The Zulus and Matabele: Warrior Nations

by Glen Lyndon Dodds

  5. ‘THEY FELL LIKE STONES’ — THE BATTLES OF ISANDLWANA AND RORKE’S DRIFT

  ‘We went to see the dead people at Isandlwana. We saw a single warrior dead, staring in our direction, with his war shield in his hand . . . . We saw countless things dead. Dead was the horse, dead too, the mule, dead was the dog, dead was the monkey, dead were the wagons, dead were the tents, dead were the boxes, dead was everything, even to the very metals.’ Recollections of a Zulu boy

  Cetshwayo sent the bulk of his warriors against the British Centre Column. At about 4.30am on Saturday 11 January 1879, the column, which numbered approximately 4,700 officers and men (enveloped in a thick mist and drizzling rain) began crossing the Mzinyathi at Rorke’s Drift. No opposition was encountered during the crossing, which occurred throughout the day, and a camp was established on the Zulu bank.

  On the following day Chelmsford advanced from Rorke’s Drift against a nearby umuzi, none other than Sihayo’s homestead, which was located in the Batshe Valley, an area crossed by the track along which Chelmsford planned to advance. Sihayo was at oNdini, but a small Zulu force under one of his sons opened fire from a sheltered position and a brief skirmish ensued in which the Zulus were put to flight, leaving behind about 30 dead, one of whom was their leader. Sihayo’s abandoned homestead was then set alight and livestock seized, after which the soldiers returned to camp, having lost few of their own number. In subsequent days, work was undertaken to improve the track at several points along the Batshe Valley—in some places, for instance, it crossed marshy ground—while mounted troops scouted eastward. They duly reported locating a suitable campsite where the track skirted a prominent hill called Isandlwana, at the west end of a vast plain. The site had a good supply of fuel and water, so Chelmsford decided to establish an advanced base there, where some of the wagons could be unloaded before being sent back to Rorke’s Drift to bring on further supplies.

  On 20 January, the Centre Column thus advanced to Isandlwana. A short distance to the north of the sphinx-like hill, a spur leads up to a plateau, the Nyoni Heights, which has an east-west axis and whose southern edge forms an escarpment intersected at various places by the courses of streams that flow down to the plain. The plain itself runs east from Isandlwana for several miles and is four miles or so wide in places, and bisected on a north-south axis by dongas formed by the streams. A short distance to the south of Isandlwana is a hill known as Mahlabamkhosi, while the southern flank of the plain is bounded by a range of hills—the Hlazakazi Heights—to the east of which are the upper reaches of the Mangeni River.

  The column crossed a nek or saddle-back ridge between Isandlwana and Mahlabamkhosi and encamped beneath the eastern face of Isandlwana. The 2/3rd Natal Native Contingent was the northernmost unit, then came the 1/3rd NNC, the 2/24th, N/5 Royal Artillery, the mounted troops and, on the south side of the track, the 1/24th. The Headquarters Staff were located behind the centre of the line, while the wagons were parked on the nek and behind each unit’s camp.

  Colonel Glyn wished to form a laager but Chelmsford overruled him. Doing so would be time-consuming, and most of the wagons were going to be sent back to Rorke’s Drift for supplies. Moreover the camp was not entrenched, doubtless partly because of the stony nature of the ground would have rendered the task extremely difficult. Nor was any attempt made to impede an enemy approach by using thornbushes and broken bottles. Lieutenant Teignmouth Melvill of the 1/24th was one of a number of officers who felt concerned about the omission of such defensive features: ‘These Zulus will charge home,’ he said, ‘and with our small numbers we ought to be in laager, or, at any rate, be prepared to stand shoulder to shoulder.’ On the other hand, infantry picquets were placed out in an arc half a mile by day and a quarter of a mile at night, extending up from Mahlabamkhosi on to the spur, while vedettes were sent up to the surrounding heights during daylight.

  Preliminary moves

  At dawn on 21 January, Chelmsford sent Major John Dartnell and about 120 irregulars to reconnoitre to the east and southeast, whereas Commandant Rupert Lonsdale and the 3rd Regiment NNC were despatched to sweep ground to the south and southeast of the camp before joining Dartnell.

