by Earl J. Hess
Winkler’s 26th Wisconsin had to bear the brunt of fighting much of Drake’s 33rd Mississippi. The 20th Connecticut failed to make enough headway to help it, and the second line apparently did not get involved in the fight. Wood praised the Wisconsin regiment highly. “The brave, skillful, and determined manner in which it met this attack, rolled back the onset, pressed forward in a countercharge, and drove back the enemy, could not be excelled by the troops in this or any other army.”48
When the 26th reached the crest of the second ridge, its position remained insecure for some time. Confederates still lurking in the thick woods on the left obtained an enfilade fire on the regiment until, some fifteen minutes later, the 20th Connecticut finally reached the crest and drove them away. By this time Winkler’s men were exhausted and almost out of ammunition. He asked Wood for help, and the brigade leader ordered the 73rd Ohio to relieve his regiment.49
“The intense exertion & excitement together with the scorching heat of the sun had utterly exhausted my men,” Winkler reported a few days later. “One officer was sun struck, & a number of others had to be helped to the rear though not wounded.” He allowed most of his troops to go back into the ravine to rest a few minutes in the shade and then reformed his regimental line forty yards behind the 73rd Ohio. Winkler now had an opportunity to replenish his ammunition supply, which essentially was exhausted. The 26th Wisconsin had fired so intensely that it had to scrounge among the dead and wounded to find more cartridges. Many muskets were so fouled as to require cleaning as well. The advance up the slope in pursuit of Drake’s men had been so rapid that about forty Confederates who fell into Winkler’s hands were bypassed. The Wisconsin men had no time to take possession of them and trusted to the second line to take care of the prisoners.50
Lieut. Col. Philo B. Buckingham’s 20th Connecticut had a good excuse for not keeping pace with Winkler during the advance up the two ridges. It had to contend with a deep penetration of the Union position by the right companies of Drake’s 33rd Mississippi. That penetration also threatened the right flank of Kimball’s brigade in Newton’s Fourth Corps. Newton estimated that Featherston’s Brigade attacked about fifteen minutes after Maney’s Division of Hardee’s Corps advanced toward Kimball’s front. When elements of Drake’s 33rd Mississippi bypassed Kimball’s right flank, Kimball created a refused line with the 73rd Illinois to fire in their direction.51
But Buckingham’s 20th Connecticut bore the primary responsibility for ejecting those Confederates from the gap that existed between Kimball’s right and Winkler’s advancing 26th Wisconsin. Buckingham had advanced to the first ridge crest when the Confederates penetrated the space between his regiment and the Fourth Corps position. From his perspective, it seemed as if Kimball’s brigade fell back, but in reality Kimball merely formed a refused line at his right flank. Drake’s men managed to go so far as to threaten Buckingham’s left flank as well, so the Connecticut officer refused his left wing and fired into them. “For a short time,” wrote John W. Storrs of the 20th Connecticut, “the regiment was in an extremely critical situation.” But the fire of the refused left wing drove the Confederates back.52
The way was now clear for Buckingham to swing the left wing back into alignment with the right and push his regiment forward. Wood ordered him to cross the ravine and take position on the crest of the second ridge. He encountered no more resistance in this forward move before taking position along Collier Road on the ridge top. But Buckingham noted that a gap of 125 yards still existed between his left flank and Kimball’s brigade. To cover that gap, he once again created a refused flank by forming his two left companies to face east. Wood detected signs of instability in Kimball’s ranks and worried about the area off to Buckingham’s left as well. He held his two reserve regiments in the second line for a while in case they were needed in that direction but soon realized Kimball was in no danger. He then authorized the 73rd Ohio to relieve Winkler’s 26th Wisconsin and the 55th Ohio to fill the gap between Buckingham and Kimball.53
Finally, Ward’s division line was in place where it should have been since early morning, connected and firmly facing the foe. Wood found that Collier Road “was a well-traveled highway, on the south side of which was an ordinary fence of rails, partly standing and partly thrown down. The men took position behind this fence and kept a constant and continuous fire upon the enemy.” Featherston’s Confederates were withdrawing toward the timber that shielded the Peach Tree Creek Line farther south.54
