Gallipoli
Page 43
Lieutenant Frank Howitt, Army Service Corps, 11th Division
The official history remarks insouciantly that many of the battalions had not been seriously engaged, but that does not match the perceptions of the men of the 34th Brigade in their after-battle reports written eight months later. They could still well remember the heat and thirst, the confusion, the deadly Turkish sniping, the harassing artillery fire, the aimless marching and counter-marching.
The British performance at Suvla has often been pilloried yet the brilliance of the Turkish defence led by Major Willmer is often ignored. His original defensive positions had been well chosen and his men were well briefed, fighting hard then withdrawing at the last moment to the next defensible positions. All the time their accurate sniping drained the strength from the British troops floundering in front of them. Although the British leadership was appalling, credit must also be given to the superior quality of the Turkish opposition. Whatever it may have looked like from the heights of Anzac there was plenty of fighting across the Suvla Plain on 7 August.
The race for the heights surrounding Suvla Bay was triggered by the landings. Liman reacted fairly quickly, sending one regiment from the Bulair sector when the first reports of the landings reached him at about 01.40 on 7 August. Once he was sure that Bulair would not be the focus of attack he despatched the 7th and 12th Divisions, commanded by Colonel Feizi Bey, to Suvla at 07.00. These units had already undergone heavy fighting at Gallipoli, but they gamely marched down the thirty or so dusty miles to Suvla. It was once thought that they did not reach the area until the night of 8 August, but it has now been established that the 7th Division reached a position to the east of Tekke Tepe at about 22.00 on 7 August, with the 12th Division following a few hours later.42 On arrival, Feizi Bey asked for time for his exhausted men to recover before launching a counter-attack, at which point he was (as we have seen) abruptly replaced as Commander of the Northern Sector of Anzac and Suvla by Mustafa Kemal. Yet the replacement of commander had no discernible impact on the exhausted troops, incapable of offensive action until the morning of 9 August. So the British gained another day.
The British had lamentably failed to achieve their objectives on 7 August. Perhaps that was never likely given the unnecessary complexities of their battle plan, the vigorous Turkish reaction, the British troops’ inexperience and the lack of push displayed by their generals. But there was still time. A quick reorganisation during the morning of 8 August, followed by a concentrated assault focused on seizing the rest of Kiretch Tepe, Scimitar Hill, the W Hills and the Tekke Tepe Range, could yet achieve success with time to secure the key tactical positions before the Turks could effectively deploy their recently arrived but physically fatigued divisions. But that depended on everything going right and the collapse of the Turkish opposition. When Lieutenant Cuthbert Llewelyn Allen arrived with the reserves for the 11th Manchesters on 8 August he found ominous signs all around.
I noticed General Hammersley strolling on the beach with Brigadier-General Sitwell, and his Brigade Major Ashburner. General Hammersley did not seem at all excited, but judging from appearances looked rather bewildered and worried, and I concluded all was not going well with us.43
Lieutenant Cuthbert Llewelyn Allen, 11th Manchester Regiment, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
Hammersley and his brigadiers were already broken men, unwilling to do anything but allow their troops to rest and reorganise – and their own frailties were being projected on to the men they commanded. Their priority was to consolidate what they had already captured and any meagre offensive gestures during the long summer’s day were limited to trying to forge a link across the Suvla Plain between Chocolate Hill and Kiretch Tepe. The 32nd Brigade moved forward, but, exhausted by the last two days, they found the going tough, although the 6th East Yorkshires managed to take Scimitar Hill unopposed. Nor could Mahon see much hope of further advance for the elements of his 10th Division up on Kiretch Tepe without considerable artillery support. So he too did next to nothing. By this time GHQ had belatedly become aware that the dash for the hills was stalled and a visit to Stopford from Hamilton’s Chief of Staff, Colonel Cecil Aspinall, soon confirmed that rapid executive action was needed if another day was not to be wasted.
