1916

by Gabriel Doherty

  Although the plans for the Rising were worked out in 1915 and early 1916, under the leadership of Tom Clarke, the number of people involved remained a handful of the IRB and Volunteer leadership. The Americans had facilitated the movement of messengers in and out of Germany, but John Devoy was not informed of the actual Rising until 5 February 1916. He recounted receiving a coded message through Tommy O’Connor from the Supreme Council of the IRB. O’Connor began to decipher the message, but when the first sentence read ‘Nobody but the Revolutionary Directory and the chief German representative must know the contents of this,’ Devoy took the message home and decoded the rest of it himself. The key passage informed him that the Rising would take place on Easter Sunday, 23 April 1916 and that the Germans were to ‘send a shipload of arms to Limerick quay’ between 20 and 23 April.50 Devoy immediately took these instructions to Captain von Papen, and the Germans provided a ship, the Libau , sailing by the name Aud , a similar Norwegian vessel. The ship was loaded with captured Russian rifles and ammunition, and the key element for an effective military effort in the Rising was set in motion. On 14 April, another courier, Philomena Plunkett, the daughter of Count Plunkett, delivered a note with instructions that the weapons be delivered on Saturday 22 April. Devoy duly conveyed this change of date to von Papen and the message was sent to Germany. However, the Aud had already sailed and, without a radio, was beyond reach.51

  When the ship arrived off Tralee on the 20th, as arranged, there were no Volunteers to meet it – a result, perhaps, of the extreme secrecy surrounding the whole enterprise. The vessel was eventually hailed by a royal navy ship and escorted to Cobh (Queenstown) where its crew scuttled the ship. This misadventure deprived the Rising of a substantial supply of weapons and had the additional consequence of upsetting the timing by one day. In a second misadventure, Casement, by this time disillusioned with the Germans and disappointed in his effort to recruit a substantial Irish brigade from among Irish prisoners of war, was brought by submarine to Tralee Bay where he, Captain Robert Monteith and Sergeant Julian Beverley (Daniel J. Bailey) were landed on Banna Strand. Although Casement and Beverley were soon arrested, Monteith avoided detection in 1916 and eventually made his way to the United States. Casement may have hoped to cancel the Rising, but his capture, together with that of the Aud , certainly contributed to Eoin MacNeill’s decision to do so. Thus when the Rising started on Easter Monday morning, on the orders of Pearse, Clarke, Connolly, and the others, the chance for surprise, for new weapons from Germany, and for a full complement of the Volunteers, had been lost.

  The circumstances of the Rising in Dublin on Easter Monday 24 April 1916 are examined elsewhere in this volume. When the General Post Office was captured a coded message was sent to John Devoy in New York, ‘Tom successfully operated today’, which alerted him and his Clan colleagues to the fact that the insurrection had started.52 For the next few weeks Devoy and others had to rely on the garbled newspaper reports from Ireland and Britain. Devoy’s Gaelic American printed brave stories that were largely conjecture.53 The reaction across the United States, among both the general public and most of the Irish-American community, was largely disapproval of the Rising as a mad escapade, probably rather cynically prompted by the Germans. However, with the executions of the signatories to the Proclamation and several others, opinion shifted to increasing criticism of the British authorities. Within the Irish-American community, the newly organised FOIF became a driving force in arranging for public meetings and passionate speakers denouncing Britain’s ruthlessness and its hypocrisy in purporting to wage a war in Europe in defence of small nations. Even people outside the Irish community could see the irony in the situation. Theodore Roosevelt wrote to a friend in England:

  I wish your people had not shot the leaders of the Irish rebels after they surrendered. It was a prime necessity that the rebellion should be stamped out at once, and that the men should be ruthlessly dealt with while the fighting went on; but [Sir Edward] Carson himself had just been in the cabinet, and he and the Ulstermen about two years previously had been so uncomfortably near doing the same thing, and yet had been so unconditionally pardoned, that I think it would have been the better part of wisdom not to extract the death penalty …54

