German intelligence judged that the Allies would strike toward Arnhem, which lay on the northern bank of the Rhine. By the middle of the month the 9th SS was located in a triangle formed by Arnhem-Zutphen-Apeldoorn. They were scheduled to withdraw to Germany and had been ordered to hand over their vehicles to the 10th SS, though Harzer used every trick in the book to not surrender his precious equipment. The 9th SS had also despatched some forces south to support Kampfgruppe Walther, part of Student’s 1st Parachute Army, which numbered twenty-five armoured vehicles, including some Panther tanks and assault guns.
Montgomery, a usually-careful general showing uncharacteristic boldness with his narrow-front thrust, chose to ignore the intelligence about the two SS panzer divisions. Besides, what threat could these exhausted units pose? The 1st Airborne Division landed at Arnhem in ignorance of their presence on 17 September. Glider Pilot Alexander Morrison recalled the pre-briefing: ‘A tall, dapper-looking officer then moved to the centre of the platform and gave a brief summary of the known troops in northern Holland which, incidentally, made no reference to the two depleted divisions of German armour in the Arnhem area!’
Bittrich and II SS Panzer Corps learned of the British landings five minutes after they started. Following some initial confusion, his two divisions quickly cobbled together various kampfgruppen. The 9th SS, although preparing to transit home, quickly sent its reconnaissance battalion south, over the Arnhem highway bridge toward Nijmegen, and another battle group westward toward Oosterbeek, which would prevent reinforcements reaching those British paratroops in Arnhem itself. Harzer had removed the tracks and wheels from some of his vehicles and deliberately reported them unserviceable, so it was not until late afternoon that sufficient numbers of tanks were battle ready.
The following Day the 9th SS reconnaissance battalion, leaving a few self-propelled guns to guard the southern approaches of Nijmegen bridge, headed north to Elst. A column of twenty-two vehicles then attempted to force a crossing of Arnhem bridge, the northern end of which was now firmly in British hands; half were destroyed and the Germans were driven off.
Glider Pilot Louis Hagen was grateful that the 9th SS were not up to full strength:
If there had not been a sprinkling of first-class and fanatical officers and NCOs in this division, no fight would have been possible. But even with the present state of affairs, it was ridiculous that they did not wipe us out within a few hours. This panzer division, with tanks, mobile guns, flame-throwers, very close Focke-Wulf support and the heaviest and most concentrated ack-ack seen by any of the RAF pilots whom I met later on at the ‘drome’, and even mobile loudspeakers with trained German propagandists spouting English never dared to change over to direct assault or succeeded in penetrating our perimeter. No body of men, with only small arms as we had, could possibly have withstood a German panzer [division] of the old material.
The 10th SS was despatched to Nijmegen to hold the main bridges against the advancing British armour moving to link up with 1st Airborne, this was key to isolating and destroying the paratroops at Oosterbeek. However, with Arnhem bridge in British hands, the bulk of the 10th SS was obliged to use the ferry at Pannerden, eight miles (13km) southeast of Arnhem. Twelve Panthers reached the Nijmegen area and Arnhem Bridge was finally secured on 20 September. Major Behr recalls the attack on the 20th:
At dawn the heavy SS Frundsberg Mortar Section moved into position and blasted the Arnhem bridgehead. This was followed by a frontal attack by ten somewhat elderly tanks firing wildly but continuously, and supported by infantry keeping up a steady pounding of heavy machine-gun fire. The tanks were met by the very accurate fire of the British 6-pounder anti-tank guns; they slowed to a stop and then began to go back away. The barrage quietened and the machine-gunners slipped back with the tanks. But, from a safer distance, the SS mortars kept up a continuous ire.
For three days Harmel’s SS slowed the British armoured advance and to the south the Panthers of Kampfgruppe Walther attacked toward Veghel, between Eindhoven and Nijmegen, on the 22nd. The 9th SS, reinforced by Schwere Panzer Battalion 506 consisting of some sixty King Tigers, set about eliminating the defenders at Oosterbeek. Luckilyfor the paras, these attacks were not very well coordinated. The 10th SS were eventually forced back toward Arnhem, so Bittrich sent forty-five Tigers and a company of Panthers to reinforce them following the landing of the Polish 1st Parachute Brigade at Driel south of Oosterbeek.