  Late in the afternoon, Dartnell came across perhaps as many as 2,000 Zulu warriors who emerged on high ground just to the north of the head of the Mangeni. The Zulus were under a local chief, Matshana kaMondisa, who had been detached from the main impi—which was marching towards the Ngwebeni Valley northeast of Isandlwana—evidently with the aim of splitting the British forces. Matshana’s command included his own adherents and warriors from the impi. When the Zulus failed to attack, Dartnell withdrew to the east end of the Hlazakazi Heights and proceeded to encamp for the night with his men and the NNC. He was about nine miles from the camp at Isandlwana, to which he sent a request for reinforcements.

  The messenger arrived at about 1.30am on Wednesday 22nd, whereupon Major Clery, Glyn’s principal staff officer, took the message to Lord Chelmsford. Clery states that the general responded thus: ‘Order the 2nd Battalion 24th Regiment, four guns, and all the mounted troops to get ready and start at daybreak.’ Chelmsford intended to accompany the men moving to Dartnell’s assistance, and to strengthen the force he was to leave at Isandlwana, he sent a message to Durnford, commander of No. 2 Column, ordering him to come up post-haste. Durnford was at Rorke’s Drift, for in obedience to an earlier command he had moved with approximately 500 of his men from an escarpment overlooking the Middle Drift on the Tugela. At about 4.30am, Chelmsford and Colonel Glyn rode out of the camp, evidently expecting a stiff fight, leaving Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Pulleine of the 1/24th in charge.

  Although aged 40, Pulleine had never commanded a force in action—he had served on the staff during the recent Frontier War. The core of his force consisted of regular soldiers, most of whom belonged to the 1/24th (there was one company of 2/24th), while the irregular troops included companies of the 3rd NNC. In addition, Pulleine had two 7-pounders from N/5 Battery.

  Chelmsford and Glyn rendezvoused with Dartnell at about 6.15am, having pressed ahead of the infantry and guns. The general then gave orders to sweep the ground to the east and northeast of the Hlazakazi Heights. In so doing, Dartnell killed some 60 Zulus in a heavy skirmish. Another body of warriors conducted an orderly withdrawal northeast towards Siphezi Mountain, drawing Glyn after them. Chelmsford watched some of the skirmishing and ate breakfast from a commanding position on a nek between two hills north of the Mangeni.

  At 9.30am a galloper arrived post-haste from Pulleine with a message timed 8.05am. It read: ‘Report just come in that the Zulus are advancing in force from left front of the camp.’ Chelmsford believed that Pulleine was in command of a sufficiently strong force to hold the position. Furthermore, he realised that even if he did move to Pulleine’s aid, it would be about 12.30pm before he could arrive, well over four hours after the message had been despatched. He thus sent an officer to view the camp through glasses, but little could be made out at a range of twelve miles.

  Concluding that all was well, Chelmsford proceeded to send another officer, Captain Alan Gardner of the 14th Hussars, to Pulleine with orders to strike camp and move towards the Mangeni. Moreover, Commandant George Hamilton-Browne and the 1/3rd NNC were recalled from the skirmishing and likewise sent back towards Isandlwana with, states Hamilton-Browne, orders to assist Pulleine in striking the camp and moving up. Chelmsford then rode forward to locate the best campsite.

  And what of events at Isandlwana? Shortly before 8.00am, as the men in the camp were having breakfast, a trooper could be seen descending from the plateau, moving at speed, and soon reported that a large force of Zulus was approaching from the northeast across the plateau. Pulleine reacted by dashing off the message that Chelmsford was to receive an hour and a half later. He did more. The ‘fall in’ was sounded and all the 24th and companies of the NNC were deployed in front of the camp, while a party under Lieutenant Anstey of the 1/24th,
doing repair work on the track, was recalled. The men eagerly scanned the crest of the plateau but no Zulu assault materialised.

  Durnford arrived on the scene at ‘about ten or ten thirty a.m.’, according to an officer who accompanied him, Lieutenant William Cochrane of the 32nd Regiment, having ridden up from Rorke’s Drift with five troops of the Natal Native Horse, approximately 250 men. Coming on behind were a rocket battery under Major Russell, two companies of the 1/lst NNC and transport wagons. Durnford, who was 48 years old, enjoyed seniority over Pulleine and Cochrane tells us that Pulleine declared: ‘I’m sorry you have come, as you are senior to me and will of course take command’, whereupon Durnford replied, ‘I’m not going to interfere with you. I’m not going to remain in camp.’ In all, there were now 1,768 officers and men at Isandlwana, about half of whom were black.

