Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan

by Herbert P. Bix

  In this situation Tj secured Hirohito’s consent to a drastic shake-up of the command structure. On February 21, 1944, he took the unprecedented action of forcing army Chief of Staff General Sugiyama to resign so that he (Tj) could assume that position while also serving as army minister and prime minister. At the same time Navy Minister Adm. Shimada Shigetar pressured Chief of Staff Admiral Nagano to resign so he himself could assume that post. Although the majority on both general staffs were opposed, Tj once again had the emperor’s strong prior backing. When Sugiyama conveyed his worries about the changes directly to the emperor, Hirohito simply told him to cooperate.87 That ended dissent. When he felt the need, Hirohito was willing to set aside one of the most hallowed Meiji-era military traditions—the division of power between military command and administration.

  Behind Tj’s effort to unify the operational and administrative structures of the services (and, indirectly, government affairs and military command) lay the Allied advance creeping ever nearer to the Japanese home islands, and growing distrust within ruling circles of the high command’s handling of the war. The military peril was intensifying disputes over strategy—were the Marianas even defensible?—and over the allocation of scarce materials for the production of airplanes and ships. These disputes within the high command tended to delay production. Another supreme commander, less inhibited and worried about his own image, might have intervened forcefully and adjudicated these matters, but there is no indication that Hirohito did more than entrust their handling to his favorite prime minister, Tj. And as Tj briefed him on every slightest move he took or even contemplated taking, Tj could do no wrong in his eyes. In the end Tj’s tinkering with the leadership structure and his assumption of three posts merely added to his enemies and hastened his ouster.88

  Wartime diplomacy, which at this time chiefly meant relations with Nanking and the manipulation of Nanking’s ties with Chungking, also engaged the emperor’s attention, as did military operations on the Burma front. Starting in late 1943 and continuing into early 1944, Hirohito and Tj personally encouraged a new approach to China that they hoped would enable the armed forces to reduce their presence in China and thereby better sustain the attrition in the Pacific.89 This changed policy had been discussed at liaison conference meetings for over a year but its implementation had been delayed because of widespread resistance on the part of the ruling elites to surrendering Japanese “rights and interests” in China.90

  Finally, on January 9, 1944, the Tj government and the Wang Ching-wei regime in Nanking issued a joint statement announcing to the world that Japan would abolish its treaty-port settlements and extraterritorial privileges in China. Under this new policy the army was ordered to treat as a sovereign equal the client regime of “National China,” which had just declared war on the United States and Britain, and to withdraw from overseeing Chinese administration in occupied areas. To facilitate the acknowledgment of Nanking’s autonomy and the partial restoration of its sovereignty, Hirohito sent his youngest brother, Prince Mikasa, to Nanking as a member of the China Expeditionary Army’s headquarters staff.91 Mikasa’s mission was to engage in discussions with staff officers and promote understanding of the new China policy. While pursuing this and other peace maneuvers in China, the Tj government also prepared to implement Operation Ichig to destroy American air bases in China, from which B-29s were operating. The “Ichig” offensive unfolded successfully from April to October 1944.

  Hirohito did not personally embrace the principle of national self-determination, a major issue of wartime diplomacy for the Allied powers. Nor did he ever call for a reexamination of Japan’s relationship with colonial Korea and Taiwan. Like Foreign Minister Tg and his successor, Shigemitsu Mamoru, Hirohito thought in terms of the notion of “place,” meaning each racial entity in its proper place within the Japanese-led, multitiered “coprosperity sphere,” with the special privileges of Japan guaranteed by treaty. As the war worsened, however, he bowed to the exigencies of the situation and once again showed political initiative. Hirohito began discussing with Tj how to take advantage of the opportunities created by the “Ichig” offensive. They decided to alter their policy toward Yenan, in effect granting tacit recognition to Mao Tse-tung’s Communist regime in Yenan in order to use the communists against Chungking—while by the same action also appeasing the Soviet Union.92

