by Earl J. Hess
This attitude certainly was not justified by either Thomas’s or Sherman’s instructions for the day. Neither Howard nor Palmer shared this lackadaisical attitude that Hooker imparted to his subordinates. It is true that no one thought the enemy would immediately attack the Army of the Cumberland on July 20; but as Bull indicated, the modus operandi during the course of the campaign was to be prepared for anything even if trouble was not anticipated, and Hooker was letting his guard down in a dangerous way on July 20.
For about three hours, Ward’s and Williams’s men lounged about in positions not suited for defense against a sudden attack from the enemy. They had plenty of time to advance their lines forward to high ground but received no encouragement, much less orders, from Hooker to do so. For those men who happened to be in open ground, the sun grew uncomfortably hot. Some of Williams’s troops also heard the plopping of long-range overshooting by Confederate skirmishers some distance ahead as occasional bullets fell among them.30
The only activity was to Hooker’s rear as efforts were made to construct more bridges to support the corps south of Peach Tree Creek. The high banks and muddy bottom of the stream made fording impossible; artillery and wagons needed bridges, and those had to be improvised out of whatever timber could readily be had near the bridge site. Capt. William Merrell of the 141st New York was given the job of managing a work detail to construct one such bridge for Williams’s division. Merrell had worked in the lumber business before the war and had some knowledge of how to do this. The division pioneers were exhausted, so he detailed men from the ranks to help him. They cut timber and hauled it half a mile to the creek. Merrell measured the stream and found it was seventy-two feet wide and the water seven and a half feet deep in the middle. He used pine trunks to make a log crib work six by eight feet in dimension to be placed in the center of the stream. Because the bottom proved to be uneven, the crib work had to be more than twelve feet tall. Merrell’s work detail then cut tall straight pine trees for stringers, laying them from the bank to the crib work. They were almost too long to be rigid under the weight of wagons and artillery, but Merrell had received a note of urgency from Williams to get the bridge finished soon and he decided to risk it. Fence rails were laid across the stringers to serve as the bridge roadway. Willow sprouts with a layer of dirt filled in the uneven parts. Merrell was barely finished with this improvised structure by midafternoon.31
Moving Ward and Williams to the south side of Peach Tree Creek was only the first step in Thomas’s plan. After that, the entire Twentieth Corps was to move south in conjunction with Newton’s division and Palmer’s Fourteenth Corps. As we have seen, Newton did not wait for Ward to move up his main line and form a tight connection; he moved forward as soon as Ward established his skirmish line. Palmer nervously waited for Williams to establish a forward position, but Geary did not wait. His division had been on the south side since the day before, and it was ready to move forward at the first opportunity. As soon as Ward and Williams were on the south side, Geary was ready to go forward, even though neither division came up to support him. Hooker’s lazy attitude toward corps operations that day did not rub off on Geary.