The British armoured forces pushing north along a single exposed road, under constant counterattack, could simply not get through and on 26th the decision was taken to evacuate the exhausted paratroops trapped at Oosterbeek. The SS lost 3,300 casualties, including 1,100 dead in the fighting. The British 1st Airborne Division at the start of the operation had numbered just over 10,000; only 2,163 escaped back across the Rhine. The 9th SS and 10th SS had helped thwart Montgomery’s attempt to swiftly end the war with a single thrust into the Rhur and the Allies reverted to their plodding broad-front strategy across the whole of western Europe.
Military historian Max Hastings notes:
The battles in Holland and along the German border so often seem to belong to a different age from those of Normandy that it is startling to reflect that Arnhem was fought less than a month after Falaise; that within weeks of suffering one of the greatest catastrophes of modern wars, the Germans found the strength to halt the drive of Horrocks XXX Corps in its tracks, and to prolong the war until May 1945.
In the meantime, following the Arnhem landings, Model wanted to attack from the west of Venlo and the 9th and 116th Panzer was selected for this. They arrived near Arnhem just as the remaining British paras were surrendering. On 1 October, along with the 10th SS, they were thrown into a counterattack toward Elst, halfway between Arnhem and Nijmegen.
The 9th Panzer only achieved modest gains and the 10th SS to the south lost eight Tiger tanks. The 116th got to within a mile and a quarter (2km) north of Elst, but the attack was called off six days later and the division despatched back to Aachen. The division was exhausted by this needless operation that did little to alleviate pressure on the 15th Army. Nonetheless, it continued to obstruct American efforts north of Aachen. During early November the 116th resisted the US 28th Infantry Division in the Hurtgen Forest, destroying fifty-three tanks.
On 8 November two squadrons of fighter-bombers from the US 9th Air Force’s 405 Group attacked the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division’s command post located at Peltre, France, two miles (3km) east of Metz. Two buildings were destroyed, killing most of the occupants. Within a matter of weeks of this incident the full impact of the flawed victory at Falaise and the failure at Arnhem was to be felt by the Allies.
Masterly effort
Despite the German defeat at Falaise, by the end of the summer Adolf Hitler began to plan a massive counter-stroke against the Allies. He intended to punch his armour through the lightly-defended Ardennes region in Belgium and grab the port of Antwerp. This would strangle the Allied supply lines. His anxious generals wanted to restrict their goal to Liege, but Hitler ruled the panzers must reach Antwerp.
This was not to be some feeble counterattack like Mortain, or indeed every counterattack that had been characterised by it since. This was to be a full blown counteroffensive using two whole panzer armies. Most of the generals who had escaped from Normandy were to play key roles. At Army and Corps level they knew that this was an all or nothing gamble. At divisional level some hoped that they could unbalance the Allies’ momentum, regain the initiative and recapture the heady glory of the Blitzkrieg.
Astoundingly, despite the losses inflicted on them in Normandy, just four months later all the panzers divisions (except the 21st) were to be involved in Hitler’s major counterstroke. Army Group B was allocated the strategic reserve of 2,168 tanks and assault guns, some 700 were held with the 15th Army for the proposed supporting attack, leaving 970 for the opening of the offensive with a follow-on force of about 450. Some 2,500 tanks had been committed to the Ger
man attack through the Ardennes in 1940, but by this stage of the war these numbers must be viewed as quite remarkable. During the last half of 1944 Hitler was able to refit the tattered remains of thirty-five divisions, which had been shredded on the Eastern and Western Fronts, as well as forming fifteen new divisions.
Considering the disaster of Falaise and the ongoing efforts of the Allied bomber fleets, the regeneration of 5th Panzer Army, now under General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel, is little short of a miracle. The 2nd and 9th Panzer Divisions were successfully reorganised after their heavy losses in Normandy and by December each division had over 100 tanks. The 9th included Tigers of the attached Schwere Panzer Abteilung 301. Two of 5th Panzer Army’s three panzer corps commanders were familiar faces. General von Lüttwitz found himself in charge of XLVII Panzer Corps, which included his old command, 2nd Panzer, as well as 9th Panzer and Panzer Lehr. General Krüger, still commanding LVIII Panzer Corps, had responsibility for the 116th Panzer. General Karl Decker’s XXIX Panzer Corps would be brought up to direct 1st SS and Panzer Lehr at the end of December.
