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Tannenberg: Clash of Empires, 1914 (Cornerstones of Military History)

Page 55

by Dennis Showalter


  1. THE CIRCUS RIDER OF EUROPE

  1Cf. in particular Marc Raeff, “Seventeenth-Century Europe in Eighteenth-Century Russia?” Slavic Review XLIV (1982), 611–619; and The Well-Ordered Police State: Social and Institutional Changes through Law in the Germanies and Russia, 1660–1800 (New Haven, Conn., 1983). The latter work may be profitably compared to Erich Donnert, Politische Ideologie der russischen Gesellschaft zu Beginn der Regierungszeit Katharinas II (Berlin, 1976), which stresses the role of Germans in transmitting ideas from the west to Russia.

  2This process is described by a participant in Friedrich von Schubert, Unter dem Doppeladler. Erinnerungen eines Deutschen in russischem Offiziersdienst 1789–1814, ed. with intro. by E. Ambruger (Stuttgart, 1962), esp. 69 ff.

  3The most authoritative interpretations of Western influence on Russian ideas in this period are Andrzej Walicki, The Slavophile Controversy, tr. H. Andrews-Rusiecka (Oxford, 1975), and, more generally, A History of Russian Thought from the Enlightenment to Marxism, tr. H. Andrews-Rusiecka (Stanford, Calif., 1979).

  4Peter Jahn, Russophilie und Konservatismus (Stuttgart, 1980).

  5See, for example, the report of Guard Corps chief of staff Carl von Reyher on the maneuvers of the Russian Dragoon Corps in 1834 in General der Infanterie Ollech, Carl Wilhelm Friedrich Reyher, Vol. IV (Berlin, 1879), 72 ff.

  6Winfried Baumgart, The Peace of Paris 1856. Studies in War, Diplomacy, and Peacemaking, tr. Ann Pottinger Saab (Santa Barbara, Calif., 1981), 153 ff. The older account by Kurt Börries, Preussen im Krimkrieg (1853–1856) (Stuttgart, 1930), remains useful for details.

  7D. Beyrau, Russlands Orientpolitik und die Entstehung des deutschen Kaiser-reiches, 1866–1870/71 (Wiesbaden, 1974), stresses the centrality of Balkan ambitions in Russia’s acceptance of German unification. Cf. too Eberhard Kolb, “Russland und die Gründung des Norddeutschen Bundes,” in Europa und der Norddeutscher Bund (Berlin, 1968), 183–219.

  8Cf. John A. Armstrong, “Socializing for Modernization in a Multiethnic Elite,” Entrepreneurship in Imperial Russia and the Soviet Union, ed. G. Guroff, F. V. Carstensen (Princeton, 1983), 98 ff.; and “Mobilized Diaspora in Tsarist Russia: The Case of the Baltic Germans,” Soviet Nationality Policies and Practices, ed. J. Azrael (New York, 1978), 63–104; and Anders Henriksson, The Tsar’s Loyal Germans. The Riga German Community: Social Change and the Nationality Question, 1855–1905 (New York, 1983).

  9M. B. Petrovich, The Emergence of Russian Panslavism 1856–1870 (New York, 1956), remains reliable on the genesis and nature of the movement. Cf. also Franck Fadner, Seventy Years of Pan-Slavism in Russia: Karamzen to Danielevskii (Washington, D.C., 1962). On its consequences see particularly Dietrich Geyer, Der russische Imperialismus. Studien über den Zusammenhang von innerer und auswärtiger Politik 1860–1914 (Göttingen, 1977), pp. 56 ff. Samarin’s work and its impact is discussed in E. C. Thaden, “Samarin’s ‘Okrainy Rossii’ and Official Policy in the Baltic Provinces,” Russian Review XXXIII (1974), 405–415; and more generally in Gerda Hucke, Jürij Fedorovic Samarin. Sein geistesgeschichtliche Position und politische Bedeutung (Munich, 1970).

  10Paul W. Schroeder, “Containment Nineteenth-Century Style: How Russia Was Restrained,” South Atlantic Quarterly LXXXII (1983), 7.

  11George Lichtheim, A Short History of Socialism (London, 1975), 222.

