Asquith

by Roy Jenkins

  I purposely in this letter do not discuss the delicate and difficult question of personnel.

  The Committee should, as far as possible, sit de die in diem, and have full power to see that its decisions (subject to appeal to the Cabinet) are carried out promptly and effectively by the Departments.

  The reconstruction of the War Committee should be accompanied by the setting up of a Committee of National Organisation, to deal with the purely domestic side of our problems. It should have executive power within its own domain.

  The Cabinet would in all cases have ultimate authority.

  Yours always sincerely,

  H. H. Asquith1

  The difference between these proposals and Lloyd George’s was real but by no means limitless. The small War Committee was common ground, but Asquith was insisting on his own chairmanship, although his suggestions that meetings should be daily and that a vice-chairman should be appointed contained at least a hint that Lloyd George might be allowed to do much of the work on his own. The only other substantial difference about membership lay in the fact that, while they were both agreed that the First Lord of the Admiralty should be included, Asquith wanted Balfour to continue in this office, and Lloyd George wanted him replaced by Carson. Asquith also wanted the parallel “ Home Front ” committee, which Lloyd George did not, but this point only had major significance if, with the Prime Minister firmly excluded, the chairman of the other body were seeking effective Prime Ministerial powers without the name. It was therefore subordinate to the first disagreement.

  Lloyd George found Asquith’s reply “ entirely unsatisfactory.” He was in no doubt that he would fight on the issue. What was less certain was whether Bonar Law would fight with him. Lord Beaver-brook said that this question was in doubt until late on the Friday, but not after that. But it is not clear, either from Beaverbrook’s detailed account of events and conversations or from Mr. Robert Blake’s biography, what factors finally swung Bonar Law over to a completely committed position. During the earlier part of the day the pressures had been the other way. He had the disturbing memories of his isolation at the Unionist meeting the previous afternoon, which were fortified by a letter from Lansdowne complaining that these proceedings had left “ a nasty taste ” in his mouth. Then, at the end of the morning, Lloyd George showed Law his memorandum and reported on his interview with Asquith. Law was disturbed both at the extent to which Asquith was to be excluded and at the demand, which Lloyd George told him he had put forward, for the removal of Balfour from the Admiralty.

  That evening Aitken dined alone with Law at the Hyde Park Hotel and exercised all his powers of persuasion in favour of Lloyd George. He was sufficiently successful for Law, towards the end of the meal, to say that he wanted to see Lloyd George at once. “ I had the means of finding Lloyd George at that time at any hour of the day or night,” Aitken wrote; and he set off in a taxi, accompanied by Law, to exploit his knowledge.

  Lloyd George was the guest of Lord Cunliffe, Governor of the Bank of England, in the public restaurant of the Berkeley Hotel. The other members of the party were Edwin and Venetia Montagu. Lord Reading joined them after dinner. Montagu’s position throughout the crisis was openly equivocal. His personal attachment to Asquith was extreme. A year or so before he had written to him:

  In all the things that matter, in all the issues that frighten, in all the apprehensions that disturb, you show yourself clear-sighted and self-possessed, ready to help, to elucidate, to respond, to formulate, to lead, to inspire. That’s why loving you and following you is so easy and so profitable; it’s worth while all the time.m

  Montagu also had a high regard for Lloyd George. He saw the crisis as the tragedy of “ two great men of England. .. being slowly but surely pushed apart.” This result he attributed to the evil geniuses of Carson and Northcliffe operating upon the one, and of McKenna upon the other. His own endeavour throughout was to assist a solution which would marry the “ fertile, ever-working imagination and constructive power ” of Lloyd George with Asquith’s “ incomparable capacity for mastering a particular case at once, detecting the vital considerations, discarding the bad arguments, and giving a clear and right decision.” He and Reading were the only Liberals who kept open their lines of communication with both camps. Montagu, in particular, was indefatigable (although ineffective) in trying to arrange a compromise.

