The Battle of Peach Tree Creek
Page 8
With far less opposition, Schofield managed to move a substantial distance on July 19. Hascall’s division had stopped at Johnson’s Mill on the North Fork of Peach Tree Creek the evening before. Now he led the corps advance southward to a fork in the road; the left-hand fork led directly to Decatur, and the right-hand fork angled toward Atlanta. After skirmishing to secure the junction, Hascall began moving toward Decatur, while Cox moved toward Atlanta.46
Hascall pushed steadily on, crossing the South Fork of Peach Tree Creek. He sent Brig. Gen. Joseph A. Cooper’s brigade into Decatur by 3 P.M. Cooper’s men set to work, burning a train of cars and tearing up the track. A short while after Cooper secured the town, Dodge’s Sixteenth Corps troops marched in from the west to relieve the Twenty-Third Corps brigade. Cooper rejoined Hascall, and the division bivouacked near Decatur on the road to Atlanta.47
Evening, July 19
While Hascall moved to the Georgia Railroad, Cox marched his division directly toward Atlanta from the road junction south of Johnson’s Mill. He crossed the South Fork of Peach Tree Creek late in the afternoon and continued a short distance to the crossing of Pea Vine Creek. This small tributary flowed north into the South Fork. Cox bivouacked on the Peyton Plantation for the night.48
Schofield was anxious to make contact with Howard. During the morning of July 19, he sent a message to Howard with a member of his staff and an orderly. The pair rode west and north, approaching what Sherman later called the second crossing of the North Fork of Peach Tree Creek up from the junction of the two forks that formed the main stream. Two companies of the 75th Illinois from Grose’s brigade of Stanley’s division happened to be reconnoitering the road at that time, and the two mounted men approached from a direction the Federals naturally assumed would be used by the enemy. They could see that the two soldiers wore United States uniforms but when ordered to halt, the pair wheeled around and tried to ride away. They apparently assumed the 75th Illinois men were Confederates. A volley of rifle balls was unloosed and the orderly, at least, was wounded. But the two messengers managed to get away without further injury and reported the incident to Schofield, who correctly concluded that his men had been fired on by Howard’s command. The gap between the Fourth and Twenty-Third Corps was ever wider, and there was no contact of any kind between the two units, no screen to shield the hole in Sherman’s line from prying Confederates.49
McPherson’s Army of the Tennessee had an easy time of it on July 19. With no opposition to hinder him, McPherson concentrated on tearing up miles of track east of Decatur leading into the town. He then was in a fair way to link up with Schofield and move west toward Atlanta the next day.50
July 19 brought a good deal of confirmation that Johnston had been replaced by Hood. One of Dodge’s scouts came in, “having left Atlanta that morning,” and brought a newspaper along with items about the change in Confederate commanders. Dodge sent the newspaper to Sherman, who was thus able to read Johnston’s farewell to the Army of Tennessee. Wood’s men also captured an Atlanta newspaper, while scouts and spies continued to feed reports about the change of leadership to various Union officers. Prisoners taken by Geary that day told Hooker of the change and further admitted that the incident had created “great dissatisfaction in Hardee’s corps.”51
Perhaps the realization that Hood was in charge increased Sherman’s anxiety on July 19, for he fretted a good deal about the gap in his line and about whether Thomas was in position to help Schofield and McPherson if the enemy attacked. Traveling with the Twenty-Third Corps, he was sure that the way was clear for Howard to cross both forks of Peach Tree Creek but saw no sign of the Fourth Corps. “With McPherson, Howard, and Schofield, I would have ample to fight the whole of Hood’s army,” he told Thomas, “leaving you to walk into Atlanta, capturing guns and everything. But with Schofield and McPherson alone, the game will not be so certain.” He wanted two divisions of the Fourth Corps to cross the two forks of Peach Tree Creek, or perhaps the corps could move south from the bridgehead Wood created along the Buck Head and Atlanta Road and form a junction with Schofield.52
