PT 109

by William Doyle

  From 1995 to 2015, the former Palm Beach estate of Joseph P. Kennedy was owned by John K. Castle, a New York-based private equity CEO who purchased the property from the Kennedy family for $5,000,000 in 1993 and meticulously restored the estate to its original condition when it served as JFK’s Winter White House. “I think this home was incredibly important to President Kennedy,” Castle explained to the author. “It was from here that he went off to war, and it was here that he recovered from the war. As president-elect, he chose his cabinet here, and as president he spent many happy days here with his family, including the last weekend before he died.” Castle even sees a connection between his Palm Beach property and Kennedy’s PT 109 saga. He noted, “As a young man Kennedy spent many days here learning to swim and pilot small boats in a tropical environment, experiences that prepared him for life in the wartime South Pacific.” There’s something else that would have struck a chord with Kennedy—the Palm Beach estate is surrounded by coconut trees, which regularly dropped coconuts on Castle’s lawn. In 2015, Castle and his wife Marianne sold the 11 bedroom, 12 bathroom, 15,000-square-foot oceanfront property for a reported $31 million.

  “It really made an impression on himself”: The Search for Kennedy’s PT 109, National Geographic program, 2002.

  RFK briefed on multiple assassination attempts against Castro: “Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented), October 4, 1962,” declassified White House document, National Archives, National Security Archive. The memo includes the passage, “another attempt will be made against the major target which has been the object of three unsuccessful missions, and that approximately six new ones are in the planning stage,” a clear reference to Castro.

  “He’s always said that it was a major mistake”: Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Robert F. Kennedy and His Times (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2012), p. 713.

  “like God, fucking anybody”: Richard Reeves, President Kennedy, p. 291.

  “half his time thinking about adultery”: Michael Beschloss, The Crisis Years, Kennedy and Khrushchev, 1960–1963 (HarperCollins, 1991), p. 227.

  Congress blocked domestic program, popularity plunged from 83 to 57 percent: Thomas A. Bailey, New York Times Magazine, November 6, 1966.

  Epilogue: The Rising Sun

  “He died in time to be remembered”: John Galloway, ed., The Kennedys & Vietnam (Facts on File, 1971), p. 49.

  “He always seemed to be striding”: James Reston, New York Times Magazine, November 15, 1964.

  John Hellman on Kennedy’s imagery: John Hellmann, The Kennedy Obsession: The American Myth of JFK (Columbia University Press, 1997), passim.

  “He was the greatest actor of our time”: Hugh Sidey, Time, November 14, 1983.

  “The Japanese response to the assassination”: Reischauer, My Life Between Japan and America, p. 258.

  Kohei Hanami thoughts and statements on JFK’s death: Bill Hosokawa, “The Man Who Sank John F. Kennedy’s Boat,” American Legion Magazine, June 1965. Eight months after the PT 109 was sunk, the Amagiri was blown up and sunk by a magnetic mine off Borneo.

  Max Kennedy on PT 109, Solomon Islands trip, JFK Jr., Dick Keresey, Eroni Kumana and Biuku Gasa: Interview with Max Kennedy. Additional detail from National Geographic 2002 program on Robert Ballard expedition, The Search for Kennedy’s PT 109. Ballard wrote of the expedition in Robert Ballard and Michael Hamilton Morgan, Collision with History: The Search for John F. Kennedy’s PT 109 (National Geographic, 2002). The first island that the survivors reached, which they called Bird Island and went by the names of Plum Pudding Island and Kasolo, is now called Kennedy Island.

  Kevu, Evans and crew on Jack Paar show: “PT 109 Story,” The Jack Paar Show, October 1962, Film TNN:4, JFKL.

  McMahon’s August 16, 1963 letter to JFK: President’s Office Files General Correspondance, 1963: McE-McK JFKL.

  Klee on Kennedy: Interview with John Klee.

  “The most notable event of my life,” “As Jack Kennedy’s political star rose”: Liebenow, “The Incident,” Knights of the Sea.

  1960 campaign exchanges of JFK and Liebenow, Liebenow biographical details: Interview with William “Bud” Liebenow.

  “I am a great admirer of Japan”: JFK interview with NHK Japan network, early 1961, film FON: 14B, JFKL.