“This ended this severely contested engagement,” Wood proudly reported of his brigade’s part in the battle of Peach Tree Creek. “To us it was a brilliant feat of arms. We encountered the enemy in superior numbers in the open field. We met his offensive attack with an offensive return; his charge with a countercharge. The victory was complete and decisive.” Buckingham echoed this praise in his own report. He also asserted that his men had fired 150 rounds each, which seems an exaggeration considering the relatively short duration of the fighting. The 20th Connecticut lost fifty-five men. Wounded Rebel officers left on the field told the Federals they lost more troops in this battle than in any previous engagement. By sundown, the 136th New York relieved the 20th Connecticut, which fell back to occupy the second line of Wood’s brigade formation.55
Ward’s division had indeed responded to the appearance of Featherston’s Brigade with vigor, determination, and an aggressive forward drive that saved the field that afternoon, but Ward personally had little to do with it. The real work was done by Coburn, Harrison, and Wood and the officers and men under their command. Other than cheering the troops on, Ward’s only contribution to the fight was in refusing Thomas’s request to send a brigade from his division to help Newton. Ward correctly told Thomas that it was impossible. When Thomas then asked for just two regiments, Ward continued to refuse. The only reserve available to him consisted of six companies of the 136th New York. Pulling away any units “would have made a gap in my line that would probably have proved fatal to my division, if not the entire corps.” In the end, Newton did not need the reinforcement. Ward had at least one artillery unit in action, Lieut. Jerome B. Stephens’s Battery C, 1st Ohio Light Artillery, which fired over the heads of his troops for at least part of the battle, but generally the Union artillery played little role in the division’s countercharge.56
Joseph Hooker on the battlefield. This inaccurate view of the battle of Peach Tree Creek contains little in the way of reliable information about the actual course of the engagement. The battle lines were not formed so near the creek, and Hooker was on the farther side of the stream with his staff during the engagement. Theodore R. Davis, the field artist who sketched the original image, also unfairly focused public attention on Hooker’s personal leadership as a central feature of the day’s events. (Hood, “Defense of Atlanta,” 4:336)
Despite its initial success at capturing the Federal skirmish line, Featherston’s Brigade was decisively defeated on the afternoon of July 20. At most only two-thirds of Featherston’s men advanced beyond the crest of the second ridge into the ravine to engage Ward’s division, and they were outnumbered four to one by the Federals. Moreover, the Confederates who ventured beyond the captured Union skirmish line only loosely coordinated their advance.
Yet, the Rebels who tried to exploit Featherston’s initial success gave a good account of themselves. In the center of the Confederate line, three color-bearers were shot down carrying the flag of Oatis’s 22nd Mississippi by the time Featherston had driven the Federal skirmishers away from the second ridge. Then the regimental adjutant, Lieut. C. V. H. Davis, took the flag and encouraged the men to move down into the ravine only to be shot when the regiment confronted Coburn’s brigade.57
On Featherston’s left, Drane’s 31st Mississippi confronted the left wing of Harrison’s brigade in the ravine. Drane ordered his men to fall back just before he was badly wounded. Maj. F. M. Gillespie was injured soon after but, unlike Drane, was left on the field as the regiment retired. Adjutant
William J. Van de Graaff also was wounded as he held the regimental colors following the loss of three color-bearers before him. Van de Graaff was left behind during the retreat to the crest of the second ridge. Every company commander was shot during the short engagement with Harrison’s men until 1st Lieut. William B. Shaw of Company G took command of the regiment.58
Drake’s 33rd Mississippi on Featherston’s right confronted Wood’s brigade in some of the most intense fighting on Ward’s division sector. Drake was killed while waving his sword to encourage the men. Capt. Moses Jackson, who took command of the regiment, led it during the fall back toward the second ridge crest. The regiment lost its flag during the retreat. At least one color-bearer was shot, and “others attempted to get the colors and were wounded,” reported Matthew Andrew Dunn, but it was left on the ground for the enemy to pick up. Dunn put it well when he wrote, “we were badly cut to pieces” in this “very bloody affair.”59