No matter which way the junction was made, Sherman needed assurance from Thomas that he was mostly across Peach Tree Creek and able to link up with Schofield the next day. That would put him in position to support a drive by the Army of the Tennessee and the Twenty-Third Corps against the east face of the Atlanta perimeter. In several dispatches, Thomas fully informed Sherman of his progress that day. This reassured Sherman, who explained his overall conception of the next day’s moves. “If Hood fights behind forts close to the town, I will swing in between Atlanta and the river; but if he fights outside, we must accept battle.” Sherman was thinking in terms of Hood fighting Schofield and McPherson, not Thomas. This was natural, considering the Armies of the Ohio and the Tennessee were already on one of only two rail lines still bringing food and supplies into Atlanta.53
By midnight of July 19, Thomas had managed to get one division of the Fourth Corps, one division of the Twentieth Corps, and three divisions of the Fourteenth Corps across the moat formed by Peach Tree Creek. Only one of those crossings was fiercely contested by more than a skirmish line. Sherman’s movement toward Atlanta would have developed quite differently if Hood had moved his entire army to the south bank of Peach Tree Creek rather than adopt Johnston’s Peach Tree Creek Line farther south. It is possible Thomas would have had to fight a series of bloody battles to cross the stream, delaying Sherman’s plan and exacting a cost in blood and morale on the Federals. As it was, five of the nine divisions in the Army of the Cumberland were securely on the south side with modest losses, and there was every prospect that the rest could cross with little delay the next day.54
The satisfactory nature of the day’s operations further increased optimism in the Federal camp. The news that McPherson had begun tearing up the Georgia Railroad became widely known throughout the ranks. “It was thought that if this was true, [Hood] would be compelled to either fight or retreat,” commented James M. Randall of the 21st Wisconsin. Sherman admitted in his memoirs that the progress achieved on July 19 also made him wonder if Hood would fall back as readily as Johnston. “I really thought the enemy intended to evacuate the place,” he wrote.55
Hood, of course, had no intention of giving up Atlanta, but his men still pined for Johnston on July 19. “Strange is it not that he should still live in the minds of his late followers,” commented Surg. P. F. Whitehead in Loring’s Division. “To Hood no objections are made, every one thinks that he will fight here, and to use one of Mr. Lincoln’s vulgarisms, he will ‘either make a spoon or spoil a horn.’” A rumor spread like wildfire through the ranks that Johnston had resumed command of the army. “The report cheered the despondent hearts,” noted artillery officer Thomas J. Key of Arkansas, “but I was of the impression that it was done to prevent desertions and to cause the troops to fight with their former bravery.”56
Hood moved his headquarters to a house just north of Atlanta and on the road to Buck Head. He was careful to keep in touch with the authorities in Richmond, urging them, as did Johnston, to move cavalry from Mississippi onto Sherman’s supply line. Hood was not satisfied with Carter L. Stevenson as commander of his old corps; in fact, he did not trust any of the division leaders in that corps for higher command. Hardee recommended Cheatham as the best choice, so Hood gave him the command on a temporary basis, even though Cheatham “did not desire it.” If it was necessary to choose a man who already held the rank of lieutenant general, Hood suggested Stephen D. Lee (who commanded the Department of Mississippi and East Louisiana) or Wade Hampton (who led Lee’s Cavalry Corps in Virginia). Among officers holding the rank of major general, Hood recommended Mansfield Lovell, even though he was still under a cloud for the loss of New Orleans in the spring of 1862. It would take several days for the Richmond authorities to decide on Lee, who took charge of Hood’s old corps on July 27, too late to participate in the coming battle near Peach Tree Creek.57
Not lon
g after Cheatham took charge of Hood’s Corps, the new army leader tried to lay plans for an attack on Thomas. At 11 A.M. on July 19, one of his staff members informed Wheeler that, unless unforeseen circumstances cropped up, the army would strike at 1 P.M. that afternoon. Cheatham held the right of the Peach Tree Creek Line, and Wheeler was to help him deal with any Federals who may approach from the east. Hood was too ambitious; it was not yet possible to attack. As the stated time for the assault came and went, disturbing news reached army headquarters from Wheeler. The cavalry officer informed Hood before 2:15 P.M. that the Federals had reached the Georgia Railroad and were tearing it up and moving toward Decatur. This news was nearly twenty-four hours late. “It is important to get exact information of the state of affairs in that vicinity,” another staff officer informed Wheeler. Hood wanted him to send out scouts to determine if Sherman’s entire infantry line was across the forks of Peach Tree Creek and, if so, exactly where the Federals were located and in what strength. Wheeler asked for reinforcements, and by the evening of July 19 Hood contemplated sending Cleburne’s Division from Hardee’s Corps, although no orders to that effect were yet issued.58
