Who Knew?

by Jack Cooper

  4. Ibid., 203, 206.

  5. Ibid., 207.

  6. Ibid., 210.

  ...British interference continued after their Palestine Mandate ended

  In December 1947, after the United Nations had voted to partition Palestine, David Ben-Gurion called on the British high commissioner in Palestine, Alan Cunningham, requesting land records for the soon-tobe-born State of Israel. Cunningham refused. When the UN commission arrived in Palestine to monitor the transition, Cunningham assigned the commissioners to an unventilated basement and made no provisions for feeding them. They were not able to accomplish anything.1

  The British then nearly bankrupted the embryonic Jewish state by freezing the currency deposits of the Jewish Agency and private Jewish firms, banks, and other institutions with deposits in London.2

  On May 14, 1948, the British Mandate for Palestine was terminated and five Arab nations attacked Israel. When UN mediator Bernadotte was assigned to go to Palestine in June, the British convinced him that the partition lines needed re-drawing and that the Israeli-assigned Negev should be transferred to the Kingdom of Transjordan. This point became moot when Israeli forces drove the Egyptian army out of the Negev.3

  On January 7, 1949, Israeli pilots shot down five British fighter planes in an air battle with the Egyptians. President Truman summoned the British ambassador and told him: “I don’t like what your people are doing. Your planes have no business over the battle area in Palestine.”4

  When the Mandate was in force, would-be Jewish immigrants were intercepted and interned. With Israeli independence, all the women and children detainees were released. However, a year and a half later, the British were still holding able-bodied Jewish male refugees, those capable of bearing arms.5 Were they being kept out of the war against England’s clients?

  When Israel declared its independence, Arab oil ceased to flow to the refineries in Haifa, Israel. When the Israelis purchased crude oil elsewhere, the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company refused to refine the oil for Israel. When Ben-Gurion threatened to nationalize their facilities, the British finally agreed to refine the crude oil Israel had purchased.

  In June of 1949, Israel and England began negotiations regarding the frozen Jewish Agency (now Israeli) funds. The British contended that the funds would be used to indemnify England for their property, which the Israelis had sequestered. Much of the property in question was in the form of fortified positions. The Israelis countered by saying that England had lost title to these lands when they turned them over to the Arabs before they left. The Israelis had suffered much loss of life in conquering these positions, and they did not feel that they should have to purchase them again.1

  The British behavior in Palestine was exacting a heavy toll; England was suffering much internal dissension at home and diplomatic pressure from abroad. In the end, they released the detainees, called off their armed forces, and worked out their financial claims against Israel. They accepted a nominal monetary settlement and gave the Israelis fifteen years to pay at 1-percent interest.

  Thus ended a sad chapter in the relationship between Israel and Great Britain.

  ________________

  1. Howard M. Sachar, Israel and Europe: An Appraisal in History (New York: Random House, 1998), 4.

  2. Ibid., 5.

  3. Ibid., 7–9.

  4. Ibid., 11.

  5. Ibid.

  1. Ibid., 12.

  ...Zionists had to be resourceful to get UN votes for partition

  In early 1947, the United Nations took up the question of partition of Palestine into separate Jewish and Arab states. As the time for a vote approached, the Zionists began to realize that they would have to employ resourceful techniques to achieve their goal.

  Knowing that they lacked the necessary two-thirds of the voting UN members, the Jews had to keep the issue from coming to a vote before they were ready. To accomplish this, they resorted to the time-honored technique of filibuster. They lined up a number of friendly states to keep talking until assembly president Oswaldo Aranha, a good friend of the Zionists, gaveled the session to a close and postponed the vote for two days.1

  One of the crucial votes was from the nation of Liberia. That government was originally for partition but had lately switched positions and was ready to cast a “no” vote. A call went out to Harvey Firestone, president of Firestone Tire and Rubber Company.2 Firestone called his representatives in Liberia to exert pressure on the government, and they soon changed their vote back to a “yes.”3