  12Reinhard W. Wittram, “Bismarcks Russlandpolitik nach der Reichsgrün-dung,” Historische Zeitschrift 186 (1958), 261–284, is a general introduction to Bismarck’s approach to Russia. W. V. Medlicott, The Congress of Berlin and After, 2nd ed. (London, 1963); and Bismarck, Gladstone, and the Concert of Europe (London, 1956); remain useful, as does Alexander Novotny, “Der Berliner Kongress und das Problem einer europäischen Politik,” Historische Zeitschrift 186 (1958), 285–307. Bruce Waller, Bismarck at the Crossroads. The Reorientation of German Foreign Policy after the Congress of Berlin 1878–1880 (London, 1974) stresses both the central role of Russia in Bismarck’s foreign policy and the activism of the chancellor’s approach. Winfried Baumgart, “Bismarck et la crise d’orient de 1875 à 1878,” Revue d’Histoire Moderne et Contemporaine XXVII (1980), 104–108, exaggerates Bismarck’s role. K. O. von Aretin, ed., Bismarcks Aussenpolitik und der Berliner Kongress (Wiesbaden, 1978), includes well-done essays by Andreas Hillgruber on Bismarck’s foreign policy from 1871 to 1882, and Immanuel Geiss on the conference itself.

  13Cf. the general discussions by Walter Laqueur, Russia and Germany: A Century of Conflict (Boston, Toronto, 1968), 27 ff.; Fritz T. Epstein, “Der Komplex ‘Die russische Gefahr’ und sein Einfluss auf die deutsch-russischen Beziehungen im 19.Jahrhundert,” in Deutschland in der Weltpolitik des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts, ed. I. Geiss, B-J Wendt, 2nd ed. rev. (Düsseldorf, 1974), pp. 149–152; and Othmar Feyl, “Zu den deutsch-russischen Beziehungen von 1861 bis 1917 im Lichte der Buchgeschichte,” Jahrbuch für Geschichte der sozialistischen Länder Europas XXII (1982), 83–105.

  14Berthold F. Haselitz and Paul W. Blackstock (eds.), The Russian Menace to Europe: A Collection of Articles, Letters and News Despatches by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (Glencoe, 111., 1952), remains a useful compendium despite its cold war origins. Cf. also Helmut Krause, Marx und Engels und das zeitgenossische Russland (Giessen, 1958); and Roman Rosdolsky, “Friedrich Engels und das Problem der geschichtslosen Völker (Die Nationalitätenfrage in der Revolution 1848–1849 im Lichte der Neuen Rheinischen Zeitung),” Archiv für Sozialgeschichte IV (1964), 87–282.

  15Cf. Claudie Weill, Marxistes russes et social-democratie allemand 1898–1904 (Paris, 1977); and DDR scholar Botho Brachmann, Russische Sozialdemokraten in Berlin, 1895–1914 (Berlin, 1964). Peter Lösche, Der Bolschewismus im Urteil der deutschen Sozialdemokratie 1903–1920 (Berlin, 1967), is good for the later years, as is Dietrich Geyer, “Lenin und der deutsche Sozialismus,” in Deutsch-russische Beziehungen von Bismarck bis zur Gegenwart, ed. W. Maerkert (Stuttgart, 1964), 80–96.

  16Leo Stern, Die Auswirkung der ersten russischen Revolution von 1905–1907 auf Deutschland (Berlin, 1955), is a detailed DDR account. Cf. also Barbara Vogel, “Die deutsche Regierung und die russische Revolution von 1905,” in Deutschland in der Weltpolitik, 222–236.

  17Paul de Lagarde, “Über die gegenwärtigen Aufgaben der deutschen Politik,” (1853); “Über die gegenwärtige Lage des deutschen Reiches” (1871); and “Die nächsten Pflichten deutscher Politik,” (1886); reprinted in Deutsche Schriften, ed. W. Rössle (Jena, 1944), 63–93, 157–268, 435–487. See also Richard Breitling’s survey, Paul de Lagar de und der grossdeutsche Gedanke (Vienna, 1927).

  18For an analysis of his career see particularly Klaus Meyer, Theodor Schiemann als politischer Publizist (Frankfurt, 1956).