At 10 A.M., soon after Ward and Williams completed their crossing, Geary moved forward. He advanced a strong skirmish line supported by Col. Charles Candy’s brigade with Col. Patrick H. Jones’s brigade to its rear and Col. David Ireland’s brigade behind Jones. The Federals pushed Confederate skirmishers from two ridges in their front and secured yet a third ridge that seemed to be the best ground in the area. It was on a line with the final position Newton’s division assumed early that afternoon as well. By noon Candy’s men were on that ridge and collecting fence rails to make an improvised breastwork. Unfortunately, Williams’s division still lounged several hundred yards to the right rear of Ireland’s flank. Geary was now about half a mile south of Peach Tree Creek, and both of his flanks were exposed because Hooker had not bothered to push forward either Ward or Williams.32
Geary’s men also managed to eat something after assuming their new position. In fact, commissary wagons rolled up the hill to distribute rations to Ireland’s brigade. The sun was burning hot by now, and there was little shade on the ridge top for Geary’s troops.33
The tendency of all alert, ambitious commanders was to find the next good bit of ground in the direction of the enemy, and Geary was keen on seizing it. He quickly sent forward skirmishers after securing the ridge top to find out what lay ahead. Those skirmishers crossed “a swampy rivulet about 300 yards in front of my main line” and came to rest with their left wing in an open field and their right wing occupying “a high, narrow, timbered hill in front of my right.” Geary decided he must secure that hill to protect his right wing and serve as staging ground for the next push forward. He ordered Jones to send a strong regiment forward to occupy it and prepare the ground for the placement of a battery.34
Jones selected Lieut. Col. Enos Fourat’s 33rd New Jersey and accompanied it on the forward move. Marching in line, the regiment soon ascended the tree-covered slope and took position on the crest. It was evident to everyone that the hill was an isolated and vulnerable position. Fourat sent out his own skirmish line for added protection. Geary personally went forward a few minutes behind the 33rd New Jersey. Along the way he conversed with three captured Rebel skirmishers. “They were quite communicative, saying that there were no large bodies of their troops within two miles.” This information, plus what Fourat called “the feeble opposition made to our skirmishers,” led the division leader to assume that no trouble need be anticipated.35
Still, the atmosphere on that hill was disturbing. Lieut. Stephen Pierson, adjutant of the 33rd New Jersey, recalled that the forest “was ominously still; even the birds seemed to have stopped singing.” Geary had ordered a supporting regiment to the hill, and Lieut. Col. Allan H. Jackson’s 134th New York began to move forward. As Pierson made his way back to the main line on an errand, he met Jackson in transit. Jackson caught the ominous mood of the place and extended his hand while saying “‘Good-bye Adjutant.’ I laughed at him, but he said: ‘There’ll be trouble out there.’” Back on the isolated hill Geary personally marked out the location for the 33rd New Jersey line, and the men started to gather logs to make a breastwork.36
While Geary aggressively pushed forward, Palmer focused on completing the crossing of Peach Tree Creek by his Fourteenth Corps early on the morning of July 20 and then waited for Hooker to move before sending his men forward. Only two brigades of Davis’s division managed to lodge on the south side by the evening of July 19, but Baird’s division got over by midnight. Baird took a position to the left of Davis’s division and advanced half a mile south of the stream to secure “an important range of wooded hills.”37
Johnson’s men had made additional bridges to facilitate their crossing of Peach Tree Creek. As soon as those bridges were ready, the division began moving over the stream at 3 A.M. of July 20. Johnson moved forward to fill the gap between Baird’s division and Hooker’s corps, pushing Confederate skirmishers back in the early dawn of that day.38
Palmer felt frustrated by lack of activity on Hooker’s part. His instructions were to advance farther south in conjunction with the Twentieth Corps, but Williams’s division seemed content to lounge about rather than take up formation and connect firmly with Johnson. “Captain [Joel P.] Watson has been gone some time on the hunt for information as to General Hooker’s purposes and movements,” Palmer informed Johnson, “but has not yet returned. Do you know when General H. will be ready to advance?” Johnson was as much in the dark on that question as everyone else in the Fourteenth Corps. His division extended Baird’s line eastward, but a considerable gap existed to the left where Williams’s division should have been located. Johnson’s men formed two lines at about 10 A.M. and started to build fortifications but were soon told to stop work because their officers expected an advance at any moment.39
Davis experienced great delay in bringing his last b
