The Battle of Peach Tree Creek

by Earl J. Hess

  Did the change in commanders need to take place? Some historians side with Johnston, while others admit that his handling of the Army of Tennessee was a failure. Whether Johnston should have kept Davis more closely in touch with his plans is a moot point because Johnston essentially had no plans for the campaign other than to conserve his army, take no chances, and draw the enemy deeper into Georgia without fighting a battle unless he had almost no chance to lose it. Sherman allowed him few opportunities to take the offensive, and Johnston acted far too passively on the defensive, not even bothering to contest the crossings of the Chattahoochee River. The consensus of opinion among the most recent historians tends to be that Davis was compelled to fire Johnston from his important position and probably should have done so earlier.60

  Was Hood the best choice to replace Johnston? Some historians, such as Thomas Robson Hay, argue he was the only feasible choice. More recent historians tend to be as critical of Hood’s promotion as they are of Johnston’s failings. At the very least, Davis went out on a limb when he chose Hood. Widely admired for his spirit and fighting ability, even many of his friends wondered if he had the intelligence, aptitude, or patience for directing the second most-important field army in the Confederacy. Hood had not done well as a corps commander, and his sneaky habit of criticizing Johnston behind his commander’s back should have been a warning sign rather than an inducement for Davis to elevate him to this important position of trust.61

  There certainly were other choices, even though Hardee had already made it clear the previous December that he did not want to be saddled with the responsibility of army command. Stewart was a dependable and capable officer. From outside the army, Lieut. Gen. Richard Taylor, a significant factor in the Confederate victory in the Red River campaign a few months before, could have been shifted from his department command in Alabama and Mississippi. Lee might have been compelled to give up one of the corps commanders in the Army of Northern Virginia. Davis’s choices were limited more by his own mind than by the supply of capable officers available. If the Confederate government could not muster a suitable general to command its major army in the West other than by choosing someone whose first reaction was to cancel the promotion and who felt so overwhelmed that he could barely cope with it, then something was seriously wrong with the entire Confederate army. There is no comparable story to be found in the history of the Union war effort.

  There was no sense of alarm, despondency, or concern for the future in the Federal camp as there was among the Confederates. “To-morrow I want a bold push for Atlanta,” Sherman told Thomas, “and have made my orders, which, I think, will put us in Atlanta or very close to it.” He wanted the Army of the Cumberland to cross Peach Tree Creek on July 19 while Schofield and McPherson cooperated in seizing Decatur and tearing up the Georgia Railroad on their march west toward the city. “I am fully aware of the necessity of making the most of time,” Sherman informed Henry Halleck, “and shall keep things moving.”62

  3: Across Peach Tree Creek, July 19

  We are expecting a battle every moment, as Hood is said to have been placed in command because he wanted to fight.—Taylor Beatty

  Dear father and mother, I am mortally wounded. I die like a soldier, and hope to meet you all in heaven.—Frank Miser

  Much like the day before, July 19 dawned clear and hot. Many Federals continued to believe Atlanta would fall with the current move toward the city, but Sherman did not foresee Thomas taking the place just yet. His idea was that the Army of the Cumberland should cross Peach Tree Creek and distract Hood’s attention from Schofield and McPherson. Sherman worried about the extended nature of his deployment and wanted Thomas to move his left flank enough to close the gap between the Army of the Cumberland and the Army of the Ohio. Thomas planned to cross the creek and fill the gap on July 19.1

  Peach Tree Creek was a relatively small stream, fifteen to twenty feet wide, but it had steep banks and a sandy bottom “which threatened to engulph any who should be so unwise as to trust to it for a footing,” wrote Harry Stanley of the Twentieth Corps. Some of its bottomland was cleared and planted in corn. The terrain north and south of the valley was irregular and partly cleared; the rest was covered with timber and thick underbrush. Sherman believed the stream was fordable east of the road that linked Buck Head with Atlanta, but west of that road bridges were necessary. While one Federal soldier later asserted that the enemy had dammed the creak to raise the water level, there is no evidence that this took place.2

