by Earl J. Hess
Federal officers could not hide the fact that five regiments fell back in so much disorder as to nearly constitute a panic, but Candy’s left wing held firm in the chaos. “The disorganized masses of men as they rushed by the right of my line told a fearful tale,” reported Ario Pardee. “The men seemed to be panic-stricken and I regret to say that there was manifested a lack of energy, coolness, and determination on the part of the officers which was truly deplorable.” It was impossible to stop them, and, as Pardee put it, “one might conclude that destruction and defeat were inevitable.” Samuel Ives of the consolidated 27th, 35th, and 49th Alabama agreed with Pardee. “The enemy offered but feeble resistance,” he wrote, “and in their precipitous flight threw away their knapsacks, guns, and accouterments.”21
But fresh regiments and cool heads came into the picture to slow the retreat and stop the enemy. From Jones’s brigade, Maj. Charles C. Cresson led his 73rd Pennsylvania up to a position behind Pardee’s regiment. When receiving Rebel fire from the right, Cresson retired his regiment about eighty yards, faced it to the right, and advanced a short distance to an advantageous spot for defense. Here the 73rd Pennsylvania stayed and delivered fire at the enemy. Col. John T. Lockman also moved his 119th New York of Jones’s brigade to help Cresson, positioning it to the right of the 73rd Pennsylvania.22
Ireland also sent units from his brigade column to the rear of Jones. Col. Abel Godard led the 60th New York forward from the head of the column and encountered the Confederates on his way. Godard reacted calmly and effectively to the threat. He “faced his regiment by the rear rank, and made an oblique change of front forward on first company” before giving the order to fire. With the stout defense offered by the 73rd Pennsylvania and 119th New York a short distance away, Godard contributed well to stemming the Rebel tide.23
At the same time, Capt. John H. Goldsmith led the 29th Pennsylvania forward from its position as the second regiment in Ireland’s brigade column. He encountered refugees of the retreating right wing of Candy’s brigade while moving forward. One of Ireland’s staff members brought word to head for Bundy’s battery and support it. While Goldsmith continued moving forward, he encountered a group of Confederates who responded to his call to surrender by opening fire. Goldsmith ordered his right company to return the fire (it was the only part of his regiment able to reach the group) until the shooting died down, when he moved forward toward the endangered battery.24
Ireland moved the last four regiments of his brigade forward but with only limited success. Formed in column at the start, each regiment had to deploy into line. Ireland assigned his assistant inspector general, Capt. Michael Nolan, to superintend the deployment. The first regiment was to advance immediately after deploying to be followed by the next en echelon, with each regiment to the right of the previous one. It was a complicated maneuver to conduct under fire, in the woods, and on uneven terrain.25
Col. Henry A. Barnum moved the 149th New York forward after deploying but in crossing the ravine that lay at the foot of the slope received heavy Confederate fire. As Barnum put it, the regiment “was not in a position to inflict much damage upon the enemy.” The 149th New York lost thirty-five men “almost in an instant,” including Lieut. Col. Charles B. Randall and Capt. David J. Lindsay, who were killed. Nearly the entire color guard was shot down, and nearby Confederates called on Color Sergeant William Crosier to give up the flag. “I cried to them to take it, if they could, and, swiftly tearing the flag off the staff, stuffed it under my shirt and retreated, leaving my flag-staff behind.” The 149th New York then retired in disorder.26
