A History of the Roman World

by Scullard, H. H.

  This unrest among the Gauls emphasized the fact that the Alps were the natural frontier of Italy and that the victory of Telamon must be followed up by the conquest of Cisalpine Gaul in order to ensure peace and a quiet frontier. After the battle Aemilius raided the Boii, who were completely subdued by the consuls of the following year (224). It fell to the lot of the popular leader C. Flaminius to lead the first Roman army across the Po against the Insubres. This daring and able politician, who had crossed swords with the Senate on the score of his land bill, reached the consulship in 223 and proceeded to display his not inconsiderable gifts as a soldier. With his colleague he crossed the Po near the Adda and then, instead of marching directly against the Insubres, he turned through the country of the friendly Cenomani and fell on the enemy from their exposed eastern flank. Hostile senators might point out the dangers of Flaminius’ strategy, but it succeeded. In the country south of Bergamo and Brescia he encountered and defeated the enemy; the tradition, which assigns the victory to the efficiency of the Roman legions and tribunes in spite of their general’s rashness, is not above suspicion. Flaminius is said to have left unread despatches which he received from the Senate before the battle, guessing that they contained an order to return without fighting. In any case he was recalled after the battle, and his colleague’s refusal to disobey this summons prevented him from following up his victory. On his return he was voted a triumph by the people despite the Senate. After this honour he retired from office and thus allowed the consuls of 222 to enter on their duties on 15 March, a month earlier than usual; not till 153 did the consular year start on 1 January. Flaminius deserved a better tribute from his country than he received.

  The Insubres sought peace on conditions which the new consuls, Cn. Cornelius Scipio and M. Claudius Marcellus, were unwilling to accept; they then prepared to renew the struggle with the help of 30,000 Gaesati. When the consuls attacked Acerrae, which commanded the passage of the river Adda, the Gauls made a counter-attack on Clastidium which had recently been occupied by Flaminius. The consuls separated. Marcellus marched to the relief of Clastidium, where he won a victory, charging on horseback the Gaulish chieftain Viridomarus whom he slew in single combat; he thus won the spolia opima for the last time in Roman history. Meantime Scipio captured Acerrae and advanced into the heart of Insubrian territory. At Mediolanum (Milan) he got into slight difficulties, until Marcellus arrived; together they routed the enemy and took the city.8 The Insubres surrendered unconditionally and gave up some territory on which the colony of Cremona was soon founded. Lastly, the consuls of 221 and 220 finally overcame the native tribes of Istria and thus secured the north-eastern frontier up to the Julian Alps. Cisalpine Gaul was conquered and the way lay open for the infiltration of Roman culture. This was hastened by the extension of the road from Spoletium to Ariminum by Flaminius, who reached the censorship in 220; the whole route from Rome was reconditioned and the new Great North Road was called the Via Flaminia.

  Two years later Latin colonies of 6,000 settlers each were planted at Placentia and Cremona to guard the passage over the Po against the Insubres, and a fortified outpost (rather than a citizen colony) was placed at Mutina (Modena) among the Boii. But hardly had peace been established when Hannibal appeared from over the Alps, and Cisalpine Gaul rallied to his banner.

  4. THE ILLYRIAN PIRATES

  Before and after, but luckily not during, Rome’s struggle with the Gauls, her attention was diverted to Greece and a new world entered her purview. Although in the course of the third century she had become arbiter of the destinies of a multitude of Greek towns in Magna Graecia and Sicily; although many of her nobles and many even of the general rank and file that had served abroad had become interested in Greek culture, nevertheless she had no direct dealings with Greece proper and no Roman embassy set foot in Greece before 228 BC.9 But events occurred which forced Rome out of her indifference to the Hellenistic world. During the First Punic War an Illyrian chieftain named Agron had built up a very considerable kingdom, centred at Scodra (Scutari or Skhöder), and stretching from Dalmatia in the north down to the coast opposite the heel of Italy. In 231 by co-operating with Demetrius II of Macedonia he was enabled to interfere much further south, though the unwise celebration of a victory brought about his death. His widow, the queen-regent Teuta, aided by an unscrupulous chieftain, Scerdilaidas, carried on his imperialistic policy: in 230 they took Epirus and Acarnania and thus extended Illyria’s sphere of control to the Corinthian Gulf.