  Meanwhile, as noted, Chelsmford had sent Hamilton-Browne back to Isandlwana and he was currently en route to the camp. Not long after commencing the journey, and at about the time Durnford joined Pulleine, he captured a Zulu boy ‘frightened out of his life’, who told him that the main impi was to the northeast of Isandlwana. Therefore Hamilton-Browne promptly sent a lieutenant to report as such to Chelmsford and pressed on.

  By now the sound of firing could be heard from the Mangeni area. But as the camp itself appeared in no danger, the men at Isandlwana were allowed to fall out for their midday meal, though they were to eat it as quickly as possible. While having lunch, Durnford told Pulleine that he intended to ride out eastward across the plain for he was concerned that a Zulu force, about 600 strong, which had been seen on the plateau retiring in that direction might have been intent on circling and cutting off Chelmsford.

  Durnford set off at about 11.15am, shortly after Pulleine had sent a company of the 1/24th under Lieutenant Charles Cavaye on to the plateau. Durnford said that he expected support if he encountered trouble. He moved across the plain at the head of two of his troops of Natal Native Horse, as well as with the rocket battery and a company of the NNC, both of which had just arrived at Isandlwana: two of Durnford’s other troops of NNH had been ordered up on to the plateau under Lieutenants Raw and Roberts, while a third had been sent back to help escort the wagons. Durnford had asked for two companies of the 24th, but had agreed that they should remain, following protests against any further reduction of the camp’s strength.

  At about noon, members of Lieutenant Raw’s troop (accompanied by Captain George Shepstone, a son of Theophilus and effectively Durnford’s staff officer) caught sight of cattle being driven by Zulus off to the northeast and gave pursuit. The Zulus vanished over the crest and the pursuing troopers rapidly reined in as they reached the spot, finding themselves on the edge of a deep valley through which flowed the Ngwebeni stream. They found more: a sea of black faces, a mass of Zulus sitting silently in serried ranks, crammed into the valley and up its slopes—the main impi, which had so far eluded detection. It was about five and a half miles northeast of the camp at Isandlwana, much closer than was Chelmsford.

  The army numbered at least 20,000 warriors and was under the joint command of Chief Ntshingwayo kaMahole, a renowned warrior in his 70s—who evidently enjoyed precedence—and Chief Mavumengwana kaNdlela, who was in his mid-40s. He was a son of Dingane’s principal induna, and a close friend of Cetshwayo. Among amabutho known to have been present in significant strength were the iNgobamakhosi, the uMcijo (also known as the uKhandempemvu), uDududu, iSangqu, iMbube, uMbonambi, uNokhenke, uVe, uThulwana, iNdlondlo, uDloko and iNdluyengwe, as well as elements of the uMxhapho.

  They had set off from Nodwengu late on the afternoon of Friday 17 January and had encamped beside the White Mfolozi after marching some six miles. The impi covered about nine miles on each of the following two days and, on the 19th, divided into two columns, ‘marching parallel to and in sight of each other’. Scouting was undertaken by a few mounted warriors belonging to Sihayo. On the 20th, the impi saw to its left a body of white horsemen, no doubt a reconnaissance patrol that Chelmsford had sent out that day. After spending that night on the northern slopes of Siphezi Mountain, the Zulus proceeded to occupy the Ngwebeni Valley on the evening of the 21st, although stragglers continued to arrive the following morning. The warriors had conserved their strength in accordance with Cetshwayo’s instructions and were well fed because foraging parties had brought in grain, cattle and goats.

  On the basis of Zulu evidence, it is generally held that owing to superstitious custom there was no intention of attacking the British on 22 January: it was the day of the new moon (which was to begin her new life at 1.52pm) and hence the Zulus were waiting to attack on the 23rd. John Laband, however, argues that the commanders were planning to launch their attack later on the 22nd:

  After all, its being the day of the new moon had not hampered Matshana’s remarkably successful diversionary operations, which were clearly part of a concerted strategy. The Zulu commanders, moreover, were in council that day, considering their next move, and they knew their enemy to be at a fatal disadvantage, which could not be expected to persist indefinitely. Nor, as events proved, was it likely that so large a force as theirs could maintain the advantage of surprise by keeping its presence hidden for a further twenty-four hours until the dawning of a more auspicious day.

