The Battle of Peach Tree Creek
Page 28
Hood could not leave bad enough alone. In his memoirs, published one year after his death due to yellow fever in 1879, he again slammed Hardee for not serving the cause well at Peach Tree Creek. Hardee’s men did little more than skirmish on July 20, in his view, and many of them, “when they discovered that they had come into contact with breastworks, lay down and, consequently, this attempt at pitched battle proved abortive.” Hood also blamed Hardee for the fact that the attack took place much later than planned, apparently still ignorant of the mix-up of intelligence coming from Cheatham’s headquarters concerning the length to which the army had to shift right in order to strengthen the Outer Line against McPherson and Schofield. Hood’s own headquarters shared equal blame for that breakdown of information, something Hood never recognized or even seems to have understood.26
Although Hood admitted that even a late-starting attack should have succeeded, he wondered for two weeks after the battle why it had failed. According to his memoirs, Hood found the answer one day in early August 1864 when Patrick R. Cleburne visited army headquarters and told him that, while preparing his division for the attack, Hardee had warned him, in Hood’s words, “to be on the lookout for breastworks.” Hood attributed this action of Hardee to the temper instilled in the Army of Tennessee by Johnston’s extreme caution and to Hardee’s fear of Hood’s reputation for rashness. His conclusion was that Hardee might have been willing to frustrate his plans, or “at least willing I should not achieve signal success.”27
According to Hood’s memoirs, other high-ranking officers in the Army of Tennessee shared his view that Hardee was the chief cause of failure on July 20. Samuel G. French certainly thought so, and Arthur M. Manigault, who commanded a brigade in Hood’s old corps, reported that this view was widely bandied about among the officers as well. Hood contrasted Hardee’s actions with those of Stewart, praising the latter for exhorting his men just before the attack to push on regardless of any kind of opposition. He dwelled on the important role high-level commanders could play in men’s battle spirit by the content of their words and the manner in which they spoke them. “Every word, portending probable results, passes like an electric spark through the entire command,” Hood wrote. “It is, therefore, in the power of an officer to inspirit his men, and incite them to deeds of valor in the hour of battle, as well as to depress and demoralize them by an expression of despondency, one word foreshadowing the possibility of defeat.”28
Hardee died in 1873, seven years before this fresh attack on his character appeared in Hood’s memoirs, and thus was unable to answer it. Thomas B. Roy, Hardee’s faithful staff member and, in the postwar years, his son-in-law, took up the challenge. He wrote to many officers in Hardee’s Corps to see if there was any truth to the accusation. “I have found no one who ever heard of the alleged warnings against breastworks except in and by this book,” he concluded of Hood’s memoirs. Not only were Hardee and Hood dead, but Cleburne had preceded each of them through his death at the battle of Franklin on November 30, 1864.29
Roy compiled the answers to his query in a long article concerning Hardee’s conduct during the Atlanta campaign, and there were numerous letters by officers who roundly denied that Hardee ever cautioned Cleburne or anyone else about running up against breastworks at Peach Tree Creek. Walter L. Bragg, who commanded sharpshooters in Cleburne’s Division, argued that everyone already knew the Federals might be ensconced behind earthworks and that not even a lowly lieutenant would have dared caution his men against them, much less the corps commander. No one contacted by Roy could believe the story, and Roy categorically denied it in his article, which was published in the Southern Historical Society Papers in 1880, soon after the appearance of Hood’s memoirs.30
It is unclear whether Cleburne really made such a comment to Hood. We have nothing but Hood’s word for it that the conversation took place. Cleburne was not only a loyal subordinate but a friend of Hardee’s, and it is difficult to believe he would have said such a thing to Hood. The fact that all the principals involved in this had passed away by the time the accusation appeared in print made it impossible to have closure concerning it, but from the evidence available to us today there is every reason to believe Hood misunderstood some innocuous comment about the fight at Peach Tree Creek. While Hood wrote a great deal in his memoirs about duplicating Robert E. Lee’s aggressive method of commanding troops in battle, he completely overlooked a key component of Lee’s method when it came to dealing with his subordinates. Lee would never have publicly blamed one of his corps commanders for losing a major battle, especially upon such slim, hearsay evidence as Hood used to attack Hardee’s reputation after Hardee had already gone to his reward.
