Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan

by Herbert P. Bix

  Emperor: In the event we must finally open hostilities, will our operations have a probability of victory?

  Sugiyama: Yes, they will.

  Emperor: At the time of the China Incident, the army told me that we could achieve peace immediately after dealing them one blow with three divisions. Sugiyama, you were army minister at that time….

  Sugiyama: China is a vast area with many ways in and many ways out, and we met unexpectedly big difficulties…. [ellipses in original]

  Emperor: Didn’t I caution you each time about those matters? Sugiyama, are you lying to me?

  Nagano: If Your Majesty will grant me permission, I would like to make a statement.

  Emperor: Go ahead.

  Nagano: There is no 100 percent probability of victory for the troops stationed there…. Sun Tzu says that in war between states of similar strength, it is very difficult to calculate victory. Assume, however, there is a sick person and we leave him alone; he will definitely die. But if the doctor’s diagnosis offers a seventy percent chance of survival, provided the patient is operated on, then don’t you think one must try surgery? And if, after the surgery, the patient dies, one must say that was meant to be. This indeed is the situation we face today…. If we waste time, let the days pass, and are forced to fight after it it is too late to fight, then we won’t be able to do a thing about it.

  Emperor: All right, I understand. [He answered in a better mood.]

  Konoe: Shall I make changes in tomorrow’s agenda? How would you like me to go about it?

  Emperor: There is no need to change anything.55

  Konoe, unconvinced by Nagano’s logic, gave the emperor one last chance to revise the outline. Hirohito, persuaded by Nagano’s and Sugiyama’s hardline arguments, ignored it.

  When Admiral Nagano recalled this meeting in a roundtable with his former wartime colleagues soon after the surrender, he remembered the emperor’s “unusually bad mood” that evening and also suggested that Hirohito had not been pressured to approve the outline of the “national policies.” Nagano, moreover, said that it had been he rather than Konoe who had asked, “Should I reverse the order of Articles 1 and 2?” The emperor had answered, “Let the order in the draft stand just as it is written.”56 Whether Konoe, who opposed war with the United States, or Nagano, who favored it, asked that question is unimportant. The point is that the emperor was reminded, not even subtly, that this was a chance to stop, or slow, or lengthen the countdown to all-out, unbounded war. Instead of using his opportunity in any way that would have displeased the pro-war forces in the military, Hirohito accepted their “rapid decline” arguments and ruled to set time conditions—ruled, that is, in favor of opening hostilities once certain conditions were met. The momentum toward war would continue to build.

  The emperor was also far from pleased with the policy plan. At the September 5 briefing, he showed his irritation with Sugiyama and the army high command as a whole, and revealed differences in strategic thinking between him and his chiefs of staff. As would become clearer over the next four days, Hirohito was warning them that the global situation was still fraught with possibilities; for him to formally resolve on war at this stage would be premature. 57

  At 9:40 A.M. the next day, September 6, twenty minutes before the start of the imperial conference, Hirohito summoned Kido and told him that he was going to raise some questions at the meeting, whereupon Kido replied that “Privy Council President Hara should be the person to raise the important points of your majesty’s concern.” Therefore it would be “best for your majesty, to give your warning at the very end,” saying something to the effect that everyone “should cooperate fully to bring about success in the diplomatic negotiations.”58

  The main topics at the conference that day were the preparations for war and when to finalize a decision to open hostilities. During the conference Sugiyama had in his possession, and may even have introduced, prepared question-and-answer materials for the emperor. These materials made two things clear: that the United States could not be defeated, and that it was therefore impossible to predict when a war with the United States would end. However, if Japan achieved a great victory in the southern operations, Britain would be defeated and knocked out of the war,

  producing a great transformation in American public opinion. Therefore a favorable conclusion to the war is not necessarily beyond hope. In any case we will have to occupy strategic areas in the south and establish strategic superiority. Concurrently we must develop the rich resources of the southern area and utilize the economic power of the East Asian continent in order to establish a durable, self-sufficient economic position. Moreover, we shall work together with Germany and Italy to break up the unity of the United States and Britain. An unbeatable situation would see us link up Europe and Asia, guiding the situation to our advantage. In this way we might see a hope of coming out of the war [at least even with the United States].59

  Upon conclusion of the formal presentations, Hirohito gave the “Outline for Carrying Out the National Policies of the Empire” his sanction—with misgivings, without an optimistic prospect of victory, or even any notion of the course that a protracted war might take. All the participants now had to complete preparations for war with the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands by the last ten days of October, and they had to make the decision to start the war if there was no longer hope of achieving their demands through the Washington negotiations by an unspecific deadline in early October.

  Hirohito at this stage was still taking his time. To drive home his wariness on the question of war or peace, and to make his high command cooperate in giving diplomacy more time to work, he spoke out (as prearranged with Kido) just before the September 6 meeting concluded.60 “What do you two chiefs of staff think?” he asked. “Neither of you has said a word.” Then, taking a piece of paper from his pocket, he read aloud a famous tanka by Emperor Meiji: “Across the four seas all are brothers./In such a world why do the waves rage, the winds roar?”61 When he had finished, the chiefs of staff stated their intention to give priority to diplomacy, and the conference adjourned in a tense mood.