  The political dimension of these protests focused in the summer of 1916 on several congressional resolutions asking the British government to spare the life of Roger Casement, tried and convicted of treason in London in June. After extensive discussion the Senate passed a modified resolution seeking clemency for ‘Irish political prisoners’ on Saturday 29 July. The document was delivered to the White House, sent to the State Department, and then on 2 August encoded and cabled to the embassy in London and decoded there. The result was that although the resolution was delivered to the Foreign Secretary on the morning of 3 August, Casement had been hanged earlier that day. The British government had been kept fully informed of this whole procedure by their ambassador in the United States, Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, who told the Foreign Secretary privately: ‘You will of course be prepared for a great explosion of anti-British sentiment to take place in case of Casement’s execution.’55 This refusal of the British government to be moved by this appeal from the United States provided plenty of ammunition to the Clan and the FOIF in their subsequent campaigns on behalf of Irish independence.

  A more practical response to the Easter Rising in the United States was the creation of the Irish Relief Fund, which raised between $100,000 and $150,000. Despite letters of introduction from the American secretary of state, when Thomas Hughes Kelly and Joseph Smith attempted to distribute the relief money in Ireland they were denied entry, although surprisingly their two more politically extreme assistants, John A. Murphy and John Gill, were allowed to enter unmolested. Murphy and Gill worked with the Irish National Aid Association and the Irish Volunteer Dependents’ Fund to distribute the funds.56 Murphy reported that over 1,300 families had been assisted and about $25,000 a month expended.57 Difficulties over the Irish Relief Fund, together with the unsuccessful Senate resolution on behalf of Casement, along with other matters more specifically related to the war, contributed to the steady decline in Anglo-American relations throughout 1916.

  After the United States itself entered the war in April 1917, President Wilson, in the hope of eliminating a conspicuous source of British-American animosity, asked his ambassador in London to urge the British Prime Minister, David Lloyd George, to make an effort to implement some form of self-government in Ireland. In response Lloyd George, who had his own experience with this intractable problem, created the Irish Convention. The chairman of the convention was Sir Horace Plunkett, a man particularly well known and respected in the United States. The Convention did ease Anglo-American relations during the war, but it failed to devise an acceptable form of Irish self-government. Wilson was also troubled by those Irish-Americans who had identified so completely with Germany in the war that they could not accept the entry of the United States on the same side as Great Britain. John Devoy, Judge Cohalan, Joseph McGarrity, Jeremiah A. O’Leary, James K. McGuire, John T. Ryan, and others came under some degree of persecution by the American government for their actions.58

  Once the war was over, and the newly re-organised Sinn Féin party successfully replaced the Irish party in the 1918 general election, Irish-Americans returned to a very public campaign for Irish independence. Another Irish race convention was held in Philadelphia on 22 and 23 February 1919. In addition to endorsing the outcome of the 1918 election in Ireland, the convention set in motion arrangements for the meeting of a delegation with President Wilson to urge that he work for Irish independence at the Paris peace conference. The convention also created the American Commission on Irish Independence that went to Paris and Ireland to try to obtain admittance for an Irish delegation to the peace conference. Although unsuccessful, the commission did keep the Irish question before the leading figures at the peace conference and it generated a great deal of publicity for the Irish cause.59 T
he FOIF also launched the Irish Victory Fund which raised $1,000,000, which was used to finance the American Commission on Irish Independence, the early stages of the Irish bond certificate campaign, and numerous other Irish publicity activities in the United States.60 The Irish-American community helped to support the government of Dáil Éireann by purchasing $5,746,360 of bond certificates in a campaign launched in 1920 by Éamon de Valera during his trip to the United States. As the War for Independence ran on from 1919 to 1921, the destruction and misery caused stirred the humanitarian sympathies of Irish-Americans, who in turn contributed $5,069,194 to the American Committee for Relief in Ireland, which distributed these funds to the Irish White Cross in Ireland.61 The nature of the conflict also stimulated the creation of the American Commission on Conditions in Ireland, a public body that held hearings in the United States on the nature of the war in Ireland. All of these efforts kept the Irish cause before the American public while many in the Irish-American nationalist movement clashed with de Valera during his trip to the United States. This clash resulted in a split in the movement and the creation in 1920 of a pro-de Valera organisation called the American Association for the Recognition of the Irish Republic.