  19Viktor Hehn, De moribus Ruthenorum. Zur Charakteristik der russischen Volksseele, ed. T. Schiemann, reprint ed. (Osnabrück, 1966). Cf. Loren Campion. “Behind the Modern ‘Drang nach Osten.’ Baltic Emigres and Russophobia in 19th-century Germany” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Indiana, 1967); and more generally Heinrich Stammler, “Wandlungen des deutschen Bildes vom russischen Menschen,” Jahrbücher für die Geschichte Osteuropas V (1957), 271–305.

  20Cf. Theodor Scheider, Das Deutsche Reich von 1871 als Nationalstaat (Köln, 1961); and James J. Sheehan, “What is German History? Reflections on the Role of the Nation in German History and Historiography,” Journal of Modern History LIII (1981), 1–23.

  21Stephen Kern, The Culture of Time and Space 1880–1918 (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), 235 ff. The quotation is from Alfred von Tirpitz, My Memoirs, 2 vols. (New York, 1919), I, 77.

  22Woodruff D. Smith, The Ideological Origins of Nazi Imperialism (New York, 1986), 21 ff., establishes a general ideological framework putting Mitteleuropa in the context of Weltpolitik and Drang nach Osten in the context of Lebensraum. Cf. inter alia Henry Cord Meyer, Mitteleuropa in German Thought and Action (The Hague, 1953); Wolfgang Wippermann, Der “Deutsche Drang nach Osten.” Ideologie und Wirklichkeit eines politischen Schlagwortes (Darmstadt, 1981); and Dirk Oncken,
“Das Problem des Lebensraums in der deutschen Politik von 1914” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Freiburg, 1948).

  23“Alldeutsch,” Grossdeutschland und Mitteleuropa um das jahr 1950, 2nd ed. (Berlin, 1895); Friedrich von Bernhardi, Deutschland und der nächste Krieg (Stuttgart, 1912), 189 ff.; Daniel Frymann [Heinrich Class], “Wenn ich der Kaiser wär”: Politische Wahrheiten und Notwendigkeiten (Leipzig, 1912), 168 ff. The quotation is from p. 170. Cf. Roger Chickering, We Men Who Feel Most German: A Cultural Study of the Pan-German League 1886–1914 (London, 1984); and William W. Hagen, Germans, Poles and Jews: The Nationality Conflict in the Prussian East, 1772–1914 (Chicago, 1980).

  24The best presentation of parliament’s reponse to the Caprivi tariffs is Helmut Altrichter, Konstitutionalismus und Imperialisms. Der Reichstag und die deutsch-russischen Beziehungen 1890–1914 (Frankfurt, 1977), 111 ff. Walther Kirchner, “Russian Tariffs and Foreign Industries before 1919: The German Entrepreneur’s Perspective,” The Journal of Economic History XLI (1981), 361–380, stresses their limited effect on German industry.

  25For the ideological development of German agrarian conservatism cf. Hans-Jürgen Pühle, Agrarische Interessenpolitik und preussischer Konservatismus (Hanover, 1967); and Kenneth D. Barkin, The Controversy over German Industrialization 1890–1902 (Chicago, 1970), 131 ff. For its impact on German politics see particularly Geoff Eley, Reshaping the German Right: Radical Nationalism and Political Change After Bismarck (New Haven and London, 1980); and more narrowly Abraham J. Peck, Radicals and Reactionaries: The Crisis of Conservatism in Wilhelmine Germany (Washington, D.C, 1978).

  26For the evolution and ramifications of Bismarck’s eastern policies cf. most recently the DDR account by Heinz Wolter, Bismarcks Aussenpolitik 1871–1881 (Berlin, 1983), 191 passim; Susanne Zulinski, “Das Dreikaiserbündnis von 1881-Ein Bündnis der Entzweiung?” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Vienna, 1983); and Andreas Hillgruber, Bismarcks Aussenpolitik (Freiburg, 1972). Still useful for details is Wilhelm Windelband, Bismarck und die europäischen Grossmächte 1879–18885, 2nd ed. (Essen, 1942) Pending the appearance of Ivo Lambi’s projected study, the best English accounts remain A. J. P. Taylor, The Struggle For Mastery in Europe, 1848–1918 (Oxford, 1954), 258 ff.; George F. Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck’s European Order: Franco-Russian Relations 1875–1890 (Princeton, 1979), 60 ff.; and W. N. Medlicott, “Bismarck and the Three Emperors’ Alliance, 1881–1887,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th Series, XXVII (1945), 61–83. In 1867 the Habsburg Empire of Austria officially became the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. Its halves retained a common foreign office and in principle sustained a common foreign policy. Contemporary diplomats tended to use “Austria” as a shorthand, much as “Russia” presently stands for “USSR.” The following text similarly uses “Austria” instead of “Austria-Hungary” except when the dual character of the Habsburg state is of primary importance to the point under discussion.

