduct a major operation against Fallujah, an order they apparently did not welcome as they did not want to get bogged down in a protracted city battle, preferring to conduct pinpoint raids against insurgents where appropriate. U.S. forces laid siege to the city, cutting off transport links, and many residents of the city left. As the Marines moved in, their scout/snipers formed an essential element of their armory and they began to take a heavy toll on the insurgents.

  In November 2004, the U.S. forces returned to Fallujah, with additional backup from the British Black Watch regiment. In both battles, Fallujah proved to be a haven for snipers on both sides. Sergeant John Crane, a scout/sniper of the U.S. Marines, quickly notched up a kill score of eleven insurgents. In Fallujah it was either kill or be killed and snipers on both sides struggled to gain the best vantage points high up in buildings or on flat roofs in order to pin down their adversaries. Crane led a squad of Marine snipers who were located in the north of the city. Watching by day and by night, using heat-sensitive binoculars, they made it perilous for anyone to venture out of doors.

  On one occasion, the Marines spotted an insurgent sniper armed with a Dragunov SVD sniper rifle. Although the insurgent was in full view and looking for targets, he was also unaware that he was in the sights of a U.S. Marine sniper. It was to be his lucky day, however, for a slight misalignment in the Marine’s sight settings meant that the bullet missed.

  A U.S. Marine Corps sniper uses the telescopic sight on his M40A1 sniper rifle to observe a cement factory near Bahkit, Iraq on July 3, 2008, for possible insurgent activity.

  For the Marines, it was a bit uncomfortable as well. They were limited in their movements by standing orders and snipers instinctively do not like returning to the same place too often as the enemy will know where to find them and know to keep out of the way. The U.S. Marines scout/snipers did their best to make less obvious shooting positions, by making holes through buildings and concealing themselves in the backs of rooms. Iraqi gunmen on their way to “work,” therefore, had a tough job trying to survive. Sometimes they would hide behind civilians and sometimes make super-fast dashes or rolls across open ground so that a sniper would not have time to fire.

  One of the Marine snipers in the Fallujah battle was Corporal Paul W. Leicht. Located on a rooftop across the Euphrates River, Leicht watched carefully through the scope of his M40A3 sniper rifle for targets of opportunity. As part of Company B, 1st Battalion, 23rd Marine Regiment, Leicht was briefed to take out insurgents as U.S. forces had their second stab at Fallujah.

  A group of Iraqi insurgents started firing mortar rounds at the Marines and Leicht took them up in his sight. This was routine so far. This was the enemy and they were definitely in an offensive mode. They were, however, over 914m (1000 yards) from Leicht’s position. Nevertheless, Leicht carefully squeezed the trigger and one insurgent went down. Then he fired again and dropped another.

  The Marines were demonstrating once again that the sniper is one of the essential tools of the modern battlefield. Sergeant Herbert B. Hancock, the chief scout/sniper, was confident about the ability of snipers to deal with insurgents. Hancock took a team and found a position from where they could reach the insurgents. Before that, they needed some fireworks to keep the insurgents entertained while they moved into position. So they called in suppressive fire. As this demonstrates, Marine scout/snipers were not just useful for sniping. Their skill set also included forward observation and the ability to decide on the best tactical options. With their ever-watchful gaze, snipers could begin to piece together what was going on in the battlefield in a way that was not possible for regular soldiers who were constantly on the move. Hancock’s sniper team noted, for example, that certain vehicles appeared at about the same time that mortars were fired at the Marine positions. Someone giving a passing glance at these civilian vehicles would not have noticed anything strange about them. Hancock and his team, however, worked out that they were spotters for the mort
ars and, as such, they were a legitimate target. After this incident, Hancock and his team took out a mortar position not just with sniper rifles but with friendly mortars, playing the dual role of sniper and observer.

  The Marines in Fallujah were high-scoring against a determined enemy. The level of the battle can be gauged by the performance of Sergeant John Ethan Place who had thirty-two confirmed kills in a period of thirteen days. He was awarded the Silver Star.

