The Zulus and Matabele: Warrior Nations

by Glen Lyndon Dodds

  Meanwhile, the rest of the impi had advanced. The chest had moved forward and was massed at the homestead on the central spur, from where its fire was seriously threatening Pearson’s position on the knoll, while the right horn had tentatively advanced onto the western spur. The chest, however, was driven back, principally by members of the Naval Brigade and a company of the Buffs, who advanced up the spur. Seeing that the battle was lost, the right horn likewise retired. Hostilities ended at about 9.30am, about an hour and a half after they had commenced.

  Pearson’s losses were slight: two officers and six men of the NNC and three men of the Buffs were killed, while fifteen men were wounded. The British officially estimated Zulu dead at about 300, but the real number likely exceeded this figure. Despite their numbers and advantageous position, the Zulus had been soundly defeated, and the morale of the surviving warriors badly dented.

  Pearson continued on towards Eshowe at noon and arrived the following day, having burnt homesteads en route, annoyed at having been attacked. On the 24th he was joined by Welman whose advance had been without incident.

  On 28 January, by which time work on fortifying Eshowe had commenced, a runner arrived with word from Chelmsford, who had of course been defeated at Isandlwana hours after the Battle of Nyezane. Pearson was told that all previous orders were now void and that he could withdraw if he wished, though if he did so he should try to hold on to the Lower Drift. The colonel consulted his subordinates and a decision was made to stay put. However, to ease the burden on supplies, it was decided to send back most of the mounted men and the majority of the 2nd NNC. Pearson’s force—which was to endure a long siege—was therefore reduced to 1339 whites and 355 blacks plus non-combatants.

  The invasion of No. 4 Column

  Meanwhile, on 18 January Colonel Evelyn Wood and his column of 2,278 men had marched from their encampment at Bemba’s Kop on the Ncome, northeast towards the upper reaches of the White Mfolozi. Since the expiry of the ultimatum on 11 January, much of the countryside to the south, east and north of Bemba’s Kop had been scoured by mounted patrols belonging to Wood’s column, routing minor Zulu forces encountered and seizing livestock. In so doing, Wood had eased the pressure on the Centre Column, which, as noted, had crossed into Zululand at Rorke’s Drift on the 11th.

  On 20 January, Wood reached the White Mfolozi and began establishing a base called Fort Thinta, while a patrol under Lieutenant Colonel Redvers Buller, who was in command of Wood’s mounted troops, rode off across the river to reconnoitre. Upon reaching Zungwini Mountain, the westernmost of a chain of flat-topped mountains, Buller encountered stiff opposition from a force mostly consisting of Qulusi and was compelled to conduct a fighting retreat across the White Mfolozi.

  On the 22nd, Wood himself led a strong patrol, including infantry, towards Zungwini and reached the summit after forcing back several hundred Zulus. From his vantage point he saw about 4,000 warriors drilling on the next mountain in the chain, Hlobane.

  Wood spent the 23rd resting at Fort Thinta, before advancing towards Hlobane at dawn on the 24th intent on dealing with the large Zulu impi he had seen. Skirmishing ensued, during which Wood received a bombshell—a messenger arrived with news of the Centre Column’s defeat at Isandlwana.

  Wood therefore headed back to Fort Thinta, before withdrawing north-westward on 31 January to establish a fortified camp on Khambula Hill, fourteen miles or so due west of Zungwini. From here he could keep an eye on the Zulus around Hlobane, and cover the approaches to Utrecht and Luneberg, the latter being the base of Colonel Rowland’s No. 5 Column.

  From Khambula, Wood sent Buller on raids against the Qulusi. The first of these occurred on 1 February when Buller destroyed their ikhanda, ebaQulusini, near Hlobane without opposition.

  Moreover, Wood continued endeavouring to exploit the semi-independent state of the clans of northern Zululand, hoping to get them to forsake Cetshwayo. Buller was thus sent out with the mounted troops to weaken their resolve by raiding outlying homesteads and seizing cattle in order to bring about their submission. He was also charged with finding Prince Hamu, whom it will be recalled had promised to desert to the side of the British and was, in fact, being kept at oNdini by Cetshwayo. Furthermore, Buller rode north to assist Colonel Rowlands by attacking maurauding bands of Zulus raiding across the border into the Transvaal.