The two SS Panzer Corps of SS-Oberstgruppenführer Sepp Dietrich’s 6th SS Panzer Army were also swiftly rebuilt. The two panzer divisions of SS-Gruppenführer Herman Priess’ I SS Panzer Corps were each brought up to about 22,000 men; the 1st SS Panzer Division was supplemented with Tiger tanks of SS Schwere Panzer Battalion 502 and 12th SS, now under SS-Brigadeführer Hugo Kraas, was rebuilt, though it lacked experienced junior officers. The 2nd SS, re-assigned to SS-Gruppenführer Heinz Lammerding, and 9th SS, re-assigned to SS-Brigadeführer Sylverster Stadler, formed SS-Obergruppenführer Willi Bittrich’s II Panzer Corps and were similarly re built with better than average recruits, though the 9th SS lacked transport.
In late September the Allies became aware that the Germans were withdrawing their armour from the front in order to build up a panzer reserve. Signals intelligence indicated that Normandy veterans the 1st SS, 2nd SS, 9th SS and 12th SS Panzer Divisions along with the 17th SS Panzergrenadier Division were being pulled back for rest and refitting. Following its performance at Arnhem, the 9th SS had moved to Paderborn for a well-earned break and to be re-equipped. In early October the I SS Panzer Corps withdrew to Westfalen for refit. German tank strength on the Western Front steadily expanded to 2,600, compared to 1,500 on the Eastern Front, by December.
Throughout September-December the Panzer Lehr, 2nd SS and 10th SS Panzer Divisions helped hold the Siegfried Line while Hitler built up his counterattack force for the Ardennes offensive. After three months the Americans had been unable to punch though the Siegfried Line between Geilenkirchen and Aachen. After Arnhem the 10th SS were to wreak yet more havoc. While trying to eliminate the German salient at Geilenkirchen on 15 November, elements of the British 43rd (Wessex) Infantry Division were trapped by the 10th SS around Hoven.
On 12/13 November the 17th SS and 21st Panzer, with its last seven tanks, counterattacked at Sanry-sur-Nied, driving the Americans back, though they were themselves forced to withdraw for fear of encirclement. The 17th SS was ordered to retreat and escaped being trapped in Metz, which finally fell on 17 November. By the beginning of December the division was down to just 4,000 men and twenty tanks.
The Panzer Lehr, all but destroyed in Normandy, was in the process of being rebuilt when it was committed to the counterattack against the US 3rd Army in the Saar region. Unable to replace its losses in time for the Ardennes attack the division was bolstered by the attachment of Sturmgeschütz Brigade 243. The 116th Panzer Division was given very little time to recover as it was committed to the fighting in the Hurtgen Forest during the end of 1944, but even so was able to muster over 100 armoured fighting vehicles.
General de Guing and was in awe of the German efforts: ‘We must acknowledge that the re-equipping of these Panzer Armies during the difficult autumn was a masterly effort by such a hard pressed enemy’. Three things had made this possible, the escape of the panzer divisions from Normandy, German industry going flat out and the Allies struggling at the end of their supply lines. The Germans had gathered twenty-eight divisions, including eight panzer divisions, numbering 275,000 men, 950 armoured fighting vehicles and 1,900 field guns.
These forces consisted of: 6th SS Panzer Army with the 1st SS, 2nd SS, 9th SS and 12th SS Panzer Divisions and the 501 and 506 Schwere Panzer Battalions, equipped with 450 tanks, assault guns and self-propelled guns; 5th Panzer Army, including the 2nd, 9th, 116th and Panzer Lehr Panzer Divisions, with about 350 armoured fighting vehicles; 7th Army, now under General der Panzertruppen Erich Brandenberger, which lacked armour except for the 5th Parachute Division’s Sturmgeschütz Brigade 11 and the panzer units of the 15th Panzergrenadier Division.
Three other Normandy veterans that took part in the Ardennes offensive were the 341 and 394 StuG Brigades assigned to 15th Army’s LXXXI and LXXIV Army Corps respectively. Brigade 394 was reassigned to 19th Panzer Army’s XXXIX Panzer Corps in the New Year. Abteilung 301 reported to LXXXI Army Corps in November with thirty-one Tigers (four were inoperable) and sixty-six BIVs (five of which were inoperable). It served in the Ardennes with Army Group B. At the start of the attack the battalion had twenty-seven tanks but less than half were available; by 30 December it had twenty-one operational Tigers.