  A U.S. Marine Corps sniper of 1st Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment aims a M16A2 rifle with M203 grenade launcher through a hole during a Security and Stabilization Operation (SAS) as part of Operation “Al Fajr” in Fallujah, Iraq. He is using his helmet to support the weapon.

  A sniper of the Mahdi army of the radical Iraqi Shiite leader Moqtada al-Sadr in Najaf old town on August 19, 2004. Apart from his Dragunov SVD sniper rifle, the sniper has minimal equipment, merely a pouch presumably used to store ammunition. His head scarf would make him very conspicuous.

  TIMOTHY L. KELLNER

  Timothy L. Kellner is a U.S. Army sniper who has been credited with 139 confirmed kills. He is also thought to have achieved a much larger number of unconfirmed kills, some sources crediting with him more than 300.

  Like so many naturally gifted snipers, Kellner was a keen hunter as a young man, before joining the U.S. Army in 1996. His hunting background gave him a special advantage in fieldcraft and he was an expert in covert movement and concealment.

  Kellner favored the M24 Sniper Weapon System, which was the military version of the Remington 700 rifle. This had an effective range of about 800 meters (875 yards).

  Although Iraq’s open deserts may seem like an ideal arena for long-range shooting, most of the sniping in Iraq tends to be at relatively short ranges and in urban areas. This environment poses different challenges for the sniper, though the basic principles still apply. Stealth, concealment and patience are always required, as well as excellent marksmanship.

  Using the same weapon as used by Timothy L. Kellner, the M24 sniper rifle, A U.S. Army sniper of the 25th Infantry Division scans the rooftops in Baghdad Province, Iraq, during a joint cordon and search mission with 6th Iraqi National Police.

  Cities have relatively few long fields of fire, and there is plenty of cover for hostiles to disappear behind. There is also the civilian population to consider, both as potential collateral damage and as what amounts to camouflage for the enemy. Iraqi gunmen rarely dress very differently to the civilian population, posing a problem in terms of spotting and confirming a legitimate target.

  A U.S. Marine sniper with the 6th Marine Regiment armed with a Barrett M82A1 anti-materiel rifle provides security somewhere in Iraq, 2010.

  Urban sniping

  The same skills used to detect a camouflaged machine-gun post or likely route for enemy patrols are used by Kellner and his colleagues in the urban environment. Observation of the habits of noncombatant populace allows snipers to pick out anyone who seems to be out of place. By watching good ambush points or routes to and from them, a skilled marksman can identify insurgents as they move into position or retire after an attack.

  “Every shot has to be measured against the Rules of Engagement [ROE], positive identification and proportionality.”

  United States Army Staff Sergeant Jim Gilliland

  The sniper who thinks he has spotted a legitimate target must decide quickly whether or not to shoot. Opportunities are often fleeting and there is always the possibility that an over-penetrating round or a ricochet–or perhaps a missed shot–might hit a non-combatant.

  There is also the problem of confirmation; it is not always possible to check a body or even to find it. Thus many of Kellner’s kills are listed as probable but unconfirmed. However, it is the impact an effective sniper has on the enemy that matters. In terms of restricting enemy movements and diminishing morale, Kellner’s contribution to the war in Iraq is far greater than a kill-count, no matter how high, can possibly indicate.

  Unfortunately, even Kellner’s exceptional abilities did not make him proof to the random effects of IEDs and in 2003 he was critically wounded by an explosion. He returned home to a hero’s welcome and, after recovering, continued to work with the sniper community.

  Urban sniping

  In December 2003 in Samarra, Sergeant Randall Davis of B Company, 5th Battalion, 20th Infantry Regiment peered through the sight of his M14 rifle at sunset and saw an Iraqi insurgent sniper silhouetted against the light. The insurgent was in the process of maneuvering himself into a position whereby he could take aim at Davis’s colleagues in a courtyard below. He would certainly have been successful had he not been in the sights of an M14 with a trained U.S. Army sniper behind it. By taking out the Iraqi insurgent, Davis certainly saved the lives of some of his fellow soldiers and he was also a testimony to the value of sniper training, such as at Fort Benning, United States, where they were specializing in urban sniper training. Sergeant Davis had been credited with eight kills in about two weeks.