  Meiji had written his poem at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War to express his worries about the possible outcome. The next year, fortunately, he had been able to compose poems celebrating victory. Thus Meiji’s poem had its roots in his anxiety about the chances for victory.62 When Hirohito read aloud the poem to his two rarely fully cooperative chiefs of staff, the question “Why do the waves rage, the winds roar?” sent a strong, clear message. As the conference ended, the chiefs of staff—having been made aware of the emperor’s apprehension over their readiness for the possible outcome of the two-track policy they were embarking on—promised to give diplomacy more priority, and over the next few days the chiefs of staff would strive to assuage Hirohito’s doubts about their disunity, insufficient war preparations, and acting in haste.

  On September 9 Army Chief of Staff Sugiyama gave Hirohito a detailed report on the planned southern advance operation. The emperor once again wanted reassurance about the Soviets, asking what he would do “if pressure comes from the north?” Sugiyama answered:

  Once we have begun the southern operation, we cannot pay attention to anything else—we have to keep pushing forward until we achieve our objectives. Your majesty, we need your understanding. If something happens in the north, we will transfer troops up from China, but we must not stop the southern operation halfway.

  Emperor: Well, then, I’m relieved. But don’t you think it will be very hard to transfer troops from China?

  Sugiyama: Yes. Because our strength in China will be weakened, we will have to contract our battle fronts and also do other things. These matters are considered in the annual operations plan just coming up. Under any circumstances, you don’t have to worry about China.63

  The next day Sugiyama briefed the emperor again and was again questioned, this time regarding the mobilization for the southern advance operation:

 
Emperor: You may go ahead and mobilize. But if the Konoe-Roosevelt talks go well, you’ll stop, won’t you?

  Chief of the General Staff: Indeed, your majesty, we will.

  Emperor: I will ask you one more time: Is there any possibility that the north [that is, the Soviet Union] may move against us while we are engaged in the south [emphasis added]?

  Chief of the General Staff: I cannot say that will absolutely not occur. However, because of the season it is inconceivable that large forces will be able to attack us.64

  In just three days a war with the United States, at which the emperor had balked on September 6, had become a matter of lesser importance than a two-front war.

  A few days later the man who had planned the attack on the United States, Adm. Yamamoto Isoroku, commander of the Combined Fleet, paid a visit to Prime Minister Konoe, who was becoming increasingly despondent. According to the “record” of their conversation (made more than a month later), Yamamoto tried to reassure Konoe: “I don’t know about the army,” he told him, “but as you try to adjust diplomatic relations [with the United States], you don’t have to worry about the navy. The coming war will be protracted and dirty, and I don’t intend to sit idle on the flagship neglecting my duty.” The admiral intended to do everything he could to force an early, decisive, showdown battle in which he would commit his entire fleet, making especially important use of air and submarine forces. If he won that battle, a long war of attrition might be avoided—if not also won. In this top-level pep talk for the depressed prime minister, they both seem still to have believed that the hoped-for meeting at sea between Prince Konoe and President Roosevelt might come to pass. Konoe wanted a diplomatic breakthrough but feared that even if he did meet with Roosevelt, nothing would issue from their talk and war would begin. Admiral Yamamoto suggested using deception. “[I]f the talks at sea should break down, don’t assume a defiant attitude. Depart leaving everything vague. And the fleet will take action while you are en route home.”65

  But Prince Konoe was now thinking of departing the cabinet he headed, not a summit with an American president who did not want to help the empire, but strangle it. On September 26, with the deadline set on September 6 fast approaching, he complained to Privy Seal Kido that he was getting out if the military insisted on mid-October for making the decision to open hostilities.66

  Hirohito’s early-October deadline for “adjusting” relations with the United States passed with no progress in the negotiations. On October 13 he told Kido: “In the present situation there seems to be little hope for the Japan–U.S. negotiations. If hostilities erupt this time, I think I may have to issue a declaration of war.”67 The next day Konoe held his last cabinet meeting. Army Minister Tj did most of the talking:

  For the past six months, ever since April, the foreign minister has made painstaking efforts to adjust relations [with the United States.] Although I respect him for that, we remain deadlocked…. Our decision was “to start the war…if by early October we cannot thoroughly achieve our demands through negotiations.” Today is the fourteenth…. We are mobilizing hundreds of thousands of soldiers. Others are being moved from China and Manchuria, and we have requisitioned two million tons of ships, causing difficulties for many people. As I speak ships are en route to their destinations. I would not mind stopping them, and indeed would have to stop them, if there was a way for a diplomatic breakthrough…. The heart of the matter is the [imposition on us of] withdrawal [from Indochina and China]…. If we yield to America’s demands, it will destroy the fruits of the China Incident. Manchukuo will be endangered and our control of Korea undermined.68

  Two days later, on October 16, Konoe resigned—a victim of the time element in the national policy document he himself had helped to craft. After the Manchurian Incident, Konoe had been vociferously anti-Anglo-American and pro-German. On January 21, 1941, he had declared firmly before a secret session of the Diet that “Germany will win.”69 Now he was just as sure that Germany would lose, and also sure that the senior officers of both services could not promise a Japanese victory. Konoe’s policy of seeking to end the international pressure on Japan by negotiating in Washington had alienated pro-Axis forces in the government and military. Rightly convinced that the emperor and Kido supported the arguments for war put forward by Tj, Sugiyama, and Nagano, and that the emperor no longer trusted him, Konoe prepared to withdraw from the scene.

