Chapter Fourteen
Di Wor Don Don – 2001
The year 2001 began with yet another capital of a West African country having added its name to the list of Sierra Leone peace plans. The Abuja ceasefire had been signed. This time Sankoh had been kept out of the picture. President Kabbah, under pressure from the international community and on the advice of Ambassador Adeniji, appointed Issa Sesay as ‘interim leader’ of the RUF in order to help push through the disarmament process. Sesay, in his twenties and one of the RUF’s more intelligent commanders, was fearful of taking on this role in case other RUF commanders considered him a traitor to the RUF cause and killed him. He was assured by Kabbah and Adeniji that his efforts would not go unrewarded if the disarmament went ahead.
UNAMSIL remained in the country, at the time the largest UN operation in the world, but it often appeared powerless and it was only the British troop presence that provided the muscle and a degree of security that gave confidence to the people. The British military training programme continued.
With Sankoh out of the way and the British military presence dampening the enthusiasm of the rebels to recommence fighting, there remained one final piece of the jigsaw puzzle to finally achieve an end to the hostilities – the removal of Charles Taylor in Liberia. The RUF had continued to mine the diamonds that had ensured the continued support of Taylor but under intense pressure from the regional and international community, including the imposition of the sanctions against blood diamonds, and under threat from Liberian opposition forces (LURD), Taylor became increasingly isolated. His support for the RUF dissipated and, with the co-operation of Issa Sesay, the disarmament of the RUF was completed.
By the beginning of 2002 I had finally yielded to the pressures to take early retirement. In January, whilst attending a parliamentarian’s conference on democracy in Ghana as a consultant for DFID, I decided to pay a visit to Sierra Leone, the first since the completion of my tour as High Commissioner. The BBC chose to send a TV team, comprising Isobel Eaton and Becky Milligan, to film my return for a Newsnight documentary.
Using the powers under the State of Emergency Act, President Kabbah had deferred the elections due in February 2001 until the following year. He invited us to join him on a trip to the east of the country, including Kailahun and Kono, two places that I had never been able to visit during my tour because of the fighting. The scale of the destruction in the east was enormous. We visited Mobi, Kabbah’s mother’s home town where he had spent his early years. The family home was a burnt-out shell and several of Kabbah’s relatives had been murdered. The trip was clearly part of the campaign for the forthcoming elections and Kabbah sought assurances that he should stand again. He was facing a problem over whom to choose as his running mate from a number of candidates. I suggested that he lock them all in one room and not let them out until they had agreed amongst themselves who should be the candidate.
The visit, which lasted three weeks, was very emotional, with the added poignancy of attending the funeral of Dr Mike Downham, who had passed away in Bo just prior to my arrival. I met up with so many friends and colleagues, though my successor, Alan Jones, was ‘too busy’ to see me. Tony Blair had flown out on a brief visit. He remained at Lungi, where he was made a paramount chief of one of the local villages. I was kept away, much to the embarrassment of my fellow paramount chiefs.
After the Blair visit President Kabbah finally declared ‘di wor don don’ – the war is over – to much relief and rejoicing. Praise was heaped upon Britain for the role she had played and Sierra Leone was seen as one of Tony Blair’s foreign policy successes.
The US Government, having been criticized in the US press for its role in Sierra Leone, demanded that Sankoh should be put on trial for war crimes, barely a couple of years after it had been demanding that Sankoh be made Vice President. A United Nations administered but judicially independent War Crimes Court was established in Freetown at vast expense. The Sierra Leone Special Court, a hybrid of Sierra Leone and international law, tore up the amnesties provided for in all of the various Sierra Leone peace treaties and its American military Chief Prosecutor, David Crane, proceeded to issue indictments against Foday Sankoh, plus Sam Bockarie, Morris Kallon and Issa Sesay of the RUF. So much for the assurances given to Sesay if he helped with the disarmament process. Ambassador Adeniji felt especially aggrieved. Bockarie did not face the Court. He was killed fighting in Liberia, reputedly on the orders of Charles Taylor. Another RUF commander, Augustine Gbao, was later indicted.
Along with the Sierra Leone Special Court, a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established – the first time that a country coming out of conflict was subjected to both a war crimes court and a TRC. With a budget of just $6.5 million, as opposed to the SLSC’s budget in excess of $250 million, the TRC produced a 5,000-page report that detailed the scale of the atrocities throughout the country. It concluded that the RUF had been responsible for over sixty per cent of the atrocities, the AFRC and SLA thirty per cent and the CDF six per cent. It also noted that Ecomog had been responsible for one per cent though they were exempted from being charged with war crimes by the Special Court. The TRC report was critical of the SLSC, noting that the relationship between the two bodies ‘could have been immeasurably stronger had the two institutions shared something of a common vision of the basic goals of post-conflict transitional justice.’
By the time that the TRC report was published, the Special Court’s purpose-built courtroom and detention centre had been completed in the centre of Freetown and the trials started. However, Sankoh was no longer there. He had died in detention on 30 July 2003 and his indictment, along with Bockarie’s, was withdrawn. Following the deaths of Sankoh and Bockarie, the two persons who were indisputably the most responsible for the worst of the atrocities, there were calls for the Special Court to be disbanded, but they were ignored.