  Southeast Asia attracted the emperor’s attention as well. On January 7, 1944, he sanctioned an offensive from Burma into Assam Province, India. The aim was to preempt an Allied drive to recover Burma and possibly bring about an uprising of Indian nationalists against British rule. Although no documents indicate that Hirohito himself actively promoted this particular offensive, it was just the sort of operation he had pushed for all through the war—aggressive and short-sighted. The Imphal campaign, justified partly to defend Burma and partly to restore troop morale, began on March 8 and bogged down in early April. Tj and Sugiyama, who had been dubious about the operation from the start, dispatched observers to the scene and kept the emperor abreast of the deteriorating situation.93 Finally, on July 5, Hirohito accepted Tj’s recommendation and ordered the disastrous Impal campaign halted. By then, approximately 72,000 Japanese troops had been killed or wounded.94

  V

  Despite the cumulative impact of one major defeat after another, the determination of Hirohito and the high command remained undaunted. When a huge American armada closed on Saipan in mid-June to begin the conquest of the main Japanese bases in the Marianas, the Combined Fleet threw in a restored strike force of nine carriers and more than 460 aircraft to oppose the landings.95 The ensuing naval, air, and land battles of the Marianas, fought between June and August 1944, were the decisive battles of the war for the Japanese navy and its air force. Three Japanese aircraft carriers were sunk and 395 planes shot down, without inflicting any serious damage on the American invasion force.96 After desperate fighting, in which Japanese ground commanders once again failed to prepare adequate defenses in depth, Saipan, Guam, and Tinian fell and quickly became forward U.S. bases for long-range B-29 (“Superfortress”) bombers. The capture of Saipan on July 7, 1944, was a particularly heavy blow for the high command. Resistance was bitter, and when it ended, after three weeks, Japan had lost virtually the entire garrison of 23,811 as well as ten thousand noncombatants.97 It had also lost control of the air and the seas everywhere in the Pacific.

  Saipan and the remaining Japanese bases in the Marianas were now in enemy hands. In Europe the Allies had landed in Normandy and were fighting eastward and northward, while the Soviets were driving into Poland. Staff planners in Imperial Headquarters now had to anticipate that Germany would soon be defeated, and that enormous American military resources would presently be moving from Europe to the Pacific. The Philippines, Taiwan, Okinawa, and the Bonin Islands would be invaded. More important, the homeland itself was almost certain to become a battlefield, for Tokyo—1,272 miles away from Saipan—had at last come within range of B-29s.

  Hirohito’s reaction to this dismal state of affairs is of paramount importance in assessing the role he played in the war. Confronted with certain defeat, he dug in his heels and refused to accept it. “Rise to the challenge; make a tremendous effort; achieve a splendid victory like at the time of the Japan Sea naval battle [in the Russo-Japanese War],” he told Vice Chief of Staff Admiral Shimada in audience on June 17.98 The next day he warned Tj: “If we ever lose Saipan, repeated air attacks on Tokyo will follow. No matter what it takes, we have to hold there.”99 Informed by his chiefs of staff on two successive days that the situation on Saipan had become hopeless, Hirohito ignored their advice and ordered Shimada to recapture it, whereupon the First Department of the Navy General Staff immediately poured all its energies into the problem. Working night and day, with a sense of “utter desperation,” staff officers finally completed a draft plan on June 21.100 Three days later, however, on June 24, after headquarters of the Combined Fleet had weighed in with its opposition, Tj and S
himada formally reported that the recapture plan must be cancelled; Saipan was gone for good.101

  Still refusing to accept the loss of Saipan, Hirohito ordered his Chief Aide General Hasunuma to convene, in his presence, the Board of Field Marshals and Fleet Admirals so that he could consult them. The latter—two elderly princes, plus Nagano, Sugiyama, Hasunuma, the chiefs of the general staff, and the heads of the operations departments—met in the palace on June 25. After they had presented their unified view that the previous reports of the chiefs of staff were appropriate, the recapture of Saipan was impossible, Hirohito told them to put that in writing and left the room.