  The next problem was Haiti. A Zionist investigator learned that the Haitians switched their vote to pressure the United States to grant them a five-million-dollar loan. The pro-Zionists soon persuaded the Haitians that they could get the loan approved more quickly if they voted “yes.”4

  The Philippine Islands posed a major obstacle. The Philippine president, Romulo, delivered a strong anti-Zionist speech while in New York. Shortly thereafter, Supreme Court Justices Murphy and Frankfurter visited the Philippine ambassador to the United States and reminded him that a “no” vote might jeopardize passage of seven bills in Congress dealing with the Philippines. New York Senator Robert Murphy and twenty-five senators signed a letter that was sent to Manila urging a “yes” vote. The Philippines switched their position.5

  The pro-partition forces had to enlist the aid of the Jewish house detective in the hotel where the Syrian delegate was housed. A listening device was planted in the ventilator of the delegate’s room, and the Zionists soon learned that the female delegate of a small Latin-American country was being assiduously courted by a delegate of the Arab contingent. So successful was his courtship of the lady that she was preparing to defy her country’s order to vote “yes” on the partition plan. The Zionists informed her government, and she was replaced by a male delegate.1

  There is also the story of a bugged conversation that took place in a vehicle belonging to the British delegation. Hearing the perfect English spoken by Abba Eban, the Israeli foreign minister, they were concerned that he had made a favorable impression on the audience at the United Nations when he made his first speech. One of their people was heard to say, “Who is that bloke? Where did he learn to speak the King’s English?”

  Another passenger replied, “He’s a bloody don from Cambridge.”2

  The vote for partition succeeded in garnering the necessary two-thirds vote, and the Jews earned the right to fight to preserve the United Nations resolution, which the Arabs were attempting to negate by force.

  ________________

  1. Dan Kurzman, Genesis 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War (New York: World, 1970), 19.

  2. Firestone held a concession for one million acres of land in Liberia and had helped the government out of some financial difficulties.

  3. Kurzman, Genesis 1948, 20.

  4. Ibid.

  5. Ibid., 20.

  1. Ibid., 18.

  2. Ibid.

  ...a Swedish housewife made sure Israel got its machine gun

  In the days following World War II, the Jews of Palestine were confident that they would be given a state. They were also confident that the Arabs would attack, and that they would have to defend themselves. With nations willing to sell arms to the Arabs and no one willing to sell arms to the Jews, a massive underground network was fashioned to overcome this disparity in armaments.

  Haim Slavin, a Russian-born Jewish immigrant to Palestine with a background in engineering, was sent to the United States to work on arms procurement. Through an American contact, he was put in touch with a semi-retired Swedish immigrant gunsmith named Carl Ekdahl. Ekdahl agreed to design a light submachine gun for the Jews for seventeen thousand dollars.

  Midway through the project, Ekdahl came to Slavin and reported that an Egyptian group was offering a hundred thousand dollars for the same job. Slavin told Ekdahl that he understood and that Carl was free to sell his expertise elsewhere, if it would help his modest financial situation. Ekdahl invited Slavin to his home to talk it
over with his wife.

  When Mrs. Ekdahl was apprised of the situation, she asked two questions. Did her husband have a contract, and was Slavin living up to the terms? Receiving two affirmative answers, she said that there was nothing to discuss, and that Carl should get on with the job and fulfill his obligations to the Jews.1

  ________________

  1. Leonard Slater, The Pledge (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), 56–57.

  ...a film about New Zealand pilots helped Israel win a war

  After the end of the British mandate for Palestine, Israel was clandestinely searching all over the world for arms and fighter aircraft. Emmanuel Zur, an Israeli secret agent in London, had managed to obtain three Beaufighter bombers and was trying to figure out how to get them out of England from under the watchful eyes of the British. The answer came to Zur when a pilot he had hired introduced him to a New Zealand actress, who subsequently agreed to star in a “movie” Zur would produce “about New Zealand’s role in World War II.”1