After mulling over the alarming news that the Federals were already on the Georgia Railroad and heading west, Hood instructed Cheatham to shift his corps line so at least one division faced east. The east end of the Peach Tree Creek Line (which also was the right flank of Cheatham’s Corps) lay two miles north of the Georgia Railroad. Late on the evening of July 19, Brig. Gen. John C. Brown moved his division south to establish a new line, his left flank resting at the east end of the Peach Tree Creek Line and forming an angle with it. Brown’s rightmost brigade, led by Brig. Gen. Arthur M. Manigault, managed to place its right flank one and a half miles north of the railroad. Wheeler’s cavalry lay to Manigault’s right. Brown’s Division represented a refused right flank for the Peach Tree Creek Line, but Cheatham was not yet deployed so as to fully cover the eastern approach to Atlanta. Moreover, because Cheatham kept the other two divisions in place facing north, he had to thin out the rest of his corps line to only one rank in places in order to shift Brown this far south.59
For most Confederates, July 19 proved to be a day of continued fortifying and, for some units, minor shifting of position. News of Thomas’s crossing filtered through the ranks and everyone expected a battle very soon. Hood issued a circular to his corps commanders urging them to place strong skirmish lines near Peach Tree Creek. “The object is to enable a small force to resist the enemy’s crossing for some time.” Other than Reynolds, it cannot be said that any other Confederate officer tried to do this on July 19.60
Hood had to postpone his attack on Thomas until July 20. He called a conference of his corps leaders and Maj. Gen. Gustavus W. Smith, commander of the Georgia Militia, to take place at his headquarters on the Buck Head and Atlanta Road on the evening of July 19. His instructions were to assault at 1 P.M. the next day, driving directly northward against Thomas. In his memoirs, Hood explained that his intention was to “crush Sherman’s right wing, as we drove it into the narrow space between the creek and the river.” He believed that Schofield and McPherson would have had to move ten or twelve miles to support Thomas, thus isolating the Army of the Cumberland from immediate aid.61
These instructions could have been disseminated by written orders, but Hood had two other objectives in calling a conference, the first during his tenure as army commander. First, he wanted “to deliver most explicit instructions [to his corps commanders] in regard to their respective duties.” He asked each man directly if he understood the orders, and all of them responded affirmatively. “I was very careful in this respect, inasmuch as I had learned from long experience that no measure is more important, upon the eve of battle, than to make certain, in the presence of the commanders, that each thoroughly comprehends his orders.”62
The second objective lay in Hood’s attempt to time the attack precisely when he predicted that only a part of Thomas’s army would have time to take position on the south side of Peach Tree Creek. He reckoned that by 1 P.M., many Federal units would have crossed but not yet have secured their positions with heavy earthworks. Timing was all important in this scheme, and the troops needed to know that, if they saw breastworks, they were to attack without restraint just the same. That, Hood reasoned, could be imparted to the corps leaders only through a personal meeting. The army commander wanted to catch the enemy “in the act of throwing up such works, and just in that state of confusion to enable our forces to rout them by a bold and persistent attack.”63
There was another, unstated, reason for Hood’s desire to have a personal conference with his subordinates. He was brand new to the job, about to embark on a risky move for which he had poor preparation. He knew that many members of his army questioned the change of leadership. It was far from a comfortable situation for the young commander, and he undoubtedly felt the need to establish a clear and supportive relationship with his chief subordinates. As biographer Richard McMurry has pointed out, Hardee resented Hood’s elevation; Stewart had not yet led his corps in action; Cheatham was a supporter of Johnston and had assumed corps command for the first time in his life only a few hours before the conference. Hood’s chief of staff, Brig. Gen. William W. Mackall, was a strong supporter and friend of Johnston.64
