The Last Warrior

by Andrew F. Krepinevich

  53. A. W. Marshall, “The Improvement in Intelligence Estimates Through Studies of Organizational Behavior (U),” seminar background paper for Board of Trustees meeting, March 15, 1968, 1–7.

  54. A. W. Marshall, “Problems of Estimating Military Power,” RAND P-3417, August 1966.

  55. Ibid., 2.

  56. Ibid., 9.

  57. Ibid., 17.

  58. Ibid., 16.

  59. Ibid., 21.

  60. Marshall, “1969–1975,” interview by Guthe, 5–21.

  61. A. W. Marshall, letter to Ivan Selin, RAND L-23604, December 15, 1967, 1.

  62. A. W. Marshall and S. G. Winter, “Program of Studies in the Analysis of Organizational Behavior,” RAND L-4277, draft March 3, 1967. A. W. Marshall and S. G. Winter, “A RAND Department of ‘Management Sciences’—the Case in Brief,” RAND L-4277, draft March 3, 1967.

  63. A. W. Marshall and S. G. Winter, “A RAND Department of ‘Management Sciences’—the Case in Brief,” RAND M-8668, December 29, 1967, 1.

  64. A. W. Marshall, “Attachment II: Problems and Hypotheses Concerning Soviet Behavior (U),” RAND, July 16, 1968.

  65. A. W. Marshall, “Comparisons, R&D Strategy, and Policy Issues,” RAND WN-7630-DDRE, October 1971, 25.

  Chapter 4: The Birth of Net Assessment, 1969–1973

  1. James S. Lay, “Directive for a Net Capabilities Evaluation Subcommittee,” NSC 5423, June 23, 1954 (originally top secret; declassified February 1987).

  2. William Z. Slany, chief ed., Lisle A. Rose and Neal H. Petersen, eds., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, vol. 2, part 1, National Security Affairs (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1984), 332–33. We now know that this report overstated the capability of LRA’s bombers. Steven J. Zaloga, The Kremlin’s Nuclear Sword, 15–16, 24, 26, 28.

  3. Robert R. Bowie, NSC 140/1, “Summary Evaluation of the Net Capability of the USSR to Inflict Direct Damage on the United States up to July 1, 1955” memorandum for the secretary of state, June 2, 1953 (originally top secret; declassified March 1976), 1.

  4. Ibid., 2.

  5. David S. Peterson, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, vol. 10, National Security Policy (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 2002), 202.

  6. Ibid.

  7. McGeorge Bundy, “Discontinuance of the Net Evaluation Subcommittee of the National Security Council,” National Security Action Memorandum No. 327, March 18, 1965.

  8. General Leon W. Johnson, memorandum to R. B. Foster, December 9, 1968.

  9. John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961, available at http://www.jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/BqXIEM9F4024ntFl7SVAjA.aspx?gclid=COznv9bwt7sCFa9lOgod2kcAkw, accessed December 18, 2013.

  10. Thomas Powers, The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 200–206.

  11. See comments by Russell Jack Smith (then deputy director for intelligence) in his The Unknown CIA: My Three Decades with the Agency (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989), 205.

  12. For a discussion of ONE and its decline, see Harold P. Ford, Estimative Intelligence: The Purposes and Problems of National Intelligence Estimating, rev. ed. (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1993), 81–105. See also William Colby and Peter Forbath, Honorable Men: My Life in the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 351; and Ray S. Cline, Secrets Spies and Scholars: Blueprint of the Essential CIA (Washington, DC: Acropolis Books, 1976), 135–40.

  13. Andrew Marshall, “Outline for DIS Presentation, November 15, 1972”; and Andrew Marshall, notes for “Talk to CIA Training Course” (section on new methods), February 15, 1973.

  14. Andrew Marshall, “Intelligence and Crisis Management,” in Crisis Decision Making in the Atlantic Alliance: Perspectives on Deterrence, Gen. Jack N. Merritt, Gen. Robert Reed, and Roger Weissinger-Baylon, eds. (Menlo Park, CA: Strategic Decisions Press, n.d.), 8–1, 8–2.

  15. A. W. Marshall, “Intelligence Inputs for Major Issues: A Substantive Evaluation and Proposal for Improvement,” memorandum for Henry A. Kissinger, NSC, May 1, 1970, 2; and Marshall, “1969–1975,” interview by Guthe, 5–12.

  16. Marshall, “Intelligence Inputs for Major Issues: A Substantive Evaluation and Proposal for Improvement,” memorandum for Henry A. Kissinger, NSC, May 1, 1970, 4–5, 7–9.