  In the ensuing discussion Tj announced to the conference that the army had designed “balloon bombs,” and was planning to send thirty thousand aloft against the enemy in the autumn.102 There is a strong possibility that Hirohito had received an informal briefing on the balloon-bomb weapon program sometime between December 1943 and January 1944, and thereafter had taken a keen interest in its progress.103 At this bleak moment in the war, when Imperial Headquarters was about to turn to planning for future ground battles on the home islands, Hirohito may have drawn comfort from learning, in the report of the board, that army and navy preparations were well under way to retaliate for the anticipated B-29 bombing raids.

  Reliance on such special reprisal weapons as wind-carried balloon bombs was an indication of Hirohito’s growing anxiety. The loss of the Marianas had inaugurated not only a new stage in the war, but also a new political crisis in Tokyo, in which he himself was once again targeted for criticism by members of his own imperial family. Around this time in the diary of Hirohito’s brother, Prince Takamatsu, there appear comments such as: The emperor doesn’t realize the gravity of the situation; he cleaves rigidly to bureaucratic hierarchy and is liable to dismiss anyone who steps beyond his jurisdiction; he “flares up frequently.”104 Criticism from the member of the family who had long faulted Hirohito’s performance as emperor was nothing new, of course. More important were criticisms arising within ruling circles, and directed against Tj, whose accumulation of power Hirohito alone had made possible.

  Between the defeats in the Solomons early in 1943 and the fall of Saipan in July 1944, a small group of court officials and senior statesmen led by Konoe and aided by a navy group centered around Admiral Okada, had been working covertly to force Tj out of office. Knowing that Tj’s power flowed from the supporting and far greater power of the emperor, these men never doubted that Hirohito could dismiss his prime minister whenever he decided to. Indeed, they regarded the emperor as the main obstacle in their path to peace.105

  Personally disappointed with the state of the war, Hirohito finally decided to withdraw his support of Tj, opening the way for Tj’s enemies to precipitate the collapse of the entire Tj cabinet on July 18, 1944.

  Two days after Tj had resigned, Hirohito himself bestowed on his favorite general an unusually warm imperial rescript praising him for his “meritorious services and hard work” and telling him that, “Hereafter we expect you to live up to our trust and make even greater contributions to military affairs.”106 Although the rescript was not published, Tj’s enemies within the government and in court circles knew of it and were put on notice as to the emperor’s feelings toward the man many Japanese at that time feared as a virtual dictator.

  Kido, the quintessential backstage man, who once was as great an admirer of Tj as the emperor, had played the key role in Tj’s downfall. Yet during the tenure of Tj’s successor, Gen. Koiso Kuniaki, Kido continued to support the prowar factions of the army and navy, as did the emperor. Tj’s dismissal, in other words, did not reflect an intention on the part of either the emperor or Kido to end the war.

  The emperor’s view of the war became less sanguine after Tj’s downfall. Nevertheless, knowing full well that B-29s would soon be bombing Tokyo, both he and Kido remained unwilling to even consider an early peace effort. The same was true of many senior statesmen who participated in “peace maneuvers” around Prince Konoe.107

  Politically, however, Hirohito’s dismissal of Tj signaled a profound shift. In the autumn of 1941, at the time of the decision to broaden the war by attacking Pearl Harbor, the emperor’s chief political adviser, Kido, had been instrumental in forming a loose alliance between the court group and some senior statesmen on the one hand, and the prowar forces composed of the military elites, “renovationist bureaucrats,” and top leaders of the business world on the other.108 U.S. ambassador Grew had never even imagined such a grouping. As for Konoe, he had stepped down from office prior to Tj’s appointment, becoming an opponent of war with the United States and Britain (though not, of course, publicly so).109 Now, almost three years later, Tj’s resignation brought Konoe and the men around him, representing the most powerful interests in all the key areas of Japanese life, back to the political stage. Not enchanted by the mystique of the throne, possessed of a realistic insight into Japan’s military predicament, and able to influence members of the court group and the imperial family, Konoe was ready to take the initiative in trying to break out of the hopeless war by exerting influence on members of the court group and the imperial family.

