by Earl J. Hess
Perhaps Coburn also had Thompson’s Station in mind when he reacted so quickly and decisively to the first news of a Rebel approach on July 20. To Coburn belongs the lion’s share of the credit for the success of Ward’s division. Levin Miller of the 33rd Indiana put it well when he wrote that, “unless we had met the rebels just as we did and at the place we did, defeat and rout, I think, would most certainly have occurred.” Thanks to Hooker’s negligence, the division was lounging where it “had no position at all to stand and resist the large force and rapidly advancing attack that was being made by the enemy.” It was an uphill fight for all of Ward’s men, but they won it and established their line on top of the second ridge where they could not be moved.77
Ward received no credit from his own men. They were convinced the division would have suffered ignominious defeat if he had been responsible for its actions that afternoon. “Genl W. will get great credit I suppose,” Benjamin Harrison told his wife, “when the literal truth is his Div never heard from him during the fight.” Harrison did not see Ward or any of his staff members during the battle.78
Coburn’s men certainly saw their own commander as the hero of Peach Tree Creek. He made himself conspicuous by riding to every part of the brigade, cheering the men. Even Harrison’s troops gave Coburn his due. “I have always held that he saved the Army of the Cumberland that day,” wrote Capt. William M. Meredith of the 70th Indiana. “Had it not been for his promptness, our brigade would have been surprised and driven into the creek.”79
Coburn, Harrison, and Wood, in addition to the subordinate officers and the rank and file, deserved enormous credit for how they handled the crisis presented by the attack of Featherston’s Brigade. But it is worth pointing out that the Confederates moved no more than about 820 men into the ravine to engage Ward’s division, which outnumbered them by more than four to one. The normal advantage of occupying higher ground did not avail the Confederates on July 20; the Federals, attacking uphill, stopped them and threw them back with heavy Rebel losses. Numbers, spirit, superior leadership, and unit cohesion decided the contest on Ward’s division front.
7: Scott versus Geary
We raised the old Rebel yell and rushed on the works.
—J. P. Cannon
For three hours the fury of the battle along our entire line could not be surpassed.—John W. Geary
John W. Geary’s division was already positioned in as good a spot as possible to receive an enemy assault, and soon after Featherston hit Ward’s sector that attack came rolling forward. Having taken post on the Collier Road ridge crest earlier that day, Hooker’s Second Division contained a bit fewer than 3,000 men. Born in Pennsylvania, Geary had been a teacher, lawyer, and surveyor before taking command of a Pennsylvania regiment in the Mexican War. He had also served as governor of strife-torn Kansas Territory in 1856–57. His Civil War service spanned many battles in Virginia and the West.1
The formation Geary adopted for his division on July 20 both helped and hindered his ability to make a stand on the second ridge crest. He stacked his three brigades in a column formation, one a short distance behind the other. Largely this was done because of the terrain. The ridge top was heavily timbered on Geary’s sector, and the ground to his right was cut up by ravines. To the left the ground was largely open and the responsibility of Ward’s division, with Shoal Creek only about eighty yards from Geary’s left flank. Geary placed his main line even with the skirmish line of Ward’s command and advanced his skirmishers and the 33rd New Jersey a few hundred yards farther south.2
Geary decided to form his division on a narrow front of only one brigade but to place the two supporting brigades close enough to the first to be readily available. Col. Charles Candy’s brigade formed the first line on the ridge crest with Col. Ario Pardee Jr.’s 147th Pennsylvania anchoring the left. Next Candy placed Lieut. Thomas E. Sloan’s Battery E, Pennsylvania Light Artillery with Capt. Robert Kirkup’s 5th Ohio to its right. Capt. Henry Bundy’s 13th New York Light Artillery was positioned to the right of the 5th Ohio. A shallow dry ravine drained southward to the right of Bundy’s battery, and on the west side of it stood Capt. Myron T. Wright’s 29th Ohio. Then Lieut. Col. John Flynn’s 28th Pennsylvania extended the line, and Lieut. Col. Eugene Powell’s 66th Ohio anchored the brigade’s right flank. To Powell’s right lay rugged ground that as yet was uncovered by a Federal line of battle. Candy’s men had time to pile up fence rails for a slight breastwork along their position, which was a few yards north of Collier Road.3