Pursuing his duties with messianic fervour, Crane had not stopped at indicting just members of the RUF. Notwithstanding the positive role Johnny Paul Koroma had played in the peace and disarmament process, he was indicted for war crimes, but he managed to flee the country, never to be seen again. It was suspected that he died in the Ivory Coast. Other ex-AFRC/SLA members were indicted – Alex Brima, Bazzy Kamara and Santigie Koroma.
The biggest shock had come when Crane announced the indictments of Sam Hinga Norman and two other members of the CDF, Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa. Norman, serving as Kabbah’s Minister for Internal Affairs at the time, was unceremoniously dragged out of his office in handcuffs by the police acting on behalf of the court, bundled into the back of a truck and driven away. This angered many, including myself, who regarded Norman as one of the heroes who, with the CDF, had helped restore peace and democracy to Sierra Leone.
Norman and the other indictees had been incarcerated originally in an old slave dungeon in Bonthe, miles away from the capital and out of touch with their families and lawyers until the new courthouse and detention centre were built in the centre of Freetown. I visited Norman in the depressing conditions in Bonthe and kept in close touch with him by telephone from the UK. I would continue to visit him regularly in Freetown during my frequent visits to Sierra Leone in my retirement.
I had questioned Crane why he had felt it necessary to indict Norman and members of the CDF – these were the ‘good guys’, the ones who had fought bravely for the restoration of the legitimate government. Crane told me that he felt that he had to be seen to be ‘even-handed’. I found his reasoning bizarre. It was rather like a referee, having red-carded a footballer for a brutal tackle, then sending off a member of the opposing team to keep the sides even. I did not necessarily dispute that some members of the CDF may have committed savage acts when defending their homes and families against the rebels. When a bunch of thugs and killers came to your village and started killing your family, chopping off arms and legs and burning down your homes, waving your finger at them and saying that it was against human rights was unlikely to h
ave much effect. But if there were to be indictments against the CDF, then why stop at Norman? The chain of command in the CDF, such as it was, went all the way up to the President.
David Crane had claimed that no one was above the law and that it was equal justice for all. But, in addition to members of Ecomog being exempted, it is worth noting that before the SLSC was set up in Sierra Leone, the US Government had concluded a bilateral agreement with the Sierra Leone government that prevented any US national being brought before the court – shades of Animal Farm, where all are equal but some are more equal than others.
In February 2006 I flew out to Freetown to testify before the court on behalf of Norman, along with General David Richards and former Vice President Joe Demby. I was criticized by the judges of the Court for describing Norman as ‘a national hero’. David Richards and Joe Demby also defended Norman and I admired them both for doing so. Demby was no longer Vice President; he had been ditched by President Kabbah at the previous election in favour of Solomon Berewa. David Richards’ voluntary appearance was perhaps more telling as he was still a senior serving officer in the British Army. President Kabbah, who claimed that he had been unaware that Norman would be indicted, refused to testify in defence of his former minister.
The trials dragged on for several years eating up vast millions of dollars. Just as the CDF trial had reached its conclusion, Sam Norman died in peculiar circumstances following a routine medical operation in Senegal whilst still in detention in February 2007. Thousands took part in his funeral services in Freetown and Bo, which the Norman family asked me to arrange with Joe Demby.
All the other indictees were found guilty of war crimes and sent to serve their long sentences in Rwanda.
The highest profile indictee was Charles Taylor. He had finally been persuaded to step down by the Nigerians and Ghanaians. His indictment was unveiled in June 2003 when Taylor was in Accra during the delicate negotiations to end the renewed fighting in Liberia. It nearly derailed the whole peace process there. Clearly embarrassed by the action of the court’s Chief Prosecutor in Freetown, the Ghanaians ignored the indictment and handed Taylor over to President Obasanjo in Nigeria as part of the deal to end the fighting. Obasanjo came under intense pressure, especially from the Americans, to hand Taylor over to the court. Obasanjo refused, announcing that he would only hand Taylor over to an elected government in Liberia. Elections duly took place in Liberia in October 2005 and Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was elected President, Africa’s first elected female president. Taylor was flown to Monrovia and immediately on to Freetown into the custody of the court. Taylor’s trial was transferred to the premises of the International Criminal Court in The Hague for security reasons. At the time of writing this book, he is awaiting the results of his trial. If he is found guilty the British Government has agreed that he can serve his sentence in a British prison.
Several questions remain over the legacy of the Sierra Leone Special Court. Supporters of the court, citing the example of Charles Taylor’s indictment, say that it demonstrates that no one can get away with such barbarous acts with impunity, not even heads of state. However, Sam Norman’s indictment and subsequent death is a stain on the Special Court’s legacy. Who else will come forward to fight for the cause of peace and democracy in the future if they face the threat of being treated as a war criminal?