Hamilton, whose eyes were mainly fixed on Hill 971 and Chunuk Bair, finally realised that in the case of IX Corps no news was not good news. Belatedly horror-struck at the lack of positive action he rushed over to Suvla in the late afternoon of 8 August to try to persuade Stopford to launch an attack that evening. He met Stopford aboard the Jonquil and then, after a brief consultation, rushed ashore. At about 19.00 he found Hammersley immersed in the process of planning an attack by the 33rd and 32nd Brigades on the W Hills and the Anafarta Spur for the morning of 9 August. This was not soon enough for the distraught Hamilton, who broke his usual habits to interfere directly in a subordinate’s command. He ordered forward the 32nd Brigade and the divisional pioneers the 6th East Yorkshires that very night, with the focus not on the W Hills but on the imposing mass of Tekke Teppe. Although Hamilton had the right end in mind, this was madness: there was no time for the distribution of orders; no one knew where anyone else was; it was not possible within the timeframe to get the right units in the right place to launch the attack. The 32nd Brigade was scattered across the Suvla Plain and soon runners were struggling through the night trying to sort out the disarray. Catastrophically, as part of the rushed preparations, the 6th East Yorkshires were withdrawn from their position on Scimitar Hill to the 32nd Brigade rendezvous behind them at Sulajik. It was not until 04.00 on 9 August that the advance began, led by the 6th East Yorkshires. Until recently, historians thought that one exhausted company managed to reach the top of Tekke Tepe before being ambushed by the Turks sweeping over the heights.
We reached the point where the ravine ended, and in the scrub ahead of us we saw a number of men who fired upon us. For a moment we thought they were our own, firing in ignorance. Then we saw that they were Turks. We had run into the back of an enemy Battalion which held the lower slopes against our supports. They had crossed the range at a point lower than that we had attacked and had cut in behind our climbing force. We could do nothing but surrender. When we held up our hands some dozen or more of the enemy charged towards us with fixed bayonets. The man who took possession of me searched my pockets and annexed everything of military use except my revolver, which had fallen out of my hand a minute before, when I had been knocked down by a bullet that glanced off a rock on to my leg. Of those taken with me, one was not molested; one was fired at from 5 yards’ distance, missed and quietly captured; one was beaten and fired at. Thank God the man who fired at him hit the man who was beating him and broke his wrist. The fourth, my Colonel, was bayoneted. Then, for the moment their fury ceased. I was permitted to tend the Colonel. He did not seem to suffer pain at all, only to be intensely thirsty. He drank the whole of the contents of my water-bottle as well as his own. They even allowed me to carry him on my back; and on my back the Colonel died.44
Lieutenant John Still, 6th East Yorkshire Regiment, 11th Division
Local Turkish sources, who have analysed the location of discovered fragments of British equipment, coupled with the simple lack of marching time available to the East Yorkshires after their late start, would seem to indicate that they were probably ambushed far lower down on the slopes of the Baka Baba foothills, in front of Anafarta Sagir.
This relatively minor incident has been attributed disproportionate importance – the IX Corps had tried to launch a brigade attack but proved unable to generate sufficient force to take or hold Tekke Tepe against the Turkish reinforcements. The less well publicised fate of the rest of the 6th East Yorkshires demonstrates the futility of it all.
We were supposed to attack before dawn, but owing to orders being late it was broad daylight. The attacked position had not been reconnoitred, the men were dead beat, having had no sleep since we landed, and were utterly done. We were allowed to march
half way up the slope by the Turks – then received it in the neck. The Turks were strongly entrenched – we were [outnumbered] four to one. They also had a machine gun enfilading us from our left and a party of men enfilading us on our right. They had us in a trap pure and simple. The regiments that were supposed to be on our left and right flanks had gone somewhere else. We lost officers and 300 men in half an hour. Human nature could stand no more. One Company was captured all together and the rest turned and ran. I don’t blame the men for it was their first time under fire and really men could not be expected to endure it. I collected a few men and we made a bit of a stand further back, but eventually had to retire back to the reserves who were a mile and a quarter back instead of 400 yards. The staff work was damned rotten and nearly all the staff officers are incapable and inefficient. They take no interest in anything at all – if they are safe it doesn’t matter about the rest of us.45
Lieutenant Eric Halse, 6th East Yorkshire Regiment, 11th Division
When the 32nd and 33rd Brigades eventually began their move forward they were soon pressed back away from the hills and could not even recover Scimitar Hill. They had certainly tried, but they had been found wanting and had failed.