Behind Candy and at the foot of the first decline in terrain north of his position lay Col. Patrick H. Jones’s brigade. The 73rd Pennsylvania held the left flank, followed to the right by the 119th New York and, on the west side of the shallow ravine, the 134th New York. Jones formed a second line with his remaining available units, placing the 109th Pennsylvania on the left and east of the ravine with the 154th New York on the right and west of the ravine. He had already sent his 33rd New Jersey forward to occupy an advanced position on Geary’s skirmish line before the Confederate attack. Although relatively close to Candy, all regiments of Jones’s brigade would have to move up a fairly steep and timbered slope to reach the first line of the division.4
Geary held Col. David Ireland’s brigade in a column of regiments about 100 yards behind Jones’s command. Here it would be in position to rush forward in case of trouble. The division’s formation enabled Geary to mass strength on a narrow front, but he in essence abdicated responsibility for the cut-up terrain to his right, relying on Alpheus Williams’s division to cover that sector. But Williams, under Hooker’s direct order, had stationed his men only part way from Peach Tree Creek up to the second ridge crest. There they lounged around for several hours before the Confederate attack. That cut-up sector was not adequately defended and posed an enormous advantage to the enemy’s approach. A gap of 200 to 300 yards existed between Ireland’s brigade and Williams’s division thanks to Hooker’s unaccountable lack of concern about positioning the Twentieth Corps that afternoon.5
The weakness of Geary’s position lay in the fact that he as yet had no support to right or left. Toward the east, Ward’s division had largely open ground, and thus it was possible to see the Confederates approach and possible for Ward’s men to move quickly up slope to meet them, which is exactly what happened. To the west, the timbered ravine next to Geary’s right flank offered a covered approach for the Confederates, allowing them to get close in to the division before being seen and inhibiting the reaction of the defending Unionists. Fortunately, Williams’s division was not far away and in a position to front the enemy, but the terrain and Geary’s formation both allowed the Rebels an opportunity to create more trouble than was necessary if Williams had been placed forward before the battle.
John W. Geary, who commanded the only Twentieth Corps division to be ready for the Confederate attack on July 20. (Library of Congress, LC-DIG-cwpb-07246)
Scott versus Geary
Williams’s sector was located opposite division lines of authority on the Confederate side. While Brig. Gen. Thomas M. Scott’s Brigade of Loring’s Division fronted Geary, Col. Edward A. O’Neal’s Brigade of Maj. Gen. Edward C. Walthall’s Division fronted Williams. O’Neal’s command was often referred to as Cantey’s Brigade after a previous commander. A native of Georgia, Scott had been a farmer in Louisiana before commanding the 12th Louisiana early in the war. He led a brigade in the Vicksburg campaign and achieved promotion to brigadier general by May 1864.6
Scott took 1,320 men into battle, if one averages his troop strength according to the fact that 330 men served in the 57th Alabama of his brigade. That is likely a high average, because only 318 men filled the ranks of the 12th Louisiana. The brigade advanced from the Peach Tree Creek Line by the right of companies to negotiate the tangled terrain just north of that fortification. J. P. Cannon in the 27th Alabama recalled the forest in his memoirs. “It was a heavy-timbered section and the trees had been felled, lapped and crossed unti
l they presented an almost impassable barrier, but we finally made our way through the worst of it and were then halted and wheeled by the left flank into line-of-battle.” By this time, Union skirmishes were already firing at them.7
According to Cannon, the Confederates were well aware of the risks attending this assault. “It is a fearful thing to charge an enemy in his works, especially when outnumbered two or three to one, but feeling that it had to be done we nerved ourselves up to this point to do our whole duty.” Cannon felt his comrades “were ready” for the attack when Scott ordered the brigade to “fix bayonets, forward, double-quick, march.” Scott’s men moved out with courage. “We raised the old Rebel yell and rushed on the works, but the yell was soon drowned by the roar of musketry and thunder of cannon, canister, and minie-balls.”8
While Scott outnumbered the Federal skirmishers, he had no artillery support to contend with the fire issuing from Sloan’s and Bundy’s guns. A portion of his line opposite Candy’s left wing, advancing in largely open ground, faltered under this fire until Scott personally led the 55th and 57th Alabama in a renewal of the advance that finally took the Union skirmish line. Ironically, some of the Federal skirmishers who were taken prisoner and rushed south were killed and wounded by the fire of Union artillery descending on the rear areas behind Scott’s advancing men.9
