by Earl J. Hess
Capt. Augustus L. Milligan reported that the 57th Alabama suffered the loss of two field officers, one staff officer, and fifteen line officers. One of the latter was Capt. Bailey M. Talbot of Company H. Talbot “acted imprudently, in the charge,” reported Joel Dyer Murphree to his wife. He advanced ahead of his men in the forward movement and lagged behind in the retreat. When last seen, Talbot was moving slowly back across open ground at the rear of the regiment. “He may have laid down behind something to protect him and was captured,” Murphree surmised. Talbot died on the field at age twenty-nine instead. The day before the battle he wrote to his young son Riley. “Should I fall fighting for what history will tell you, my boy, avenge the blood of your father.” Milligan wrote a eulogy for his fallen men. “The long list of casualties in this regiment in the engagement of the 20th instant will be sufficient evidence of its deep devotion to the cause of Southern liberty and independence,” he asserted.47
Scott’s men supported Milligan’s effort to portray the battle of Peach Tree Creek as evidence of devotion to duty. J. P. Cannon argued after the war that the troops “literally obeyed” Stewart’s order to attack regardless of obstacles. He blamed Hardee’s Corps for not supporting Stewart’s efforts. Troops of the Army of Mississippi “could have driven the enemy across Peach Tree Creek” if they had had proper help to the right and left. Milligan of the 57th Alabama praised Scott for showing himself “in the midst of danger cheering the men with his presence and cool determination,” but failed to note that the brigade’s left wing went behind Candy’s line without his guidance.48
Loring used only two of his brigades in the attack on July 20 and lost 1,016 men in the process. With a combined total of 2,550 men, Loring lost 39.8 percent of his strength in the attack on Ward’s and Geary’s divisions. He believed his troops had taken out of action 2,500 Federals, but that was an exaggerated estimate. Ward’s and Geary’s combined losses totaled 1,027 men out of about 7,000 engaged, or 14.6 percent. The number of Union and Confederate casualties on this part of the battlefield was almost equal, but the percentage lost was dramatically worse for the Confederates (39.8 percent compared to 14.6 percent). Stewart noted in his report to Army of Tennessee headquarters that Loring lost more heavily than his other division commanders. The result of this bloodletting was a failed effort to break Hooker’s line.49
8: O’Neal versus Williams and Reynolds versus McCook
Boys, don’t shoot until you see them—there’s a bully place to bury them out there.—Joseph Hooker
The clouds of smoke . . . poured down on us to hide everything but the flash of the enemy’s guns.—Rice C. Bull
Thus we had made a desperate charge, lost many of the best men in our Corps and accomplished nothing.—Robert H. Dacus
Loring’s troops were in action only a short while before Stewart threw another division of his Army of Mississippi into the attack. Commanded by Maj. Gen. Edward C. Walthall, it fronted Williams’s division and the left end of Palmer’s Fourteenth Corps line. Born in Virginia, Walthall lived most of his life at Holly Springs, Mississippi, where he practiced law and entered the war by joining the 15th Mississippi. He served in the Western Theater, rising to brigade and then division command by 1863. Walthall led only two brigades into action on July 20. He positioned Cantey’s Brigade, now commanded by Col. Edward A. O’Neal, on his right connecting with the left of Scott’s Brigade of Loring’s Division. On the left, Walthall placed Brig. Gen. Daniel H. Reynolds’s Brigade. His other unit, led by Brig. Gen. William A. Quarles, was left in reserve. Stewart accompanied Walthall’s Division to observe its progress that day.1
Like Loring, Walthall ordered his regimental commanders to advance from the Peach Tree Creek Line by the right of companies so they could negotiate the heavy timber that fronted the position. When the troops reached the northern edge of that timber, at the location of the Confederate skirmish line, they fronted once more into line. Waiting a few minutes for Loring to go in, as he was instructed, Walthall found that Hood’s complicated plan of maneuver had fallen by the wayside. The troops to his right seemed to be guiding right, as they should have done, but they were not then wheeling to the left as Hood instructed. From nearly the start of the battle on Hardee’s sector, the attack was devolving into a simple, straightforward advance. In fact, Walthall found that he had to move farther to the right than anticipated in an attempt to keep his right flank somewhere near Loring’s left flank. As a result, the right wing of his command, O’Neal’s Brigade, landed up east of Howell’s Mill Road and confronted Williams’s division. The left wing, Reynolds’s Brigade, remained west of the road and attacked the far-left end of Palmer’s corps line.2