  Urban sniping presented all sorts of challenges, not least the fact that insurgents were prepared to use civilians for protection when they were out in the streets. The members of Fox company, Battalion Landing Team, 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines, 24th Expeditionary Force were faced with just such a challenge on one occasion when they received an order to recover the body of one of their fellow soldiers who had been killed in an ambush. Unfortunately, the Iraqi insurgents wanted to stop them, so the sniper team got themselves into position to provide essential backup. Then they spotted an insurgent holding an AK47 in one hand and with his other hand on the shoulder of a child. The Marine scout/sniper deliberately aimed away from the insurgent and child, sending a round smashing into the building a few feet away. This created enough of a distraction for the child to take the opportunity to run away. The insurgent made the mistake of coming out to inspect the damage from the shot as the second Marine scout/sniper had him in his sights.

  U.S. Army Specialist Chantah Bun (foreground) looks through the AN/PVS-10 Day and Night Vision sniper scope of his tripod-mounted M40A1 sniper rifle. He is supported by another sniper armed with an M21 sniper rifle. Both are Bravo Company Snipers, 1st Battalion, 24th Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade, 25th Infantry Division, Stryker Brigade Combat Team. They are guarding an Iraqi police station in Mosul, Iraq.

  This 2005 photograph shows U.S. Army soldiers escorting a sniper team to a hidden location near the Euphrates River, Iskandariyah, Iraq, in an operation to stop the placing of improvised explosive devices along a nearby road.

  On another occasion, in Baghdad, two U.S. Army snipers were tasked with the mission of taking out an insurgent machine-gun position that had been causing persistent problems for troops in a compound. As ever, the challenge for the sniper is to get into the optimum position with clear lines of sight so that they can see without being seen. On this occasion, the two army snipers worked their way to the top of a building and set up their equipment on a flat roof. It was night time so they used their night-vision equipment to scan the scene. Unfortunately for them, on this night there was a celebration going on in the streets, with people firing guns in the air. It was therefore difficult to pick out the noise of the enemy machine-gun position in the confusion. Patience is one of the essential pieces of equipment that the sniper carries with him and as the two army snipers waited and prepared their weapons, the commotion gradually died down leaving only the stillness of the night. Then one sound began to penetrate the relative silence–the juddering fire of a 12.7mm (0.5in) machine gun.

  The army snipers pinpointed the position of the gun and discerned that it was manned by four men. They were 731m (800 yards) away so it would require fast and accurate shooting to get all of them. They made the final preparations with their M24 rifles and fired almost simultaneously, bringing down two insurgents. The other two tried to get away but it was too late. The two rifles fired again in unison and the other two insurgents also fell. The snipers then withdrew from their position before a
ny insurgents had a chance to pinpoint them.

  “JUBA”

  In 2005 in Baghdad a singular phenomenon arose among the usual exchange of sniping and sharpshooting. The Army 1-64 Battalion lost two men to a particular sniper in February and six more were wounded.

  The shots seemed to follow a pattern. Other regiments may also have suffered from the same sniper. In June 2005 four U.S. Marine scout/snipers were shot in the head. Known as “Juba,” this sniper’s trademark was to target coalition forces and to have an uncanny ability to get around body armor. Another “Juba” trademark was that he did not fire a second shot and therefore it was extremely difficult to pinpoint where he was firing from.

  Whether “Juba” was in fact a single individual or whether he represented a particularly effective team of Iraqi insurgent snipers is unknown. What is clear is that the name had a psychologically negative effect on American troops in theater who whenever they went out on patrol felt the eyes of “Juba” upon them. The Internet provided a useful means of extending the “Juba” myth, with videos being circulated of American soldiers being shot and victorious insurgents returning to base. The fact that no positive identification of the super-sniper was provided rather suggests that “Juba” may have been a particularly effective sniper in the area at the time, or that he worked as part of an effective team. Whatever the truth behind the legend, eventually American forces shrugged off the “Juba” scare and got on with their duties, knowing that the best countermeasure was good battle drills and effective counter-sniper operations.