  In late February, Rowlands was required to move to Pretoria, where Boer republican elements were stirring in the wake of Isandlwana. No 5 Column therefore came under Wood’s command, and its mounted men were ordered to move up to Khambula.

  On 12 March, the British experienced a reverse beside the Ntombe River northeast of Luneburg. A convoy carrying ammunition and rations to the garrison there, and a company of the 80th Regiment which had been sent out from Luneburg to help bring it in, were attacked by a mixed force of at least 800 Swazi and Zulu warriors under a warlord called Mbilini Mswati, a renegade son of the Swazi king, who had fled to Zululand in 1866. The toll of British dead was one officer and 60 men, a civil surgeon, two white wagon conductors and 15 black drivers, while the bodies of only 30 of Mbilini’s warriors were found among the dead.

  On the other hand, Cetshwayo’s position had just been seriously weakened, for Hamu, who had managed to slip away from oNdini, defected to the enemy and turned up at Khambula on 10 March where he was soon joined by a growing number of adherents who finally numbered around 1,300. The fighting men were drafted into an existing unit known as Wood’s Irregulars. Hamu and the non-combatants were located near Utrecht.

  In March, Cetshwayo summoned the bulk of his warriors to reassemble at oNdini by the 22nd for another major campaign. Nevertheless, the king and his council hoped to avoid further bloodshed and made peaceful, but unfruitful, overtures to the British during the course of the month. Hence the king and his councillors decided that the majority of the assembled warriors should march northwest under Mnyamana to the assistance of the hard-pressed Qulusi. The remainder were to reinforce the warriors in the vicinity of Eshowe—where Pearson had been under siege since early February—and prevent any relief force from breaking through.

  The main impi, which was little inferior in strength to that of the Isandlwana campaign and once again included warriors from all the crack regiments, set off from oNdini on 24 March and by the afternoon of the 27th was nearing the Qulusi stronghold and cattle depot of Hlobane.

  Unaware of the impi’s advance, Wood set out that very night with his mounted troops and levies to attack Hlobane, having been instructed by Chelmsford (who was planning to march to the relief of Eshowe) to create a diversion in the northwest and thus draw off some of Cetshwayo’s forces.

  Wood decided to assault Hlobane by means of a pincer movement, whereby 640 men under Lieutenant Colonel John Russell would ascend a plateau adjoining the mountain’s west end, while Buller and 675 men would climb the eastern slopes of Hlobane itself. Before dawn on the 28th, both parties began their respective ascents.

  As Buller moved up Hlobane, a severe thunderstorm broke overhead and flashes of lightning illuminated the scene, betraying his presence to Zulus in caves above who opened fire, causing a few casualties. Nevertheless, Buller managed to come out on the summit, driving a small number of Zulus before him. He then swept westward across the extensive and gently undulating summit, rounding up about 2,000 cattle, and clashing with an increasing number of Qulusi and Mbilini’s men who were expecting the arrival of the main impi.

  The force despatched from oNdini was indeed approaching and, between 10am and 11am, Buller suddenly caught sight of it drawing near from the southeast. He was therefore forced to quit Hlobane as fast as he could by descending the Devil’s Pass, difficult ground falling steeply away for about 200 feet, in a narrow series of giant steps strewn with boulders, down on to the Ntendeka plateau which Russell had abandoned after likewise spotting the oncoming impi.

  The descent proved a nightmare. Some horses lost
their footing and plunged to their deaths, while a number of the men were killed by the Qulusi and adherents of Mbilini. Buller, however, once again proved an inspiring leader. Amid the fear and confusion he moved back and forth encouraging his men, saving some who had got into difficulties. He was to receive the Victoria Cross for his gallantry.

  The British then withdrew in disarray to Khambula, having lost fifteen officers, 79 men and over a hundred black levies. On the other hand the Zulus, who numbered at least 20,000 warriors, proceeded to bivouac beside the White Mfolozi a few miles west of Hlobane and about fifteen miles from Wood’s camp, the Qulusi and Mbilini’s followers having joined the main impi.