  17. Ibid., 3.

  18. A. W. Marshall, “Net Assessment of US and Soviet Force Posture: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations,” 2.

  19. Marshall, “1969–1975,” interview by Guthe, 5–14.

  20. Ibid.; K. Wayne Smith, “Meeting of Special Defense Panel,” memorandum for Dr. Kissinger, September 29, 1970, top secret sensitive (declassified August 17, 2000), 1.

  21. A. W. Marshall, “Net Assessment of US and Soviet Force Posture,” NSC, 1970, top secret (declassified March 26, 2004), 7.

  22. A. W. Marshall, “Net Assessment of US and Soviet Force Posture: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations,” NSC, 1970, top secret (declassified March 26, 2004), 1.

  23. Marshall, “Net Assessment of US and Soviet Force Posture,” 10.

  24. Marshall, “Net Assessment of US and Soviet Force Posture: Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations,” 2.

  25. Blue Ribbon Defense Panel, Defense for Peace: Report to the President and the Secretary of Defense on the Department of Defense, July 1, 1970, 7, 59, 215–16.

  26. Marshall, “1969–1975,” interview by Guthe, 5–15.

  27. Ibid., 5–16.

  28. Barry D. Watts, “Net Assessment at CIA; Nixon’s Intelligence Reorganization,” interview with A. W. Marshall, July 26, 2005.

  29. J. R. Schlesinger, “A Review of the Intelligence Community,” March 10, 1971, redacted copy, 1, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB144/, accessed January 6, 2013. For a discussion of Schlesinger’s study from CIA’s perspective, see Garthoff, Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the US Intelligence Community, 1946–2005, 65–69.

  30. Schlesinger, “A Review of the Intelligence Community,” 5, 8, 9, 10. A 1974 CIA review of major studies of the intelligence community going back to 1960 argued that the “cumulative impact” of these studies was “necessarily more negative than the intelligence community’s record of achievement would warrant”; CIA, “An Historical Review of Studies of the Intelligence Community for the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy,” December 1974, preface, available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB144/.

  31. “Comments on ‘A Review of the Intelligence Community.’” undated, 2–3, also available at http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB144/.

  32. Schlesinger, “A Review of the Intelligence Community,” 29–30.

  33. “Comments on ‘A Review of the Intelligence Community,’” 31–33; and Richard M. Nixon, “Organization and Management of the US Foreign Intelligence Community,” memorandum, November 5, 1971, 4–5.

  34. Marshall, “1969–75,” interview by Guthe, 5–16.

  35. Barry D. Watts, “Marshall’s Role in Nixon’s Intelligence Reorganization; the Interagency Process,” interview with A. W. Marshall, July 31, 2005.

  36. Nixon, “Organization and Management of the US Intelligence Community,” 5–6.

  37. Marshall, “1969–1975,” interview by Guthe, 5–17; and Nixon, “Organization and Management of the US Foreign Intelligence Community,” 6; “Net Assessment Group,” March 8, 1972; and memo, J. Fred Buzhardt, general counsel of the Department of Defense, to the secretary of defense, subject: Establishment of Net Assessment Group, n.d.

  38. “Director of Net Assessment,” DoD Directive 5015.39, December 6, 1971. The directive established the net assessment director as “the principal staff advisor and assistant to the Secretary of Defense on net assessment,” and included among his responsibilities developing assessments of current and projected US and foreign military capabilities as well as preparing the net assessment portion of the defense secretary’s annual report to Cong
ress.

  39. Letter, Andrew Marshall to Michel Crozier, November 2, 1973.

  40. A. W. Marshall, memorandum for the record, “Definition of the National Net Assessment Process,” NSC, March 26, 1972, 1.

  41. Andrew W. Marshall, “The Nature and Scope of Net Assessments,” NSC memorandum, August 16, 1972, 1.

  42. Ibid., 2.

  43. Ibid. [Authors’ emphasis.]

  44. Ibid.

  45. Ibid., 1–2.

  46. Ibid., 1.

  47. Ibid., 2. [Authors’ emphasis.]

  48. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1948), 36.