  On the occasion of this Berkeley Hotel dinner he was able to do little in this direction. He found Lloyd George “ very disturbed and distrait, very little conversation occurred between us and he was called away.”n

  It was Aitken who did the calling. He beckoned from the comer of the restaurant and Lloyd George responded immediately. He knew that Law was the crucial man to influence. They joined the Unionist leader in the waiting taxi and drove back together to the Hyde Park Hotel. Lloyd George had already received Asquith’s reply to his memorandum, but it seems likely that he did not show it to Law that night; perhaps he did not have it with him. With or without it, he made the most delicate use of his persuasive powers. Aitken records that he “ exercised consummate tact.” By the following morning he felt certain enough of his man to send Law the following note:

  War Office, Whitehall, S.W.

  December 2nd, 1916

  My dear Bonar,

  I enclose copy of P.M.’s letter.

  The life of the country depends on resolute action by you

  now.

  Yours ever,

  D. Lloyd George 0

  Asquith in the meantime was behaving with his usual aplomb. He had made plans to go to Walmer for the Saturday night and Sunday, and he intended to stick to them. Reading endeavoured to dissuade him, and received the curious reply that “ he (Asquith) was told that Carson was in the neighbourhood of Walmer and was very anxious to see him and discuss the matter.”1 Before going the Prime Minister again summoned Hankey to lunch at Downing Street. The latter wrote in his diary for that day:

  I suggested a solution to the Prime Minister, but it was not well received. .. . Very shortly after lunch the Prime Minister left by motor for Walmer Castle. It was very typical of him that in the middle of this tremendous crisis he should go away for the weekend! Typical both of his qualities and of his defects; of his extraordinary composure and of his easy-going habits. After lunch, at Mrs. Asquith’s request, I saw Bonar Law, and learned from him that he had called a party meeting of Unionist Cabinet members for the following day, and that he would probably “ send a letter ” (viz. of resignation) after it. He explained that he must do this in order not to appear in the eyes of his party to be dragged at the heels of Lloyd George. ... Bonar Law told me that he might put off his party meeting if he was sure that Lloyd George would not resign first.... So I went after Reading... . Reading, however, had only been able to persuade Lloyd George to postpone action until tomorrow. I went back to Bonar Law, but this was not good enough for him and he decided to go on with his party meeting. So back to Downing Street where we arranged that Bonham Carter should follow the Prime Minister to Walmer and bring him back tomorrow morning. I walked home with Reading. We both agreed that the whole crisis is intolerable. There is really very little between them. Everyone agrees that the methods of the War Committee call for reform. Everyone agrees that the Prime Minister possesses the best judgment. The only thing is that Lloyd George and Bonar Law insist that the former and not the Prime Minister must be the man to run the war.... The obvious compromise is for the Prime Minister to retain the Presidency of the War Committee with Lloyd George as Chairman, and to give Lloyd George a fairly free run for his money. This is my solution.p

  1 The fact that he was misinformed about Carson’s whereabouts makes his reason still stranger. Reading told Montagu, with whom he breakfasted on the Saturday morning, about the interchange, and the latter recorded it.

  It sounded a tangled situation, and so indeed it was. Montagu, and not only Reading, tried to intervene with Lloyd George that afternoon. The three of them had an hour’s
talk at the War Office. “We could not shake (Lloyd George’s) determination. He insists upon the Chairmanship of the War Committee and upon removing Balfour from the Admiralty,” Montagu noted.® Montagu also wrote a long letter to Asquith and sent it down to Walmer with Bonham Carter. It was a letter of near despair:

  Audacious as I am of advice, I am at a loss to give any. I receive very bitter letters from Margot, but I have not had time or courage to answer them. She, like McKenna, attributes everything that has happened in the Press to L.G., notwithstanding the fact that the views of the Press are nearly all inconsistent with L.G’s scheme. I remain of opinion, based not only on affection but on conviction, that there is no conceivable Prime Minister but you.

