The Zulus and Matabele: Warrior Nations

by Glen Lyndon Dodds

  The Matabele launched their assault before 4am. They intended to take the enemy by surprise but were thwarted, for the alarm was raised as they drew near in the darkness, and one of their regiments was not yet in position. Accounts differ as to how the invaders were alerted. Willoughby, for example, relates that one of the approaching Matabele fired his gun by mistake.

  The same source comments that at 3.50am, the sound of heavy firing was heard coming from the direction of the encampment to the rear of the Salisbury laager. That the Shona levies encamped on the rise were the first to be attacked is confirmed elsewhere. Forbes tells us that the ‘friendlies’ in question woke to find Matabele ‘upon them and stabbing them’, but that the survivors nonetheless managed to make their way to the laager.

  Following this, the force of the Matabele assault was principally directed against the rear and right faces of the Salisbury laager and the left and rear faces of the Victoria laager, though, to quote Willoughby, the Matabele soon began ‘a steady and continuous fire on all sides with Martini rifles and muzzle-loaders.’ Owing to the darkness, the Matabele could not be seen at first and their positions were only given away by the flashes that occurred when they discharged their firearms.

  In response, the defenders fired into the bush, employing both rifles and machine guns. Unfortunately, Shona levies guarding the captured cattle located in the enclosure near the laagers, panicked and ran towards the Victoria laager and as a result some of them were accidentally killed by machine gun fire.

  Despite the defenders’ stiff fire, Willoughby comments that in several places the Matabele managed to advance to within 150 yards of the laagers and that a small number got as close as under 80 yards and managed to stampede the captured cattle in the enclosure abandoned by the Shona levies. But most of the Matabele did not advance beyond the edge of the bushes and, after about twenty minutes of heavy enemy fire, were compelled to retire further into the bush and their firing ceased.

  Forbes then sent out some mounted men to ride around the vicinity and help bring in any levies who had failed to reach the sanctuary of the laagers. No serious resistance was encountered (a few shots were fired by Matabele lurking in the bushes) and the horsemen soon returned with a few Shona.

  Forbes records that shortly after this, ‘when it was getting light enough to see some distance’, a body of Matabele warriors between 200 and 300 strong—the Insuga regiment—began moving forward from a small rise about 350 yards to the southeast. They advanced down the slope in a casual, ‘most plucky’ manner, and opened fire upon reaching the bottom, while other Matabele recommenced shooting from the surrounding bush. But this assault likewise ended in failure. For instance, Forbes says that Insuga were subjected to very heavy fire by two or three Maxims and about 200 rifles, and so withdrew with much greater alacrity than they had approached.

  Subsequently, Forbes sent out 40 mounted men of the Salisbury Column to see if the enemy had withdrawn and horsemen likewise left the Victoria laager for the same purpose. Willoughby only mentions that troopers emerged from the Salisbury laager and says that they rode out at 4.45am while the light was still poor, whereas Forbes says that the mounted men left the laagers in broad daylight—dawn occurred around 5am. Perhaps they were referring to different incidents, but if so, the end result was the same, for both sources mention that the troopers were driven back. Forbes states that within half a mile or so of the laagers, each body of troopers made contact with the enemy and, ‘after a smart skirmish’, withdrew, pursued by the enemy until supported by the defenders’ Maxim fire.

  According to Forbes, following the return of the troopers, a large number of Matabele appeared on a small hill approximately 2,000 yards to the west, apparently in the process of reforming, but were dispersed by shellfire. For his part, Willoughby records that at 5.30am, following a lull, the Matabele attacked once again though in a less determined manner, and soon fell back before being reinforced by warriors (men who had not taken part in the earlier fighting) who took up a position about 2,200 yards southwest of the laagers—probably the same incident mentioned by Forbes. However, shellfire forced them to give ground.