  It was not, however, the territorial expansion of Illyria that drew Rome’s first glance across the Adriatic. The immemorial pursuit and chief industry of the Illyrians was piracy. Their rugged broken coast with its screen of islands formed a perfect base from which their light and speedy little galleys (lembi) could prey on passing merchantmen. Checked in earlier days by the fleets of various Greek cities, they now roved the seas unhindered until Rome at length assumed the role of policeman. As long as they victimized only Greek shipping in the Adriatic, Rome was unmoved. But when they ravaged the coast of southern Italy and ventured into the Ionian Sea to rob, capture and even kill Italian traders, popular indignation at last forced Rome’s hand. But the Senate preferred diplomacy to force. Two envoys were sent to Teuta, who was busy besieging Issa in an attempt to annex all the neighbouring Greek cities not yet under her control (aut. 230). The queen repudiated responsibility for any outrages committed by her subjects and refused to guarantee the future safety of Italian commerce; angered by a threat from the ambassadors she broke off negotiations. On their return home the envoys were attacked by pirates and one of them was killed. Whether or not Teuta was directly responsible for this outrage, she sealed her doom by refusing to offer any explanation. But Rome was still slow to act. It was not until the queen had besieged and captured Corcyra and had defeated a relieving Greek fleet that a Roman navy sailed into Illyrian waters.10

  In the summer of 229 Cn. Fulvius Centumalus sailed to Corcyra with 200 vessels. Resistance in face of this fleet was useless and even Teuta was not rash enough to attempt it. A Greek of Pharos named Demetrius, whom the queen had left in command at Corcyra, promptly betrayed the town to the Romans who received the willing surrender of the townsfolk. Fulvius then sailed to Apollonia where the other consul, L. Postumius Albinus, landed from Brundisium with 22,000 troops. Apollonia like Corcyra at once surrendered, and Epidamnus (Dyrrhachium) followed suit. The army advanced northwards perhaps to the Drilo (Drin) without meeting any serious opposition; the fleet received the surrender of Issa, Pharos and Corcyra Nigra. Teuta fled to her fortress at Rhizon where she held out till the spring of 228; her capitulation was inevitable, so that only one consul and 40 ships remained in Illyria during the winter. The terms granted her were that she should retain her crown, but pay tribute to Rome and renounce all claim to districts taken by the Romans; further, only two Illyrian vessels might sail beyond Lissus (Alessio), perhaps fixed as the southern limit of her kingdom.

  Rome had thus freed the passage between Italy and Greece from the danger of Illyrian pirates. Future protection was secured by guarding the two flanks of the Illyrian kingdom. In the north the traitor Demetrius was given his native island, Pharos, together with other islands and mainland towns; here he reigned by permission of Rome. In the south the Romans themselves established a protectorate: a coastal strip from Lissus to the frontier of Epirus, together with the islands they had taken. The inhabitants of this district were made neither allies nor subjects; they were free from tribute and retained their autonomy, but had to supply troops on demand.11 Thus almost without striking a blow Rome had confined Illyrian shipping to the Adriatic without destroying the kingdom, and had established a base on the Albanian coast from which she could keep an eye on her neighbour. The slowness with which she entered upon the war and the conditions she imposed after it are sufficient to disprove the theory that she deliberately cultivated an aggressive eastern policy. The Senate, although perhaps conscious that if the need arose the new protector
ate would block Macedon, had only intervened when and in so far as it was necessary to maintain order.

  After the war the Romans sent ambassadors to the Achaeans, Aetolians, Corinthians and Athenians to announce their victory and to explain their conduct; for the Greeks, no less than the Italians, had benefited by the suppression of piracy. Thus for the first time Rome came officially into contact with the leading powers of Greece by an exchange of diplomatic courtesies. The envoys were well received and Corinth admitted the Romans to the Isthmian Games, thus recognizing them as members of the Hellenic world. But no formal engagements were concluded, nor was any approach made to Macedon, which was now governed by Antigonus Doson, regent for the young Philip. Rome perhaps realized that the formation of her new protectorate had in fact annoyed the Macedonians, who in earlier days had controlled some of the Adriatic ports from which they were now excluded. Be that as it may, the Romans made no attempt to entangle themselves in Greek politics.12

