1916

by Gabriel Doherty

  Plunkett arrived back in Dublin on either Holy Thursday or Good Friday. He mentioned the latter date in the Irish Press on 26 May 1933. He filed a report on his trip with his superiors, which included his son, Joe, but not Eoin MacNeill. Instead of going directly to request a meeting with Archbishop Walsh, as the pope had urged, the count set out for the country where he met about five members of the hierarchy, so worried was he about ‘what the bishops might do’.58 No names are given in the Plunkett-Dillon memoir. It is likely that the count’s authoritative account of his audience with Benedict XV was recounted to each in turn. According to his daughter’s account Count Plunkett ‘warned them that if there was trouble in the immediate future they should not take any action and asked them to refrain from condemning what they did not understand’. The memoir recounts that he was so tired he did not remember the names of the bishops he had spoken to at the time but ‘he thought none of the bishops he interviewed condemned the Rising’.59

  News of the count’s audience with the pope may have spread quite quickly amongst the other bishops. Time was short to spread the news if it was as late as Good Friday that he visited the bishops. But they had at least twenty four hours to communicate the extraordinary news that he had brought to them. The pope did not bless the Rising. Count Plunkett, in his retelling of the events in 1933, had the imagination to embellish and embroider. Naïve he might have been, but he was sincere and very devout. His report was readily believed and of great importance to Catholics who felt a great sense of unease about the revolutionary course upon which they were about to embark.

  ARCHBISHOP WALSH, CURRAN

  AND THE 'CASTLE DOCUMENT

  The pace of events had quickened during Count Plunkett’s absence from the country. The 1916 leaders feared that Dublin Castle might move against the Irish Volunteers before there was an opportunity to strike. In the weeks leading up to Easter Sunday the drilling and manoeuvres continued throughout the country. Whereas Eoin MacNeill regarded this as nothing more than business as usual, Pearse was preparing the men for the Rising whether they were aware of that fact or not. Drilling and manoeuvres had become so ritualised, however, that there may not have been a widespread awareness that the Irish Volunteers were about to take part in the real thing. Because of the danger of imminent repression by British forces, there was a growing anxiety among the radicals that the Rising might be stopped. Those anxieties had grounds in reality.

  The Plunkett-Dillon memoir casts new light on the development of events. It reveals that the IRB had a spy in Dublin Castle. Eugene Smith, a civil servant, had got sight of a document which detailed British plans to round up the Irish Volunteers and confiscate their arms. When he had the opportunity Smith memorised sections of the document and wrote them out later in safety. Having almost completed his task of copying he felt he had come under suspicion so he passed what he had on to his IRB contact. It was then put in code and given to Joe Plunkett, who deciphered it and brought it to the Military Council. The document outlined details of measures that were to be taken against the Volunteers on receipt of an order from the chief secretary’s office. There were lists of all the organisations and the members to be arrested. There were arrangements for confining citizens to their houses and for the occupation of houses, including those of MacNeill and Count Plunkett. Volunteer headquarters were to be occupied, as was Archbishop Walsh’s house, which was listed as ‘Ara Coeli’ (Cardinal Logue’s house in Armagh) in the version of the text smuggled out by Smith.

  Joe Plunkett and others took the decision to publish the document. The type-setting was done in Larkfield, the Plunkett family home. It was then circulated to the newspapers but all refused to publish it.

  On 8 April 1916 Curran records that Séamus O’Kelly called to see him, and was very anxious about information received regarding the intentions of the government to disarm the Volunteers: ‘He said the evidence was incontrovertible and would be available next Saturday.’ He wanted the influence of ‘neutral personages to intervene to prevent bloodshed, asserting that the Volunteers were not pro-German’. Assistant Commissioner Quinn was ‘on tenterhooks’, according to Curran, who also noted that the Volunteers had become very evident of late, holding nightly meetings, and marching through the streets of Dublin, a hundred strong, with rifles on shoulders.