  Postscript on PT Boats: the author asked PT boat historian and former U.S. Navy officer Harold E. “Ted” Walther, Jr. for his opinion on what the highlights and impact of PT boats were in World War II. He wrote:

  PT BOATS FINEST HOURS

  1. Squadron 1 GM’s DeJong and Huffman shooting down first Kate at Pearl Harbor, Dec 7, 1941.

  2. Squadron 3 conducting first offensive operations in Philippines (Dec 8, 1941-April 1942) and Rescuing Gen MacArthur.

  3. Squadron 1 burying dead at sea after Midway, including two Japanese pilots.

  3a. Later rescue by Squadron 1 boats of Capt Eddie Rickenbacker MOH, and 7 crewmembers of B-17D Ser No. 40-3089, 11th BS/ 5BG/ 13AF on October 21, 1942.

  4. Squadron 3(2) and Squadron 2, combating the Tokyo Express almost every night at Guadalcanal from 12 October 1942-1 February 1943, as the campaign progressed up the Solomons chain later in 1943-44, joined by Squadrons 5, 6, 9, and 10, 11, 19, 20. Barge hunting.

  4a. 0200 14 Oct 1942 PT 38, 46, 48, 60, got underway from Tulagi and attacked Tokyo Express as it retired from shelling Henderson Field. PT 38 fired 4 torpedoes at a Destroyer and observed 1 hit, PT 60 fired 2 torpedoes and observed 2 hits on another Destroyer, PT 48 slowly closed a Destroyer and at 200 yards was caught in its searchlight beam, PT 48 turned (so close the crew could see the hull plates and rivets) and sped down the length of the Destroyer pouring .50 caliber rounds into the superstructure.

  4b. 9 Dec 1942: LT. John M. “Jack” Searles in PT 59 while on patrol with PT 44 (LT. Frank Freeland), sinking Japanese submarine I-3, recovering Japanese documents, code books etc. and discovering how Japanese were resupplying forces ashore via Sub and Barge.

  4c. 12 Dec 1942: LT. Lester Gamble in PT 45 sinking IJN Teruzuki (“Shining Moon”) joining him on this patrol was LT Henry “Stilly” Taylor in PT 40 and LT jg. William E.“Bill” Kriener lll in PT 37.

  4d. Recovery of Squadron 10 boats from Stanvac Manila sinking.

  4e. Incident and following rescue of PT 109 crew.

  4f. Daylight Cove raids.

  4g. PT 167 being attacked by 12 Japanese torpedo planes and being torpedoed (torpedo skipped through crews quarters forward, one plane hit the boats antenna and crashed in the sea and the boat returned to base.

  5. Squadron 6 Div 17, RON 7.8.12. New Guinea campaign attacking Japanese shipping, barge hunting, and attacking shore installations, working with NCDU, 7th Amphibious Scouts, Alamo Scouts and Australian Commandos.

  5a. PT 190 and PT 191 “Ordeal In Vitiaz Strait”, Dec 27, 1943, being attacked by 28 Japanese aircraft.

  6. Squadrons 15, 22, and 29 in action in Mediterranean. These 3 Squadrons did a lot, Torpedo and Gun attacks against German destroyers but also worked with British Commando, USN Scouts and Raiders, and USN Beach Jumper units.

  7. Squadron 2(2), 30, 34, 35, operations on Mason Dixon line at Normandy, also attack on Cherbourg.

  7a. Squadron 2(2) was a 3 boat Squadron (71, 72, and 199) specifically tasked with supporting O.S.S. operations in France, Holland, and Denmark.

  8. Squadrons 7, 12, 21, 33, and 36 (45 Boats) heading N/NW from Mios Woendi, New Guinea to Leyte Gulf (1100+ miles) and being the vanguard for the Battle of Surigao Strait, working with Alamo Scouts and Philippine Guerillas and rescuing paratroopers of 503 Airborne Combat Team and returning Gen MacArthur to Corregidor.

  8a. PT 489 Squadron 33 and PT 363 Squadron 18 in the successful rescue of a downed Navy pilot in Wasile Bay, Halmahera Island in Indonesia, despite intense fire from Japanese forces

  As an additional mention: MTBSTC, MTBRTU, and Squadron 4, at Melville, also follow on training sites at Miami Shakedown and PT base Toboga, Republic de Panama, during the course of the war 15, v
olunteer officers and enlisted men passed through the schools and follow on training, and were sent on to 42 Squadrons. Medals and Heroics aside, To stand up a training program and train all these men from a small piece of land in Rhode Island, is truly the finest hour of PT Boats.