  During the next ten years Rome was too busy with the Gallic invasion and, as will be seen, with trying to check the growing power of Carthage in Spain, to think much of Greece where momentous events were taking place. Antigonus Doson had revived the power of Macedon and had asserted his hegemony in Greece; further, he had won the support of Demetrius of Pharos, who was quietly extending his power beyond the limits imposed by Rome. This adventurer, after the death or abdication of Teuta, had become regent for Agron’s son, and with Prince Scerdilaidas controlled the Illyrian kingdom. With a rash disregard for his safety Demetrius continued on his reckless course of aggression even when the young Philip, who had succeeded Antigonus on the throne of Macedon, was distracted with internal difficulties and could give little help to his Illyrian ally. Nothing daunted, Demetrius in 220 proceeded with Scerdilaidas to attack Pylos with a fleet of 90 vessels, thus perhaps violating the treaty of 228, and then sailed into the Aegean, where his pirate squadrons ranged far and wide. Further, he invaded some territory under the Roman protectorate. This could not be overlooked, and the situation was aggravated in Roman eyes by a visit which King Philip paid to Scerdilaidas in Illyria in the winter of 220–219. Relations with Carthage were becoming strained and it would never do to allow eastern affairs to become threatening. What if Carthage should make overtures to Demetrius or Philip? So once again Rome sent a force to check Demetrius and his Illyrian pirates.

  A whirlwind campaign laid Demetrius low. The consuls of 219, L. Aemilius Paullus and M. Livius Salinator, sailed to Greece. Demetrius intended to resist in the south at Dimale and in the north at Pharos, where he himself remained. But Aemilius stormed Dimale in seven days, with the result that the surrounding district hastened to surrender. The consuls then sailed to Pharos which they captured by strategy; a ‘fixing’ frontal attack covered the approach of a body of men who had disembarked at the rear. Demetrius fled to Philip. The consuls, anxious at the news which came from Spain, where Hannibal was besieging Saguntum, hastily made a settlement. Pharos and other districts were put on the same basis as the towns which had been placed under Roman protection ten years before. Scerdilaidas and the young king Pinnes were left undisturbed in Illyria.

  Philip, deeply occupied in a struggle with the Aetolians and Sparta, had not raised a hand to help Demetrius, but welcomed him after his flight and later lent a ready ear to that adventurer’s schemes for revenge on Rome. He also received help from Scerdilaidas who, disregarding his obligations to Rome, sailed south of Lissus to join him. Such happenings might have claimed Roman attention had it not been for Hannibal’s distracting activity; as it was, the Romans did nothing. Scerdilaidas, however, decided with cheerful inconsequence to attack Philip, his erstwhile ally (217). But he soon came to grief and thus gave Philip control of more territory bordering on the Roman protectorate, so that when the moment was ripe the Macedonian king was more ready to make common cause with Hannibal. Thus Rome’s two expeditions in eastern waters resulted in the suppression of piracy, the establishment of a protectorate in Lower Illyria and the stirring up of the enmity of Philip of Macedon.

  5. THE PUNIC EMPIRE IN SPAIN

  While Rome was engaged in Cisalpine Gaul and across the Adriatic, Carthage was fully occupied in the western Mediterranean. The friendly relations of Rome and Carthage during the war with the mercenaries were rudely shattered by Rome’s seizure of Sardinia, and at Carthage the party which stood for hostility towards Rome again climbed into the saddle. If Carthage ever again intended to cross swords with Rome, clearly she must train and keep a standing army like other nations. Hanno’s policy was to encourage expansion in Africa; and Numidia and Mauretania would have afforded good material. But there was better elsewhere. By reconquest and extended conquest Hamilcar proposed to make good the decline of Carthaginian influence in Spain, and thus to offset the loss of Sicily and Sardinia. In Spain Carthage could train and support an army with less fear of Roman intervention. It is unlikely that Hamilcar and the advocates of this policy of re-establishing Punic domination in the western Mediterranean aimed directly and deliberately at revenge. But certainly after Rome’s handling of the Sardinian question those who saw the future of Carthage in Africa had to give place to an expansionist group. The tradition that Hamilcar conquered Spain against the wishes of his government is absurd. He was in alliance with Hasdrubal, the leader of the democratic party, and when money and booty began to pour in from the Peninsula Hanno’s faction would become less vocal. The main part of the Punic government was behind the Barcids.