  49. Richard Rumelt, Good Strategy, Bad Strategy (New York: Crown Business, 2011), 62.

  50. Marshall, “The Nature and Scope of Net Assessments,” 2.

  51. Ibid., 2.

  52. Ibid., 2–3.

  53. Marshall, “1969–1975,” interview by Guthe, 5–2.

  54. Henry A. Kissinger, “Program for National Net Assessment,” NSSM 178, March 29, 1973.

  55. National Security Decision Memorandum (NSDM) 224 (“National Net Assessment Process”), and NSSM 186 (“National Net Assessment of Comparative Costs and Capabilities of US and Soviet Military Establishments”). The titles and dates of all Nixon administration NSDMs and NSSMs can be found on the Federation of American Scientists’ website, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/direct.htm.

  56. Henry A. Kissinger, “National Net Assessment of the Comparative Costs and Capabilities of US and Soviet Military Establishments,” NSC, NSSM 186, September 1, 1973.

  57. Kissinger became secretary of state on September 22, 1973, a position he held until January 20, 1977. However, he continued as national security adviser to the president until November 1975, the only period since 1947 in which the same individual has held both positions.

  58. A. W. Marshall, “Departure Planning,” memorandum for Brent Scowcroft, October 3, 1973, 1.

  59. Andrew Marshall, “Dinner Remarks,” March 28, 2008, cited in Mie Augier and Barry D. Watts, “Conference Report on the Past, Present, and Future of Net Assessment,” unpublished paper, 2009, 151.

  Chapter 5: Moving to the Pentagon, 1973–1975

  1. A. W. Marshall, “Departure Planning,” memorandum for Brent Scowcroft, October 3, 1973, unclassified.

  2. J. R. Schlesinger, “Net Assessment,” memorandum for the secretaries of the military departments, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the director of defense research and engineering, the assistant secretary of defense (intelligence), the assistant secretary of defense (international security affairs), the director of defense program analysis and evaluation, and the assistant to the secretary and deputy secretary, October 13, 1973, unclassified.

  3. Henry A. Kissinger, “National Net Assessment Process,” National Security Council, NSDM 239, November 27, 1973.

  4. Henry A. Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1979), 195–204.

  5. Harold Brown, testimony, January 31, 1979, Department of Defense Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1980, hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, 96th Congress, 1st session, 278.

  6. President Richard M. Nixon, broadcast to the nation, January 23, 1973, accessed at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=3808#axzz2gm8H8SaS.

  7. “Watching Birds and Budgets,” Time, February 11, 1974, 16.

  8. A. W. Marshall, “1969–1975,” interview with Kurt Guthe, December 14, 1993, 5–31; Barry D. Watts, notes from telephone discussion with Phillip A. Karber, August 13, 2005. The position of assistant secretary of defense (systems analysis) changed to the director, program analysis and evaluation, on April 11, 1973.

  9. Barry D. Watts, “Selecting Key Balances, Coordination,” interview with A. W. Marshall, July 22, 2005.

  10. A. W. Marshall, “1973–1980,” interview by Kurt Guthe, April 9, 1994, unclassified, 6–11.

  11. The Soviet Union required its conscripts to serve for two years. One might expect soldiers at the end of that time to be considerably more proficient at soldiering than those who has just been inducted.

  12. Watts, “Early Days of Net Assessment Discussion,” October 1, 2002, 5.

  13. Barry Watts, notes from a discussion with Phillip Karber, A. W. Marshall, and Andrew May, September 19, 2005.

  14. A. W. Marshall, memo to Schlesinger on Project 186 Phase I, July 30, 1974.

  15. Barry D. Watts, “Early Days of Net Assessment Discussion,” October 1, 2002, 5.

  16. “Project 186, Phase 1 Report (Ground Forces),” secretary of defense talking points for a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 30, 1974, unclassified, 2.

  17. Marshall, “1973–1980,” interview by Guthe, 6–9.

  18. Barry D. Watts, “Early Days of Net Assessment Discussion,” 3.

  19. Marshall, “1973–1980,” interview by Guthe, 6–33.

  20. Marshall, “The Formative Period of the Office of Net Assessment,” 4.

  21. Marshall, “The Formative Period of the Office of Net Assessment,” 5.

  22. On the grounds that methodologies for doing net assessments “are virtually nonexistent,” and because data problems abounded, Marshall’s August 1972 NSC paper, “The Nature and Scope of Net Assessments,” observed, “Initial assessments are bound to be crude, tentative, and controversial.”

  23. A. W. Marshall, “Comments on the US/Soviet Navy Net Assessment,” memorandum for Rear Admiral Harry Train, February 7, 1974, 1 (declassified August 6, 2004).

  24. ONA’s military investment balance did not, of course, ignore each side’s total military consumption, including resources allocated to operations and maintenance. However, Robert Gough, who drafted three versions of this balance in the late 1970s, points out that the term investment was deliberately chosen to emphasize Soviet military spending aimed at producing future military capability. Robert G. Gough, e-mail to Barry D. Watts, September 27, 2004.

