For That One Day: The Memoirs of Mitsuo Fuchida, Commander of the Attack on Pearl Harbor

by Tadanori Urabe

We carrier pilots, who are fond of gossip, referred to them as the Hashirajima Fleet. It was meant to be disparaging. When we overheard that the battleships of Hashirajima Fleet were engaged in a fire exercise, we all burst into laughter because we wondered what targets they would shoot their main guns at. The battleships of the US Pacific Fleet were sunk at Pearl Harbor, and there were no more opponents to shoot. We all laughed about the situation, as if our battleships were waiting for the US rivals to come back from the bottom of the sea.

  The battleships of the US Pacific Fleet were sunk and unable to move, so they had no contribution to make to the American Navy’s operations. On the other hand, the battleships of the Combined Fleet were unharmed but refused to move from the safety of Hashirajima Anchorage. While there was a difference between “unable to move” and “refused to move,” it made no difference from the perspective of not contributing to our operations. We call it an “idle force,” and the idle force is what has been most strongly criticized in military strategy from ancient times.

  Wasn’t it the same Admiral Yamamoto who took the initiative of designing the grand strategy to attack Pearl Harbor after a long and perilous journey? Didn’t it occur to him to initiate a new strategic design on a much grander scale: to create a grand task force fleet with the flagship, Yamato, in the forefront, with the six carriers of the Nagumo Task Force as the core of the fleet, escorted by all of the Admiral’s battleships? A fleet capable of advancing to the Pacific Ocean, of attacking not only Hawaii but also the West Coast of the mainland US with prompt and decisive action. We might thereby have paralyzed the fighting spirit of the American people. At the time, it all appeared very strange to me that he failed to capitalize on this opportunity.

  28

  Doolittle Air-Raid on Tokyo

  During the First Stage Operation, every day in Japan brought news of victory. When Singapore fell, the nation was filled with processions of flags as the first celebration of the victory. Somebody called it “The 100 Days of Glory” following the start of the war. The Japanese people went into rapture. Both soldiers on the front line and people on the home front strutted with arrogance. Pride comes before the fall. What a vulnerable situation it was!

  While news of victory continued in Japan, only news of loss piled up in the United States. Naturally, the American people were depressed, starting to murmur that there should be at least news of a single victory for their side.

  In fact, dark days continued for the US following the total loss at Pearl Harbor, with a succession of defeats everywhere across the Pacific theater. The US government frantically tried to encourage its people by showcasing a very ambitious military build-up plan, but it would take two years for these plans to materialize. If the situation remained unchanged, there was concern that the American people’s morale might collapse.

  Under these circumstances, a Lieutenant Colonel of the US Army Air Force named James Doolittle proposed an idea to his Army leaders: “What do you think about an air-raid on Japan’s imperial capital, Tokyo?”4

  As far as the Army leaders were concerned, they liked the idea of an air-raid on Tokyo. Even if only a type of psychological warfare, it still would enhance the morale of the American people. But the problem was how to turn this into a realistic possibility given the existing limited war capability of the United States.

  Naturally, any contemplated air-raid on Tokyo was possible only if carrier-based planes were deployed. In the early days of the war, the US Navy had only three aircraft carriers that were available for duty in the Pacific Ocean—the USS Lexington, Enterprise and Yorktown. However, even if they should attempt an air-raid with carrier-based planes, the aircraft carriers would have to be positioned within 300 nautical miles off the coast of Japan. Then, there was the inevitable certainty that they would meet heavy counter-attack by defenders deployed along the coastline. This meant a high risk of being sunk. For this reason, the US Navy remained hesitant to participate in such a risky enterprise.

  However, Doolittle’s recommendation was to launch medium-range US Army bombers from a Navy carrier. By doing this, it would be possible to launch from 500 nautical miles off the Japanese coastline, and this would put the carrier out of the cruising range of the coast-based Japanese attack planes.

  Obviously, it would not be possible for the bombers to return to the carrier after the air-raid mission. The plan called for them to continue to fly to mainland China, where they would be supplied with fuel at Chiang Kai-shek’s air force base. They would continue to fly westward to re-fuel in Spain and finally return to the mainland United States. It was a grand concept—a one-way attack, making a journey around the world.