  On Sunday 9 April Seán T. O’Kelly called to see Curran. He had the same story as the other O’Kelly about a Castle document. It had been seen piecemeal by a clerk in Dublin Castle who had reported its contents to the Volunteers. They would not have the complete document until the following Saturday. But Seán T. was convinced of its authenticity, and that ‘immediate military action against the Volunteers was intended’. Curran decided not to tell Archbishop Walsh until he had the text.60 But on 16 April he wrote to Hagan:

  Peace negotiations seem to be in the air especially since Asquith’s visit to you [in Rome] … We had 5 German U boats in the Irish sea last week. The mails were interrupted for a day or two. The Lady Master [?] and another was sunk. According to underground talk, things are very serious here and heading for an outburst. The talk is that govt is to disarm the Sinn Féiners and the latter say they will resist … The police made a foolish attack on the Citizen Army at Liberty Hall, but it was like the naval attack on the Dardanelles. They didn’t come prepared only warned the ‘Citizens’, who forthwith fortified themselves and summoned reinforcements. The govt is stupid … How in the world a conflict is to be avoided for long I cannot see. You may have heard more about it before this letter reaches you.61

  Seán T. O’Kelly visited Curran again on 18 April 1916, the Tuesday of Holy Week, saying ‘that there was little or nothing new but that the situation was very serious. Looks as if the document was not intended for immediate use but drawn up in case of invasion’. Although Curran had his suspicions, he was not certain that O’Kelly was a member of the IRB. In fact, as he was to learn later, his friend was part of the inner circle that had been entrusted with a mission in 1915 to tell John Devoy in America of the decision to stage a rising. Prudence dictated that he should not confide in his clerical friend, who would have been duty-bound to report the matter to the archbishop.

  On 19 April Alderman J.J. Kelly read the ‘Castle document’ on to the record of Dublin corporation. By that time it had already appeared in Patrick Little’s paper, New Ireland. Once it was part of the official record of the corporation, however, the dailies had no alternative but to report it. The news shocked many and increased a sense of public indignation despite the official denials as to its authenticity by Dublin Castle.62 Curran wrote again to Hagan on 19 April with news of the document:

  You will be interested in the enclosed. Naturally it has caused great excitement this evening. The document was to have been printed [in] Ireland today. The printers got alarmed, brought it to the Irish Times who advised its suppression and who I am told sent it to the Castle. Meanwhile the printers consulted a solicitor who also advised its suppression. The editor then thought of giving the gist of the document in the form of notes, but the matter was settled by the Castle stepping in suppressing it. Meanwhile some fifty thousand leaflets were printed. It was then brought today to the evening papers who all refused to publish it. During the day Ald. Tom Kelly published it under special circumstances in the corporation. It is said a meeting of the Privy Council was summoned. At any rate the papers published it in the evening with the usual denial from the military authorities.63

  Curran provided his own theory, which, he said, was based on ‘good ground’:

  Not long ago there was a grave anxiety lest the Huns would pay us a visit in Lough Swilly, if not on the E. coast of England. Great precautions were naturally taken. What would be more prudent for the military authorities to have in readiness [a] precautionary measure to deal with the armed forces of Liberty Hall and Sinn Féin. They must have had some scheme ready, if they are not fools. Liberty Hall and some of the wilder Sinn Féin people would certainly join the Huns. Equally certain i
t is that neither John MacNeill nor the National Volunteers would do so. But there is no getting over the fact that some of the same extreme people would.

  That being so, Curran argued:

  What is there to wonder at in the document except the isolation of this house and the Mansion House? I certainly cannot understand the prohibition of communication to this house and the Mansion House. I could understand neighbouring Volunteers seeking to conceal their weapons about the grounds in case of a general search, but I cannot surmise what they mean by prohibiting communication from here [original emphasis]. At any rate there is my theory. As the document has got into the evening papers, the Volunteers do not see the necessity of publishing the document in the way they contemplated.64

