According to most sources Stadler replaced Müller on the 10th, however they may have been a handover period. Stadler recalls:
My assumption of command of the Division was accomplished by 0800 on 3rd July 1944. During the preceding night, the last elements of SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 19 had been pulled out of the main line of resistance (MLR) north of Esquay and replaced by the 10th SS Panzer Division. The combat units of the Division were assembled in the area of Maizet-Vacognes-Montigny-Division Command Post at Le Mesnil – so that they could be used as tactical reserves of the II SS Panzer Corps right behind the MLR and, if necessary, launch counterattacks.
For this purpose, the Division was to investigate the possibilities of commitment in the sectors of the 10th SS Panzer Division and the 277th Infantry Division, determine routes of approach, and move the Artillery Regiment into such a position that it could support counterattacks in any direction and at anytime.
Battle for Hill 112
Stadler quickly found his division being thrown into action and recalled the details of the battle at some length:
Within one hour after the Division had been taken over, orders for a counterattack on Maltot, Eterville and on Baron by way of Hill 112, were received from the Corps by telephone, and a short time later confirmed in writing. So the attack on Baron was to be launched at 2000 and that on Eterville at 1200. Although the time was very short, the execution of this task was still possible thanks to the fact that the SS-Panzergrenadier Regiment 20 was not too far away and that a tank abteilung, together with the artillery, could support the operation from the positions they were in at the time. The units just mentioned received their orders accordingly by telephone and, after hasty assembly into position, were able to launch the counterattack at about 1300. Around Maltot a vigorous battle developed, in which reorganized elements of the 12th SS Panzer Division, which had been forced back early that morning from Eterville and Maltot – participated, on our side.
At about 1500, Maltot was again in our hands. The enemy answered with increased air activity and concentrated very strong artillery fire on Maltot. In these circumstances, it was out of the question to continue the counterattack on Eterville by daylight, in spite of the support given by the entire Corps Artillery, which, however, consisted only of a few sudden concentrations. Therefore the Division ordered an attack on Baron to be launched at 2000, together with other elements. In the meantime, the Command Post (CP) had been transferred to the group of farmhouses, one kilometre northwest of Grimbosq. The advanced Division CP was located in the thicket one kilometre northwest of Bully [east of Esquay and Maltot].
Things did not run smoothly as the Allies did all they could to impede the massing of the 9th SS; in addition, its position was compromised by the loss of Hill 112. The latter was to become the scene of heavy casualties for both sides. Stadler discovered flexibility was an increasing prerequisite of such operations:
Concentration of the Division was greatly impeded and delayed by serious traffic jams on roads, harassing fire from the enemy artillery directed on villages along the routes of advance, and on road junctions, as well as by the strong enemy air activity. In addition to that, the enemy managed at about 1800 to capture height 112, which dominated the entire Corps sector. Thereupon the mission assigned to the Division was altered by the Corps, to the effect that only height 112, and later Eterville, had to be recaptured.
Having changed the combat plan accordingly, the counterattack was now launched at about 2100, (line of departure time). In spite of the extremely strong enemy artillery fire, our forces advanced toward Eterville and those operating in the area between Eterville and height 112, made good progress. Eterville was recaptured toward 0100. However, it was impossible to get near height 112 because of the concentrated artillery fire maintained for hours by all the enemy’s heavy weapons. It was not until daybreak that the wooded strip of land – in other words, the southern edge of the plateau on this height could be taken. Thus the gap torn open in the MLR on the preceding day had been closed again and the mission assigned to the Division accomplished. Height 112 was no longer defended in the same way as before, i.e. on the northern edge of the plateau; the Division ordered the construction of a new MLR in the southern part of the plateau, near the northern edge of the wooded strip of land, continuing toward the west, a line which was not visible to the enemy.