  27For the evolution of Moltke’s official views and their implications, cf. his memoranda of April 27, 1871, and January, 1880, in Helmuth von Moltke, Die deutschen Aufmarschpläne 1871–1890, ed. by F. von Schmerfeld, pub. as Forschungen und Darstellungen aus dem Reichsarchiv VII (Berlin, 1929), 4 ff.; Eberhard Kessel, Moltke (Stuttgart, 1957), 622 passim, and Graydon A. Tunstall, “The Schlieffen Plan: The Diplomacy and Military Strategy of the Central Powers in the East, 1905–1914,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, Rutgers University, 1975), 12 ff.

  28“Generalstabsreisen (Reise 1885),” in General-feldmarschall Alfred Graf Waldersee in seinem militärischen Wirken, ed. H. Mohs, Vol. II, 1882–1904 (Berlin, 1929), 147 ff.

  29For Moltke’s 1887 memoranda on the military advantages of a first strike, see Die deutschen Aufmarschpläne, 137 passim. Cf. also “Generalstabsreisen (Reise 1886),” in Mohs, Waldersee II, 168 ff.; and Gerhard Ritter, “Die Zusammenarbeit der Generalstäbe Deutschlands und Österreich-Ungarns vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg,” in Zur Geschichte und Problematik der Demokratie. Festgabe für Hans Herzfeld (Berlin, 1958), 523–549.

  30Cf. F. C. Bridge, From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866–1914 (London, 1972), 34 ff.; and Lothar Hobelt, “Österreich-Ungarn und das Deutsche Reich als Zweibundpartner,” in Österreich und die deutsche Frage im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, ed. H. Lutz and H. Rumpler (Munich, 1982), 256–281.

  31Kennan, Bismarck’s European Order, 103 ff., is comprehensive on Russia’s reaction to the Bulgarian crisis. On the issue of public opinion cf. Geyer, Der russische Imperialisms, 93 ff.; and the older and more detailed work of Irene Grünig, Die russische öffentliche Meinung und ihre Stellung zu den Grossmächten 1878–1894 (Berlin, 1929), 86 ff.

  32The general patterns of Russo-German economic relations are summarized in the brief essay by Helmut Böhme, “Die deutsch-russischen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen unter dem Gesichtspunkt der deutschen Handelspolitik (1878–1894),” in Deutschland und Russland im Zeitalter des Kapitalismus, ed. K. O. von Aretin and Werner Conze (Wiesbaden, 1977), 173–190, and the accompanying discussion, 191–206. H. Müller-Link, Industrialisierung und Aussenpolitik. Preussen-Deutschland und das Zarenreich, 1860–1890 (Göttingen, 1977), is a detailed account, best read in company with Theodore H. von Laue, Sergei Witte and the Industrialization of Russia (New York, 1963). Bleichröder’s role is presented in Fritz Stern, Gold and Iron: Bismarck, Bleichröder, and the Building of the German Empire (New York, 1977), 434 ff.

  33Holstein’s views are reflected in the diary entries of Feb. 7, 1884, Oct. 13, 1885, Sept. 14 and Dec. 1, 1886, in The Holstein Papers, ed. N. Rich and M. H. Fisher, 4 vols. (Cambridge, 1955–63), II, 75, 253, 298–300, 315–316. Cf.

  Norman Rich, Friedrich von Holstein: Politics and Diplomacy in the Era of Bismarck and Wilhelm II, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1965), I, 183 ff. Relevant models of Russian imperialism include Reinhard Wittram, “Das Russische Imperium und sein Gestaltwandel,” Historische Zeitschrift 187 (1959), 568–593; Donald W. Tread-gold, “Russian Expansion in the Light of Turner’s Study of the American Frontier, Agricultural History XXVI (1952), 147–152; and J. L. Wieczynski, “Toward a Frontier Theory of Early Russian History,” Russian Review XXIII (1974), 284–295.

