The Zulus and Matabele: Warrior Nations

by Glen Lyndon Dodds

  Hurried preparations were made to receive them. The laager was a strong one, wedge-shaped, with its base resting on the bank of the Bushman’s and a cannon deployed at its apex. But manpower was scarce. There were only 75 Afrikaner men capable of fighting. To make things worse, rain was in the air and so much of the powder was not sufficiently dry. As the defenders gathered around their minister to pray, they could see the Zulus marching majestically in the vicinity. Presently, the Boers were surrounded by perhaps 10,000 warriors, some of whom were carrying guns captured from Retief’s and Uys’ men.

  Zulus then opened fire on the trekkers. Others hurled throwing spears (which had been reintroduced by Dingane), but no charge en masse against the wagons was attempted. Hence the defenders were able to move repeatedly from sector to sector, reinforcing colleagues under pressure. The Boers shot and loaded in rotation, thereby maintaining a constant rate of fire. At about midday the Zulu attacks died down, whereupon a mounted party sallied out of the laager and skirmished with the warriors who thus withdrew. Both sides then settled down for the night. The trekkers took no chances. To deter any attack under cover of darkness and facilitate the loading of muskets, around the laager sentries were doubled and lanterns hung out on whipstocks and raised aloft. For their part, the Zulus spent much of the night feasting on seized Boer livestock.

  Dawn brought renewed action when mounted Boers made a sortie before falling back, drawing the Zulus after them and into the defenders’ zone of fire. However, Zulu attempts to storm the defences by setting the wagons alight with spears wrapped in burning straw were repulsed.

  That night again proved an anxious one for the Boers, for the Zulus remained in the vicinity. On the following day, though, the warriors chanted a war-song and set off for home with captured livestock, some of which were retaken by the Afrikaners when they gave chase.

  Following the Battle of Veglaer (as it became known), the Boers broke camp and moved near to Gert Maritz’s laager beside the Little Tugela in the shadow of the Drakensberg. But bad weather, depleted supplies and illness continued to beset them and Maritz’s death from fever in late September undermined morale even further.

  Good news was received in October. A ship docked at Durban from Cape Town bearing supplies of all kinds sent by well-wishers. Moreover, word arrived that reinforcements were on the way under a self-assured and dynamic figure named Andries Pretorius. An experienced commando leader, he had spent some time with the Voortrekker groups in 1837 before returning to his home in the Graaff-Reinet district, intent on leading a trek north with his friends and relations to Natal. Pretorius had received urgent word from the trekkers there to come post-haste, and on 22 November he duly appeared, having pressed ahead of the bulk of his party with 60 mounted men and a small ship’s cannon. He was soon appointed commander-in-chief. Consequently, on 28 November he set off for Zululand at the head of a commando. En route he took steps to ensure that it was a disciplined force. He established a proper chain of command, posted sentries, punished insubordination and at night formed strong laagers. On the sixth day after departure, and before crossing the Tugela, the slow-moving force was joined by a contingent from Durban consisting of a few Englishmen under Alexander Biggar (the father of Robert Biggar) and some 60 Natal Zulus.

  Shortly after Pretorius left the Boer camp, a message arrived there warning him to refrain from ‘offensive measures against the Zulu chief.’ It was sent by Major Samuel Charters, who had just landed at Durban with about 100 troops, bearing orders from the Governor of Cape Colony to keep the peace.

  As was customary, on Sunday 9 December, Pretorius’ commando observed the Sabbath. They did more. They vowed that if God granted them victory against the Zulus they would build a church and commemorate the event as a day of thanksgiving. Pretorius then pressed on and crossed the Mzinyathi River.

  On Saturday 15 December, the commando (which was under surveillance from Zulu spies) reached the west bank of the Ncome River and formed a laager. It was the eve of one of the most momentous battles in the history of South Africa—Blood River—of which F.A. Van Jaarsveld has commented: ‘No other battle in South African history has excited as much attention or such diverse interpretations.’