  This operational concept was accepted by the leaders of the US forces, and all preparations for this plan were entrusted to Doolittle.

  The US Navy decided to use the Hornet for this operation and have her double back from the Atlantic area, where she had been deployed, to the Pacific Ocean. She would then be docked at the Alameda Naval Port in San Francisco to complete preparations for the expedition.

  Doolittle decided to use 16 medium-range B-25B Mitchell bombers to be launched from the Hornet, and he began to recruit his crews. At that time, the purpose of the mission—to launch an air-raid on Tokyo—was still kept confidential, and prospective recruits were told only that it was a high-risk special mission. All the crew members were selected from among volunteers.

  Starting from late February, 1942, Doolittle carried out intensive training of his crews at Eglin Base in Florida. The training consisted of simulated carrier takeoffs with the shortest runways as well as ultra-low-altitude bombing. On April 1, 1942, in accordance with their transfer orders from Eglin Base to San Francisco, the 160 men-—including 80 backup and maintenance crew members—under Doolittle’s command boarded the USS Hornet. By the time the men reached the ship, the 16 B-25 Mitchell bombers were already loaded on the Hornet’s flight deck.

  At 10:00 AM on the following day, April 2nd, the Hornet sailed out of San Francisco under the command of Vice Admiral William F. Halsey, Jr. Outside the port, the heavy cruiser Vincennes, the light cruiser Nashville and several other destroyers joined and headed towards the west. When the fleet reached 10 nautical miles off the coast, Halsey announced that the fleet’s mission was an air-raid on Tokyo.

  Hearing this announcement, the Doolittle bomber and the Hornet crews, along with the entire fleet, exploded in exultation.

  There is virtually no difference in human behavior. Similarly, on November 23, 1941, when all the ships of the Nagumo Task Force got together in Hitokappu Bay, the entire fleet was completely jubilant at the announcement that our target was Pearl Harbor.

  When the Tokyo air-raid fleet was passing Hawaii, they were joined by the aircraft carrier Enterprise and several cruisers and destroyers. The Enterprise’s assignment was enemy surveillance and air alertness. By this time, the Tokyo air-raid task force, under Halsey’s command with the Enterprise as the flagship, had increased to 16 ships in total: two aircraft carriers, the Hornet and Enterprise; three heavy cruisers, the Northampton, Salt Lake City and Vincennes; one light cruiser, the Nashville; eight destroyers and two oil tankers. The fleet headed westwards.

  On April 18th, when dawn broke a group of Japanese fishing boats was sighted. The US fleet was still 700 nautical miles off the east coast of the Japanese homeland. The lead boat in the fishing fleet was a picket boat that had been deployed by the Japanese Navy. The light cruiser Nashville opened fire on the fishing boats. Nevertheless, before it was sunk, No.23 Nitto Maru managed to radio an attack warning, saying that they had encountered an enemy task force.

  Based on this alarm, Japanese land-based air squadrons on the eastern front stood by for the coming assault of the enemy task force with the expectation that the fleet would sail closer to within the range of 300 nautical miles.

  Meanwhile, because they had been detected by the fleet of Japanese fishing boats, Halsey decided to expedite the launching time for the air-raid on Tokyo. In
the original plan, the bombers were to be launched from 500 nautical miles to the east of the Japanese coastline, and the air-raid was to be conducted at night. Now, the plan was changed. The starting time was moved up by 10 hours, the bombers would be launched when the Hornet was 650 miles to the east of mainland Japan, and the air-raid would take place in the daytime. The order was issued through loudspeaker. “Army planes, take your launching position now.”

  Doolittle’s lead plane started to move. The running distance on the deck for the commander’s plane was only 450 feet, while the shortest takeoff distance practiced at Eglin Base was 700 feet. The Hornet was sailing against the wind at full speed. Her bow was pounded by waves, sending splashes up to the flight deck. On the flight deck, the wind speed was so strong that it was difficult to stand and not be blown away.