The rank and file could not know what was going on at army headquarters on the evening of July 19, but they knew that action was in the air. “We are expecting a battle every moment,” Taylor Beatty wrote in his diary, “as Hood is said to have been placed in command because he wanted to fight.”65
4: Preparations for Battle, July 20
At one I attack the . . . enemy. He has pressed our lines until he is within a short distance of Atlanta, and I must fight or evacuate. I am going to fight. The odds are against us, but I leave the issue with the God of Battles.—John Bell Hood
With each passing day of Sherman’s operations south of the Chattahoochee, the temperature and humidity continued to climb. Some soldiers remembered July 20 as “intolerably warm, scarcely a breath of air stirring,” while others recalled it as “an intensely hot day.” Clouds obscured the sky at times, but in most ways it was a typical summer day in the Deep South.1
As was his habit, Sherman developed definite ideas about how to push operations on the third day since his crossing of the Chattahoochee. Even though Thomas provided a sketch showing his troop positions, Sherman still believed his subordinate had too much manpower on the right wing of the Army of the Cumberland. He wanted Thomas to move Stanley’s and Wood’s divisions farther to the left, wheeling so as to cover the space between Thomas’s left flank and Schofield’s corps in the area embraced by the forks of Peach Tree Creek. “In other words, I wish you to strengthen your left and risk more to your right, for the reason that as Atlanta is threatened the enemy will look to it rather than the river.” Sherman contemplated a general advance closer to the city on July 20 with all units forming a connected line and the main threat posed to Hood coming from Schofield and McPherson. “Each army commander will accept battle on anything like fair terms,” he wrote in special field orders, “but if the army reach within cannon-range of the city without receiving artillery or musketry fire he will halt, form a strong line, with batteries in position, and await orders.” Sherman announced that he would continue to travel with Schofield’s command on July 20. Engineer troops completed a wagon bridge over the Chattahoochee River and took up the last pontoon bridge on July 20, making Federal logistical support more secure.2
Thomas gave Howard his marching orders for the day when the latter visited Army of the Cumberland headquarters at dawn. Newton was to place the rest of his division in the bridgehead south of Peach Tree Creek along the Buck Head and Atlanta Road, relieving Hazen’s brigade, and then advance cautiously south. After Hazen rejoined Wood’s division, Stanley and Wood were to move out in fulfillment of Sherman’s directive to connect with Schofield and cover the area around the forks of Peach Tree Cr
eek. Howard issued orders to his subordinates at 6 A.M. Stanley was to take the lead with Wood following close behind him, and Howard intended to travel with Stanley that day. Given Newton’s detached position, Howard told him to report directly to Thomas for orders. Joseph Fullerton, Howard’s adjutant general, informed Newton that Stanley and Wood would try to make connection with his left flank as soon as possible, but for the time being Newton’s division was the left end of Thomas’s connected line. “From present appearances the battle will be fought by the forces to your left,” Fullerton told Newton.3
The first order of business for Newton was to mass his entire division south of Peach Tree Creek. Kimball’s brigade had already crossed the stream the evening before and held the bridgehead with Hazen’s brigade during the night. Kimball replaced Hazen’s men in the light breastworks with his own troops at 8 A.M. Then Col. John W. Blake’s brigade followed by Brig. Gen. Luther P. Bradley’s brigade crossed the bridge and moved into place to the left and rear of Kimball. Hazen’s troops filed north over the bridge when the way was clear and made their way to Wood’s location.4
Thomas kept close tabs on events that morning, spending time at Hooker’s headquarters and consulting personally with Newton on the Buck Head and Atlanta Road. Newton was ready to advance his division farther south but needed to wait until he could form a connection with Twentieth Corps units to the west. Sending a staff officer to find Hooker, Newton discovered that the only Twentieth Corps division located south of Peach Tree Creek was Geary’s command and that a gap existed between Geary and his own division. Hooker informed Newton that he intended to move Ward’s division into that gap later in the day, and as soon as the Federals could present a connected front of some kind Newton intended to advance.5