  34Diary entry of Jan. 8, 1887; and letter to Max von Thielmann, Mar. 22, 1887, Holstein Papers II, 330–331, 336–338.

  35For the context of the Reinsurance Treaty cf. particularly Hans-Ulrich Wehler, “Bismarcks späte Russlandpolitik 1879–1890,” in Krisenherde des Kaiser-reiches 1871–1918. Studien zur deutschen Sozial-und Verfassungsgeschichte (Göttingen, 1970), 163–180; and Peter Rassow, “Die Stellung Deutschlands im Kreise der Grossen Mächte 1887–1890,” in Mainzer Akademie der Wissenschaft und der Literatur, Abhandlungen . . . 1959, 179–231. H. Hallmann, ed. Geschichte und Problematik des deutsch-russischen Rückversicherungsvertrags von 1887 (Darmstadt, 1968), incorporates the key documents, as well as excerpts from most major German interpretations.

  36Cf. Heide W. Whelan, Alexander III and the State Council: Bureaucracy and Counter-Reform in Late Imperial Russia (New Brunswick, N.J., 1982); and more generally Jacob W. Kipp and W. Bruce Lincoln, “Autocracy and Reform: Bureaucratic Absolutism and Political Modernization in Nineteenth-Century Russia,” Russian History VI (1979), 1–21. The most detailed accounts of Russo-German economic and financial relations are from the DDR: Sigrid Kumpf-Korfes, Bismarcks “Draht nach Russland.” Zum Problem der sozialökonomischen Hintergründe der russisch-deutschen Entfremdung im Zeitraum von 1878 bis 1894 (Berlin 1968), and more generally, Joachim Mai, Das deutsche Kapital in Russland 1850–1894 (Berlin, 1970).

  37Waldersee’s view of events is summarized in his Denkwürdigkeiten, ed. H. O. Meisner, 3 vols. (Stuttgart, 1923–25), I, 334 ff., especially the entries for Nov. 17 and Dec. 4. Moltke’s recommendation of Nov. 30 is in the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (hereafter cited as PAAA), Deutschland 121, Geheim 12a/1. General analyses of the preventive war issue in 1887 include Karl-Ernst Jeismann, Das Problem des Präventivkrieges im europäischen Staatensystem
(Munich, 1957), esp. 116 ff.; and R. Koop, “Das Problem des Präventivkrieges in der Politik Bismarcks” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Freiburg, 1953). DDR scholar Konrad Canis goes to another extreme in asserting an essential identity of ends and interests between the chancellor and the general in Bismarck und Waldersee (Berlin, 1980). J. Alden Nichols, The Year of the Three Kaisers (Urbana 111., 1987) integrates Germany’s foreign and domestic politics in 1887/88.

  38Bülow to Holstein, Dec. 10, 1887 and Jan. 5, 1888, in Holstein Papers III, 236 ff., 246 ff. Allegations that Bülow supported a preventive war during this period are strongly disproved by his letter of Dec. 25 to Philipp Eulenburg, in which he states that from a political perspective, war with Russia is not very promising, “and our politics must do everything consistent with our security and honor to avoid this ‘unproductive’ war.” Philipp Eulenburgs Politische Korrespon-denz, ed. J. C. G. Rohl, 3 vols. (Boppard, 1976–83), I, 257–258.

  39“Bemerkungen Graf Ws zu einer Denkschrift des Generalleutnants v. Brandenstein vom November 1883, Jänuar 1884”; and comments of Oct. 14, 1885, on the Aufmarschplan of 1884/85, in Mohs, Waldersee II, 256–257, 277.

  40Gordon Martel, Imperial Diplomacy: Rosebery and the Failure of Foreign Policy (Kingston, Montreal, 1986), 96–97.

  41“Offensive gegen Russland,” April 15, 1889; and “Krieg gegen Russland,” Feb. 1890, in Mohs, Waldersee II, 323 ff., 327 ff. Cf. Wolfgang Foerster, Aus der Gedankenwerkstaat des deutschen Generalstabes (Berlin, 1931), 42ff.

  42On the French army’s low self-image in this period see Alan Mitchell, “A Situation of Inferiority: French Military Reorganization after the Defeat of 1870,” American Historical Review LXXXVI (1981), 49–62.

 

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