  The Battle of Blood River

  Unfortunately, sources relating to this epic engagement are not as full as could be wished and are somewhat contradictory. Indeed, one authority on the subject, F.J. du Toit Spies, has concluded that no final solution regarding the course of the battle is possible.

  Nonetheless, certain facts are known. The laager was located in a strong defensive position for the terrain was open, providing a good field of fire once an early morning mist had cleared. Furthermore, its east side was protected by the river, which was of sufficient depth at this point to prevent or at least greatly impede an advance from that quarter.

  Additionally, a deep donga, down which a small stream flowed into the Ncome, afforded a barrier to the south. Effectively, then, the Zulus could only really attack from the north and west, thereby enabling the defenders to concentrate their fire; and fortunately for the Voortrekkers, because the day was to prove fine and sunny, they were able to keep their powder dry. Moreover, Pretorius issued the men with small leather cartridges of buckshot which, when fired, would burst at about 40 yards. There were also three cannon, the largest of which had a range of several thousand yards.

  The shape of the laager is disputed, but it was probably formed up like a capital D. There were at least 57 wagons (some put the number at 64) and they were lashed together to prevent the Zulus forcing an opening through them. Wooden gates especially brought by Pretorius, were used to block the gaps between them, while lanterns were again hung from whipstocks.

  Different figures have been given for the strength of the commando. Among the most reliable are those of B.J. Liebenberg, who states that the laager’s European element numbered 468 Afrikaners and three English settlers from Port Natal. There were also many non-whites, including about 120 Port Natal blacks. The laager also contained approximately 1,400 horses and oxen.

  Reasonable estimates place the strength of the impi, which was commanded by Ndlela, at some 8,000 to 10,000 men. Among the regiments present was Dingane’s favourite ibutho, the uDlambedlu, the first regiment he had established following his accession. About 200 of the Zulus possessed guns.

  Before dawn on 16 December, the Zulus moved forward from the southeast, with the left horn (consisting of young amabutho) well to the fore. This crossed the Ncome via a drift downstream of the laager and circled around to the northwest of the Boer position before sitting down and awaiting daylight.

  At about 6.30 the early morning mists began to rise, enabling the Voortrekkers to see the Zulu left horn arrayed about 170 yards away. Suddenly the warriors rose to their feet, shouted war-cries, rattled spears against their shields, and began surging forward before the rest of the army was in position. One of the Boers who watched the spectacle later recalled: ‘Their approach, although frightful on account of the great number, yet presented a beautiful appearance.’

  Trekker marksmen responded by firing buckshot and many of the Zulus fell, as did others hit by grapeshot from one or more of the cannons. Soon the north-western side of the laager was enveloped in thick black smoke. Valiantly, nonetheless, the Zulus repeatedly endeavoured to press home their attack. Eventually, however, they realised that it was futile to try to penetrate the defenders’ zone of fire and thus fell back, although some groups of warriors broke away to occupy the donga where they could come within a few yards of the laager. Pretorius ordered a sally and thus men lined the lip of the donga, and poured fire into the Zulus below. The survivors retired in a southerly direction, with at least some of them making for the drift. At about the same time, mounted trekkers moved against the rest of the left horn, which took to its heels—some of the warriors fled towards a hill to the southwest. At about 8am the Boer pursuit was called off.

  B
ut the day’s bloodshed was far from over—the chest and right horn were closing in. The latter, the foremost, intended crossing the Ncome just to the northeast of the laager but was prevented from doing so when Pretorius deployed mounted horsemen on the river bank and their withering fire led the Zulus to veer south to ford the river at the same point as the left horn had done earlier. The chest, coming up behind, did likewise. In the meantime, cannon fire from the laager had been directed against the senior Zulu commanders who had taken up a position on a hill on the east side of the Ncome and had inflicted some casualties and forced them to scatter.

  Having crossed the river, the right horn surged forward and attacked the laager from the northwest. Repeatedly it charged, but once again enemy fire proved too hot to penetrate and for the frustrated Zulus the number of their dead and wounded rose rapidly. When the more senior warriors of the chest arrived on the scene, some of them jeered the younger men of the right horn (reportedly warriors actually came to blows) and some tried to force a way through their ranks to close with the enemy themselves. Congestion and disorder soon prevailed, and the assault crumbled as a number of Zulu units began to retire at about 11am.