rigade over Peach Tree Creek; in fact, that brigade was the last of Palmer’s Fourteenth Corps to move over the stream. James D. Morgan managed to cross five companies of the 60th Illinois early on the morning of July 20, bypassing the Confederates who still held the high bluff opposite Howell’s Mill. It was not enough to compel the enemy to retire; in fact, heavy skirmishing resumed that morning near the mill as the Confederates stubbornly held on to the bluff. Late in the evening of July 20 the enemy seemed to have left, and Morgan pushed the 10th Michigan over the creek at 6:30 P.M., followed by three other regiments after dark.40
Earlier that day, Dilworth’s brigade managed to get artillery up to the line it had established and held against Reynolds’s counterattack of July 19. Capt. George Q. Gardner’s 5th Wisconsin Battery had to be manhandled by the gunners into position because of the close proximity of Reynolds’s skirmish line. The pieces delivered destructive fire and compelled the Rebel skirmishers to fall back on July 20. To Dilworth’s right, Mitchell’s brigade encountered stiff resistance near the junction of Peach Tree Creek and the Chattahoochee River. Confederate skirmishers fought stubbornly and compelled the Federals to keep part of the brigade on the north side of the creek as a reserve in case they had to retire across the stream. “The enemy cling with great obstinacy to [their position on] our right,” Palmer informed Thomas’s headquarters. This was the left anchor of Hood’s Peach Tree Creek Line.41
By noon, Thomas had finished a ride along his line and sent a complete report to Sherman. He noted the heavy resistance to Palmer’s right wing and informed his superior that all his troops were on the south side of Peach Tree Creek. After mulling over the evidence, Thomas concluded that Confederate attention “is fully occupied by us, and I am in hopes Generals McPherson, Schofield, and Howard will be able to fall upon his rear without any very great difficulty.”42
Thomas, of course, was wrong. Hood’s attention was almost fully on the Army of the Cumberland, and he actually was ill-informed of Schofield and McPherson’s movements. Army of Tennessee headquarters was alive with preparations to attack Thomas that afternoon. “Feeling it impossible to hold Atlanta without giving battle,” Hood reported, “I determined to strike the enemy while attempting to cross this stream.”43
Hood called another conference of his major subordinates on the morning of July 20 to finalize details of the attack plan. He set 1 P.M. as the start of the assault to be conducted by Hardee’s Corps and Stewart’s Army of Mississippi, with Cheatham’s Corps to be held as a reserve. Hood put together an unnecessarily elaborate battle plan. Rather than a simple frontal attack, he wanted the divisions to maneuver so as to herd the retreating enemy and trap them in the area near the junction of Peach Tree Creek and the Chattahoochee River. To do so, the rightmost division of Hardee was to start, followed by the next in line to the left after the first had gone 200 yards. After hitting the Federals, each division was to veer left to accomplish Hood’s goal. This was an attack in echelon and something of an oblique movement as well. Any Civil War army would have found it difficult, and the Army of Tennessee did not have a sterling record of complicated movements on the battlefield. Yet Hood felt that Peach Tree Creek was a major terrain feature that could inhibit Thomas’s retreat; he wanted to use the creek as an obstacle to pin the enemy and damage him more severely than if he had a chance simply to fall back northward. He told Hardee and Stewart to hold back a division each as a reserve.44
As soon as instructions filtered down the chain of command, Hardee’s and Stewart’s men began to prepare for battle. They filled canteens and received an additional twenty rounds of small-arms ammunition per man. Stewart made a special effort to ensure his division commanders fully understood the details of the operation. He also told them to thoroughly examine the terrain in front of the Peach Tree Creek Line so there would be no surprises when the assault began. There was still time for other things that morning. Albert T. Goodloe of the 35th Alabama met with his bible class “as usual, and had a good time studying the Scriptures” before they were called into line.45
By about midmorning, disturbing news from Wheeler indicated that Schofield and McPherson were looming as a more potent threat than Hood had previously thought. The Confederate cavalry had not served army headquarters well for the past few days; Wheeler had failed to station sufficient troops far enough east of Atlanta to detect and accurately report on Sherman’s success in snipping the Georgia Railroad as early as July 18. The only explanation for this failure lies in Wheeler’s preoccupation with opposing Thomas’s advance north of Atlanta and his failure to station Kelly’s cavalry division far enough from the city’s east side to know what was happening near Decatur.
That failure of intelligence hampered Hood’s plans severely. Now, on the threshold of his first attack as army commander, he had to worry about a new threat.