While the 22nd, 31st, and 33rd Mississippi advanced northward into the ravine, with at least some support from the 1st Mississippi Battalion Sharpshooters, Featherston and the 3rd and 40th Mississippi remained on the second ridge crest near Collier Road. Exactly why has never clearly been explained. Capt. Charles A. Huddleston reported that the 40th Mississippi halted only forty yards north of the captured Union skirmish line but still on top of the ridge crest. “It was discovered that the regiment was very much depleted in numbers,” Huddleston wrote to imply the reason for its failure to move farther north. Lieut. Col. George P. Wallace was wounded and lost an arm, while Maj. W. McD. Gibbens was killed. The regiment held on the ridge for twenty-five minutes before the units that had advanced into the ravine fought and fell back to the captured Union skirmish line. Then the 40th Mississippi retired from the ridge. Mellon’s 3rd Mississippi also remained near Collier Road “partially protected by a rail fence.” Mellon was wounded soon after it reached the crest, and Lieut. Col. Samuel M. Dyer took charge of the regiment. He was content to hold it behind the slim rail breastwork for about twenty minutes before the other regiments retreated out of the ravine. Part of Oatis’s 22nd Mississippi remained on the ridge too, taking shelter behind the captured Union skirmish works, which “afforded us partial protection.” Oatis’s men merely moved the rails from one side of the road where the Federals had placed them to the other side to better suit their notion of how to defend the position.60
Featherston’s Brigade fell back soon after the retreat from the ravine brought out everyone who could escape the battle. The Confederates made their way over the largely open ground to the south of the Union skirmish position under what Oatis called a “murderous fire.” Featherston restored his line about 300 yards south of Collier Road partially in a strip of woods as Maj. James M. Stigler reformed his 1st Mississippi Battalion Sharpshooters into a skirmish line to protect the brigade’s new position.61
For the Federals who climbed the ridge to the top, seeing the enemy retreat was a moment of supreme exultation. “Then up went the Cry they are going back,” wrote Lysander Wheeler of the 105th Illinois. “Contrary as ever they walked off not hurrying much which gave our boys lots of Chance to pepper them which they improved with glee.” Andrew Jackson Johnson joined his comrades of the 70th Indiana in plopping down along Collier Road and firing as fast as he could “into their retreating colums [sic].” The musketry fire combined with oblique Union artillery fire from Geary’s position produced quite a few casualties. The next day, Federal troops who examined the ground just south of the Union skirmish line found many bodies lying in gullies and ravines.62
Harrison, who rode his horse during the entire battle, worried about the heavy expenditure of ammunition by his men and wondered if they would run out. He sent an aide and his assistant adjutant general to find more. Not only did they secure some boxes from Union ordnance wagons, but several men worked to gather cartridges from dead Confederate soldiers lying just south of Collier Road and distribute them along the brigade line.63
According to Federal accounts, the Rebels lost several regimental flags during their retreat from the second ridge crest. Either they were dropped or, in one case, a color-bearer had planted the staff in the ground. A Federal who ventured out to retrieve one of the flags was killed before he got back to his regiment, but another flag reportedly was taken by other Union soldiers under cover of darkness that night.64
Ward’s men secured control of the second ridge crest by increasing the height of the rail breastworks, which by now had changed hands twice. The work of fortifying the line along Collier Road continued after darkness fell. Men roamed the rear area to find fence rails or anything else to carry up the ridge because entrenching tools were not yet available to dig trenches on the crest.65
Many of Ward’s men counted themselves lucky for surviving near misses or slight injuries. A captain in the 70th Indiana saw three bullet holes in his hat after the battle, and a ball passed through the coat sleeve of Samuel Merrill. Andrew Jackson Johnson of the same regiment recalled an incident wherein one Confederate bullet hit him and two comrades while all three were lying down on top of the second ridge. It glanced off Red Garrison’s knapsack and “Struck the back part of my left thigh[,] passed on and Struck Newt [Adams].” All Johnson had to contend with was “a black spot on my thigh” that was “quite sore. I must be very lucky as it Seems as though the Johnny balls cannot enter,” Johnson concluded.66