  Seeing this, Pretorius ordered some of his men to mount. Gaps between the wagons were made, and the trekkers galloped out against their weakened and demoralised opponents who began fleeing, mostly towards the Ncome. Lunguza kaMpukane, our only Zulu eyewitness of events, who was with a youthful regiment deemed too young to participate in the battle other than to help finish off the enemy, relates:

  After our troops had been repulsed there was a general flight in various directions. The Boers charged; four came in our direction riding red horses, five in another direction, six in another. They fired on the Zulus with their guns. Our men hid in ant-bear holes, under ant-heaps, stuffing their heads in though otherwise exposed, whilst others hid themselves under heaps of corpses to be found in every direction. Men were shot who were already dead. I found men shot dead in front as well as behind me as we fled.

  Fleeing warriors leapt into the Ncome or scurried down the donga, desperate to escape. Some made it, but many did not. From the banks, the Boers had a wealth of targets and more and more Zulus perished. In an attempt to save themselves, some warriors submerged, a point noted by a French naturalist, Adulphe Delegorgue, who visited the battlesite the following year. He stated, upon seeing the bones of many of those who had died, that ‘obeying the instinct of self-preservation, they dived underwater until forced to the surface, where their heads were immediately shattered by the avenging bullets of the Boers.’ In addition, other Zulus died some distance from the laager for the Voortrekker pursuit was conducted far across the Ncome until their mounts were exhausted.

  The Annals of Natal vividly describes the battle as a scene of ‘shouting and tumult and lamentation, and a sea of black faces, and a dense smoke that rose straight as a plumb-line upwards from the ground.’ It had certainly been a hard-fought encounter, so much so that the trekkers’ guns reportedly almost became too hot to handle. Nevertheless, the casualties were terribly disproportionate. None of the Europeans was killed and only three were wounded, including Pretorius. In contrast, Zulus perished by the thousand—the Boers put the figure at 3,000. The Annals states that bodies were piled beside the laager ‘like pumpkins on a rich soil.’ Furthermore, so many Zulus were killed in the Ncome that its waters literally turned red, leading the victors to give it the name ‘Blood River.’ Of the engagement, F. Lion Catchet was to declare years later: ‘It was not a battle; it was an execution.’

  Within days of the battle, Pretorius wrote as follows: ‘The venture was great and our army puny . . . hence we could do nothing but trust in the justice of our cause and the God of our fathers . . . . However, it pleased the Almighty . . . to grant us victory with no loss of life.’

  It was an opinion shared by other members of the victorious commando who likewise attributed the battle’s outcome to divine intervention, and it is a view still held by many Afrikaners today.

  After Blood River, Pretorius hurriedly pressed on, unopposed, towards uMgungundlovu. On 20 December he found the royal homestead abandoned and in flames. It was less than a year since the ‘wizards’ had been butchered—how the wheel of fortune had spun!

  Dingane was fleeing north, having given orders to regiments to decoy and harass the enemy. On 27 December, a clash occurred in the valley of the White Mfolozi when a 300-strong Boer commando under Carel Landman, accompanied by some 70 dismounted Port Natal blacks under Biggar, descended into the valley to round up a large herd of cattle that turned out to be a mass of Zulu warriors with shields on their backs, creeping about on all-fours. Soon Landman found himself under attack, with hitherto concealed amabutho moving in from all sides. The trekkers managed to fight their way clear (although four of them perished) but most of the Port Natal blacks were cut off and slaughtered. Biggar died with them rather than abandon them to their fate. The Boers claimed that they had killed about 1,000 Zulus, though this no doubt has to be taken with a pinch of salt. So, too, must Zulu claims that when Pretorius and his colleagues withdrew to Natal in early January (incidentally taking with them less livestock than they wished), they did so with unseemly haste.