  Their impact on the war?

  They filled a void, a stop gap measure to buy time for larger ships to be built, and they took the fight to the enemy, and went in were larger ships couldn’t because of uncharted reefs, shallow water etc. When they could not attack capital ships, they found new employment, hunting barges and interdiction. Barges were used by the Japanese to reinforce island garrisons with men, weapons, equipment, and supplies. These were also used by the Germans in the Mediterranean, called Flak Lighters, they were considerably larger and more heavily armed.

  While everyone has visons of PT Boats roaring in and letting loose torpedoes at larger ships, it was soon discovered at Tulagi that stealth was the best tactic and weapon the PT’s could use. They would approach the Tokyo Express routes in groups of two or three boats at low speeds as to not create and illuminate a phosphorescent wake (which also attracted Japanese Jake float planes, which would fly up the wake and drop a bomb on the boat) when the Express was sighted, the boats would either maneuver into an intercept position or lie in wait and ambush the ships. When torpedoes were launched, the boat(s) would turn and high speed it out of the area, sometimes using a smoke screen to help mask their exit wake. Later in the war when hunting barges, when a enemy was encountered, extreme violence of action and superior firepower was brought to bear on the enemy, resulting in a short action usually not lasting more than minutes. Then using speed to exit the area.

  In the Battle of Surigao Strait, which was the last true torpedo boat action, 39 PT boats (from Squadrons 7, 12, 21, 33, and 36) were used as a scouting force, they were to report Japanese movements through the Strait to Adm. Oldendorf’s 7th Fleet battle force. They’re secondary mission was attack the Japanese force, of the 39 boats, 15 boats in the force launched 35 torpedoes. The results as per ACQ pg 389: 14 missed, 1 ran erratically (PT 146), 1 ran hot on deck (PT 493), 11 were unobserved, and 7 were claimed as hits, with PT 137 claiming hits on the light cruiser Abukuma, which was later sunk by USAAF bombers on 10/26/44 off Mindanao. PT’s also claimed hits on destroyer Asagumo.

  Thanks to the PT’s warning and reports to the 7th Fleet Battle Force, only one destroyer, Shigure, from the first force survived, and the second force which the Abukuma was part of, turned tail and in doing so the heavy cruiser Nachi(second force flagship) collided with the burning and damaged heavy cruiser Mogami (from first force)and the destroyer Shiranuhi was sunk in retreat, by US planes.

  APPENDIX A:

  JFK’S LOST 1946 NARRATIVE OF THE SINKING OF PT 109: UNPUBLISHED EXCERPTS

  On the third day of August in the second year of the war, the PT 109 with two other PT boats were patrolling near the island of Kolombangara in the northern Solomons.

  The three PT boats were patrolling at a slow speed to prevent their wake in the brilliantly phosphorescent water giving away their position to the enemy planes that had been circling over their heads since early evening. About midnight a report was picked up that Japanese destroyers were in the area, proceeding at slow speed to relieve the Japanese garrison at Kolombangara.

  At 2:27 in the morning a forward lookout on the torpedo boat reported an object off the starboard bow. The visibility at that time was poor—the sky was cloudy—and there was a heavy mist over the water.

  The reported object was a Japanese destroyer but it was going at extremely high speed—estimated later to be over 40 knots. It broke out of the mist on top of the PT 109—and smashed into it—splitting it from bow to stern.

  Only one man—Patrick McMahon, was in the engine room on the PT 109 at the time of the collision. His first knowledge of his impending ordeal came when the Destroyer broke through the engine room. McMahon was thrown against the starboard bulkhead. A tremendous burst of flame from the exploding gas tanks covered him. He pulled his knees up close to his chest and waited to die.

  Patrick McMahon was a native of California. He was forty-one years old with a wife and son and before the war he taught at a small public school near Pasadena. At the time of Pearl Harbor his son joined the Navy and volunteered for submarine service. McMahon continued to teach for a few restless months and then one day told his wife that he was going to join the Navy, too. He enlisted in the Navy, was assigned to boot camp, and in one of those queer inexplicable acts, the United States Navy assigned him to a motor torpedo boat school at Melville, Rhode Island, for PT boat duty, although he was well over the age limit for these hard-riding boats.