The warm, humid weather played a role in the battle, according to many Confederate officers. They tended to cite this factor when explaining their defeat on the afternoon of July 20. “The heat was very oppressive,” argued Oatis, “and some of the men exhausted by the charge fell almost fainting at the enemy’s works.” Oatis implied that this was a reason some of his regiment failed to advance beyond the captured Union works. But even officers who led their troops into the ravine cited the heat as impeding their ability to resist Ward’s advance. Jackson thought his men of the 33rd Mississippi “were so completely exhausted and overcome with heat it was difficult for them to load and fire their pieces.” Loring and Stewart not only accepted this partial explanation for Featherston’s defeat but also cited the lack of support by Maney’s Division to the right.67
But Loring was willing to make a second effort after the repulse of Featherston’s men. He informed Stewart that if a fresh brigade could be found and Hardee could cooperate, his division would try again. Nothing came of this idea, and the Confederates merely skirmished for several hours from their position at the former Confederate skirmish line located along the edge of the tree cover a few hundred yards north of the Peach Tree Creek Line. Several Federal officers reported that Featherston attempted to attack again more than once, but there is no evidence to support such a contention.68
Out of 1,230 men engaged, Featherston lost exactly half, or 626. The 31st and 33rd Mississippi combined accounted for half of Featherston’s losses, testifying to the fierce fight they conducted with Ward’s division in the ravine. In fact, 164 men out of 215 in the 31st Mississippi were lost, amounting to 76.7 percent of the total engaged.69
Two hundred troops Featherston had left behind on picket duty before shifting to the right that day returned after the attack had failed, and it is likely these relatively fresh reinforcements were primarily responsible for keeping up a steady skirmish fire at the Federals that evening. John Adams’s Brigade reached Loring’s Division from its picket duty along the Chattahoochee River late that evening as well, but it was too late to take part in the battle.70
Ward’s division suffered a total of 551 casualties, significantly fewer than the Confederate brigade it fought that day. Roughly 4,000 Federals opposed Featherston’s Brigade and 13.7 percent were lost. Coburn took 1,315 men into action and lost 216 of them, amounting to 16.4 percent. Harrison’s brigade suffered 181 casualties, amounting to 13.7 percent if his troop strength was similar to Coburn’s. Wood lost 143 men of his brigade or 10.8 percent if he had as many men as Coburn.71
The Federals on Ward�
�s sector claimed to have captured seven Confederate colors plus twenty-five officer swords. They secured 114 Rebel prisoners in addition to taking in 132 wounded Confederates left on the field. Levin Miller’s 33rd Indiana picked up 152 Confederate small arms and turned them over to Ward’s ordnance officer.72
Featherston insisted that his men had done all they could to carry out Hood’s order and did so with enthusiasm. “No numbers were too large for them to attack,” he wrote to Hood after the war, “and no works too strong for them to charge. I cannot employ language sufficiently expressive of their courage and spirit displayed on this occasion.” He consistently blamed Maney’s Division to the right for not supporting his advance.73
But the Confederate brigade commander ignored the fact that at least one-third of his men did not advance into the ravine to support the other two-thirds who moved forward to engage the enemy. The brigade commander also did not personally go down into the ravine with those regiments. If one judged by casualties, the 31st and 33rd Mississippi bore the brunt of Featherston’s battle. While the Mississippians of his brigade initially advanced with good spirit to capture the Union skirmish line, the spirit went out of many of them as soon as they planted themselves on the second ridge crest along Collier Road. “They lost their organization,” as Jacob Cox generously phrased it, and some regiments continued forward in piecemeal fashion. Featherston did not have any artillery support to buck up his men’s courage or weaken Union resistance.74
The Federals had every reason to crow about their success that afternoon. Coburn called it “a victory snatched from the trembling balance of battle.” Many Federal participants were proud of the fact that they had fought and won an open field engagement without the aid of fortifications.75
For the men of Coburn’s brigade, the victory at Peach Tree Creek called to mind their terrible defeat at Thompson’s Station on March 5, 1863. A few miles south of Franklin, Tennessee, the brigade engaged in an unequal contest with a numerically superior force of Confederate cavalry, was defeated, and largely captured. “We remembered Thompson’s Station and were even,” wrote Jefferson E. Brant of the 85th Indiana.76