But the shift to the right enabled Walthall to more directly hit the space between Geary’s division and Palmer’s corps, which was covered only by a blue-coated skirmish line. O’Neal’s Confederates swept across Hiram Embry’s plantation near the junction of Collier Road and Howell’s Mill Road, driving back the Federal skirmishers and moving into the rugged and timbered ground that fronted Williams.3
O’Neal had a rather checkered history of service in the Civil War. Born in Alabama and a college graduate, he worked as a lawyer before securing a commission as colonel of the 26th Alabama in Virginia. He did well in several major battles as a brigade commander until Gettysburg, when his performance did not match Lee’s expectations. Transfer to the West with his old regiment led to his elevation to brigade command once more. Brig. Gen. James Cantey had fallen ill and was out of service since mid-May, 1864, so O’Neal took over the brigade. He aligned his command with the 37th Mississippi on the right, followed by the 17th Alabama, then the 26th Alabama, and the brigade sharpshooter battalion next, with the 29th Alabama on the far left. A member of the 37th Mississippi reported his regiment had 210 men in the attack. If that was an average for all, then O’Neal took 1,050 troops into action.4
Like other units before it, the brigade advanced by the right of companies to negotiate the tangled vegetation fronting the Peach Tree Creek Line. Then O’Neal ordered his officers to front their regiments about 300 yards from the Federal skirmish line. O’Neal then urged his men to “drive every obstacle before them.” They charged with a yell and forced back the Union skirmishers. Col. Orlando S. Holland proudly reported that the color-bearer of his 37th Mississippi was the first to plant a flag on the captured Union breastworks. Serg. Samuel W. Jones, who had been a member of the regimental color guard since his enlistment more than two years before, accomplished the deed. Jones excitedly told Holland “Colonel my colors are here first.” A moment later he was shot through the head and “his brains bedaubed the flag he so nobly bore,” as Holland put it. Only two weeks before, Holland had recommended the twenty-one-year-old Jones for promotion to ensign of the regiment. The recommendation was approved by all higher-ranking officers, but the commission was not issued until July 22, two days after his death.5
O’Neal versus Williams
The Confederates took a number of prisoners when they captured the Federal skirmish line. Maj. David F. Bryan’s 26th Alabama alone rounded up fifteen captives. After passing the skirmish works, O’Neal’s men entered the difficult ground filling the gap between Geary and Palmer. It “was very rough and the bushes and undergrowth dense and tangled,” reported O’Neal. The right end of his brigade line struggled through the forest and entered an open field. At this point the Confederates looked to the right and saw what O’Neal described as a line of Federals in a crescent shape configuration about 100 yards away. By now a great deal had happened in Geary’s division, and this was the line, formed mostly by Ireland’s brigade, that linked Geary’s formation with the left end of Williams’s division. O’Neal ordered the 37th Mississippi to wheel right and fire at this crescent-shaped position, and the three right companies of the neighboring 17th Alabama did the same. The rest of O’Neal’s Brigade continued to advance a short distance north to confront Williams’s division.6
Because of Hood’s plan to att
ack en echelon, Williams already had prior warning of the Confederate approach. O’Neal came in a few minutes after Scott, giving Williams an opportunity to adjust his position and make ready for the enemy. Born in Connecticut and a graduate of Yale University, Williams practiced law in Detroit and served in a Michigan regiment during the Mexican War. He led a division in Virginia during the first half of the Civil War and was one of the most thoroughly experienced division commanders in Sherman’s army group during the Atlanta campaign.7
When the battle of Peach Tree Creek began, Williams was in the process of strengthening his skirmish line with a section of artillery and more troops. Then the firing started on Newton’s front and rolled toward the Federal right. Williams firmed up his position to get ready for trouble. Earlier that day he had advanced from the bottomland skirting Peach Tree Creek along a country road that angled toward the southeast and joined Howell’s Mill Road at the Hiram Embry plantation, stopping his division about 600 yards short of the Embry place where a straggling group of deserted houses was located. Williams had assigned Brig. Gen. Joseph F. Knipe’s brigade to take position to the right of the road, while Col. James F. Robinson’s brigade took post to the left. Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Ruger’s brigade remained to the rear of Knipe as a reserve. Given Hooker’s lack of concern about hurrying things forward, the division lounged about for hours before the Confederate advance without maintaining proper formations or planning to move forward. It needed advanced warning of trouble and, thanks to Hood’s plan to attack en echelon, received it.8