  VI

  Tj’s successor, Prime Minister Koiso, was a virtual unknown whose cabinet lasted for eight critical months. During that time, between July 22, 1944 and April 5, 1945, the war grew increasingly desperate, and the Japanese people were forced to make more and more sacrifices. On July 24, 1944, the emperor sanctioned plans for showdown battles in the Philippines, Taiwan, the Southwest [Nansei] Islands, the Ryukyus, and the Japanese home islands with the exception of Hokkaido and the Kuriles. Two days later, he told Koiso to stay in the capital as long as possible and let the war determine whether the Imperial Headquarters should be moved to the continent. As for himself, he intended “to remain in this divine land and fight to the death.”110

  Shortly afterward, on August 4, the Koiso cabinet decided to arm virtually the entire nation and have all subjects begin military training (with bamboo spears) in workplaces and schools throughout the country. Hirohito formally confirmed the new preparations for defense against the forthcoming enemy offensives at his imperial conference two weeks later. Emphasis was to be placed on air defense, fighting the enemy “in the interior” rather than “at the water’s edge,” and the rapid development of “sure victory weapons,” which meant the large-scale production of “body-smashing” or “special attack” weapons, designed to “exchange” the life of the crew or the pilot for a specific military achievement.111

  On August 5, 1944, the liaison conference changed its name to Supreme War Leadership Council and began new diplomatic initiatives aimed at making the Nationalist government in Chungking acknowledge Japan’s “sincerity;” the council also mapped its first vague overtures to the Soviet Union. The latter plan, made by the Foreign Ministry, ostensibly sought Soviet help in bringing about reconciliation between the Chinese Communists and Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalists. Japan could then conclude peace with the new regime in China and be in a better position to wage the “War of Greater East Asia.” In return Japan would endeavor to promote restoration of relations—that is, peace—between its Nazi ally, the German Third Reich, and the Soviet Union.112 And why? So that Japan’s crumbling hegemony in East Asia might be stabilized. This first Soviet-centered peace plan amounted to little and ended in nothing.

  Awareness of the emperor’s resolve to fight on was widespread in government circles, particularly after his rescript of September 7, 1944, on the occasion of convening the Eighty-fifth Imperial Diet. After noting that the enemy’s offensive was intensifying and the overall war situation had “grown more critical,” Hirohito had declared, “Today our imperial state is indeed challenged to reach powerfully for a decisive victory. You who are the leaders of our people must now renew your tenacity and, uniting in your resolve, smash our enemies’ evil purposes, thereby furthering forever our imperial destiny.”113

  That Hirohito still had hope of
victory could be seen in his and the Imperial Headquarters’ performance during the Battle of Leyte, in the southern Philippines. The American reconquest of its former colony, by troops under General MacArthur’s command, started in October with the air, naval, and land battles of Leyte and the Philippine Sea. Continuing into November, these battles virtually destroyed what was left of the Combined Fleet and took the lives of about eighty thousand Japanese defenders.114 The decision of Imperial Headquarters, on October 18, to fight the decisive battle on Leyte made an effective defense of Luzon impossible. After the war, Hirohito himself admitted: “Contrary to the views of the Army and Navy General Staffs, I agreed to the showdown battle of Leyte thinking that if we attacked at Leyte and America flinched, then we would probably be able to find room to negotiate.”115 His statement reflects what actually happened: Hirohito and his chiefs of staff forced the field commander, Gen. Yamashita Tomoyuki, to engage the American invasion force where Yamashita had not wanted to fight and had not prepared defenses. It was one more example of the destructive influence Hirohito often wielded in operational matters.

  Fighting on Leyte continued into late December 1944, and involved kamikaze suicide attacks that were initially highly effective as the planes came in from behind the cover of mountains. Finally Imperial Headquarters decided to write off the island as lost. The costly defense forced delays in preparations for fighting more important battles elsewhere, including the homeland. The development of “balloon bomb” reprisal weapons, which Hirohito on September 25 had placed under the control of Army Chief of Staff Umezu and ordered completed by the end of October, remained on schedule, however.116 In response to the Leyte defeat, the first release of thousands of balloon bombs against the U.S. mainland occurred on or around Emperor Meiji’s day of remembrance, November 3; by March 1945, about 9,300 had been released.117 Very few reached the North American continent; those that did caused little damage.