  Subsequently, mounted troops re-emerged from the laager and moved against the Matabele, some of whom were now sheltering in deep dongas to the north and south. The troopers from the Victoria Column succeeded in dislodging a small number of enemy they came across and pursued them for some distance, reportedly killing many of them. On the other hand, Captain Spreckley from the Salisbury laager did not encounter any rebels in the direction he rode. This was also true, at least initially, of Captain Maurice Heany. He rode off northwest with his men for about 1,000 yards without seeing any enemy, but was about to engage Matabele to his front when he was attacked from both sides by a large number of warriors and thus conducted a fighting withdrawal. The Matabele in question duly took up a position behind a kopje and opened fire. In response, Forbes had them shelled by a 7-pounder and sent Heany (who had returned to the Salisbury laager) and Captain Henry Borrow against them. They found the Matabele gone. The desultory battle was over.

  Forbes states that only one European lost his life, a trooper of the Victoria Column who had been shot in the groin. He places the number of native levies killed at between 40 and 50, and says that several native women and children also died. Willoughby, on the other hand, says that 23 black levies were killed and that the wounded totalled 38, seven of whom were European.

  Matabele losses were undoubtedly heavier. For instance, A.J. de Roos, a Dutchman who served with the column, states that ‘the surrounding country was strewn with dead and wounded.’ Forbes put the figure of Matabele dead at least 500, while Willoughby estimated that perhaps as many as 600 lost their lives: both figures are, however, almost certainly too high.

  The column broke camp at 3pm and confidently pressed on, shadowed by the Matabele, who harassed them during subsequent days. On the 26th, the horse carrying Captain Gwynyth Williams, a former officer in the Royal Horse Guards, bolted and carried him off out of sight. As Forbes later learned, Williams was conveyed into broken terrain where he was killed in a fire-fight with warriors who had chased him. He was ‘a very great loss.’

  The Battle of Bembesi

  1 November 1893 witnessed the major engagement of the war. It occurred when the Matabele attacked the columns again when they were near the headwaters of the Bembesi River, about seventeen miles from Lobengula’s capital. The impi involved consisted of the veterans of Shangani and reinforcements from Bulawayo, most notably Imbizo, Lobengula’s finest regiment. The army likely numbered over 6,000 men, though slightly higher figures are sometimes given.

  At 11.50am, before battle was joined, the columns laagered on a small hill not far from the summit of an east-west ridge. The laagers were about 100 yards apart (that of the Salisbury Column was the northernmost) and some deserted huts lay between them. The countryside in the immediate vicinity was open, but thornbush was present on the ridge, about 350 yards or more to the north. Preparing lunch commenced, and some of the men began to mend clothing. Moreover, such was their confidence that they sent all their oxen and most of the horses a mile or so off to the south to graze and water on lower ground.

  The Matabele were concealed in the thornbush. According to Summers and Pagden, they were heading west through the woodland in a strung-out formation extending about three-quarters of a mile, intent on ambushing the columns beside the Umguza River near Bulawayo. At about 12.50pm, states Willoughby, ‘a dense mass of natives were seen emerging from the bush on a high ridge to the north-west’, about one and a half miles away. In response, 7-pounder shellfire commenced. The warriors, who belonged to Insuga, therefore faced the enemy, before hurriedly abandoning their exposed position to shelter in a fold of the ground that provided some cover, where they were to remain virtually throughout the battle.

  The vast majority of the Matabele, however, were still in the thornbush, and the regiments in
the centre of the line—most notably Imbizo and Ingubo, which were closest to the laagers—rapidly made their way towards the edge of the bush. As a result, a lax pair of picquets were taken by surprise, one of whom was stabbed to death while the other successfully ran for his life towards the Salisbury laager, which provided covering fire. As Forbes comments: ‘It was entirely owing to their own carelessness that they had been surprised, as although there were small patches of bush that were very thick, they could get a good view for 500 or 600 yards, and would have been quite safe if they had been keeping a proper look out.’ Willoughby tells us that the closest Matabele rushed through the bush ‘in splendid order’ and almost immediately occupied its outer fringe, from where they opened fire while other regiments moved up in support.

  Although some warriors unsuccessfully attacked the Victoria laager, the main Matabele thrust was against that of the Salisbury Column. Willoughby records that the assault was conducted ‘with great determination and admirable pluck’ but that the Matabele fire was generally ineffective for, as at Shangani, they mostly aimed too high.