  The Battle of Khambula

  Shortly after dawn on 29 March 1879, Wood sent Commandant Pieter Raaff and his Transvaal Rangers from Khambula to locate the Zulu army. En route, Raaff came across a Zulu who had slipped away from the enemy. He was one of Hamu’s men and had fought on the British side at Hlobane where, to save himself, he had discarded his British insignia and temporarily thrown in his lot with his former colleagues. He was sent on to report to Wood, and warned him that the impi would probably attack at ‘dinner time.’

  Meanwhile, Raaff had pressed on and at about 10am, after reaching the edge of the Zungwini plateau, caught sight of the warriors cooking beside the White Mfolozi and a tributary stream, having moved a few miles north from their overnight encampment. At 11am, Raaff returned to the British camp to report that the Zulus were advancing northwest on Khambula. Outlying units were hurriedly called in.

  The Zulus were soon spotted when about five miles away, heading westwards in five columns. Wood feared that instead of moving against him, the impi would continue on towards the settlement of Utrecht. But upon reaching hills approximately four miles southeast of his position, the Zulus halted. For over an hour they remained stationary, watched anxiously by the British.

  Cetshwayo had given orders that no fortified positions were to be attacked. His commanders were to seize British cattle and lure the enemy from their positions into the open. Failing that, they were to march into the Transvaal and force the British to follow them, and there hopefully surprise attack their pursuers. But Zulu spirits were high following Hlobane. Many warriors, especially the younger amabutho, were itching to come to grips once again. Indeed, it is said that Mnyamana simply lost control of his army. He was to watch the battle from a hill about three miles from the British position, while Ntshingwayo, the senior commander at Isandlwana, directed the warriors from about 700 yards east of Wood’s position.

  In due course the left horn, the uMcijo regiment, recommenced marching. Its direction?—towards Utrecht. But at about 1pm it changed course, suddenly veering right, directly towards the British camp. The pace also changed. Now it came on fast, before halting about three miles from Wood’s position.

  In the meantime, the right horn which, despite what is sometimes maintained, consisted entirely of the iNgobamakhosi regiment, had likewise begun to move. It circled around to the north of Khambula until it reached a point about a mile and a half from the enemy. For its part, the chest edged forward towards Wood, but was much further from the British position than the right horn.

  Major Hackett and his men driving back Zulus at the Battle of Khambula, by Orlando Norie. ©Somerset Military Museum Trust

  And what of the British? At around 12.45, after dinner had been eaten, the tents were struck and the defences manned. Wood was in command of 669 mounted troops and 1,238 regular infantry belonging to eight companies of the 90th Light Infantry and seven companies of the 1/13th Light Infantry. Moreover, there were 58 of Wood’s Irregulars present (the remainder had deserted following Hlobane), eleven Royal Engineers, and the 110 men of No. 11 Battery, 7th Brigade, Royal Artillery, with their six 7-pounders. In all, 2,086 officers and men, of whom 88 were unfit for service due to illness.

  Wood’s defences on Khambula included a hexagonal main laager with the wagons locked tightly together and with sods thrown up beneath the wagons to form a rampart. The southern side of the laager overlooked ground that fell away gently before soon descending into a valley that ran along the southern side of the position. In contrast, to the north the ground fell away gently, providing a better field of fire. About 306 yards to the east of the laager, and in a more elevated position on a narrow ridge of tableland, was an earthwork redoubt in which two of the 7-pounders were placed, facing northeast. The other four guns were deployed between the redoubt and the laager to cover the northern approaches. Moreover, to the southwest the redoubt was connected by a palisade to a smaller laager on lower ground, on the edge of the ridge’s southern face: this held the column’s 2,000 cattle. About 200 yards to the west of the main laager, and on the lip of the valley, was the garrison’s refuse tip on which clumps of mealies and long grass had grown rapidly amidst the horse manure.