  Howard’s plan for the day called for Wood’s division to move south down the road linking Buck Head with Atlanta and attempt a crossing of the creek. Stanley and Newton were to move left in the direction of Decatur at least as far as the North Fork of Peach Tree Creek to begin filling the gap between Thomas and Schofield. Wood sent two brigades south along the Buck Head and Atlanta Road, commanded by Col. William H. Gibson and Col. Frederick Knefler. One mile south of Buck Head they encountered Confederate skirmishers of Brig. Gen. Lucius E. Polk’s Brigade, Maj. Gen. Patrick Cleburne’s Division. The Federals drove the Rebel skirmishers an additional mile to the creek, arriving about 6:30 A.M. The Confederates retired to the south side of the stream and burned the bridge, “which must have been a considerable structure,” Wood reported. The Rebels took shelter behind light fortifications on the southern bluff of the valley. About a mile south of the Confederate works, a good deal of smoke arose from the men who held the Peach Tree Creek Line as they cooked their morning meals.3

  Howard reported Wood’s progress to Thomas and gave his opinion that the crossing would be very difficult, given the nature of the stream and the fortifications south of the crossing. Thomas nevertheless sent orders for the division to push across the creek as soon as possible. By 1 P.M. Knefler received the order to force his brigade over the stream. It was unfordable near the burned bridge, so Knefler found a spot a bit downstream where a timbered ravine extended down to the bank. This spot was farther west than the Confederate earthwork on the south side and largely unseen by the Rebels. Knefler’s pioneers gathered poles about thirty feet long to place as stringers across the stream. Then he selected fifty men each from the 79th Indiana and the 9th Kentucky and placed them under Maj. George W. Parker of the former regiment. The 100 men carried fence rails down to the water. After the pioneers worked quietly to lay the stringers, they positioned the rails crosswise over them to construct a footbridge. Knefler’s 100 picked troops then moved over and advanced south as skirmishers.4

  The rest of the brigade deployed skirmishers as well; they demonstrated at the burned bridge and distracted enemy attention while the footbridge took shape. Parker’s 100 men flanked the Confederates out of their fortifications and captured the heights on the south side of Peach Tree, although Parker was wounded in the process. About thirty-five Confederates fell into Union hands, including Lieut. Col. William J. Hale of the 2nd Tennessee. Gibson’s brigade also managed to construct a footbridge a bit downstream from Knefler’s crossing and joined the Union force on the southern bluff. Federal artillery supported Wood’s crossing, dominating the Confederate guns that replied. Prisoners told the Federals that the skirmishing and sniping performed by Knefler’s brigade compelled them to keep close behind their works. But for this, they might have noticed Parker’s flanking movement sooner. All in all, Wood was quite pleased with the operation. “Considering that . . . the passage was really made in the presence of a considerable force, it may be truly asserted that no handsomer nor more artistic operation was made during the campaign.” Wood lost about twenty-five men in the crossing.5

  The Federals quickly formed a bridgehead on the bluff south of Peach Tree Creek with Gibson’s brigade positioned in line east of the road and to the stream. Knefler formed west of the road, his line extending in a curve like Gibson’s to the creek. As soon as the Confederates recovered from their surprise and retreat, they sent a strong skirmish line forward to determine how far the enemy had advanced. By then Gibson and Knefler were se
curely in place.6

  The last unit of Wood’s division came south to the creek before the day ended. Brig. Gen. William B. Hazen’s brigade left Buck Head at 1 P.M. and arrived at Peach Tree Creek in time to serve as a reserve for the crossing. As soon as Gibson and Knefler were firmly positioned on the south side, Hazen’s pioneers began to rebuild the burned bridge. They were nearly finished by dusk when Wood adjusted his units. He sent Hazen to the south side and pulled Gibson and Knefler back to the north side under cover of darkness. The latter two brigades then marched back to Buck Head to retrieve camp equipage they had left there that morning. Hazen was fully aware that a large enemy force lay a short distance south, so his men worked to strengthen the hasty fortifications Gibson and Knefler had constructed.7