  The majority of the defenders returned fire from behind the defences, but some behaved in a foolhardy manner by standing on the wagons, a risky stance even given the poor marksmanship of the enemy. One of those who did so was Mostyn William Barnard, who later recalled that the warriors ‘came on splendidly in short rushes, stopping to fire, and so on. They were not in mass or in line, but advanced more in the shape of a lot of locusts than anything else’. Cecil Paddon, another participant, relates that small bodies of Matabele repeatedly rushed forward in an attempt to come to blows, but were repulsed. A few others took advantage of an area of dead ground between the bush and the Salisbury laager, and crawled up to some half-built huts about 100 or 150 yards to the north of the laager, from where they opened fire, inflicting some casualties on the enemy. Eventually, they were forced to withdraw, leaving two of their number dead.

  Forbes comments that while the main attack was in progress against the right face of the Salisbury laager, several unsuccessful attempts ‘were made to get around us’—attempts which were thwarted by Maxim fire. This evidently included fire by guns belonging to the Victoria Column which was able to manoeuvre its 7-pounder and four machine guns—three Maxims and a Hotchkiss—so that they could assist the Salisbury laager.

  The Maxims proved particularly deadly during the course of the battle. Imbizo suffered the most, and one of their number, Ntabeni Khumalo, later remarked that when the machine guns ‘opened fire they killed such a lot of us that we were taken by surprise. The wounded and the dead lay in heaps.’ For his part, Willoughby comments:

  The Maxims especially, and all the machine guns, played a most important part throughout, and, without their assistance, I think it is doubtful whether the rifle fire brought to bear could have succeeded in repelling the rush; the Matabele themselves have since stated that they did not fear our rifles so much, but that they could not stand against the Maxims.

  Willoughby was impressed by the spirit of the warriors of Imbizo and Ingubo: ‘I cannot speak too highly of the pluck of these two regiments. I believe that no civilised army could have withstood the terrific fire they did for at most half as long.’ De Vere Stent, a journalist who was with the column, echoed his sentiments: ‘The facing of the Maxims by the Ingubo regiment at a distance of a hundred and ten yards, [he no doubt underestimated the distance somewhat] was, perhaps one of the most magnificent displays of physical courage that Africa has ever seen.’

  Forbes states that the Matabele assault lasted for about 40 minutes, whereupon the demoralised warriors began retiring, doing so ‘in a sulky sort of way . . . walking quietly back until they were out of sight.’ His timescale harmonises with that of Willoughby, who relates that at 1.30pm the Matabele began to show signs of having had enough of the murderous fire to which they had been subjected and began withdrawing into the bush.

  Meanwhile, when hostilities had commenced, the oxen and horses were recalled and it was at about 1.25pm, shortly before the Matabele assaults ceased, that the horses reached the scene, whereupon some of them, frightened by the din of battle, stampeded. They ran off northwest in the direction of two Matabele regiments, Ihlati and Isiziba, which fired on them. Hence they turned southward and, in due course, were brought back to the wagons by a few white horsemen, following an abortive attempt by Insuga to capture the animals. On the other hand, the oxen remained in the open throughout the battle, a short distance to the south of the laagers, protected by a small guard.

  Firing ceased shortly before 2pm, whereupon two parties left the laagers. A hundred dismounted men were sent to clear the enemy from the bush. They advanced in skirmishing order and drove off warriors they encountered. At the same time, a troop of mounted men headed off northwest in pursuit of Insuga. At about 2.15pm, however, they suddenly found themselves under attack as Matabele charged out of the bushes towards them on their right flank. Shell and Maxim fire, though, forced the warriors to retreat back into cover.