  The cause, date and degree of the diminution of Punic influence in Spain is uncertain; but the application of the question cui bono would point to the implication of the Greek cities – especially Massilia. But Gades, at any rate, remained in Punic hands and thither Hamilcar Barca sailed in 237 with his nine-year-old son Hannibal whom he had just forced to swear that he would never be Rome’s friend; this anecdote, which seems authentic, shows something of the mind of the father. Based at Gades, he proceeded to reconquer southern and eastern Spain. Andalusia soon fell to his sword and he advanced the Punic frontier to Cape Nao, building a dominating fortress at Akra Leuke (White Rock; probably modern Alicante). In 231 an embassy came to him from Rome, whose ally, Massilia, could ill afford to see the Punic frontier creeping so far north. The Romans themselves probably cared little what happened in southern Spain and were contented with Hamilcar’s neat reply: that he was fighting the Iberians to get money with which to pay off the Roman war indemnity. But they had shown that they were keeping an eye on Carthaginian expansion and at some point they entered into friendly relations with the native city of Saguntum. Shortly afterwards Hamilcar, who was withdrawing from the siege of Helice (modern Elche) at the approach of the Orissi, met his death by drowning, but only after he had secured the safety of his son Hannibal and the officers with him (229–228). So fell a gallant soldier, of whom his country might justly be proud.

  Hamilcar was succeeded by the leader of the popular party, his son-in-law Hasdrubal, who was chosen by the troops and afterwards received confirmation of his appointment from the people of Carthage. He avenged his predecessor’s death by an expedition against the Orissi, and thus reached the Upper Guadiana. Though his army was reckoned at 50,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry and 200 elephants, he achieved more by diplomacy than force. He married an Iberian princess and changed the Punic headquarters from Alicante to the site of Mastia, where he founded the city of New Carthage (Cartagena) on a peninsula which commanded one of the best harbours in the world; there were rich silver mines in the vicinity and the passage to Africa was easy. From this base he advanced up the east coast in the direction of the Ebro. In 226 he was met by ambassadors from the Romans, who feared that he might join hands with the rebellious Ligurians and Gallic tribes. A treaty was arranged by which Hasdrubal agreed not to cross the Ebro with an armed force and perhaps undertook not to help the Gauls; as a quid pro quo he possibly received the assurance that Rome would not interfere with his conquests south of the river. The attitude of Rome’s al
ly Massilia to this arrangement is uncertain; though doubtless it was she who had warned Rome of Hasdrubal’s encroachments. By the Ebro treaty she definitely lost her three colonies which the Carthaginians had taken: Hemeroscopium, Alonis and Alicante. But her two colonies north of the Ebro, Emporiae and Rhode, were saved from Hasdrubal’s grasp.13

  In 221 Hasdrubal was assassinated by a Celt and his place was filled by Hamilcar’s twenty-five-year-old son, Hannibal, who was soon to enter the lists against Rome in one of the most epic struggles known to history. The new general reverted to his father’s warlike policy, though, like Hasdrubal, he married a Spanish princess from Castulo. He at once attacked the Olcades who dwelt near the Upper Guadiana, and after wintering at New Carthage he stormed the highland tribes of the central plateau. Advancing along the westerly route to Salmantica (Salamanca) he defeated the Vaccaei and on his return the Carpetani, thus advancing the standards of Carthage beyond the Tagus (220). Though many of the more distant tribes south of the Ebro (e.g. the Celtiberians of the Upper Tagus and Douro, and the Lusitanians) were still unconquered, and though some of the nearer tribes (e.g. the Vaccaei and Carpetani) were only prevented from revolting through the hostages they had surrendered, nevertheless the Barcid generals had won a great empire from which Carthage could draw immense supplies of manpower and mineral wealth: ‘an inexhaustible treasure-store for empire.’