  While Wood crossed Peach Tree Creek along the Buck Head and Atlanta Road, John Newton sent a small reconnaissance from Buck Head southeast along a secondary road toward the North Fork of Peach Tree Creek that morning. Brig. Gen. Nathan Kimball dispatched the 74th Illinois and 24th Wisconsin, which found the bridge over the North Fork burned and Confederate skirmishers dug in on the opposite bank. Kimball recalled the regiments in time for Newton to execute a new order. He was to move his entire division south of Buck Head to replace Wood’s division at the bridgehead so recently established. Newton left Buck Head by 6 P.M. and arrived at Peach Tree Creek by dusk. His pioneers finished reconstructing the bridge after Hazen crossed the creek to relieve Gibson and Knefler. At 11 P.M., Newton sent Kimball’s brigade across the bridge to reinforce Hazen in the bridgehead. Apparently, it was only because Gibson and Knefler needed their camp equipage at Buck Head that Howard allowed this shifting of divisions back and forth to take place. Only because of that circumstance, Newton instead of Wood would be involved in the fight that would come off at Peach Tree Creek the next day.8

  Stanley’s division made modest progress in its effort to move southeast and find Schofield’s corps. Marching farther east than Kimball’s small reconnoitering party that morning, Col. William Grose’s brigade led Stanley’s advance along a different road that led toward Decatur. Grose found a bridge over the North Fork of Peach Tree Creek already burning when he got to that point, and Confederate skirmishers were dug in on the other side of the stream. Howard received word from Sherman by 2:50 P.M. that Schofield also was on the move somewhere east of Stanley’s position and attempting to contact Stanley. Howard then ordered Stanley to push across the North Fork and continue his advance if possible. The Federals crossed the fork and drove the Confederates away. Some of the bridge had been saved, and the rest was quickly repaired by Union pioneers, but Schofield seemed not to be in reach.9

  While the Fourth Corps performed various tasks during the course of July 19, Hooker ordered Geary to move his division across Peach Tree Creek a bit to the west of the Buck Head and Atlanta Road. Geary moved his men toward Howell’s Mill at dawn only to find that skirmishers of Davis’s Fourteenth Corps division were already in place there battling Confederate skirmishers on the south side of the creek. When Geary informed Hooker of this fact, the corps commander told him to move to Davis’s left. Geary found a likely crossing place three-quarters of a mile east of Howell’s Mill and massed his division in the timber near the stream. He deployed skirmishers on the north side of the creek but cautioned them not to expose themselves or open fire just yet, wanting to screen his position from the enemy. Hooker and Geary personally placed the two batteries attached to the division, urging the gunners to construct breastworks for their own protection, as the division pioneers gathered stringers and rails for a bridge.10

  Geary’s twelve guns, belonging to Capt. Henry Bundy’s 13th New York Independent Battery and Lieut. Thomas E. Sloan’s Battery E, Pennsylvania Light Artillery, opened fire at 3 P.M. The skirmishers now opened fire as well. The noise and smoke helped to cover the fact that Geary’s pioneers sprang into action and hurriedly lay down the stringers and rails needed to cross infantrymen over the creek. “All was done very quickly,” Geary reported.11

  Soon the footbridge was strong enough to support the weight of Col. David Ireland’s brigade as it rushed across the temporary structure, led by Col. Henry A. Barnum’s 149th New York. Barnum wasted no time in forming a skirmish line with three of his companies, the rest moving closely behind in support. The 149th New York advanced up the bluff on the south side and took the Confederate skirmishers by surprise. The 16th South Carolina and part of the 46th Georgia, both from Brig. Gen. States R. Gist’s Brigade of Walker’s Division, held the Rebel skirmish line at this point. Barnum drove the Carolinians and Georgians from their fortifications. The rest of Ireland’s brigade soon followed to form a bridgehead on the south side, reversing the Confederate skirmish pits. Barnum captured twenty-three prisoners and some entrenching tools.12

  Geary crossed the rest of his division after Ireland’s advance. Col. Charles Candy’s brigade used the rude footbridge at 6 P.M. and extended Ireland’s line to the right, his right flank resting on the creek. Candy also constructed breastworks. Col. Patrick H. Jones moved his brigade over the creek that night and took position to Ireland’s left, his own left flank connecting with the creek as well.13