Col. Herbert von Hammerstein’s 102nd New York moved out next and lost sight of the 149th New York very quickly. Suddenly it received heavy fire from the right as it crossed the ravine. With this punishment added to the confusion in the area, Hammerstein’s men broke and fell back. The 102nd New York lost fifty-five troops in its brief exposure to battle at Peach Tree Creek. Next, Lieut. Col. Koert S. Van Voorhis moved his 137th New York forward after Hammerstein left and encountered similarly heavy fire. Van Voorhis managed to control his men and stop them briefly to make a stand, but his right flank ended inside the ravine, and the line was enfiladed with no good prospects for refusing it to meet the enemy. The 137th New York therefore retreated some 300 yards to reform.27
Lastly, Col. George A. Cobham Jr. moved forward his 111th Pennsylvania and managed to get it through the ravine and at least part way up the slope toward the location of Candy’s embattled brigade. But it received an increasingly heavy fire from Scott’s men that brought down many Pennsylvanians. According to John Richards Boyle, “some of the wounded were rolling down the steep declivity.” Boyle initially thought men of Williams’s division were mistakenly firing on Ireland’s brigade, but when the enemy troops came within fifty yards of the regiment, they began to call on the Yankees to surrender. Cobham ordered his men to change front and meet this threat when he was shot through the lungs while waving his sword in the air. He died later that night. “In an instant,” wrote Boyle, “the regiment had dissolved to the left rear and rallied on its colors in a new and corrected line.”28
Lieut. Col. Thomas M. Walker took charge of the 111th Pennsylvania and commanded it for the rest of the battle. The men were out of immediate danger but faced with what Boyle called a torrent of fire from the ravine. The terrain and vegetation accentuated the sound and impression of this fire. “Trees were clipped of their branches, bushes were cut away as by knives, and rails with which the swale was bridged were splintered. The clothing of many of the men who were not wounded was perforated. The coat and trousers of one of the officers were in shreds from the musket balls that barely missed his person.” According to Boyle, the ravine “was a throat of death,” the worst experience of the war for the 111th Pennsylvania. For half an hour it endured this fire and lost 74 men out of about 200 engaged. Thirty-two of the casualties were missing, captured by the Confederates during the pull-out from the ravine.29
Ireland’s four regiments reformed near the scene of their repulse in and around the ravine with the 149th New York on the left and the 102nd New York on the right. The 137th New York and 111th Pennsylvania formed behind those two regiments. Eventually, Barnum and Hammerstein moved the 149th and 102nd New York back to the other two so that all four regiments were now together in one line. At this point in the fight, Hooker rode up to show himself and received “stirring cheers” from the troops.30
It had been a remarkable occurrence; half a Confederate brigade disrupted the attempt of four Union regiments to form and participate in the battle. Scott’s men had the advantage of terrain and tree cover, but most importantly they were well in hand and hit Ireland’s units exactly when the Federals were vulnerable, moving forward individually and not suspecting a threat to their right. But the Unionists recovered quickly and reformed a short distance away to shore up the developing line of resistance that would hold for the rest of the engagement.
111th Pennsylvania at Peach Tree Creek. A dramatic visual representation of the fierce fight experienced by the regiment as it met Scott’s Confederates in and near the ravine behind Candy’s brigade. (Boyle, Soldiers True, 234)
Despite the chaotic way in which it deployed, Ireland’s brigade managed to blunt the further progress of Scott’s left wing down the ravine behind Candy’s position. Added to regiments of Jones’s brigade, the developing Union line behind Candy managed to hold ground and prevent further danger to Geary’s division. How far the comparatively small number of Confederates might have penetrated is an open question, but their attack ground to a halt in the rugged terrain somewhere to the rear of Geary’s front line.