The British quickly contested the 9th SS successes at Eterville and Hill 112 on the 4th, giving the division no respite from the bloodletting. The panzers managed to knock out a number of British tanks, for little loss, but the panzergrenadiers suffered from the enemy’s artillery. Stadler recalled, perhaps with some pride:
In the course of the forenoon the enemy, in turn, resumed his attacks and managed to take Eterville once again, whereas his attacks on height 112 were repelled with considerable losses. A counterattack launched immediately on Eterville succeeded and, by noon, the village was again in our hands. An extremely heavy and fluctuating battle ensued afterwards for the ruins of Eterville, which place changed hands repeatedly until, finally, it was firmly in our possession late in the evening of 4 July 1944. The losses suffered during these engagements in the rocky terrain offering almost no cover, were considerable (Grenadiers about 10%), and mainly caused, of course, by the excessively strong artillery fire, which could be countered by next to nothing from our side, since only some 700 rounds of ammunition were available for the entire attack on 4 July. Nevertheless, the panzer Abteilung operating near Eterville managed to destroy twelve–fourteen enemy vehicles, whereas they lost only two tanks. Thus, it could be figured out that the enemy losses were at least as high as ours.
During the night of 4/5 July the division was relieved on the eastern sector by elements of the 12th SS and on the western sector by the 10th SS. The divisional forces were reassembled in almost the same area as on 3 July. They were assigned the task of constructing prepared positions in the rear in the line along the course of a stream and along the heights south of it, and occupying the line with weak forces.
The Panzer Pioneer Abteilung was put in charge of the construction of this position, assisted by an abteilung from each of the SS-Panzergrenadier Regiments. The Artillery Regiment was then ordered to move into position to provide covering ire for the entire Corps sector. In the meantime the rest of the division was instructed to refit and rest up as best they could.
The British renewed their attacks on 6 July this time along the road running from Caen to Noyers. To help the 277th Infantry Division recapture Noyers, the 9th SS despatched its armoured reconnaissance battalion. The latter successfully retook the town and remained supporting the 277th.
The panzers’ regimental HQ was established at Bully, about two and a half miles (4km) east of Point 112, between Caen and Evrecy, on 12 July. When the British attacked between Gavrus and Noyers-Bocage four days later, the division’s tanks were undergoing maintenance. However, the 227th was ordered to counterattack, supported by the 9th SS. About twenty panzers were mustered to the right of Point 113 north of Evrecy, but the British put down smoke and they were forced to withdraw. While Point 113 remained unoccupied, the panzers took Bougy and reached Gavrus, moving up the Orne valley. During the various engagements they knocked out a total of forty tanks, including eighteen around Bougy and eight at Point 113, for the loss of just five panzers. Sylvester Stadler recalled the battle:
A serious crisis occurred only once on the occasion of a concentrated attack carried out by British armoured troops with some forty to fifty tanks late in the evening of 16 or 17 July1944, on Height 113. All day, the enemy had pounded the hill with undiminished intensity and covered it with a smokescreen. Sometimes, the smoke was so dense that the majority of the troops felt sick and therefore believed that the enemy was using gas. An immediate investigation proved that this was incorrect. Besides the physical discomfort caused by this heavy smoke, the visibility was very bad, the result of which was that the troops became rather nervous and overstrained,
as it was impossible to see what was going on ahead of the positions. With the duration of the smoke-shell firing, the situation naturally grew worse and worse. On the occasion concerned, the firing was maintained all day.
Stadler remembered the sudden British armed assault which came late in the day and threatened to overwhelm his men. The 9th SS though were quick witted and swiftly turned the tables on their attackers as their commander noted:
At about 2100, enemy forces all of a sudden appeared with tanks in the MLR and managed to break through on a width of 400-500 meters just east of Height 113. The Grenadiers committed on that part of the front (about fifty to sixty men) were all taken prisoner. Our own tanks, a battalion of about fifteen to twenty tanks, were located on the rear slope of the hill and noticed the enemy only at the very last moment, either on account of the dense smoke, or perhaps owing to the swift and surprising advance of his forces. During the ensuing tank battle, fifteen enemy tanks were destroyed with no losses at all on our side. Thereupon, the enemy quickly withdrew to his original position. At the same time, a smaller group advanced along the lane from Gavrus to Evrecy under cover of smoke, and darkness, which in the meantime had fallen. They managed to break through the forward elements, but then, also, ran right into our tanks on the rear slope, which overwhelmed them after a very short fire duel, or took them prisoner (two tanks and about twenty men).