  Curran recorded in his diary on 19 April that the archbishop did not accept Dublin Castle’s denials that the document was false; he thought that there was ‘a lot of substance’ in it. Séamus O’Kelly had visited Curran that same day, and confirmed that view. Curran then went to 2 Dawson Street, the headquarters of the Irish Volunteers. On entering the building, one walked on a stone plaque ‘recording the shooting of the civilians at Bachelor’s Walk’. (The plaque was later seized by the military.) There Curran met Eoin MacNeill, who also believed that the document was genuine. The conversation continued: ‘We were discussing bloodshed. Anyway, it was clearly conveyed to me by him that it would result in armed resistance, and certainly by Seán T., to whom I distinctly remember talking either on that evening of 19 April 1916, or next morning.’ Curran had not seen the evening papers. As Dublin Castle had sought to suppress publication of the document, the Volunteers had 50,000 copies of it ready to be handed out. As the following day was Holy Thursday, he said that they should be sent to the churches and the priests would see that they were distributed. Publication meant that it was not necessary to act on his suggestion.

  On 20 April, Holy Thursday, the German arms consignment on the Aud was intercepted in Tralee Bay by the British navy. Its captain scuttled his ship on 21 April. Sir Roger Casement landed the same day from a U boat, stationed off Banna strand, near Tralee. He carried news that the promised German support would not be sufficient to launch an uprising. Shortly afterwards he was arrested.

  On 21 April, Good Friday, Bulmer Hobson was ‘arrested’ by the IRB. He was opposed to the timing of the Rising. That evening, at 7pm, James MacNeill, Eoin’s brother, visited Curran and expressed his grave concern that a ‘small rash act by a fool on either side would cause a blaze and involve everybody’. He dreaded ‘a calamity arising out of what may well be a misunderstanding’. James, who was not on the council of the Volunteers, told Curran that two men, who were not identified, had called to see his brother that morning. They had ‘completely upset Eoin’ and he was extremely worried, as was James was. James wanted to seek an unofficial assurance that would be given to some responsible person ‘that no disarmament was intended’. This was a reference to Archbishop Walsh. Curran replied that he was ill and that nobody was allowed to see him except Dr Cox. Walsh’s doctor would learn the archbishop’s views by the following day. Cox was a close friend of the MacNeills. He was also a Privy Councillor with access to Dublin Castle. Curran asked MacNeill to accept him as a possible route to the authorities.

  That night Curran told the archbishop of the visit. He listened carefully but said nothing. Curran, meanwhile, had also heard a bit of gossip, to the effect that an officer at a dance had told his partner that he had not taken off his clothes for forty eight hours, and that he had 10 other officers and 200 men in barracks under arms ready to attack the Volunteers. At twenty minutes to ten that night, Good Friday, Curran met Quinn. They talked about the dangers of disarmament ‘to which he [Quinn] was fully alive’. But the policeman was convinced that ‘the Volunteers were lunatics, playing into the hands of the military’. He mentioned that two men had been landed in Kerry, although he probably did not use the name Roger Casement to Curran on that occasion.

  Curran met Dr Cox on Easter Saturday, 22 April, telling him that the archbishop would be prepared to discuss the matter raised by James MacNeill with him. Walsh, however, decided not to interfere. That did not prevent Dr Cox taking steps to make representations to the British authorities. But both Cox and Quinn told Curran that the military controlled everything, and that ‘not even the highest placed legal or civil authority carried any weight against the military’.

  On 22 April Eoin MacNeill issued a countermanding order, cancelling manoeuvres for the following day. This appeared in the Sunday Independent the next day. Curran wrote to Hagan on Saturday, 22 April 1916.

  Things are even more serious here. Yesterday the leaders of the Volunteers received serious news. I don’t know what it was except that they are convinced on what they regard as absolutely reliable authority that preparations to disarm them are in progress. The Volunteers will resist if this is attempted and are taking steps not to be surprised unawares. A rash step by a fool on either side will precipitate an outburst. Frankly I do not see how the thing can end without a blaze sooner or later.65

  Curran, who was no amateur in the study of Irish politics, added:

  Personally I find it hard to believe that the government or police authorities mean to cause trouble. They deny the genuineness of the published document, but many sane people including His Grace (and, I modestly add, myself) simply regard the denial as worthless. I look at the document as a plan agreed upon, or under consideration, for future eventualities, indefinite as regards time.