  Within a few days, Zur provided funds for the film “documenting” the courage exhibited by New Zealand pilots during the war. He then contacted people in the British film industry and organized a production company. The “actors” he hired were all real pilots. The final scene in the script called for a mass takeoff of the Beaufighters. The cameras rolled and the planes took off on a one-way trip to Israel.2

  ________________

  1. Dan Kurzman, Genesis 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War (New York: World, 1970), 486.

  2. Ibid., 486.

  ...the Syrians lost the same cargo twice

  In April of 1948, in anticipation of the coming war with the Arabs, the Jews sank the Syrian arms ship Lino in the Bari Harbor of Italy. A few months later, Ada Serini, the chief Israeli underground agent in Italy, received word from an Italian official that the Syrians were planning to retrieve the lost weapons from the bottom of the harbor. Ms. Serini saw an inviting prospect of getting the arms and having the Syrians pay the salvage bill.

  Ms. Serini contacted a trusted and well-paid shipping agent who was engaged to “help” the Syrians locate a vessel and crew. Everything went according to plan, and the ship, the Agira, set out for Syria with the recovered arms and two crewmen chosen by Ada. She then dispatched a fishing boat with two Israelis in Syrian army uniforms. The fishing boat soon caught up with the Agira, told them that the ship was in danger, and asked to come aboard with some special communications equipment.

  Once aboard, the Israelis took over the ship, transferred the cargo and crew,1 and scuttled the ship.

  Thus it was that the Syrians lost two ships, while all the arms that they had purchased went to Israel.

  ________________

  1. Dan Kurzman, Genesis 1948: The First Arab Israeli War (New York: World, 1970), 549–50.

  ...the Israelis sank their own ship

  During the 1948 war for Israeli independence, Israel had two armies in the field. One was the regular Israeli army, and the other was a force of irregulars called the Irgun. The Irgun was cooperating with the Israeli army while retaining much of its own autonomy. As part of their own war effort, the Irgun negotiated an arms deal with the French. The French were upset with the British government for forcing them out of Syria and Lebanon. They felt that if the Irgun came to power in Israel, their influence would be substantial.1 So strongly did the French feel about the matter that they agreed to furnish the arms free of charge.

  The Altalena, the ship bearing the arms for Israel, left France on its way to Israel, but a dispute arose between Irgun leader Menachem Begin and Israeli prime minister and defense minister David Ben-Gurion about jurisdiction over the arms. Begin insisted that a substantial portion be allocated to Irgun troops, while Ben-Gurion insisted that the Israeli army assume jurisdiction.2 The dispute escalated, exchanges of fire took place between the two groups, casualties mounted, and the Altalena was sunk with its load of arms.

  The tragic irony is that there soon would have been enough arms for all. So great was the French stockpile of arms for Israel that it was estimated the Altalena would have required four more trips to make the complete delivery.3

  ________________

  1. Dan Kurzman, Genesis 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War (New York: World, 1970), 458.

  2. Ibid., 465.

  3. Ibid., 458.

  ...the jailer asked the prisoner for a character reference

  In Israel’s 1948 War of Independence, the Jewish settlement of Kfar Etzion dominated the road needed by the Arabs to reinforce and resupply their troops besieging Jerusalem. With the help of Jordan’s renowned Arab Legion, Arab troops attacked Kfar Etzion. The battle raged for several days until the outnumbered, outgunned, and out-ofammunition Jews surrendered. The Arab makeshift soldiers went on a rampage killing almost all the prisoners who had surrendered.1

  Among the prisoners was a female radio operator named Aliza Feuchtwanger. Two Arab irregulars, bent on raping the woman, were pulling her from either side, when suddenly a volley of shots rang out and both attackers fell dead. The shooter identified himself as Captain Hekmat of the Jordanian Arab Legion.2 He took Aliza into his car and drove her in the direction of a prison in Hebron. On the way, the captain made a pass at her, but she rebuffed him saying that she thought that the officers of the Legion were gentlemen. Hekmat then offered marriage, but she lied and told him that she was already married.3

  For the rest of the 1948 war, Aliza and her fiancé Moshe Beginsky, also a prisoner, remained in the prison. Treatment was good and Aliza and Moshe were granted some time together in their cells.4

  When the war ended and the prisoners were repatriated, Captain Hekmat asked if Aliza would write a note stating that he had always acted like a gentleman. Aliza willingly wrote the note. Here was a prisoner writing a character reference for her jailer.5

  Then she went off to Jerusalem to marry Moshe.