Resolving conflicts diplomatically elsewhere has become more difficult as a result of the Sierra Leone Special Court’s antics. When resolving conflicts it is usually necessary to persuade both sides of the conflict to cease fighting and killing, lay down their weapons and negotiate a peaceful agreement. Often this will require not only understanding, patience and skilful diplomacy but also some form of concessions such as pardons and/or amnesties. The Special Court demonstrated that such provisions and assurances negotiated on the ground in good faith become meaningless once the juggernaut of international justice comes on the scene. What incentive, therefore, will there be for some of those involved to stop fighting?
These are difficult issues and there is no easy answer but I suggest that if the international community is to get involved, it is better left to the International Criminal Court (ICC) to ponder rather than ad hoc courts like the SLSC. It is perhaps no coincidence that the United States was the major supporter of the SLSC. The US remains one of the very few major countries in the world to continue to boycott the ICC, claiming that ad hoc courts like the SLSC can pursue the cause of international justice more effectively.
However, the ICC also needs to take more account of indigenous forms of justice. My former American colleague, John Hirsch, has written that ‘the decision to grant an amnesty or invoke “the duty to prosecute” is best taken by the citizens of the country rather than the international community through the Security Council or other instrument.’ This theme of local supremacy has also been emphasized by the eminent British Africanist Richard Dowden, Director of the Royal African Society. He has written: ‘The ICC cannot hand out justice in Sudan as if it were Surrey ... the Western-inspired Universalist idea of justice might come into conflict with local forms of law, jeopardizing the process of reconciliation. If the ICC is going to step into Africa’s complex wars, it must understand the local contexts and think through the effects of its actions. Local input and outcomes must be as close to the heart of the ICC’s mission as justice.’
These are views that I fully share.
Epilogue
The Sierra Leone conflict has become a benchmark for dealing with subsequent conflicts by the British Government. It is now given as a positive example of how direct military involvement can save lives and end conflicts. Tony Blair cited the example of Sierra Leone as part of his reasoning for Britain’s involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan. David Cameron may well have had Sierra Leone partly in mind in justifying Britain’s involvement in Libya. But, as will be seen in the events described in this book, the path followed leading to Britain deploying its military forces in Operation Palliser and Operation Barras was tortuous and by no means straightforward. The end of the Sierra Leone conflict came at a huge cost, some of which might have been avoided if different decisions had been taken at the time.
For those involved at the time, the Sierra Leone conflict will have long-lasting memories. Most have now moved on.
In 2003 Robin Cook resigned from the Cabinet over the Iraq war, as did Clare Short. He died unexpectedly in 2005 whilst out walking. Clare Short stood down at the last election as the Labour MP for Birmingham Ladywood.
Tony Blair has continued to visit the country regularly whilst pursuing his interests through his African governance programmes and the Tony Blair Faith Foundation.
David Richards has continued his successful career in the military and as General Sir David Richards is now the Chief of the Defence Staff.
Lincoln Jopp is now a colonel in the Scots Guards and recently took the parade at the Trooping of the Colour ceremony in London. Colonel Andrew Gale sadly passed away in 2008. Colin Glass and Dai Harries remain in the Diplomatic Service.
Having won the elections in 2002, President Kabbah stood down in 2007 and his SLPP party, led by Solomon Berewa, was defeated in the subsequent elections by Ernest Koroma’s APC party. Kabbah’s treatment of Sam Norman was given as one reason for the SLPP loss. President Koroma’s government, including Zainab Bangura initially as Foreign Minister and later Health Minister, now continues the struggle to maintain the peace and democracy and develop the prosperity that the courageous people of Sierra Leone deserve, but in the face of continuing corruption and a growing drugs problem.
On my retirement I was invited to become a member of a United Nations team of experts looking at lessons learned from the UN peace operations in Sierra Leone and we submitted our report to Kofi Anan at the end of 2002. I was offered the post of African Director by the International Crisis Group, the influential and widely respected think tank based in Brussels, but the offer was withdrawn ‘on the advice of senior figures in the Foreign Office�
��.
Through various activities, such as the establishment of a charity for the school for the blind and patron of the Dorothy Springer Trust assisting the disabled, I maintain my close links and commitment to Sierra Leone. On two occasions, in 2003 and 2007, we brought the Blind School Choir to the UK to give a series of concerts in different venues around the country, including Westminster Abbey, where we sang My West African Home.
I visit the country frequently. On every visit I receive a warm welcome.
Glossary
AFRC Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (later changed to Armed Forces Ruling Council)
APC All People’s Congress
AU African Union
BHC British High Commission
BOC British overseas citizen
BPP British protected person
CCP Commission for the Consolidation of Peace
CCSL Christian Council of Churches Sierra Leone
CDF Civil Defence Forces
CDS Chief Defence Staff
CDU Civil Defence Units
CHOGM Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting
CMG Companion of the Order of St Michael and St George
CPT Close protection team
CSM Civil society movement
DDR Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DFID Department for International Development
EC European Commission
Ecomog Ecowas military force in West Africa
Ecowas Economic Community of West African States
EU European Union
FAC Foreign Affairs Committee
FCO Foreign and Commonwealth Office
HE ‘His Excellency’
HMG Her Majesty’s Government
ICC International Criminal Court
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
MBE Member of the Order of the British Empire
Atrocities, Diamonds and Diplomacy Page 29