Everything that the Germans had striven so hard to rebuild now stood on the very brink of victory or destruction. Elements of the 1st SS and 12th SS Panzer Divisions launched the 6th SS Panzer Army’s main thrusts to the north, along the line St Vith-Vielsalm, on 16 December 1944. They did so under dense cloud, thereby avoiding the unwanted attentions of the Allies’ troublesome fighter-bombers. Perhaps not surprisingly after its losses in Normandy, the 12th SS was Only able to field one mixed tank abteilung for the Ardennes offensive, consisting of two companies of Panzer IVs and two companies of Panthers. The other abteilung remained in Germany where it was being reconstituted. The division also committed its two panzergrenadier regiments and its anti-tank battalion to the struggle.
Kampfgruppe Peiper, drawn from 1st SS, consisted of 100 Panzer IVs and Panthers, forty-two formidable King Tigers and twenty-five assault guns. Unfortunately, desperately short of fuel, SS-Obersturmbannführer Peiper, instead of pushing west, turned north to seize 50,000 gallons of American gasoline at Bullingen. His force was eventually surrounded and destroyed, leaving forty-five tanks and sixty self-propelled guns north of the Amblève River. The 12th SS, following-up the kampfgruppe, was unable to budge the Americans from the Elsenborn Ridge and had to swing left, nor was Panzer Lehr able to get to Bastogne before the Americans reinforced the town.
On the northern shoulder, the 9th SS headed northward after breaking through the Losheim Gap. Initially only the artillery regiment and reconnaissance battalion were committed, though once St Vith was captured, the rest of the division was brought in. On 18 December the 9th SS reached their official start line and fought their way toward Manhay and Trois Ponts before being replaced by the 12th Volksgrenadier Division. They got as far as Salmchateau, less than halfway to the Meuse.
Meanwhile, 116th Panzer drove between Bastogne and St Vith, but the Americans holding out in Bastogne delayed 2nd Panzer. Failing to take Bastogne greatly slowed 5th Panzer Army’s drive on the Meuse. St Vith fell on 21 December, though American artillery fire forced 6th SS Panzer Army to become entangled with the 5th Panzer Army. Hitler felt that even if Antwerp were not taken, keeping his panzers in the hard won bulge created in the frontline would slow the Allied push on the vital Ruhr. To secure the bulge, Bastogne had to be taken and the 12th SS was shifted south to help capture the town.
By 22 December 9th SS had been committed to the southern flank of 1st SS, but they were unable to reach Kampfgruppe Peiper. At the end of the month the 9th SS were replaced by the 12th Infantry Division and also moved south to help with the assault on Bastogne. Once the weather cleared, however, Allied fighter-bombers began to attack the panzers in a repeat of the Falaise battle. Exposed on the snow-covered landscape
many were easy targets.
Lacking fuel, 2nd Panzer got as far as Celles, just four miles (6.5km) short of the River Meuse before American armour moved in for the kill. Celles was not far from Dinant on the Meuse, where Rommel’s 7th Panzer had crossed the river in 1940, heralding France’s defeat. American tanks also halted the 2nd SS, and 116th and Panzer Lehr were stopped short of Marche.
Even in the face of defeat, the 2nd SS continued to inflict heavy losses on the Americans. Normandy survivor SS-Obersturmführer Fritz Langanke, taking his Panther tank into battle just before Christmas, recalled:
I climbed back into my seat and watched the slope in the direction of La Fosse. Obersturmführer Veith, who would later die in the Ardennes and be awarded the Knight’s Cross after his death, stood in front of my vehicle next to the muzzle break of the gun.
Suddenly, American tanks appeared. They came down the slope from La Fosse in a spread-out formation and obviously wanted to drive forward the III Kompanie. I yelled at Veith to get out of the way, we had to fire. He did not hear it over the noise of the engines. In a very short time the Americans were at the points we had test fired at earlier; and we had to fire our first shell.
Despite the sad situation I could not suppress a grin when Veith’s cap was blown off by the air pressure from the shot. He was completely confused for a moment until he grasped what was happening when our second shell was fired. Thanks to our preparations, we knocked out the first five Sherman tanks in quick succession despite the poor visibility. They moved at a steep angle to us, down the slope, half-right. The firing distance between us was 500 and 700 metres. The other tanks then turned around and drove back. Thereafter it was quiet and dusk set in soon.
On Christmas Eve the reconnaissance battalion of 2nd Panzer reached Foy-Nôtre-Dame just three miles from Dinant. Pushing on to the river they ran into five British Shermans from the 3rd Royal Tank Regiment guarding the crossing. Losing two panzers, the Germans fell back. General Bayerlein was ordered to help 2nd Panzer near Celles.
Falaise: The Flawed Victory Page 27