  Doolittle opened the throttle to give full power to his engine. The plane was likened to an angry stallion trying to jump. The wheel stopper was released quickly. The plane ran smoothly towards the bow, and as the forward deck sank downward, the plane floated in the air. A cheer of relief arose from everyone watching. Doolittle was followed by the second, third and fourth plane until, finally, all 16 planes had taken off.

  Each carried three 500-pound and several incendiary bombs. Out of the 16 planes, 13 of them bombarded Tokyo, two bombed Nagoya, and one plane bombed Kobe. Meanwhile, the Japanese air squadrons failed to shoot down a single enemy plane because they had been surprised by the earlier-than-expected attack.

  After they completed their air-raid, Doolittle’s bomber squadron flew towards the Chinese continent. Their staging base was Lingshui Air Field and controlled by Chiang Kai-shek’s Air Force. However, due to the earlier launching time, the distance from the launching point to Lingshui was 2,200 nautical miles, beyond the limit of their cruising range. For this reason, without making a formation, each plane took independent action in order to save time before re-grouping after launching.

  To make matters worse, the weather on the Chinese continent was bad. Therefore, none of them made it to Lingshui. Without enough fuel, they all made forced landings in badly damaged condition at various locations in China, except for one that made a forced landing in the Maritime Province of Siberia. I heard later that there was a dispute between the US and the Soviet Union over the return of the American plane.

  The Imperial Army was responsible for all air-cover over mainland Japan except for specific Navy-controlled locations. At 2:00 PM on April 18, 1942, the Army Command Center of the Eastern District made the following announcement:

  “Around 00:30 in the morning, enemy planes raided the Keihin District from the northwest, but they were intercepted by our air squadrons and driven off. The confirmed number of enemy planes shot down is nine, and our damage appears negligible. The Royal Family is safe and secure.”

  I do not know why they made this statement, but the Army’s story that it shot down nine planes was nothing but a tall tale. In fact, none of the planes was shot down. People knew it and joked that, “Instead of kyu-ki [nine planes], it was probably kuki [meaning “empty air” in Japanese] that they shot down.” However, the actual amount of damage was as announced, and it was something less than a mosquito bite. In its announcement, the Army Information Department ridiculed the attempt to inflict damage stating that, “They say the name of the commander was Doolittle, but it proved to be Do-nothing.” I overheard this and thought that it was rather clever on the Army’s part.

  However, the big question was where had these twin-engine land-based bombers been dispatched from? Within Japanese military circles, it was still unthinkable that the bombers had been launched from a carrier. Besides, it is out of the cruising range from Midway or the Aleutians.

  It was when our fleet was returning from the Indian Ocean Campaign and passing through the East China Sea—at the mid-point between the Philippines and Taiwan—that I learned about the Tokyo air-raid. Early that morning, the Nagumo Task Force knew of the approaching enemy task force because of the warning from the No. 23 Nitto Maru. Its two carriers were positioned 700 nautical miles off the coast. Then, in order to encounter and annihilate them, our fleet started to sail eastwards at full speed. However, there were 2,000 nautical miles or more separating us from the enemy. Therefore, while we were still heading to meet the enemy, we received the report about the air-raid on Tokyo. According to the report, the enemy force was made up of a limited number of twin-engine land based bombers. I wondered, “Where the hell did they come from?”

  The next day, the Akagi’s enemy communication team picked up a radio broadcast from the US, which reported that President Roosevelt said the raiders who bombed Tokyo took off from Shangri-La. To be honest, I was not sure if there actually was an island called Shangri-La in the Pacific. I was a fool for precise answers, and so I unfolded a sea chart and carefully tried to find the island. It turns out that I should not have expected to find it. What I learned later was that Shangri-La was the name of a mystic city in the hinterlands of Tibet that appeared in the popular novel, Lost Horizon, by the writer James Hilton. This novel was made into a movie and was very popular among Americans. President Roosevelt took advantage of this and joked that the Tokyo Raiders had taken off from Shangri-La. The American people were probably pleased, but I was fooled by Roosevelt.