While Ireland and Jones dealt with the rear areas, an intense and deadly fight occurred for the ground occupied by Bundy’s 13th New York Battery in Candy’s line. The 66th Ohio, 28th Pennsylvania, and 29th Ohio peeled away to expose the right flank of the battery. According to Capt. Robert Kirkup of the 5th Ohio, positioned to the left of Bundy’s command,
the Federals “gave way and retreated in confusion.” Kirkup however was determined that his men would stay and support the guns. Ario Pardee, from his position in the 147th Pennsylvania to the left of the 5th Ohio, had nothing but praise for Kirkup’s cool conduct and success in holding the Ohio men to their work.31
Capt. Henry Bundy also worked hard to hold his gunners in their place. When Featherston’s Confederates initially hit Ward’s sector to the left of Geary’s division, Bundy directed his fire at them. A few minutes later, Scott’s Brigade appeared in front of Candy’s line and Bundy redirected his fire to the front. Soon after, the Confederates began to wrap around Candy’s right flank, and the three infantry regiments fell away.32
The heaviest pressure fell on Bundy’s right section of two guns, led by Lieut. Henry Muller. The crews continued to work their pieces even though they were subjected to heavy fire. Within minutes six cannoneers were wounded. A noncommissioned officer at one gun received nine bullets, and another at the other gun was hit eight times. Twenty horses fell in this hail of rifle fire from Scott’s men. The surviving men at the two pieces gave up and fled, abandoning their guns. Elements of Samuel Ives’s consolidated 27th, 35th, and 49th Alabama did this damage to Bundy’s battery.33
Henry E. Clarke of the 29th Ohio, who had been detailed to help Bundy’s men serve the guns, vividly recalled being captured in the confusion as the two pieces were abandoned. “Give the d-d Yanks no quarter!” he heard the Confederates yell, but no one killed them in cold blood. Instead, Clarke was taken prisoner and hurried south from the battlefield. When reaching the tree cover behind the Confederate skirmish line under guard, Clarke saw the effect of the fight on his enemy. “The woods were full of wounded rebels, who were getting off the field in the best manner they could.”34
Clarke was captured at Scott’s high tide, but effective work by Candy’s left wing now blunted Confederate progress. Bundy redirected the fire of his other four pieces toward the right to keep the enemy away from the two abandoned guns, firing canister at short range. Pardee refused the right wing of his 147th Pennsylvania to fire in that direction too, behind the 5th Ohio to his right. Two of Ireland’s regiments came forward to help as well. Maj. John A. Reynolds, Hooker’s chief of artillery, was on the scene and came upon Godard’s 60th New York. He asked Godard to move up and join the refused right flank of Pardee’s Pennsylvania regiment. One of Ireland’s staff officers had earlier ordered Goldsmith’s 29th Pennsylvania forward to support Bundy, but Goldsmith was delayed by encountering elements of Scott’s left wing on the way. After dealing with those Confederates, Goldsmith continued forward and aligned to the right of the 60th New York in the new position. These regiments—Candy’s 147th Pennsylvania and 5th Ohio, plus Ireland’s 60th New York and 29th Pennsylvania—provided immediate support for Bundy’s battery at the same time that the rest of Jones’s and Ireland’s brigades blocked the other Confederates circling round through the ravine.35
Bundy’s two abandoned pieces remained for a few minutes in no-man’s land, isolated between the opposing lines. Pardee saw them and told Capt. Jacob P. Kreider of Company F, 147th Pennsylvania to retrieve the guns. Kreider called for volunteers, and several of his own men plus some from Company A came forward. A number of Bundy’s men and troops from Kirkup’s 5th Ohio also joined the group. As these Federals moved forward to secure the guns, parts of the 109th Pennsylvania also joined them and helped to turn the cannon around so as to fire toward the right and rear of Candy’s line.36
Bundy took charge of those two abandoned guns and directed their fire. Everyone was full of praise for the 13th New York Battery men. The stand of Bundy’s four remaining guns proved to be the key to stopping Confederate progress along the ridge top where Candy held his line. Supported by the work of numerous infantry regiments to the left and rear, Scott’s attack was blunted. Bundy lost eleven men. Sloan’s Battery E, Pennsylvania Light Artillery, positioned between Pardee’s 147th Pennsylvania and Kirkup’s 5th Ohio, was not threatened. It fired a total of 530 rounds to the front and obliquely to the left. Sloan lost five men and fourteen horses.37
The fight for the ridge top occupied by Candy’s brigade was short but intense. This spot “was the key position of the entire battle,” Geary asserted, and “once gained by the enemy the day was lost.” It had been a very emotional experience for the men of Bundy’s battery. They almost lost their guns and narrowly averted a humiliating defeat. A lieutenant of the battery broke into tears when he thanked the men of the 109th Pennsylvania for helping to recover the two abandoned pieces.38