  He identified the extremists, as he described them, within the nationalist ranks:

  But the military people form the dangerous element on one side and Liberty Hall, the secret societies, and some of the more extreme Irish Volunteers form the dangerous elements on the other. I can hardly imagine the military authorities taking such a critical step without consulting the government and I can hardly imagine the government giving consent. It would simply set the whole country on fire …

  He read the events as follows: ‘Naturally many people see in these supposed arrangements a move to introduce conscription. All is not plain sailing within the Irish party, nor within the National Volunteers.’66

  Curran had heard alarming news from a priest who had come to his office in an agitated state after having a conversation with a Volunteer officer. He was told that ‘Easter Sunday’s mobilisation meant a rising’. The identity of the officer was not revealed by Curran other than that he was well known and much esteemed and that he was killed in the Rising. The officer had consulted the priest to ‘satisfy his conscience as to what he ought to do’. After the visit of the priest, Curran went to see Seán T. O’Kelly at the offices of the Gaelic League in 25 Parnell Square. According to Curran’s diary entry for that day:

  He told me that the Volunteers were to mobilise on the following day [Sunday] at 4pm with arms and three days provisions. Seán felt like James MacNeill and feared the extremists, including those of his own body, would cause a clash. He was particularly apprehensive of the dangerous influence of Liberty Hall and T.C. [Tom Clarke] Among the other extremists were Pearse [and] Fitzgibbon.67

  At the time Curran supported the position held by Eoin MacNeill: ‘I was entirely opposed to anything in the nature of a rising until the Germans could land.’ MacNeill’s countermanding orders were ignored by the inner core of the IRB led by Clarke, Pearse, MacDermott, MacDonagh, Joseph Plunkett, Ceannt and others. Bulmer Hobson was kidnapped by his fellow members of the IRB and held under house arrest in order to prevent him from trying to stop the Rising.

  Curran wrote to Hagan again, on Easter Sunday, 23 April 1916:

  Things passed off quietly here today. John MacNeill issued an order countermanding the mobilisation of the Volunteers. It was published in the Irish [sic] Independent and by messenger. The more extreme party (Liberty Hall and Pearse) tried to suppress it and declare that it was bogus. Result – a new scare. Miss MacNeill [Eoin’s sister] came here [archbishop’s house] towards 3pm to obtain help t
o stop the mobilisation and to declare the MacNeill order authentic. According to John MacNeill the carrying out of the mobilisation would end in a catastrophe and bloodshed. The order was obeyed, though there were small gatherings of Volunteers. A crisis has evidently come. I fear today’s change of procedure will lead to a split between the moderate and more extreme Volunteers.68

  After speaking with the archbishop about Miss MacNeill’s visit, Curran undertook to go to priests of the nearer mobilisation districts and deliver a letter from Eoin MacNeill authenticating his order. He selected the districts of Fairview, Rutland Square and Camden Row. He went first to Fr John Flanagan of Marlborough Street. The latter went with the future Archbishop of Dublin, Edward Byrne, to Volunteer headquarters in Parnell Square where they found that MacNeill’s countermanding order was being carried out. Curran also gave a letter to Fr Walter MacDonald, later parish priest of Fairview. He agreed to ‘see after Fr Mathew Park’ (a mobilisation centre). Curran then went with Fr Charles Murphy of Harrington Street to Camden Row where the letter was given to a score of Volunteers. He found that they were disbanding when he arrived. Curran recorded that Quinn had spent all of Easter Sunday in Dublin Castle and had not returned at 10pm.69

  EASTER RISING AND AFTERMATH

  A detailed account of Curran’s activities during Easter Week appears elsewhere in this volume. Suffice it to note here that he behaved very courageously during those days of revolution. The violence did not keep him indoors. Unfortunately, his fluent and frequent correspondence with Hagan and O’Riordan was interrupted by the unfolding tragedy.