  I remain of opinion that Lloyd George is an invaluable asset to any war government. ... I would most earnestly suggest that you should come to London to discuss this matter. You may entertain your own opinion, as I have expressed mine, of the vital mistake Lloyd George is making in plunging the country into this condition. But it is for you as Prime Minister, I assume, to try and prevent this wherever the fault. I cannot believe that this can be done by the mere exchange of two formal letters.... It is all a nightmare to mer

  Influenced by this letter, by Bonham Carter’s verbal persuasion, and perhaps by his inability to find Carson (who had not left London), Asquith agreed to return on the Sunday morning (December 3rd). He reached Downing Street at 2.0 p.m., was greeted by Montagu, and immediately sent for Crewe, who joined them at the end of a late luncheon.

  While Asquith had been motoring through Kent the Unionist ministers had met at Bonar Law’s house in Kensington. On this occasion there is no doubt that there were two absentees. Balfour was in bed, and Lansdowne, who had retreated to Bowood on the Friday evening, taking Grey with him, was pleased to discover, when he received the summons, that there were no trains which would get him to the meeting in time. Several other aspects of this meeting remain shrouded in mystery. A resolution, which ran as follows, was carried for transmission to Asquith:

  We share the view expressed to you by Mr. Bonar Law some time ago that the Government cannot continue as it is.

  It is evident that a change must be made, and, in our opinion, the publicity given to the intention of Mr. Lloyd George makes reconstruction from within no longer possible.

  We therefore urge the Prime Minister to tender the resignation of the Government.

  If he feels unable to take that step, we authorise Mr. Bonar Law to tender our resignation.

  The reference to “ the publicity given to the intention of Mr. Lloyd George ” was provoked by an article which had appeared in Reynolds' newspaper that morning, and which Beaverbrook subsequently described as “ like an interview with Lloyd George written in the third person.” It gave the readers of that newspaper, who apparently included all the Conservative ministers, a full inside picture of the game at that stage from Lloyd George’s point of view, including the information that if his terms were not accepted he intended to resign and appeal to public opinion.

  These revelations gave great offence to the assembling ministers. They were already aggrieved by Bonar Law’s tardiness in telling them what was happening. It was intolerable that they should be better informed as readers of Reynolds' than as colleagues of the Unionist leader. Furthermore they regarded Lloyd George’s fault as completely in character. They were eager to give him a sharp rap over the knuckles. But what else did they intend to achieve with the remainder of their resolution?

  This remains the greatest mystery of the whole crisis. It was not a mystery to everyone. Lord Beaverbrook gave a perfectly clear explanation of what they had in view. “ .. . the tone of the meeting,” he wrote, “ had changed since Thursday from one of passive hostility to Lloyd George’s plan to an active determination to force an issue and compel Lloyd George to accept the domination of the Prime Minister or retire from the Government.” When Asquith resigned, Lloyd George would be forced to try to form an administration. “ On his failure, which was thought certain, Asquith would return stronger than ever, and Lloyd George and his few friends would be thrown out of the Government on its re-formation.”s But is this a convincing explanation?

  First, it must be said that if the intention of the Conservative ministers was to strengthen Asquith and destroy Lloyd George, they behaved with an almost unbelievable ineptitude. Their resolution, which was to be transmitted by the one man amongst them who had gone over to Lloyd George, breathed no word of confidence in Asquith. On the contrary, the instruction that if he would not resign himself, he must accept their resignations struck a distinctly hostile note. How was this likely to strengthen his hand against Lloyd George?