Alpheus S. Williams, a stalwart division leader in Sherman’s army group whose men expertly handled themselves to deal with the unexpected Confederate attack. (Library of Congress, LC-DIG-cwpb-07269)
The terrain constricted Williams’s deployment. A rugged ravine covered his left flank, the same ravine used by the left wing of Scott’s Brigade to cause so much trouble for Geary. Another ravine separated Williams’s right flank from the left end of Palmer’s Fourteenth Corps line. Robinson and Knipe occupied the higher ground between these two ravines, the division line bisected by the country road. Williams immediately ordered Knipe and Robinson to form their men properly. Sections of Lieut. Charles E. Winegar’s Battery I, 1st New York Light Artillery and Capt. John D. Woodbury’s Battery M, 1st New York Light Artillery were positioned where possible to cover the high ground and the ravines.9
Williams ordered Ruger to move his brigade to the right a bit where one of Palmer’s units was positioned. Brig. Gen. Richard W. Johnson, who commanded the division on Palmer’s extreme left, had earlier placed Col. Marshall F. Moore’s brigade west of the ravine separating the two corps. Moore faced his men east and started to construct breastworks to protect Palmer’s left flank. Williams now wanted that ground for his own division, and relieving Moore allowed the Fourteenth Corps troops to rejoin their parent division west of the ravine. Ruger relieved Moore quickly and formed his brigade in a line behind Robinson and Knipe.10
In the midst of all this excited preparation, Hooker was shaken out of his lethargy. The fire of battle seemed to awaken him. Always a keen proponent of elan under stress, Hooker rode along Williams’s developing line and encouraged the troops. “Boys, don’t shoot until you see them—there’s a bully place to bury them out there,” he yelled.11
Ohio-born James S. Robinson, a volunteer soldier who had worked as a newspaper publisher and state politician, commanded the 82nd Ohio in Virginia before coming west with Hooker’s command in the fall of 1863. Like Williams, Robinson heard the initial roll of musketry on Newton’s front and observed its progress toward Hooker’s right. He barely got his brigade deployed from column into line before O’Neal’s men approached through the timber in front and started to fire. “The battle at once grew fierce and bloody,” Robinson reported, “a portion of my troops becoming mingled with those of the enemy in an almost hand-to-hand conflict.” Robinson had the 143rd New York on his extreme left, then the 82nd Ohio, 61st Ohio, and 101st Illinois on the extreme right at the country road. The 82nd Illinois was held a few yards to the rear as a reserve. Hovering about in the rear of Williams’s developing line was the 31st Wisconsin, which had only recently joined Sherman’s army group and had not yet been assigned to a brigade.12
Robinson’s Brigade
Col. Horace Boughton’s 143rd New York received its first fire as it deployed from column into line, but Boughton held the men firmly to their duty. He obeyed Robinson’s order to move forward and make connection with Ireland’s brigade to the left. Going ahead a few yards, it soon became clear that Ireland had fallen back and could not make connection. Moreover, the 82nd Ohio to Boughton’s right failed to advance as far as he did, so the 143rd New York was unsupported on both flanks. But the New York men were sheltered by thick woods; as O’Neal’s troops advanced within twenty yards of their position, they poured in a disciplined fire that forced the Confederates to retire. Boughton credited the success to his men’s skill at musketry, “which was done with such precision and effect.” Boughton felt uncomfortable holding his advanced position and immediately retired about forty yards to rejoin the rest of Robinson’s brigade.13
Col. Stephen J. McGroarty’s 61st Ohio, positioned to the right of the 82nd Ohio, also advanced nearly as far forward as Boughton’s New Yorkers. McGroarty’s men held firm and fired their rifles well enough to stop O’Neal’s first attack, with some Confederates falling within ten feet of the Ohio line. The Federals also took heavy casualties in this fight. McGroarty was wounded along with four other officers and more than seventy men. The 61st Ohio fell back to the rest of the brigade line at about the same time as Boughton’s New York regiment.14