  Alpheus Williams moved his division forward on the evening of July 19, starting at about 6 P.M. His men marched five miles along a circuitous route before reaching the vicinity of Howell’s Mill by 10 P.M. It was too late to cross and form a larger bridgehead on the south side, so Williams bivouacked for the night on the north side of the stream.14

  William T. Ward’s division also moved south to Peach Tree Creek on July 19. At 3 P.M., while still part way to the stream, James Wood’s brigade halted and massed to hear an important message. A staff officer informed the brigade that Sherman wanted everyone to know Hood had replaced Johnston. The new commanders’ classmates in the Union army had warned that he was “of an impetuous, rash and confident disposition,” according to Capt. Hartwell Osborn of the 55th Ohio. “Be prepared for sudden and unexpected attacks.” Rather than daunted by the news, Osborn’s men were happy that Sherman kept them informed of the latest developments. “It was as if Uncle Billy had taken his soldiers into his confidence. Courage rose high in the ranks.” Osborn’s first sergeant, “a bronzed and well tried soldier, turned to me and said, ‘Well, Captain, they mean to come out of their works. I think we’ll get a few of them now.’”15

  Wood took position to the left of Williams’s division when he reached Peach Tree Creek that evening and bivouacked on the north side for the night. Pioneers from all brigades of Ward’s division began to make bridges over the stream under cover of darkness.16

  By the end of the day Hooker had done little more than Howard in bridging Peach Tree Creek and had created only a presence south of the stream instead of massing his entire command. Howard could do no more than position two brigades south of the creek because he was charged with the responsibility of trying to find Schofield off to the east. There was no similar excuse for Hooker to be so lax as to cross only one of his three divisions against light opposition. Thomas instructed Hooker to push Williams and Ward over the creek early on July 20, connect with the Fourteenth Corps to the right and the Fourth Corps to the left, and advance toward Atlanta.17

  Palmer and his men in the Fourteenth Corps did a better job of crossing Peach Tree Creek on July 19 than did Hooker and the Twentieth Corps and did so against greater opposition. Thomas wanted Palmer to cross the stream with one division supported by the others, and Palmer ordered Davis to take the lead. Davis initially tried to do so at Howell’s Mill but found enemy resistance too great. The mill building, two stories supported by stout walls, stood like a fortress. Clark Howell had constructed it in 1852, and the building combined a gristmill, sawmill, plane machine, and cotton gin. From a ridge located close to the mill on the south side, Confederate skirmishers commanded the building with their fire.18

  It would be too costly to fight across Peach Tree Creek at Howell’s Mill, so Thomas instructed Davis to move downstream
where a better crossing was reported at the mouth of Green Bone Creek. Col. Caleb J. Dilworth’s brigade led the division to the place, and Thomas, Palmer, and Davis accompanied Dilworth. Confederate skirmishers on the south bank opened fire, and “a well-spent ball” hit Davis’s boot, stinging his foot. The other generals kidded their subordinate about “getting the first hit.”19

  Dilworth placed Lieut. Col. Charles W. Clancy’s 52nd Ohio in the lead and planned to move the rest of his brigade over the creek as fast as possible to support it. Clancy made a crude footbridge from logs. The stream was about twenty-five feet wide and eight feet deep at this spot. The bluff on the south side was fifty feet tall, but “a light strip of undergrowth” on each bank helped to screen the Federals.20

  Clancy moved his troops over the footbridge under Dilworth’s personal supervision. Then he deployed five companies under Maj. James T. Holmes as skirmishers, instructing Holmes to push the enemy from the bluff and continue south until reaching a ridge that was visible 300 to 500 yards from the stream. It was a distinctive feature because a few houses were built on the cleared top of the ridge. In a spirited move, the 52nd Ohio accomplished its task, rushing forward in the face of persistent skirmish fire and seizing the ridge. Once there Clancy ordered breastworks constructed to secure the top, where he placed seven companies of his regiment, sending three companies forward to establish a skirmish line. Dilworth wanted Clancy to move his skirmishers even farther forward as soon as possible and saw to it that the rest of the brigade started to cross the creek.21