In the end, the overwhelming majority of Confederate commentators on the battle of Peach Tree Creek found it easy to conclude the effort had been an abject failure. “Take it all together my opinion is we did not make it pay,” wrote Capt. Alfred Tyler Fielder of the 12th Tennessee in Maney’s Division. The perspective of someone who did not participate in the battle confirmed that the opinion was widespread throughout the Army of Tennessee. Arthur M. Manigault had missed the fight because his brigade was in Cheatham’s command facing the twin threats posed by McPherson and Schofield, yet he accurately characterized the battle of Peach Tree Creek as “a complete failure. We lost more men than the enemy did, and gained no substantial advantage. It did not delay the enemy twelve hours, but only made him more cautious, and caused him to be in a better state of preparation for any occurrence of a like nature.”31
The battle of Peach Tree Creek was one episode of a long campaign, and the flow of events barely paused for it. Sherman began thinking of his moves and prospects at 1 A.M. of July 21. Having digested the first reports of the battle, he informed McPherson what had happened to Thomas and characterized it as a vigorous thumping of the Confederates. The enemy had been “roughly handled” on July 20. “I would not be astonished to find him off in the morning, but I see no signs looking that way yet.” If so, Sherman wanted a hot pursuit and expected the Army of Tennessee to move toward Macon. If Hood stayed, Sherman wanted Thomas to advance to shorten the Union line and gain more firm command of the Chattahoochee River. Sherman accurately predicted that Hood would reinforce his right to more strongly oppose McPherson and Schofield.32
Early on July 21, Thomas more clearly informed Sherman of the battle’s characteristics, noting that it had involved some of the heaviest fighting of the campaign thus far but had produced comparatively light Union casualties. Thomas expressed little hope of advancing very far, assuming the Confederates were well fortified a short distance from his position. As a result, the Army of the Cumberland did relatively little on July 21, “a fearfully hot day” in Howard’s view. The men of Newton’s division rested, buried the dead, and strengthened their earthworks. Thomas told Newton not to advance until he could secure firm contact with Wood’s division to the east, and that could only be done by Wood’s advance.33
By 4 P.M., Newton sent two regiments from Blake’s brigade forward to reconnoiter the area south of his position. Col. John Q. Lane led the units and skirmished heavily with the enemy before falling back and reporting what he discovered. Newton relayed the information to army headquarters, indicating that Lane had found the Rebel skirmish line heavily fortified and only 500 yards south of Newton’s position. The works were strongly held, and there was no prospect of success if Newton launched an attack on them without heavy support to right and left. Thomas’s staff officers replied that the commander had no idea of a major attack that day.34
If the annoying gap between Newton and Wood had to be filled on July 21, it was up to Wood and Stanley to do so. A glimmer of hope appeared when Union skirmishers reported at 5 A.M. that Confederate skirmishers in front of the two Fourth Corps divisions had fallen back to the main enemy line the night before. Howard immediately issued orders for the two divisions to move forward by wheeling left. Stanley’s left brigade did not have to move at all for it already
had assumed a position very close to the Confederate main line the evening before, but Wood’s command, to Stanley’s right, advanced a mile and a half to close up with the enemy’s main line of works. By 11 A.M., both divisions were well within musket range of the Confederate Peach Tree Creek Line and the Outer Line.35
By 2 P.M., Howard received a note from Schofield asking for a Fourth Corps brigade to relieve one of his own brigades that barely filled a sizable gap in the Union line between Stanley’s left flank and Schofield’s right. The Twenty-Third Corps had to shift left to secure its contact with McPherson’s right, and it would help Schofield a great deal to have Howard relieve that brigade. Unlike his usual helpful attitude, Howard refused to do so. “I have one small brigade in reserve,” he explained to Schofield, “and there is quite a space between my right and Peach Tree Creek. Hood is great for attacking, and I feel that it is necessary for safety to retain this brigade in a movable condition. The enemy is in strong force throughout my entire front, also opposite the gap between Wood and Newton.” In fact, Howard was busy with shifting units along the line held by Stanley and Wood to even out troop strength, and he issued orders to fill up a deep ravine that bisected the Fourth Corps position with timber to prevent the enemy from using it to split his command in two.36