Although embittered officers such as Lieutenant Halse blamed staff officers for much of the disaster, this was not altogether fair. There had been a systemic malfunction that individuals could do little to prevent – a lamentable disintegration in the whole process of generating, issuing and carrying out orders, whether at the headquarters of IX Corps or within its divisions and brigades. Orders were issued, cancelled and reissued. The results were often vague or even contradictory in nature. There was little or no coordination between neighbouring brigades, which, having no sense of being part of a coherent plan, often acted independently of each other in a vacuum. The sheer scale of the Suvla operations and the relatively large distances involved exaggerated the communication problems, so that when it came to the further dissemination of orders to the battalions there was yet more confusion. Most received them far too late to plan their attacks properly, and some never received them at all. Also, hastily cobbled-together headquarters were staffed by officers with little relevant experience – although of course this statement could apply to most British formations in 1915, wherever they were serving, it was especially relevant to those that made up the benighted IX Corps. Almost no one knew what they were doing – not just the generals. All the Turks had to do was hold their ground.
The situation on 9 August grew increasingly threatening for the British brigades strewn across the Suvla area. Any advantage of surprise they may have had had been dissipated and it was evident that the Turkish rearguard action had achieved its aim of buying time for reinforcements to arrive. Worse still, a gap had opened in the British line in the plain and foothills to the north of Sulajik. Furthermore, as Lieutenant Cuthbert Llewelyn Allen discovered when he moved forward with his party of reinforcements for the 11th Manchesters, morale was deteriorating and there were many stragglers.
The country through which we advanced was very open, small scrub and trees being dotted here and there. These afforded excellent places for snipers and very soon we began to receive their attention. This, together with land mines, which had to be watched for and avoided, also stray bullets coming across from every direction, made things somewhat unpleasant. Heavy firing was going on to our front and on both flanks. We met a continuous stream of wounded being helped or, in the case of those who could walk, making their way back to the dressing station. One thing I noticed here was that in a great number of cases, and especially of men who were not too seriously wounded and could walk, two or three men would accompany them: one carrying his rifle and equipment and the others helping him. This meant that for every actual casualty inflicted on us by the Turks, our fighting strength was reduced by two or three men. Naturally anything of that kind had to be stopped at once and orders were given that no one, unless actually wounded, would be allowed to pass back through our lines.46
Lieutenant Cuthbert Llewelyn Allen, 11th Manchester Regiment, 34th Brigade, 11th Division
By 10 August the 10th and 11th Divisions were showing all the signs of being exhausted. Behind them the 53rd Division had begun landing on the night of 8 August but had been split up when some battalions were fed into action piecemeal on 9 August. Even worse, the 53rd Division was not really a division at all. Many of its best original battalions had already been sent to the Western Front and it had been despatched to Gallipoli without its allotted artillery – an absurd measure in a war in which artillery dominated the battlefield. Now the 158th and 159th Brigades were ordered to attack Scimitar Hill and the W Hills at 06.00 on the morning of 10 August, with neither rhyme nor reason shown in the manner of their deployment. Whatever potential the half-trained territorials may have had as soldiers was lost in attacks which took place in an atmosphere of complete disorder. One seething staff officer summed up the disaster as the battalions tore themselves to pieces on the Turkish defences:
Orders for attack at 6 a.m. received at 4 a.m. Had a frightful rush to give our orders even to the 4th Cheshires and 4th Welsh commanding officers. None of them knew where their battalions were and we never saw anyone of the 7th Cheshires at all. At 6 a.m. the attack began in a very ragged sort of way and passed through the trenches held by the 34th and 32nd Infantry Brigades. The attack progressed very slowly and there was little cohesion. It was finally held up by about 8.35 a.m. About noon the 4th Welsh bolted and rout was stopped by me and some men on our left and right. Another assault ordered for 5 p.m. in spite of contrary opinions of Brigadiers of the 159th, 34th and 158th Infantry Brigades. It was quite impossible to do any more than tell the leading line to advance at 5 p.m. and leave the rest to luck. Cowan and I had to lead the firing line. The attack was badly supported and eventually failed. The troops occupied their original trenches held by the 32nd Infantry Brigade. Failure was caused by entire lack of organisation of the attack – hurry which was quite unnecessary – exhaustion of men who had no food and worst of all no water.47
Captain Arthur Crookenden, Headquarters, 159th Brigade, 53rd Division
The result was the needless destruction of a division that should not have left Britain until it was ready for action. Given another six months’ proper training it might have become a valuable formation in the battle against Germany on the Western Front. Instead it was cast away in just a day. The 53rd Division would henceforth be regarded as ‘sucked oranges’, as Stopford put it in discussions with Hamilton on 11 August;48 a negligible force, largely discounted in the planning of future battles.
On the night of 10 August, the next division of inexperienced troops arrived for the slaughter – this time the 54th Division. They were moved forward to fill the large gaps in the British front line to the south of Kiretch Tepe. After another day had been wasted it was decided that the 163rd Brigade of the 54th Division would advance across the plain at 16.00 on 12 August to secure the ground and prepare the way for a major assault on the Tekke Tepe Range at dawn the next day. By now the story should be familiar.
We suddenly got word about 3.30 p.m. that we were to move at 4 p.m. We had no water and very little food but a little extra came along with some rum which we all took neat. I enjoyed my share. Then the advance took place, our regiment in part of the front line. Talk of the fog of war. Nobody knows what is happening on their right or left and very soon all connection is lost. Our chaps did awfully well. As for my platoon, I absolutely love them and some of my men would insist on keeping with me. Well, a group of us got to a place in the advance which we decided to organise for defence. At first there were not many of us but driblets of men of all regiments in the brigade came and reinforced us. You should just hear us cheer and wave our helmets when two machine guns came up – entirely manhandled. Although under a decent fire everybody was as cool as a cucumber, cigarettes and thirst quenchers were passed round without distinction of rank, for on the battlefield the lot of officer and
man are one. Oh it was fine. I had some narrow escapes. A shrapnel shell burst above and a pellet went right through the toe of my right boot and out at the side without so much as holing my sock. A bullet also just hit my finger and drew a little blood but that was all. I did not forget to thank God for my deliverance. Well then we had to dig ourselves in to escape the effects of the shrapnel which might be expected next morning. This digging is in reality ‘scraping’ with the entrenching tools which each man carries with him.49
Lieutenant Hubert Wolton, 1/5th Suffolk Regiment, 163rd Brigade, 54th Division
In the course of the advance a small party of men of the 1/5th Norfolk Regiment were cut off, chose to fight to the death and found the Turks more than willing to oblige. It was this incident that over the years created a ludicrous legend of the ‘missing Norfolks’ who were supposed to have mysteriously disappeared ‘into a cloud’. The failure of the 163rd Brigade attack meant that the main action planned for dawn on 13 August was cancelled. Perhaps it was just as well, as none of the IX Corps divisions thrown together at Suvla were in a fit state for offensive action. If anything there was a threat that the Turks might breach the British line and imperil the whole operation. It was evident that a pause was needed before the next attack. Major General Walter Braithwaite passed on Hamilton’s orders to Stopford.
Chief has decided that he will not call upon corps to make general attack at present. Therefore you must with utmost energy reorganise your troops and consolidate your present line. Take every opportunity to make as forward a line as possible and make that line impregnable. Chief relies on you to expedite by every means in your power the process of reorganisation and the thorough preparation of trenches, communications etc.50