Stephen Pierson of the 33rd New Jersey visited Bundy’s battery soon after the fight and saw that the spokes of some wheels were nearly cut in pieces by musketry. One of Bundy’s sergeants, “still black and grimy from the fight,” leaned against one of the guns while “patting it affectionately with his hand, as a mother might pat her child who had been in great danger, but had been saved.” The New Jersey soldiers had a habit, when their cartridges became damp, of taking the minie balls out and filling old socks, which they then gave to Bundy’s gunners. Bundy had used those “stocking legs,” as the sergeant called them, that afternoon. They served as improvised canister rounds, effective at short range.39
The sketchy reports written by regimental commanders in Scott’s left wing agree that the Confederate units received “very heavy fire” and that the wing was unsupported to right and left. Unit commanders also united in reporting that the hot, humid weather was a problem. “Owing to the rapidity of the advance and the ruggedness of the ground,” reported Colonel Nelson of the 12th Louisiana, “my men were very much exhausted.” A company clerk of the 12th noted in the unit’s record of events that “many fell, completely exhausted.”40
Scott apparently remained with the right wing of his brigade, consisting of the 55th and 57th Alabama, which had been repulsed in the first attempt to strike at Pardee’s and Kirkup’s Union regiments. The left wing of Scott’s Brigade receded from its high tide and fell back, compelling Scott to order the right wing to retire as well. Federal observers noted the time of the Rebel fall back as about 6 P.M.41
Geary’s division reacted to the unexpected with commendable alacrity and intelligence. In a sometimes chaotic process, brigade and regimental commanders adjusted their positions under extreme pressure to form a long refused line from the left wing of Candy’s brigade toward the position of Williams’s division to the right and rear of Geary’s location. Eventually, that refused line connected with Williams’s left flank to form a solid barrier to any Confederate advance. The 33rd New Jersey of Jones’s brigade formed on the extreme right of this refused line and connected with Williams. The process of forming the refused line saved Geary’s division. Hooker personally helped to establish this refused line by pointing out the best places for some of the regiments to take position and ordering the Federals to construct breastworks to more securely hold the new line.42
Despite their repulse, Scott’s men achieved a remarkable feat. With scarcely two-thirds of a brigade, the Confederates disrupted and threw into confusion the majority of three Union brigades. They came closer than one could have expected to breaking through Geary’s position. Only because Geary had depth in his formation were the Federals able to respond quickly enough to meet this threat.
When he fell back, Scott left skirmishers near the skirt of timber that shielded the Peach Tree Creek Line. These Confederates kept up a sporadic fire on Geary’s division until after dusk. Ward’s division, now positioned on the ridge top to the left of Geary’s line, contributed its fire to keep this Rebel skirmishing down to a manageable level.43
“I have never seen more heroic fighting,” Geary reported of the engagement at Peach Tree Creek. “For three hours the fury of the battle along our entire line could not be surpassed.” Looking at the field afterward, noting how the musketry scored trees and brush, Geary was reminded of the great battle at Gettysburg more than a year before. He saw Peach Tree Creek “as a test of the
discipline and valor of our troops, and as the first defeat of the newly appointed commander of the rebel army.” The battle “was glorious in its results.”44
Geary’s Division at End of Battle
Geary’s division lost 476 men, constituting 15.8 percent of the somewhat less than 3,000 troops involved. Ireland’s brigade suffered 233 casualties, roughly half the division losses, while forming the new refused line. Regimental casualties varied among Geary’s units. The 109th Pennsylvania suffered sixteen losses and the 154th New York only seven, even though its Companies D and E fired an average of eighty rounds per man during the battle.45
Scott lost 390 men out of 1,320 engaged on July 20. That amounted to a loss rate of 29.5 percent. The 55th and 57th Alabama in Scott’s right wing suffered the most. Their combined casualties totaled 284 troops, or 72.8 percent of the brigade casualties. These regiments attacked Pardee and Kirkup across open ground and suffered enormously for it. Ironically, the regiments of Scott’s left wing, which operated mostly on cut-up, timbered ground, achieved far more than the right wing and lost comparatively fewer troops.46