On Wood rested the responsibility of holding Howard’s right. Wood had started the day with Knefler’s brigade on his left and Gibson’s on his right, holding Hazen’s brigade as a reserve behind the line. During the advance, Hazen brought his men up between Knefler and Gibson to extend Wood’s line before it came to rest about 800 yards from the main Confederate position. For the rest of the day, Wood’s troops busied themselves with digging earthworks and making their new position as secure as possible. For many men in Gibson’s brigade, that meant cutting small timber and rolling the logs forward to reduce their exposure to enemy fire. When a Confederate deserter came into their lines that afternoon and warned that his former comrades were preparing to attack, the men of Knefler’s brigade quickly dropped their entrenching tools and got ready for a battle that never took place. Heavy skirmishing however occurred all along the line that day.37
Gibson found that there still were no friendly troops near his right flank after the move forward so he stretched almost his entire brigade out in a single line as well as reinforced the skirmishers stationed off to his right. Signal officers in Hazen’s brigade found a good pine tree and climbed it; from the top they could clearly see the streets of Atlanta. Despite the move forward, Wood was still unable to make contact with Newton. Howard told Thomas’s headquarters that, by the end of the day, there was still a gap of half a mile between the two divisions. Brig. Gen. John H. King’s brigade of regular troops, however, had been shifted from Johnson’s Fourteenth Corps division to this sector on the evening of July 20. King now tried to cover the gap by positioning his men on the north side of Peach Tree Creek opposite the interval.38
Sherman was pleased with this incremental advance, even though it did not unite his entire command in one continuous line. The Confederates still held a conspicuous hill near where Stanley’s left met Schofield’s right, and there they “keep up an infernal clatter” of skirmish fire that could be heard some distance away. Schofield paid little attention to it, focusing most of his energy on securing his connection with McPherson instead. On his right flank, Col. William E. Hobson’s brigade held a road junction linking the routes to Power’s Ferry on the Chattahoochee River with a major road leading to Atlanta. Hobson was barely in touch with the extreme left flank of Stanley’s division. His men skirmished very heavily with the Confederates who held the hill all day of July 21 without relief from the Fourth Corps. In fact, Schofield kept Hobson there all day of July 22 as well before letting him return to Hascall’s division.39
Schofield was able to firm up his connection with McPherson on July 21 and, for most of his men, that day was characterized by heavy skirmishing along the Twenty-Third Corps line. The troops also could hear the railroad cars clanging away in Atlanta, and some were able to climb trees and catch a glimpse of the city.40
McPherson made greater progress than any other element in Sherman’s army group on July 21, mostly because he had been farther behind the other armies during the preceding days. One of his divisions attacked a prominent hill and captured it in heavy fighting, breaking the far end of the Confederate Outer Line. His troops were thereafter held in place by the Rebels who fought to minimize the effect of this loss as Hood scrambled to mount a major attack on McPherson the next day.41
While Sherman’s left wing inched forward, with McPherson’s progress dramatically prompting plans for a renewed offensive by Hood, the Union right wing remained in place. Newton’s division had already shown that little more than skirmishing and reconnoitering was possible for Thomas’s men on July 21. While Thomas wanted Hooker to press forward and find out what the enemy was up to, there was little opportunity of doing more to help Sherman’s overall plan. Brigade commanders along the Twentieth Corps line pressed their skirmishers forward and relayed the expected news that the Confederates were in force a short distance south of the corps line. In some Federal units, rumors of a second attack steeled the nerves of expectant Unionists, who were to realize by the end of the day that they were in fact merely rumors. For most men in the Twentieth Corps, July 21 was a day of burial, digging earthworks, and resting from the labors of the day before.42