A flurry of dispatches emanating from army headquarters to Wheeler began to appear by 10:20 A.M. of July 20. Through his staff members, Hood urged Wheeler to hold back McPherson as long as possible while he sent an additional cavalry force from Jackson’s Division to help. He also told Wheeler that he had decided to extend Cheatham’s Corps line all the way down to the Georgia Railroad. He also counted on the Georgia Militia to help secure the position east of Atlanta. By early afternoon William W. Mackall sent an urgent message to Wheeler asking him to report on the latest developments. Mackall wanted to know if he had fallen back much and how many Federals confronted him. Such inquiries clearly indicate that Wheeler was not in close, regular contact with Hood, increasing the sense of uncertainty about the planned assault on Thomas, which already was delayed by the time Mackall sent that dispatch to Wheeler.46
During the hours just before his attack, Hood increasingly was in the fog about major issues associated with the operation. He had pitifully few details about the threat posed by Schofield and McPherson and had authorized a shift in his army’s line of battle before the attack could begin. In Hood’s mind, this would involve a relatively minor movement. He wanted Cheatham to shift right so as to reach the Georgia Railroad with his right flank, but he apparently had no idea how far Cheatham would have to move to do this.47
To make matters more complicated, there actually were two movements discussed that morning, not just one. Cheatham had been complaining that ever since he moved Brown’s Division south of the Peach Tree Creek Line to begin forming the new Confederate position facing east on the evening of July 19, the rest of his corps (still on the Peach Tree Creek Line facing north) was stretched too thin. His other two divisions there had to hold the same sector as the three divisions had formerly held, and Cheatham could do that only by thinning his line to one rank in the center of that two-division sector. On the morning of July 20, Hood authorized Cheatham to make up for this by shifting Hardee and Stewart to the right the equivalent of one division frontage. He divided up the responsibility; both Hardee and Stewart were to shift right the equivalent of half a division. This would make the north-facing Peach Tree Creek Line compact and fully manned along its entire length.48
This minor adjustment in the Confederate position really had nothing to do with the other shift, the effort to move Cheatham all the way down to the Georgia Railroad. But for reasons that are not fully clear, Hood confused the two shifts in his mind. He seems to have assumed that Cheatham merely needed to shift the length of one division to reach the railroad and never kept the two shifts clear in his thinking or in his orders to subordinates. When the shift began, Cheatham intended to move all the way to the railroad, a distance of about one and a half miles (or about a two-division frontage), but Hardee and Stewart understood that they were only to move about half a division frontage in order to keep pace with Cheatham.49
Who was primarily responsible for this mix-up in the Army of Tennessee? Historians have generally, and rightfully, placed blame on Cheatham. He was new to corps command and admittedly not well suited for the job. Handling three divisions was very different from handling one, and Cheatham
was not up to his enlarged duties. He held the fundamental responsibility for informing army headquarters of his position and needs, and he failed to do so. But Hood cannot be held blameless. Such a basic misunderstanding of the army’s position never occurred when Johnston held command. He used his staff effectively to keep tabs on unit positions and always knew where they were and what sectors they needed to fill. Hood’s mobility was severely restricted by his physical infirmities (a major reason why he should not have been placed in command of the army), but he also does not seem to have used his staff well to serve as his eyes and ears. There is no indication that army-level staff members rode along the line to inspect unit locations on July 20. Hood still had much to learn about managing an army.50
As usual, Hood completely ignored this problem in his official report and in his memoirs. In the former, Hood argued that Cheatham’s new position, with most of his corps facing east, could serve a purpose in the proposed attack on Thomas. If Cheatham’s left could hold firm at the angle in the north-facing and east-facing Rebel position (near the junction of Pea Vine Creek and Peach Tree Creek), that would help to separate Schofield from Thomas and make the Army of the Cumberland more vulnerable to Hardee’s and Stewart’s assault.51