  This particular instruction apart, the whole resignation gambit, which they urged upon Asquith, was a most hazardous one. Lord Beaverbrook, and other commentators following him, have written as though this was a weapon frequently and successfully employed by Prime Ministers. They assume that a short visit to Buckingham Palace is a time-honoured way of dealing with a recalcitrant colleague or a confused Cabinet situation: the resigning Prime Minister can confidently expect to be recalled within a day or so. In fact there is not a single post-1832 example of a Prime Minister behaving in this way and strengthening his position. Gladstone in 1873 tried to force Disraeli to form a minority administration, but that was because he wished to escape from office before the forthcoming election; he failed in his objective and led his party to a heavy defeat. In 1885 he tried the same tactic on Salisbury, who took office for six months, and then made an unexpectedly good electoral showing.

  On both these occasions the party situation was relatively stable. There was no question of another Liberal stepping into the place which Gladstone had vacated. A more fluid situation existed in 1931 which was a precedent for Beaverbrook and the other commentators, although not of course for Asquith or the Tory ministers. On this occasion MacDonald did from some points of view strengthen his position by going to Buckingham Palace to resign—but only because he was careful not to leave again until he had secured a commission to form a new Government. He did not make the mistake of allowing anyone else to try first.

  For the Unionist ministers to have assumed—if they did—that the best way to help Asquith was to demand his resignation was therefore extraordinarily foolish. But was this the way their minds worked? There is contrary evidence, from both Curzon and Austen Chamberlain. Curzon wrote to Lansdowne a few hours after the Unionist meeting. There is such a difference between the beginning and the end of his letter that it is possible almost to sense the mind of that patrician but flexible character adjusting himself to a new situation as he rapidly added one spidery sentence to another. He began with strong criticism of Lloyd George. Then he defended the tactic of the Unionist resolution. It was designed, he said, to bring Lloyd George face to face with the facts of political responsibility. “ His Government will be dictated to him by others, not shaped exclusively by himself.” The assumption was that Lloyd George would form a government, not that he would fail to do so. Curzon concluded with some harsh remarks about Asquith:

  Had one felt that reconstruction by and under the present Prime Minister was possible, we should all have preferred to try it. But we know that with him as Chairman, either of the Cabinet or War Committee, it is absolutely impossible to win the War, and it will be for himself and Lloyd George to determine whether he goes out altogether or becomes Lord Chancellor or Chancellor of the Exchequer in a new Government, a nominal Premiership being a protean compromise which, in our view, could have no endurance.t

  Curzon behaved in a double-faced way throughout the crisis. A day later he wrote to Asquith to assure him that “ my resignation yesterday was far from having the sinister purport which I believe you were inclined to attribute to it.”u ; and there is a widely believed story that he followed this up by a verbal assurance to the Prime Minister that he would never serve under Lloyd George. Even so, he can have had no motive for dissimulating in Lloyd George’s fa
vour when writing to Lansdowne. Curzon’s letter is strong evidence that the feeling at the Unionist meeting was much more confused than Beaverbrook allowed.

  Curzon’s evidence is supported by Austen Chamberlain. Chamberlain was more straightforward, less clever, and much less ambitious than Curzon. He was at least as suspicious of Lloyd George,1 although at a later stage he was to be much more loyal to him.

  1 He had strong family reasons for disliking him, and these were always powerful with Chamberlain.

  In his already quoted letter to the Indian Viceroy, Chamberlain described the situation with which, as he saw it, the Unionist ministers were confronted on the Sunday morning:

  Lloyd George was in revolt and the controversy on his side was being carried on in the Press by partial and inaccurate revelations. Asquith, Grey and Balfour were being openly denounced and told they must go. No Government could continue to exist on such terms, and since the Prime Minister had failed to assert his authority and to reorganize his administration in time, we thought that the ordinary constitutional practice should be followed and the man who had made the Government impossible should be faced with his responsibilities. If he could form a Government, well and good. If not, he must take his place again as a Member of an Asquith Administration, having learned the limits of his power and deprived thenceforward of the opportunity for intrigue. In any case, power and responsibility must go together and the man who was Prime Minister in name must also be Prime Minister in fact.