  Throughout all of this, from the election of the Irish party candidates in 1910 to the creation of the Irish Free State in 1921, the Irish-American community had a vital and dynamic role in the nationalist struggle in Ireland. Clan na Gael had helped revive the IRB, supported the Irish Volunteers, facilitated Casement’s mission to Germany, provided the link to Germany during the war, and gave assistance after the Rising. Irish-Americans gave generously to every nationalist cause. Even the American government, albeit cautiously, attempted to nudge the British forward in dealing with Ireland. When the 1916 Proclamation called on Ireland’s ‘exiled children in America’ it was not an idle gesture. The ‘exiled children’ were ready and they answered the call.

  THE EASTER RISING IN THE CONTEXT

  OF CENSORSHIP AND PROPAGANDA

  WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE

  TO MAJOR IVON PRICE

  _________________

  Brian P. Murphy

  ‘Ireland is like an exam paper: all questions, no answers.’1 That was the observation of Arthur Clery and his dictum applies to many events in Irish history. It certainly is applicable to any telling of the story of the Easter Rising of 1916. This paper attempts to examine the events surrounding the Rising, both its causes and consequences, in the light of the censorship and propaganda that were taking place at that time.

  Special reference is paid to Major Ivon Price (1866–1931), for several reasons. Firstly, he was appointed chief intelligence officer at the Irish military command at the outbreak of war in August 1914. In this capacity Price had a leading role in the application of the Defence of the Realm Act (DORA) of August 1914 in such areas as the press, the post and the surveillance of persons. This paper attempts to give not only some idea of the dissemination of the ‘Sinn Féin propaganda’ (especially the views of Pearse and Casement) to which Price objected in his evidence to the royal commission appointed to investigate the causes of the Rising, but also some outline of the methods that he used to counter it.

  Secondly, Price’s evidence to the commission was used extensively in its final report, possibly more than any other witness, and influenced its conclusion. This paper attempts to evaluate the worth of that evidence.

  Thirdly, Price’s role during the Rising and afterwards was significant, notably his attempt to bribe Eoin MacNeill to give false evidence against John Dillon and his comment on the murder of Francis Sheehy Skeffington by Captain Bowen Colthurst that ‘some of us think that it was a good thing Sheehy Skeffington was put out of the way, anyhow.’ This paper addresses these two issues and suggests some reasons why the ideals of the Easter Rising became acceptable, despite the continued efforts of Major Price and the British authorities to silence the growth of Irish republicanism.

  INTRODUCTION

  The evidence of Major Price to the royal commission on the rebellion in Ireland, which began its inquiry on 18 May 1916 at Westminster and published its findings on 3 July, may serve as an introduction to this study on the theme of censorship, propaganda and the Easter Rising. His evidence may also serve as a warning to the uncritical acceptance of original sources: his christian name was Ivon, not Ivor, as named in the royal commission.2

  Ivon Price occupied a central position in the British administration in Ireland from the start of the war until the Easter Rising and after. A former member of the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC), he had been seconded to the army in August 1914 where he was given the rank of major and, as indicated above, served in the intelligence section of army headquarters. Price brought to his task considerable skills: he had a law degree from Trinity College Dublin, and he had experience in the crime special branch department, which specialised in political work.3 As chief intelligence officer, Price acted as an intermediary not only between the army and the civil authority at Dublin Castle but also between the army and the police authorities, both the RIC and the Dublin Metropolitan Police (DMP).4