Geary’s Division at Start of Battle
Similar wavering took place on Scott’s left wing as well before the gray line continued advancing northward, but here the Federal skirmish line had heavy reinforcements. Before Scott began his advance, Geary had sent forward Col. Enos Fourat’s 33rd New Jersey from Jones’s brigade to occupy a ridge more than 300 yards in front of the right wing of Candy’s brigade. His skirmish line occupied the ridge too, which was a short feature in the timbered landscape, and a swampy stream lay between the ridge and the main Federal line. Geary also ordered forward the 134th New York from Jones’s brigade to support the Jerseymen, and it had barely started moving forward when the enemy approached.10
Scott’s left wing, consisting of Col. Noel L. Nelson’s 12th Louisiana and the consolidated 27th, 35th, and 49th Alabama under Col. Samuel S. Ives, approached the Union skirmish line anchored by the 33rd New Jersey on the ridge. The Confederates were able to advance through the timber before they engaged the Federal skirmishers only seventy-five yards from Fourat’s Jersey line. For a few minutes the opposing sides held static as Fourat sent his adjutant, Lieut. Stephen Pierson, to the left to see what was happening. Pierson went far enough to be able to look into the open ground fronting Candy’s left wing and saw Scott’s right wing approach the Federal skirmishers. “I stopped but a few moments to take it all in, and then rode back to report,” Pierson remembered. By the time he returned, Scott’s left wing was pressing forward. “How the bullets did come in from the front!,” Pierson marveled.11
Fourat’s men held firm and returned the fire, stalling the Confederates even though the Federals did not yet have breastworks. Not until Scott’s left began to wrap around Fourat’s right did the Union position crumble. Fourat refused his two right companies, but they could not stop the Confederates from continuing to flank that end of the regiment. To make matters worse, Scott’s troops began to flank the left end of the New Jersey line as well. As Fourat put it, “to stand longer was madness, and I reluctantly gave the order to retire fighting.” With the enemy closing in rapidly from three sides, the bearer of the regiment’s state flag fell, and several members of the color guard also were hit. There was no time to recover the flag, and it fell into Rebel hands as the regiment barely had time to escape. Ives credited John E. Abernethy of the 27th Alabama with capturing those state colors, although an unidentified correspondent of the Augusta Daily Constitutionalist claimed they were taken by Pvt. John H. Badgett of the same regiment.12
Charles Candy, whose brigade anchored Geary’s position along Collier Road on the best high ground to be had by the Federals south of Peach Tree Creek. (Library of Congress, LC-DIG-cwpb-04609)
Stephen Pierson remembered the frenzied retreat of the 33rd New Jersey back to Geary’s main line that afternoon. As he crossed the swampy stream, he marveled at the sight of bullets plopping into the mud and water. Some Confederates followed up the retreat quite closely. The Federals came across Lieut. Col. Allan Jackson’s 134th New York still on its way forward. “Where are they, Adjutant?” Jackson called to Pierson. “Deploy quickly, Colonel, they are right here,” was the answer, but Jackson was wounded before he could give any orders. As a result, the 134th was swept up with the retreating 33rd New Jersey. Both regiments fell back through Candy’s line and tried to regroup behind Jones’s position. Here the men met Hooker who was riding forward, “magnificent in appearance,” according to Pierson. The corps commander told them, “Boys, I guess we will stop here.”13
Fourat was frantic with concern about the fact that his regiment not only retired in disorder but lost one of its flags. Three days later, he wrote a full report of the incident to the adjutant general of the state of New Jersey, assuring him that Geary and Jones placed no blame on his men. Hooker told Fourat, “Colonel, it is no disgrace to lose your colors under such circumstances; I only wonder that a man of you escaped capture.” Fourat stated that his troops were proud “of their blue banner,” but “it was an impossibility” to save it from falling into enemy hands.14
Geary had been with the 33rd New Jersey for a time just before the Confederate attack and rushed back when the gray tide began to roll forward. According to Henry E. Clarke, a 29th Ohio man detailed to Bundy’s battery, Geary crossed the thin breastwork of Candy’s line yelling, “A general engagement! A general engagement! Men, hold your ground. I will send support to you.” Geary came back in time to cancel the forward movement of another regiment instructed to go forward and support the 33rd New Jersey. Col. John T. Lockman’s 119th New York had started from Jones’s position and reached the breastworks of Candy’s brigade when the New Jersey unit and the 134th New York came rushing back. Geary told Lockman to stay just behind Candy’s men and support them when needed.15