  One company of the 90th Light Infantry was in the redoubt, while one and a half companies of the 1/13th were stationed in the cattle laager. The rest of the infantry manned the main laager, which also contained the mounted troops. Range markers had been set up around the camp to enhance the effect of the defenders’ fire. The gun crews manning the artillery between the main laager and the redoubt were told to fall back to the former if the Zulus got close.

  At about 1.30pm, the right horn, after taking up its new position, began to advance towards the British camp. To goad the oncoming warriors into launching a full-scale attack, Wood sent Buller and about 100 mounted men, some of who were black, towards the Zulus. Buller and his men rode out from the main laager when the right horn was less than a mile away. When within range, he ordered his men to dismount and fire. This spurred on the iNgobamakhosi. Buller’s force then rode back towards the laager, dismounting and firing again as it did so, though the Native Horse rode off to the west from where they were to harass the flanks of the enemy during the course of the battle.

  At approximately 1.45pm, the artillery opened fire over Buller’s retiring men at the oncoming iNgobamakhosi, who were taunting the withdrawing horsemen by shouting ‘We are the boys from Isandlwana!’ Then, when the right horn was about 300 yards from the British position, the 90th Light Infantry opened fire. This, combined with flanking fire from the redoubt, severely mauled the Zulus, whose advance was checked—for, as a Zulu named Sihlahla recalled shortly after the battle, they ‘could not face the bullets.’ A few managed to reach the main laager, only to be slain. Consequently, within 45 minutes or so of the battle’s commencement, the right horn began falling back northeast to the cover of some rocky ledges where it was to remain for much of the rest of the engagement.

  At about 2.15pm, as the right horn was withdrawing, the rest of the impi began advancing to the attack, the chest from the east and the left horn from the south. As the Zulus approached at a steady trot across the open ground, they were subjected to artillery fire that cut swathes through the ranks of the chest. Nonetheless, they pressed on, with the left horn making for the dead ground of the valley. The chest veered towards the same location.

  In due course, the first wave of warriors of the left horn surged out of the dead ground only to run into withering cross-fire from the southern sides of the main laager and the cattle laager. Nevertheless, more and more warriors swarmed up the gentle slope leading to the British camp, funnelling into the gap between the laagers. The narrowest part of the slope was in front of the cattle laager and the Zulus there, most notably the uNokhenke regiment, soon forced their way into the enclosure and engaged hand-to-hand with the 1/13th deployed there, with both sides being hampered by the terrified cattle. The outnumbered soldiers managed to extricate themselves and fell back towards the redoubt, while Zulus with rifles proceeded to open fire from the wagons on the main laager.

  Following the capture of the cattle laager, some 1,000 to 1,500 Zulus—evidently the uMbonambi regiment—began forming up to the west of the enclosure intent on assaulting the main laager. In response
, at about 3pm, Wood ordered Major Hackett to counter-attack with two companies of the 90th. To the consternation of the Zulus, Hackett and his men moved out of the laager, fixed bayonets, and advanced towards them, supported by case-shot from the artillery. They threw the Zulus on to the defensive and back over the rim, from where Hackett’s men poured fire down into the valley. The Zulus were also forced to abandon the cattle laager under stiff fire from the redoubt and the guns.

  In turn, however, Hackett came under heavy fire from warriors armed with Martini-Henry rifles deployed in the vacated huts of Wood’s Irregulars to the east, and from behind the camp’s refuse dump to the west. The Zulus behind the rubbish heaps belonged to the uMcijo ibutho which had been driven back by a company of the 1/13th that emerged from the southwest corner of the main laager (at about the time of Hackett’s sortie) with the aim of repulsing the regiment with the bayonet. Consequently, Hackett’s men were forced to withdraw to the main laager, taking with them their wounded commander, who had been shot in the face.

  At about this time, with Hackett falling back on the main laager, Wood was forced temporarily to withdraw a company of the 1/13th stationed at the right rear of the principal laager, owing to Zulu fire from behind the refuse dump. Moreover, the artillery shelled the Zulus among the huts, while the warriors sheltering behind the refuse dump were finally killed or put to flight by volleys of rifle fire that flattened the dumps.