  ________________

  1. Dan Kurzman, Genesis 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War (New York: World, 1970), 229.

  2. Ibid., 230–31.

  3. Ibid., 231–32.

  4. Ibid., 234.

  5. Ibid., 233–34.

  ...a tank driver’s poor English lost Jerusalem for the Israelis

  During the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, the Israelis made two unsuccessful attempts to capture Latrun, the fortress controlling the main road to Jerusalem. As they set out upon their third attempt, the Israelis were confident of success. They had the defenders outmanned and outgunned. As the Israeli armored attack force approached the battle zone, the leader, a former English soldier, noticed that his main gun was jammed. Jumping out of his tank, he informed the second tanker to continue the attack while he went to the airport where he could find the tool to clear the jammed gun.

  On his arrival at the airport, he happened to look behind him and saw the entire Israeli column following him. Furious, he descended on the hapless tanker and demanded to know why he had followed him rather than continue the attack as ordered. As it turned out, the man did not understand English.

  Meanwhile, the infantry back at Latrun was unable to carry out the mission without the support of the tanks. Since the second United Nations cease-fire was to go into effect in a few minutes, there was no time to go back to renew the attack, and the Old City remained under Arab control for the next nineteen years.1

  ________________

  1. Dan Kurzman, Genesis 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War (New York: World, 1970), 534–35.

  ...Arab leaders admit that they created the refugee problem

  Beginning in 1948, Arab policies contributed to the creation and perpetuation of the Arab refugee problem.

  During the War of Independence, when the Arab nations attacked the fledgling state of Israel, one of the battles fought was in the village of Deir Yassin. Although it was a bloody battle with many civilian casualties, the Arabs exacerbated the situation by spreading a false rumor that the Jewish fighters were raping the women. This lead to massive flight by the Arab
populace.

  When confronted with the false rumor, Hussein Khalidi, an Arab leader, said, “We have to say this, so that the Arab armies will come to liberate us.” Arab journalist Hazam Nusseibi admitted more recently to the BBC that the trumped-up charge “was our biggest mistake...as soon as they heard that women had been raped at Deir Yassin, the Palestinians fled in terror.”1

  Another contributing factor to the refugee problem followed the battle for the city of Haifa. “The Arab leaders, preferring not to surrender, announced that they and their community intended to evacuate the town....”2 A somewhat similar situation occurred in Jaffa, where many of the town’s populace fled. However, enough stayed so that Jaffa is still an Arab town.3

  Another major cause of making Arabs refugees came from Arab threats. Azzam Pasha, secretary general of the Arab League, was quoted as saying, “This will be a war of extermination and a momentous massacre which will be spoken of like the Mongolian massacre and the Crusades.”4 When the war began to turn in favor of the Israelis, Arabs feared that the Israelis would do to the Arabs what the pasha had promised for the Jews, and a massive exodus took place.

  The former prime minister of Syria, Khalid al-Azm, wrote in his memoirs in 1972, regarding the refugees,

  [I]t is we who made them leave.... We brought disaster upon... Arab refugees, by inviting them and bringing pressure to bear upon them to leave.... We have rendered them dispossessed.... We have accustomed them to begging.... We have lowered their moral and social level.... Then we exploited them in executing crimes of murder, arson, and throwing bombs upon...men, women, and children – all this in the service of political purposes.1

  Alan Dershowitz, in The Case for Israel, shows that Palestinian Authority head Mahmoud Abbas reproached Arab armies for “forc[ing Palestinians] to emigrate,” and cites a research study conducted by the Institute for Palestine Studies that determined that most Arab refuges left of their own will, without any contact with the Israeli army.2