Very soon after the 33rd New Jersey and 134th New York returned to Geary’s position, the Confederates began to flank the Federals. The temporary resistance offered by the 33rd New Jersey caused Scott’s Brigade to break into two wings separated by at least 100 yards. Both wings kept advancing without being able to support each other. The left wing took full advantage of the timbered ravine immediately to Geary’s right and bypassed the Federal flank. Nelson’s 12th Louisiana and Ives’s consolidated 27th, 35th, and 49th Alabama participated in this flanking movement, throwing an entire division of Union troops into confusion and near catastrophe. Nelson and Ives were able to accomplish more for their limited numbers than any other Confederate commanders at Peach Tree Creek. If properly supported by additional men, they might have been able to break open Hooker’s position at a key point.16
Scott’s right wing failed to support this advantage. Geary witnessed the approach of the 55th Alabama and 57th Alabama across the open ground against Candy’s left wing, coming from the woods “in immense brown and gray masses . . . with flags and banners, many of them new and beautiful.” Pardee ordered his 147th Pennsylvania to open fire as Sloan’s and Bundy’s gunners trained their sights on the two Alabama regiments. “The lines of the enemy were broken and they were soon compelled to seek cover in the woods,” Pardee reported.17
But Scott’s left wing quickly produced trouble for the Federals. The first regiment to feel the pressure as enemy troops circled round the right flank in the woods was Lieut. Col. Eugene Powell’s 66th Ohio, which retreated in some haste. Then Col. John Flynn’s 28th Pennsylvania peeled out of line. The 29th Ohio, under Capt. Myron T. Wright, stood its ground for a while and fired at the Rebels in front. The thick woods hid the enemy in front and on the flank, and soon it became apparent that Confederate troops were to the rear as well. A member of Wright’s command named Ike recalled that his comrades could hear the Rebels
yell “surrender you yankey sons of bitches but we could not see it in that line as long as thare was one hole left to git out of so we lit out.” The 29th Ohio fell back about 200 yards “in some disorder” according to Wright and reformed at the foot of the slope behind Jones’s brigade. “One half minet later and we would of lost the hole regt,” concluded Ike.18
Within a short while, the right flank of Candy’s brigade crumbled and retreated in disorder. In falling back, it affected several other regiments that had rushed forward to its support. As soon as trouble became apparent, Jones moved his 134th and 154th New York forward and obliquely to the right until the right flank of those two regiments was roughly even with the right flank of the 66th Ohio. The men lay down just behind Candy’s line, but very soon that forward line broke. As each regiment fell back it passed over Jones’s two regiments and brought them back too. Maj. Lewis D. Warner admitted that some degree of panic affected his 154th New York as Candy’s troops trampled over them. “I could say that it was a race for life,” reported William Harper of the 154th New York, “the minnies pelting the ground like so much hail.”19
Scott’s left wing disrupted and forced back five Union regiments thus far, clearing Federal troops from Candy’s line west of the dry ravine and exposing the right flank of Bundy’s battery. At the same time that Scott’s left wing met and drove Candy’s right wing, Geary and his subordinates were rushing more help to Candy from Jones’s and Ireland’s brigades. The 109th Pennsylvania held the left end of Jones’s second line and, at the first sign of a Rebel attack, was moved forward to support Pardee’s 147th Pennsylvania. As soon as it arrived, trouble became apparent on the right of Candy’s line so the 109th was moved in that direction. The Pennsylvanians met the 29th Ohio as it retreated “in a confused mass,” according to Fergus Elliott of the 109th. Elliott saw the color-bearer of the 29th Ohio and called on him to stop and rally the troops, but he refused. Just then Elliott saw Serg. Samuel Gourd fall. “Gourd was a staunch friend of mine,” Elliott remembered more than thirty years later, “and his death seemed to nerve me to do what I had first intended doing—make a stand.” Elliott grabbed the colors of the 29th Ohio from the reluctant flag bearer and waved them while shouting. Two of his comrades understood and encouraged him. “That’s right, Ferg, stand where you are, we’ll stand with you.” Elliott played an inspiring role in bringing order out of chaos at the foot of the slope behind Candy’s line.20