  The last days of Dingane

  Meanwhile, what of Dingane? The badly mauled king founded a smaller capital, again called uMgungundlovu, just beyond the Black Mfolozi and about nine miles from present-day Nongoma, and began consolidating his position. His hopes were revived by news that the British objected to what had occurred and had warned the Boers—whom they maintained were still subjects of the Crown—that any future aggression would be ‘followed by the strongest marked displeasure.’

  However, the Voortrekkers were dismissive and proceeded to establish their own republic governed by the Volksraad, an elected assembly consisting of 24 members. The capital was a fledgling town (founded in 1838) on high ground about 50 miles northwest of Durban and named Pietermaritzburg in honour of Piet Retief and Gert Maritz.

  Nevertheless, relations between the Boers and the British soldiers at Durban were amicable and the latter’s new commander, Captain Henry Jarvis, worked towards bringing about harmony between Afrikaners and Zulus. Consequently, on 25 March 1839, peace was concluded. Dingane agreed to leave the Boers unmolested south of the Tugela and to return captured Voortrekker arms, horses, cattle and sheep, while Pretorius promised to punish Afrikaners who strayed beyond the Tugela and to assist the Zulus if they were unjustly attacked by a third party.

  But Dingane failed to comply fully with the treaty. True, by August the bulk of the firearms etc which had belonged to Retief’s party had been handed over, but hardly any of the 40,000 cattle that the Boers claimed had been stolen from them were returned. Instead of trying to ensure that the terms of the treaty were fulfilled, Dingane concentrated on establishing a base for himself beyond the Pongola, intent on shifting the nucleus of his kingdom away from his troubled southern flank into Swazi territory. In 1839 an impi was despatched to begin the process of conquest but encountered stiff resistance and, despite being reinforced by fresh amabutho, the campaign ended in failure.

  Dingane’s hopes were dashed. So, also, was the morale of his people, many of whom now began deserting their weakened king. Foremost among them was his half-brother Mpande, who had failed to provide effective military assistance for the Swazi campaign. In September he fled across the Tugela into Natal, accompanied by about 17,000 followers drawn from southern Zululand, after hearing that he was to be executed by his indignant brother.

  In Natal, contact was made with the Boers and, on 27 October, the two parties agreed upon a combined attack on Dingane, whom the Boers wished to be replaced by Mpande. Hence in January 1840, shortly after the British garrison at Durban had been recalled by the Governor of Cape Colony (the troops had sailed on 24 December), Zululand was invaded again. Dingane had attempted to ward off an incursion by sending Nzobo and another induna to Na
tal with presents, but both had been seized by the Boers who charged them with complicity in the murder of Retief’s party and subsequent assault on the trekker encampments.

  The invasion force consisted of two separate columns. Mpande, who was threatened with death if his men deserted to Dingane, crossed the Tugela with Pretorius and a commando of 308 armed men plus ancillaries, whereas several thousand Zulus, under Nongalaza kaNondela, did so further to the east.

  On 29 January, after Dingane had abandoned his second capital, Nongalaza clashed with the king’s forces under the leadership of Ndlela among the Maqongqo Hills in the far north of Zululand. It is sometimes said that the battle was watched by the Boers, who remained aloof, allowing Zulu to kill Zulu, but in fact they were miles from the scene. Details of the engagement are scarce. It was evidently a bitter encounter that turned in Nongalaza’s favour when some of Dingane’s warriors deserted to his side and, ultimately, the king’s men were forced to withdraw.

  On the evening of the 30th, when just south of the White Mfolozi, the Boers received word that Dingane’s forces had been defeated and that he was in flight. The following day they arraigned Nzobo and his fellow envoy before a military court in which Mpande testified against them, declaring that they had been largely responsible for the murder of Retief’s party. Nzobo boldly admitted to the allegations, but asked that his companion be spared as he was innocent. However, both men were sentenced to death by firing squad. The execution was witnessed by Delegorgue. The first volley killed Nzobo’s companion but only wounded the former, who, ‘as calmly as ever, and in spite of his suffering . . . arose and stood steadfastly facing the guns, until the second round of shots rang out.’