In the lull between O’Neal’s first and second attacks, Robinson’s men fired left oblique into the ravine separating them from Ireland’s embattled troops. In this way the infantrymen and artillery gunners of Williams’s division aided Geary’s efforts to a limited degree.15
Robinson’s brigade held firm for the rest of the battle, anchoring Williams’s left flank near enough to Geary so that eventually Ireland could establish contact with it. In the meanwhile, the experiences of individuals in Robinson’s brigade told the story of Peach Tree Creek in personal ways. Lieut. George Young, a member of Robinson’s staff, was shot while riding across a field to deliver a message, the bullet entering the lower part of his left leg. Young endured many operations over the coming years that never completely took away the recurring pain until his death in 1909. Within the ranks of the 82nd Ohio, which lost sixty-two men on July 20, Dewitt C. Foos encountered trouble when he left the ranks after O’Neal’s first attack. Foos later claimed he helped a wounded comrade to the rear, but his officers testified that he had no permission to do so. Once to the rear, a provost marshal ordered him to escort some prisoners to the rear. By the time he returned to his company, Foos was branded as a deserter in the face of the enemy. He was tried by a general court-martial, found guilty, and sentenced to stand on a barrel two hours per day for twenty days “with a placard in his back in letters three inches long ‘I skulked before the enemy.’” Williams approved the findings, and Foos apparently learned a lesson about leaving ranks without explicit permission of his officers.16
Williams’s right wing was led by Joseph F. Knipe, a former shoemaker from Philadelphia and Mexican War veteran who had worked for the Pennsylvania Railroad before the Civil War. As colonel of the 46th Pennsylvania and leader of a brigade, Knipe gained experience in several Virginia battles. Many men of Williams’s skirmish line were drawn from his command on July 20, giving a good account of themselves in their fighting retreat from Walthall’s advance.17
Knipe’s men were resting in column when the fighting started, and the first shots came as a surprise to them. According to Rice C. Bull of the 123rd New York, everyone knew how disastrous it would be if the enemy hit them while the brigade was still massed in column. As a result, everything moved in quick time as the men marched south before deploying lines, first Col. William K.
Logie’s 141st New York and then Lieut. Col. James C. Rogers’s 123rd New York. Logie’s men went no more than 200 yards before they met the retiring Federal skirmishers and, behind them, O’Neal’s men. The 141st New York “ran head-on into them,” as Bull put it, in the woods. The first few minutes of firing brought down many troops, including Logie, who was killed, and Andrew J. McNett, his lieutenant colonel, who was wounded. Nevertheless, the regiment managed to come into line and hold firm, as Rogers brought the 123rd New York up to its right in the same fashion. Rogers also lost several men while coming into line. The 5th Connecticut and a detachment of the 3rd Maryland next came into line to the right of the 123rd New York, with Col. James L. Selfridge’s 46th Pennsylvania anchoring Knipe’s right flank.18
Joseph F. Knipe, the excitable brigade leader who played a large role in stopping O’Neal’s Confederates but who still could take time to share his chewing tobacco with his men. (Library of Congress, LC-DIG-cwpb-05077)
Knipe’s Brigade
The reaction of Knipe’s men to the sudden Confederate attack led Rice Bull to contemplate the nature of his comrades. “No brigade was ever in a more dangerous position to receive an attack,” he wrote, and only because it consisted of “experienced veteran soldiers, men who knew what to do under the most adverse and changing conditions,” the situation was saved in the nick of time. Bull had further reason to contemplate human nature under trial when he recalled seeing a Federal skirmisher belonging, according to the insignia on his cap, to the 27th Indiana of Ruger’s brigade. “He was a straight young fellow at least six feet tall and looked every inch a soldier.” The man stopped a moment when he reached the line of the 123rd New York to take one more shot at the Rebels but was instantly killed by a bullet that slammed so hard into his forehead it made a loud noise. Gunners of Winegar’s New York battery had to move his body out of the way as they maneuvered a section of guns into position. Bull never knew the name of this brave man; he was buried anonymously with the dead of Knipe’s brigade, and his family probably never learned the details of his fate.19