  25. Andrew May and Barry D. Watts, Interview with Dr. James Schlesinger, February 8, 2006.

  26. Ibid.

  27. Ibid.

  28. Marshall, “1969–1975,” interview by Guthe, 5–40.

  29. Barry D. Watts, interview with A. W. Marshall, July 23, 2004.

  30. Marshall recalled some meetings with CIA representatives. He was finally given a paper on the subject that he found “totally unconvincing.” In it the CIA conceded that its estimates could at the most be off by about 1 percent—in either direction!

  31. A. W. Marshall, “Memo for NA Staff,” November 17, 1976.

  32. More than thirty years after the establishment of ONA, when former staff member Andrew Krepinevich was teaching a graduate course on net assessment, he showed Marshall a draft of a “notional” structure of what he intended to give the students, asking him whether it was accurate. Marshall’s only reply was that the structure was generally correct.

  33. The source is Krepinevich, who made the statement to a colleague while serving on Marshall’s staff.

  34. As Project 186 evolved, it eventually added assessments of the forces on NATO’s northern and southern flanks and explored reinforcements from the United States and the western military districts of the USSR.

  35. Barry D. Watts, notes from, discussion of P-186 with Phillip A. Karber, Andrew Marshall, Barry D. Watts, and Andrew May, September 19, 2005, 2.

  36. Andrew May, “RE: P-186 and the Balances,” e-mail to Barry D. Watts, October 19, 2005.

  37. During the 1970s and early 1980s Kuklinski, an army officer on the Polish general staff who also acted as a liaison with Moscow, provided the CIA with thousands of secret documents as well as insights into the plans and thinking of the Warsaw Pact. James Risen, “Ryszard Kuklinki, 73, Spy in Poland in Cold War, Dies,” New York Times, February 12, 2004.

  38. Diego Ruiz-Palmer in “Conference Report on the Past, Present and Future of Net Assessment,” by Mie Augier and Barry D. Watts, “Conference Report on the Past, Present and Future of N
et Assessment,” unpublished paper, 2009, 79–81. Other prominent members of Karber’s Project 186 team included John Milam, A. Grant Whitley, Douglas Komer, Graham Turbiville, and Jon Lellenberg. When Karber left BDM in 1988, Milam succeeded him and continued to run Project 186 until 1996.

  39. Allan Rehm, “The Background of Project Eager,” March 2002, 4–5. Marshall, along with the CIA’s Strategic Evaluation Center and Pat Parker, the Pentagon’s assistant secretary of defense for intelligence, had sponsored Rehm’s earlier research on Soviet operations research while he was at the Center for Naval Analyses.

  40. See, for example, Judith K. Grange and John A. Battilega, “The Soviet Framework for Planning and Analysis, (U),” Foreign Systems Research Center SAI-83–103-FSRC-B, SAI, October 31, 1983.

  41. John Battilega, in “Conference Report on the Past, Present and Future of Net Assessment,” by Mie Augier and Barry D. Watts, unpublished conference report, 2009, 95.

  42. Peter W. Rodman, Presidential Command (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009), 93–94.

  43. Hugh Sidey, “We Are Going to Win—But How?,” Time, December 1, 1975, 16.

  44. Ibid.

  45. A. W. Marshall, “The Formative Period of the Office of Net Assessment,” OSD/NA memorandum, September 3, 2002, 5.

  46. Sergey Modestov, “The Pentagon’s Gray Cardinal (Éminence Grise) Andrew Marshall—Ideologist of the New American Revolution in Military Affairs,” Nezavisimaya Gazeta, December 14, 1995.

  Chapter 6: The Maturation of Net Assessment, 1976–1980

  1. “Interview with James R. Schlesinger,” February 8, 2006, in Barry D. Watts, “Interviews and Materials on the Intellectual History of Diagnostic Net Assessment,” July 2006, 110.

  2. A. W. Marshall, “Future Directions for Net Assessment,” OSD/NA memorandum for Eugene Fubini, February 28, 1977, 1.

  3. Ibid., 2.

  4. A. W. Marshall and J. G. Roche, “Strategy for Competing with the Soviets in the Military Sector of the Continuing Political-Military Competition,” OSD/NA paper, July 26, 1976, A-2.

  5. Ibid., A-4.

  6. Ibid., B-1. These basic assessments were followed by discussions of the trends and asymmetries in each competition.