  When the first shots of the Easter Rising were fired outside the walls of Dublin Castle, on Easter Monday, 24 April 1916, Price was discussing Irish affairs with Sir Matthew Nathan, under secretary, and Arthur Norway, secretary to the Irish Post Office, inside the grounds of the castle. On the same day he made an armed intervention against rebels in the City Hall adjoining Dublin Castle. The physical proximity of Price to the events of the Rising and the centrality of his role in the Irish administration prior to the Rising makes his testimony to the royal commission extremely valuable. On a personal level it should be noted that his evidence was given in the context of the recent death of his son, Lieutenant Ernest Dickinson Price, who was killed in action on 19 March 1916 at La Targette in France.5

  When asked by the commissioners concerning the state of propaganda in Ireland, Price replied frankly that ‘his information was that the army lost 50,000 men as the result of the Sinn Féin propaganda in Ireland.’6 Propaganda was, and is, a servant of policy and Price’s observation of the effect of Sinn Féin propaganda on recruiting illustrated perfectly the two priorities of British government policy in Ireland after the outbreak of war on 4 August 1914: recruiting, and, on the world stage, the general conduct of the war. British propaganda reflected these two aims. However, in Ireland the introduction of a home rule bill by Asquith’s Liberal government in April 1912 had created another political issue which generated its own propaganda and which remained an important issue during the war years.

  For example, the Curragh ‘mutiny’ of 20 March 1914 provoked Eoin MacNeill and Roger Casement to write a joint letter to the Irish Independent on 27 March 1914. Adverting to the power of the press, they claimed: ‘we can trace in the English unionist press for months past the anticipation of, and preparation for the great military coup d’état ,’ and they concluded that ‘the thing that speaks to the world is the whole hearted and unanimous endorsement of the Curragh pronunciamento by the leaders and spokesmen of the English governing classes, the owners of Ireland who, as the “constitutional party”, are ready and eager for the opportunity of again undertaking the government of Ireland by the army.’7

  The private papers of H.A. Gwynne, editor of the Morning Post , lend substance to the allegations of Casement and MacNeill. In a letter, dated 23 March 1914, to Sir John French, chief of the imperial general staff, Gwynne informed him that ‘it is therefore your clear duty to declare to the politicians that no settlement or agreement or statement will do the slightest good unless the government say in plain language that they have no intention of allowing the army to coerce Ulster.’8 When no statement was forthcoming Gwynne informed French that ‘the best thing he could do was to authorise me practically to announce his resignation, which I did in the MP [ Morning Post ] on Monday last 30 March.’9

  The influence of the English unionist press could hardly be better illustrated: it could dictate the cond
uct of a general who, in 1918, was to be appointed lord lieutenant of Ireland. Commenting upon the incident, the historian Patricia Jalland observed that ‘the Liberal government’s home rule policy was undermined far more effectively by the Curragh crisis than by the intervention of the First World War.’10 While the finer points of Jalland’s conclusion may be debated, her linking of the home rule crisis and the Great War as jointly shaping the destiny of Ireland in these years can hardly be denied. Both of these issues dominated the process of propaganda and of censorship and had a direct impact upon the press, the postal service and personal liberty. Central to the implementation of this system was the Defence of the Realm Act that was passed on 8 August 1914.

  THE DEFENCE OF THE REALM ACT AND THE PRESS

  The introduction of a Defence of the Realm Act in August 1914, with its attendant Defence of the Realm Regulations (DORR), was the principal legal measure designed to silence political dissent not only in Ireland but also in England. It was used to control freedom of the press, freedom of speech, and the conduct of public meetings.11 In effect the Act permitted the Dublin Castle authorities to use court martial procedures rather than the civil law of the land. The first suppression of advanced nationalist newspapers, that is newspapers that rejected participation in the war and the home rule policy as espoused by John Redmond, took place in December 1914. The royal commission noted that, although members of the Irish party were ‘strongly against newspapers suppression’, ‘a flood of seditious literature was disseminated by the leaders of the Irish Volunteer party early in the war, and certain newspapers were suppressed’.12