  On the third day following the raid, the Japanese Army caught one of the raider crews that had crash-landed. They interrogated the crew, and it became clear that they took off from the aircraft carrier Hornet. My evaluation of Lieutenant Commander Doolittle was quite high; he successfully conducted an air-raid on Tokyo by launching land-based planes from a carrier, thereby catching us by surprise. While still the enemy, I thought he was really commendable.

  Needless to say, the US side appreciated this air-raid on Tokyo immensely. In his post-war book, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, Professor Samuel Eliot Morrison, a famous historian and retired Rear Admiral of the Navy Reserves, mentions that nothing since the start of the war had given greater satisfaction to the American people than the news that Tokyo had been bombarded. After returning home, Captain Ted W. Lawson, who participated in the Tokyo raid, wrote a book titled, Thirty Seconds Over Tokyo, that became a best seller. It was also made into a movie that became very popular.

  In summary, accounting for the 80 crew members of the 16 Doolittle Tokyo Raider bombers, one plane crashed in Soviet territory, and all five on board died; two planes crash-landed in Japan, and eight of the ten survivors were captured by the Japanese Army; the remaining 64 surviving crew members (one died at the crash-landing) from 13 planes were received by the Chongqing government of Chiang Kai-shek and sent back to the United States as heroes. Before long, Doolittle was promoted two grades to Brigadier General.

  29

  Midway Operations Planning

  From its inception, Doolittle’s air-raid on Tokyo was intended to deliver a psychological shock to the Japanese leadership and demoralize the Japanese people—not necessarily to inflict significant material damage. As a consequence, the actual damage was negligible, but it had an unintended and lasting impact in terms of the strategies that followed.

  The air-raid badly hurt the pride of Admiral Yamamoto. Before Doolittle’s raid, it was implicit that, as long as he was the Supreme Commander of the Combined Fleet, he would never allow an air-raid on the imperial capital, Tokyo, where the Emperor resided. Now, this pride had been wounded by an unorthodox attack utilizing a no-return operational plan. In response, Yamamoto decided to occupy Midway5 and the Aleutian islands of Attu and Kiska. This would enable his pilots to conduct daily aerial patrols from these bases for early detection of enemy activity, thereby preventing any future air-raids on Tokyo. However, this was a non-professional concept from an aviation perspective. Daily aerial patrols were not so dependable because various factors, such as bad weather conditions, could intervene.

  I admit that, even today, there are those who argue that this was not Admiral Yamamoto’s motivation. However, as I see
it, later developments support my understanding much better than such opposing views.

  At that time, Imperial Headquarters was formulating a plan to cut Australia off from the US as part of our Stage Two Operations. The essence of the operational strategy was to isolate Australia by invading and occupying Fiji, Samoa and New Caledonia and reducing them to ashes so that they would be of no use to our enemy. Personally, I thought this plan should be the main focus of Stage Two Operations rather than the capture of Midway, Attu and Kiska. However, in order to isolate Australia, the key to the operation’s success was to wipe out the air power deployed between Sydney and Canberra, where General MacArthur, who had escaped from the Philippines, appeared to be preparing for his next campaign. We expected that the enemy’s air power would be quite tough, and I was in high spirits waiting to give the enemy another scare.

  However, the General Staff was compelled to concede to Admiral Yamamoto, whose influence had expanded because of the successful Hawaii campaign, and they agreed to the Midway operation and postponed the contemplated plan to cut Australia off from the US. Consequently, it was decided to mobilize the entire force of the Combined Fleet with the aim of luring the US task force—with its core of three aircraft carriers that were away from and consequently not destroyed at Pearl Harbor—into battle.

  On April 22nd, the Nagumo Task Force, having giving up the chase for the Halsey Task Force, entered and anchored in Hiroshima Bay. For two days from April 28th, a study meeting of Stage One Operations was held on the flagship, Yamato. At that meeting, Rear Admiral Tamon Yamaguchi, Commander of the First Air Division, said that our experience during initial operations proved that a task force with a core group of carriers is the fleet’s main power in decisive battles. He continued and said that because of this reason, we needed to change our present fleet configuration with cruisers as the core in forward positions—to three task force fleets, to be designated the First, Second and Third Fleets— each to include a group of carriers as the core force that would, in turn, be escorted by groups of battleships, cruisers and destroyers.