Irving Bronson of the 107th New York had a fresh look at the aftermath of battle when he accompanied a skirmish line that moved forward according to Thomas’s instructions. The line advanced far enough to catch a glimpse of a strongly fortified Confederate skirmish line through the pine trees. Along the way, Bronson also saw evidence of trauma from the battle of July 20. “There was blood, chunks of flesh, hair, and an arm and leg, besides torn clothes, four or five muskets, and lots of things that a soldier has to carry. Some one of our shells must have done terrible execution on that spot.” Bronson estimated that six men had been killed here, and their remains moved away.43
The appearance of Hooker remained a highlight of July 21 for many men of the Twentieth Corps. Hooker was a master of bravado, and the western troops in Ward’s division particularly loved him for it. “His face looked just like a sunbeam,” wrote George F. Cram of the 105th Illinois. “When he came along to our regt. we brought out a battle flag which we captured, he stopped and coming up to us said, ‘Boys what regt. is this?’ The 105 Ill., we replied. Then said he, ‘You did splendidly, splendidly but they did just as well on the right, the corps is all right.’ We gave him cheer after cheer and it was carried from regt. to regt. all along the line as he rode on.”44
When not cheering Hooker, members of the Twentieth Corps amused themselves by reading the letters and other material found on the bodies of dead Confederates in their sector. William T. Shimp of the 46th Pennsylvania called them “Love Letters,” and he also found the words to a Southern patriotic song on the body of a slain enemy soldier. Lewis Dickinson of the 22nd Wisconsin found a bogus election ticket on the body of a dead Mississippi man that read “‘Save the Union,’ ‘No civil war.’” The Federals who read it assumed it indicated the depth of resentment toward the Confederacy among at least some of the rank and file in the Confederate army.45
Thomas’s instructions for Palmer’s corps were much the same as for Hooker’s command; advance as far as possible and entrench. Davis’s division was farther behind than any other in the Army of the Cumberland, so his men had a special task: to mass their strength and move south far enough to come abreast of the other troops. Sherman strongly supported these instructions and urged Thomas to move his right flank so as to clear the entire south bank of the Chattahoochee River and make firm contact with the railroad between the stream and Atlanta.46
Johnson’s division moved a reinforced skirmish line forward at midafternoon of July 21 and met heavy fire. Nevertheless, the line captured the Confederate skirmish position, having advanced in places
from 300 yards to a half mile. Dozens of Rebels were captured in the process, but Johnson lost an equal number of men as well. To Johnson’s right, Absalom Baird’s division also moved south on July 21. The Confederates were unable to stop either Johnson or Baird from advancing their lines. “With a heavy force they succeeded in gaining a portion of the line of pits and compelled the retirement of the whole,” reported William H. Young of Ector’s Brigade in French’s Division.47
Davis’s division had never fully pushed back the enemy skirmish line in the area near Howell’s Mill, but now it mounted a major effort to do so. James D. Morgan advanced the 10th Illinois of his brigade and captured the stubbornly held skirmish position that barred further progress. This freed up the entire division, and Davis was able to come up with Baird to his left. Davis also was able to push heavy skirmish lines toward the Marietta and Atlanta Road and the Western and Atlantic Railroad to his right. The Federals occupied a section of the former for a couple of hours before Confederate reinforcements pushed them back in a countermovement. Nevertheless, the main line of Davis’s division was now in position to see more of the landscape to the south. Brigade commander John G. Mitchell reportedly was able, with the aid of a field glass, to see a clock tower in Atlanta and “told the boys what time it was.”48
Thomas felt that his men had done all they could on July 21, and he was right. There only was room for moving opposing skirmish lines because the Confederate Peach Tree Creek Line was too strongly held to be profitably assaulted.49