  The Battle of Isandlwana

  What is certain is that the Zulus’ detection by Raw’s troop of Ngwane brought matters to a head. The troopers dismounted, fired a volley and then fell back, as did Roberts’ troop (again consisting of Ngwane) to Raw’s left. While both troops made a fighting retreat in the face of pursuing Zulus, a company of NNC that had been in close support of Raw took to its heels. The first of the Zulu regiments to give chase was the uMcijo, which had been located closest to where Raw’s men caught sight of the impi. It surged forward without being ordered to do so either by Ntshingwayo or Mavumengwana, and other regiments rapidly did likewise. Soon a huge wave of warriors was on the plateau, advancing at a very fast walking pace and forming up into the ‘beast’s horns’ formation. The right horn comprised the uDududu, iMbube, iSangqu and the uNokhenke. The uMcijo and elements of the uMxhapho formed the chest, wheras the uMbonambi, iNgobamakhosi (Cetshwayo’s favourite ibutho) and uVe formed the left horn. The loins consisted of the uNdi Corps, namely the uThulwana, iNdluyengwe, iNdlondlo and uDloko regiments, following on at the right rear, although some members of these regiments broke away and followed the chest.

  Durnford was of course making his way across the plain. He had pressed on with his mounted troops, leaving the rocket battery and its NNC escort lagging behind. Cochrane tells us that Durnford had gone several miles when ‘a mounted man . . . reported that there was an immense impi behind the hills to our left’. No sooner had he done so than the ‘Zulus appeared in force in front of us and to our left . . . . They opened fire at . . . about 800 yards, and advanced very rapidly.’ Durnford halted, discharged a volley, and began falling back ‘steadily in skirmishing order, keeping up a steady fire.’

  Meanwhile, Major Russell and his rocket battery had just passed Amatutshane, a conical kopje on the plain, and was thus about a mile and a half from the camp, when he became aware of the Zulu advance. He rapidly wheeled left towards the Nyoni Heights and, just below Itusi peak, encountered the advance-guard of either the iNgobamakhosi or the uMbonambi. Desperately, the battery fired off a 9-pounder rocket. It burst near the Zulus but to little or no effect: the warriors kept on coming, descending the escarpment. Russell’s NNC escort now fled, leaving him and the handful of men of his battery to fight it out. They were engaged in hand-to-hand combat when the retreating Durnford arrived on the scene. He then pressed on towards Isandlwana with his men and the survivors of the battery, leaving Russell behind among the dead.

  At about 12.15pm Shepstone galloped into the camp—by which time the firing on the plateau had already been heard—and reported to Pulleine. Coincidentally, Captain Gardner arrived simultaneously with Chelmsford’s
order to break camp. Pulleine hesitated for a moment, before sending word to Chelmsford, ‘Heavy firing to left of our camp. Cannot move camp at present.’ The ‘Alarm’ was sounded and the men again began forming up in columns in front of the position.

  As the Zulu attack seemed to be developing to the north of the camp, Pulleine sent Mostyn’s F Company 1/24th up the spur to plug a gap between the bulk of Captain Cavaye’s E Company 1/24th (beyond the skyline and to the west of the spur) and a detached section of it under Second Lieutenant Dyson, located even further west. Cavaye and Dyson were in extended order and firing at the Zulu right horn which was crossing their front about 800 yards away and intent on outflanking the soldiers. A company of NNC (whose identity is uncertain) was also in the vicinity, to the right, and ‘blazing away at an absurd rate’, according to a regular officer who witnessed the spectacle.

  Further to the right were Raw’s and Roberts’ Ngwane, conducting their fighting withdrawal against the Zulu centre. In due course they fell back to the foot of the escarpment where they found themselves reinforced by another troop of NNH—again composed of Ngwane—commanded by Lieutenant W. Vause. The troop, which Durnford had sent back to escort the wagons, had just arrived at the camp, and Vause had been ordered by Shepstone to reinforce Raw and Roberts. The Ngwane dismounted and began moving up the slope in skirmishing order, inflicting heavy losses on the uMcijo, and re-emerged on the heights. At about the same time, around 50 men of Captain Stafford’s E Company, 1/lst NNC (which had likewise escorted the wagons into the camp), also ascended the escarpment, and took up a position on the extreme left of the ridge. Shepstone was involved in the fighting, for he had returned to join the fray after reporting to Pulleine.