  One of Konoe’s last official actions as prime minister was to join with Tj in recommending Prince Higashikuni to succeed him. Many believed that Higashikuni would be able to control both the army and navy and secure the highest degree of national unity. Hirohito, however, refused: As he had before, he did not want to expose in any unnecessary way the future of the imperial house. He himself later acknowledged, “I dismissed the army’s choice and allowed Tj to form a cabinet,” because, of course, Tj was the person he wanted, and he believed now especially that his personal preference should settle the issue.70 Konoe’s letter of resignation pointed out that on four separate occasions he had sought to withdraw troops in order to preserve peace with the United States, while Tj had opposed both the action and its purpose. With the China Incident unresolved, he, as a “loyal subject” of the emperor, could not take on the responsibility of entering into a huge new war whose outcome could not be foreseen. Hirohito accepted Konoe’s resignation and threw his support to the army minister. He thereby also accepted Tj’s reasoning: Army morale had to be maintained; troop withdrawal would not solve the problem of relations with China; and yielding to the United States would only serve to make the United States higher-handed than ever.71

  A conference of senior statesmen convened at the palace to decide who should succeed. Kido, supported by army generals Hayashi and Abe, pushed Tj; Admiral Okada objected. Kido explained that Tj, abandoning the time limit for the war decision, would reexamine the whole problem of relations with the United States. He did not say that Tj would be explicitly charged with making avoidance of war the reason for that reexamination of national policy, for the emperor had never ordered avoidance; nor did Kido say that Tj’s reexamination would review Japan’s options prior to the imperial conference decision of September 6.

  Thus General Tj, the army’s strongest advocate of war and the main opponent of troop withdrawal from China, received consensus and was recommended. Later that day Hirohito unhesitatingly elevated Tj to become his, and the nation’s, new prime minister. “[A]bsolutely…dumbfounded” was how Tj described his feelings to his secretary on being selected.72 “Nothing ventured, nothing gained,” was Hirohito’s comment to Kido ten days afterward.73 The emperor and Kido and those close to them now believed that war was unavoidable. On the day of Tj’s appointment, Prince Takamatsu confided to his diary: “We have finally committed to war and now must do all we can to launch it powerfully. But we have clumsily telegraphed our intentions. We needn’t have signaled what we’re going to do; having [the entire Konoe cabinet] resign was too much. As matters stand now we can merely keep silent and without the least effort war will begin.”74 So too thought many in the Roosevelt adminstration. And Konoe out, Tj in, seemed a confirmation.

  Konoe’s chief cabinet secretary, Tomita Kenji, later recorded Konoe’s reminiscences of the circumstances surrounding his resignation, in which he implied that Hirohito was clearly at fault.

  Of course his majesty is a pacifist, and there is no doubt that he wished to avoid war. When I told him, as prime minister, that to initiate war is a mistake, he agreed. But the next day he would tell me, “You were worried about it yesterday; but you don’t have to worry so much.” Thus, gradually, he began to lean toward war. And the next time I met him, he leaned even more toward war. In short, I felt the emperor was telling me: My prime minister does not understand military matters; I know much more. In short, the emperor had absorbed the views of the army and navy high commands. Consequently, as a prime minister who lacked authority over the high command, I had no way of making any further effort because the em
peror, who was the last resort, was this way.75

  The emperor would one day, down the long bloody road of World War II, praise Tj for serving him loyally while saying of Konoe, who had tried to prevent war with the United States, that he lacked “firm beliefs and courage.”76 To add to the irony, it was Konoe, not the emperor, who was arrested after the war as a probable war criminal.

  IV

  The cabinet that General Tj formed on October 17 was committed to keeping the emperor fully informed on all important questions while they were under study. Kaya Okinori came in as finance minister and Tg Shigenori as foreign minister. Over the next two weeks both these men grew extremely pessimistic about the chances of success in a war with the United States, yet neither was willing to make any one-sided diplomatic concessions to secure American agreement. Nor did they, even once, openly threaten to resign and bring down the cabinet if they could not follow their convictions when it really counted.

  At a marathon seventeen-hour meeting of the liaison conference on November 1, called to decide on a revised “Outline for Carrying Out the National Policies of the Empire,” Tg tried to prolong the discussions in Washington beyond the time desired by the navy and army so as to avoid a war decision. Eventually he yielded to military pressure and the arguments of Prime Minister Tj, who insisted that “when hardship comes, the people will gird up their loins. At the time of the Russo-Japanese War, we took our stand with no prospect of victory, and that was the situation for one year from the Battle of the Yalu River. Yet we won.”77