  A Matabele warrior in the 1890s, wearing an unusual black ostrich feather headdress. ©National Archives of Zimbabwe

  According to A.J. de Roos, at least 1,000 Matabele must have died in the battle. Willoughby states that no less than 800 to 1,000 warriors were either killed or wounded and that Lobengula’s two finest regiments seemed to have been ‘practically annihilated’. Forbes does not give an overall figure for Matabele casualties, but states that Imbizo must have had about 500 of their number (which he places at 700) either killed or wounded. A modern commentator, Julian Cobbing, rejects such figures, and calls attention to the fact that on 1 January 1894, the missionary, Helm, wrote that Imbizo and two other regiments between them only lost about 130 men in the entire campaign. Likely, Matabele losses were over-estimated by de Roos and other contemporaries. Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to conclude that the campaign entailed more serious fighting than Cobbing maintains, though some Matabele regiments undoubtedly performed in a cautious manner.

  The victors’ casualties were low. No members of the Victoria Column died, while one member of the Salisbury Column was killed and eight wounded, two of whom subsequently died of their injuries. Willoughby states that the native levies sustained no casualties because they huddled together in the huts, while Forbes notes that a ‘coolie’ was shot in the arm.

  The following day, the invaders resumed their march on Bulawayo. On 3 November, they heard a massive explosion emanating from its direction. Prior to the Battle of Bembesi, Lobengula had abandoned his capital and had ordered its destruction if his warriors were defeated. Bulawayo had thus been torched—the explosion was caused by the destruction of his supplies of gunpowder and ammunition—and was still smouldering when the column entered on the 4th.

  The advance of the Southern Column

  Meanwhile, the third invasion force, the Southern Column, had likewise advanced into Matabele territory. It was commanded by Colonel Goold-Adams of the Bechuanaland Border Police and consisted of the BBP Loch had ordered to assemble at Macloutsie, as well as Commandant Pieter Raaff’s force of volunteers, for on 6 October Jameson had instructed the latter to act jointly with the BBP, following a request to that effect by the High Commissioner.

  The Southern Column set off from Macloutsie on 11 October, having been slowed down by Raaff’s late departure from Tuli which, much to the fury of Loch, he only left on the 10th. Jameson, who wished to retard Goold-Adams’ progress so that the Salisbury and Victoria columns could arrive at Bulawayo before the imperial forces, had ordered Raaf to delay his departure. The Southern Column numbered 450 officers and men, half of whom belonged to Raaff’s contingent, and its armament included five Maxims.

  On 18 October, the column was at Tati, having been reinforced en route by Khama (who had been approached by Loch to render military assistance) and nearly 2,000 of his Ngwato, about half of whom possessed Martini-Henry rifles. Moreover, at Tati, Adams was joi
ned by Selous who had expressly made his way out from England for the campaign.

  The evening of the l9th witnessed the column’s departure from Tati as Goold-Adams pressed eastwards. On the 29th he arrived beside the Sinquesi River and laagered. He had left part of the column at a previous encampment, about ten miles behind on the Ramaquabane River, and the following day he ordered it to join him, aware that at least 3,000 Matabele warriors under Gampo Sithole were about twelve miles ahead.

  Most of the force left beside the Ramaquabane arrived on 1 November, but part of it under Captain Thomas A. Tancred halted about three miles short of Goold-Adams’ camp, for their oxen were exhausted. Tancred thus outspanned and sent the stock to the nearest watering place. His command consisted of 35 members of the BBP, ten of the Chartered Company Police, and 100 Africans, while his armament included two Maxims.

  Anxious to rejoin the bulk of the Southern Column, Tancred advanced early the next morning with part of his command, leaving the rest to follow in his wake. But at 8.15am, when he was approximately halfway, he was attacked by about 650 Matabele. The sound of gunfire was heard by Goold-Adams, and mounted men hurriedly rode out of the laager to Tancred’s aid. Selous was foremost among them, and was wounded upon his arrival. Thus assisted, Tancred’s party was able to continue with the reinforcements. However, they came under increasing pressure as more and more Matabele arrived on the scene. The warriors maintained the pressure until driven off by the Maxims in Goold-Adams’ laager and fell back into the surrounding hills. They were pursued by Goold-Adams’ horsemen and Khama’s troops, and were shelled by 7-pounders. By 11.30 that morning, hostilities were over. Gampo had not committed his entire command to the attack, which was largely undertaken by the Nyamayendlovu regiment, and of the Southern Column only two whites and a small number of natives had been killed. Selous estimated Matabele losses as about 100 men.