By the 17th, the exhausted division could muster thirteen Panzer IVs, twenty-five Panthers and fifteen assault guns, while the infantry amounted to little more than a regiment. The 9th SS was called back from the left flank of the 10th SS at the height of the Goodwood battle and positioned in the Orne valley, guarding the southern suburbs of Caen. Over the next few days the 9th SS helped the 1st SS defeat Montgomery’s Goodwood armoured offensive. Notably, on 18 July the division captured sixty-seven tanks, fifty-six of which were destroyed, the rest still running.
The 10th SS and the 272nd Infantry Division were instructed to retake St Martin, St André and May-sur-Orne east of the river and south of Caen on the 22nd, with support from the 9th SS. However, the Panthers of the 9th SS were still engaged around Bougy and could only be freed up slowly. Some were assigned to two companies of the 10th SS while the rest were to attack south of May. Few of the Panthers materialised except for those directed to take the high ground northeast of May.
Two of the division’s Panthers led forward a panzergrenadier battalion. They surprised the British but, lacking armoured reinforcements, the infantry had to attack May-sur-Orne unsupported. The rest of the panzer battalion did not arrive until about midday and ran into heavy anti-tank gunfire. Three were caught broadside on and knocked out and the order was given to withdraw under a smoke screen. By the end of the day, nine of the division’s twenty-four Panthers were out of action, but the key villages were secured. The division remained stalled north of Fontenay at Point 88.
Mont Pinçon
As Operation Spring got under way against the 1st SS on 25 July, the 9th SS was also hit hard by Canadian troops. When the enemy made a new large-scale attack in the sector of the 272nd Infantry Division and managed to achieve a deep penetration, the 9th SS launched a concentrated counterattack east of the Orne, which was successful and prevented a breakthrough by the Canadians. By the evening of the 25th, the 9th SS was able to muster eighteen Panzer IVs, eighteen Panthers and eleven assault guns; but, with their maintenance teams working full out, three days later the total stood at twenty-two Panzer IVs, twenty Panthers and twenty-two assault guns.
To restore the line, the division’s panzer regiment and 102 SS Battalion’s Tigers rolled forward on the 28th, inflicting heavy losses on the attacking tanks and stopping the Canadians in their tracks. At the end of July, General Eberbach, convinced that the British were attempting a big breakthrough, deployed the 9th SS into the woods west of Bretteville-sur-Laize and the 10th SS to Bretteville.
On 30 July, Montgomery launched Operation Bluecoat southwards towards Vire and Mont Pinçon, with the battered 7th, 11th and Guards Armoured Divisions in the lead. II SS Panzer Corps was now diverted to block this move that punched a hole in the thinly-held sector of the German line. By the 31st, the 9th SS had lost thirteen Panzer IVs, twenty Panthers, fourteen StuG IIIs, four armoured half-tracks, fifty-two trucks and six prime movers.
The 9th SS remained southwest of Caen until early August, when it moved northeast of Vire. British tanks got to within five miles (8km) of the town, the very heart of 7th Army’s resistance against the Americans. Wanting to counterattack against the Americans, who were considered inferior fighters, the Germans first had to secure Mont Pinçon against the British to control the network of roads westwards. The division was relieved by1st SS on 1 August and that night a kampfgruppe under Otto Meyer, including seventeen panzers and assault guns, moved west to take up positions on a line from Arclais to Montchauvet and Montchamp, to the west of Mont Pinçon and between Villers-Bocage and Vire. RAF Typhoons soon located the SS tank columns in the afternoon of the 2nd, launching 923 sorties, destroying thirteen tanks and seventy-six trucks, and holding up the deployment of the German panzers for most of the day.
The advance guard of the 9th SS Panzer kampfgruppe managed to engage the 11th Armoured Division near le Beny-Bocage on the afternoon of the 2nd, knocking out five Cromwells in the process. They fought furiously to regain the Périers Ridge and the bridge over the Souleuvre. The following day, the 9th SS successfully drove the British from Plesles, but the 11th Armoured Division countered their efforts at Périers.