  After completing his course, he was assigned to an engineering staff for shore duty and some months later proceeded to the Solomon Islands to work around the base. His age prevented him, it was thought, from sea duty. However, as the casualties mounted during the long Solomon Island campaign, the need for trained engineers became greater.

  And that is how he eventually found himself—with his legs curled under him on that early August morning waiting to die. Patrick McMahon, however, did not die. He was carried by the momentum of the Japanese Destroyer down under the Destroyer’s propellers which turned and twisted him until he came to the surface, nearly five hundred yards from the wreckage of the motor torpedo boat. He came up to the surface in a sea of flame but with his hands he managed to clear a small area of water around him.

  The survivors of the crash of the PT 109 were not picked up for eight days. During that time McMahon’s burns, which covered his face, body, and arms, festered, grew hard, and cracked in the salt water, and his skin peeled off. McMahon, however, did not utter a word of complaint. His only answer to questions about how he felt was a weak, but courageous smile. When the survivors were finally picked up, McMahon was sent to a hospital at Guadalcanal. He remained at the hospital over four months and on his release, he was ordered back to the United States for release from the service. . . . McMahon, however, requested that he be permitted to remain at Tulagi and help in the repair of old engines.

  He worked every day—explaining to the new engineers the intricacies of 1800 horse power Packard engines, and, frequently, disregarded the doctor’s advice and worked on the engines himself.

  I saw him often with the thin skin of his hands cut and bleeding at the end of a day’s work. But he still had that smile. McMahon’s courage was an inspiration to us all.

  APPENDIX B:

  1952 LETTERS BETWEEN JFK AND KOHEI HAMAMI, FORMER CAPTAIN OF THE AMAGIRI

  166 Kofune, Ubado-mura

  Yamagun, Fukushima-ken

  Japan

  September 15, 1952

  Dear Mr. Kennedy,

  I am informed from Dr. Gunji Hosono that a warship sunk by destroyer of the Japanese navy during the Solomon Islands Battle in August 1943 was under your command. This is a big surprise to me as I happened to be the Commander of the destroyer which sank your ship. When I read the Time magazine of August 18, 1952 which mentioned the battle in question, my memory being refreshed, I can vividly recall what happened at that time.

  I regret very much that I missed the opportunity of meeting you during your last visit to Japan. As I was living in the Fukushima Prefecture, northern part of Japan, I could not make contact with you during your brief stay in Tokyo although Dr. Hosono succeeded in locating me after great difficulty. I am looking forward to seeing you on your next visit to Japan.

  Now allow me to take this opportunity to tell about myself. I had been the destroyer commander since October 1940. In view of the international crisis at that time the Imperial Japanese Navy was prepared for the worst while attaching the last hope in the eventual success of the America-Japanese diplomatic talk. As even we young officers were quite aware of the risk of fighting the combined force of the U.S. and British navies with our inferior naval strength, the attack of Pearl Harbor which was entirely secret to us, therefore, seriously disturbed u
s.

  While most of our naval officers except the war like minority were naturally pessimistic about the outcome of the war, the unexpected victory at the commencement of the war and the skillful propaganda of the General Tojo’s cabinet led us to entertain a wishful thinking for the chance of victory. Following our defeat at the Midway Islands, however, the whole situation changed against Japan and became favorable to the United States which displayed tremendously the strength of war political and the fighting spirit.

  I was engaged in the Battle of the Solomon Islands following the seizure of Laboul [Rabaul] (New Britain Islands). I was very much concerned with the situation which then was further aggravated by the successive defeat in the Battle of Guadalcanar [Guadalcanal].

  From November 1942 to May 1943 I was assigned to the duty in the Track [Truk] Islands water. It was early June 1943 I was transferred to Laboul [Rabaul] again as the commander of the destroyer Amagiri. From that time the counterattack of the American force became increasingly offensive. As Americans controlled the air, we were in no more position to attack in daytime and we had to operate in night, attempting in vain to prevent, by destroyer force, the transportation of the American men and munitions.

  We met the disastrous defeat in Kure in early June when our flag ship was instantly sunk at the first encounter by your fleet, equipped with radar (which we were not aware) and this was followed by the subsequent defeat with the result that we were forced to retreat to Laboul [Rabaul] after the series of the unsuccessful battle.