The 9th then held the 15th (Scottish) Division with dug-in tanks, 8.8cm guns and Nebelwerfer rocket launchers. Those troops at Montchauvet were embroiled in heavy fighting round Point 170 and, although surrounded, managed to escape. On the 4 August, the 9th SS attempted to cut off the British breakthrough at Chênedollé, knocking out thirty-nine Allied tanks in the process. Otto Meyer, near Estry with thirty-two panzers and assault guns, had to block the road northwest of Chênedollé and went over to the defensive. From 11-12 August the division claimed another twenty-two enemy tanks in the unrelenting fighting.
Final days
The division was redeployed on the 13th to the Putanges area, where they were vulnerable. They then moved to the Vimoutiers area, having lost up to 5,000 casualties. The 12th SS commandeered some of their remaining tanks, but, along with the 2nd SS, the tired division attacked from outside the Falaise pocket to help some of those trapped escape.
Chapter 11
Point 112 – 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg
The 10th SS Panzer Division Frundsberg was formed in the winter of 1942-43 in southern France, initially as the 10th Panzergrenadier Division. It then moved north, but was sent to the Eastern Front the following year. In mid-June it was ordered back to France and went into action against the British VIII Corps bridgehead over the Odon on the 29th, along with the 9th SS. The following day they captured Hill 112, beating off a series of British counterattacks. Deployed between Domfront and Mortain, by 12 August the division, with just eight tanks left, was forced to withdraw toward the Falaise salient.
Combat experience
Under the command of SS-Standartenführer Michael Lippert, the 10th SS, like the 9th SS, was raised from conscripts drawn from the Reich Labour Service, or Reichsarbeitsdienst, in February 1943. Like the 12th SS, they were just teenagers; according to Reichsführer Heinrich Himmler, the average age of the recruits was eighteen years old. The division was redesignated the 10th SS Panzer Division on 3 October 1943 and named after Georg von Frundsberg (1473-1528), who had served the Hapsburg Monarchy during its many wars.
Subsequently, led by SS-Gruppenführer Karl Fischer von Treuenfeld, the division first saw action at Tarnopol in April 1944, where it took part in rescuing German troops from the Kamenets-Podolskiy pocket. In mid-June, Hitler cancelled a proposed offensive near Kowel and from his Rastenburg HQ ordered the division to be switched to the West, to help bolster the situation in Normandy. Under SS-Gruppenführer Heinz
Harmel it was sent to France on 12 June, along with the 9th SS, to fight the Allied landings.
SS-Panzer Regiment 10’s II Abteilung was loaded onto six trains in Russia and headed west from Sokol and Krystinowpol. It took five days to reach the assembly point at Saarbrücken. The first train reached Houdan, southwest of Paris on the 18th and the tanks took to the road, rumbling through Dreux, Chôteauneuf, Dignyand le Magne to Longy, where they dallied until the 25th.
SS-Obergruppenführer Paul Hausser, commander of II SS Panzer Corps, presented himself to Rommel on 23 June to inform him that the 10th SS had arrived in Northern France. By the following day most of the division, with an offical strength of about 14,800 men, had reached the assembly area in Normandy, though fuel was a problem. These units consisted of SS-Panzer-aufklürungs Abteilung 10, SS-Panzer Regiment 10, SS-Panzerjüger Abteilung 10, SS-Panzergrenadier Regiments 21 and 22, SS-Artillerie Regiment 10, SS-Flak Abteilung 10, SS-Pionier Bataillon 10 and SS-Feldersatz Bataillon 10.
Harmel’s command had the dubious accolade of being the weakest panzer division in Normandy. SS-Panzer Regiment 10, under SS-Obersturmbannführer Otto Paetsch, was Only able to field a single tank battalion. The latter, under SS-Sturmbannführer Reinhold, which had come west, consisted of thirty-nine Panzer IVs, thirty-eight StuG Ills and three Panzer III command vehicles, providing a tank force of just eighty panzers. Other divisional armoured fighting vehicles consisted of SS-Artillerie Regiment 10’s six Hummel and eleven Wespe self-propelled guns. It seems it may have also had some Grille 15cm self-propelled guns.
Falaise: The Flawed Victory Page 17