A History of the Roman World

by Scullard, H. H.

  The rest of the year was spent in diplomatic arrangements and punitive expeditions. To prepare for the future, Scipio slipped across to Africa to interview Syphax, the Numidian sheikh who had been troubling Carthage. On his return he made an example of some Spanish towns, Ilurgia (Illorci), Castax and Astapa (Estepa near Osuna), capturing the first by a brilliant converging attack. A report that Scipio was ill caused a mutiny among troops stationed on his lines of communication at the Sucro, but this was promptly crushed. To steady his men he led them against two Spanish allies who had also profited by his illness to revolt. A brilliant Roman victory up the Ebro restored their loyalty and removed a dangerous threat to Scipio’s flank. An interview with another African prince, Masinissa, and the founding of a colony at Italica (Santaponce, near Seville) for his veterans, completed Scipio’s work in Spain. The final Carthaginian resistance at Gades collapsed and Mago, after a vain attempt on New Carthage, sailed off to the Balearic Isles, where he has left his name enshrined in Mahon, the capital of Minorca. So fell the Carthaginian Empire in Spain, while Scipio returned to Rome conquering and to conquer.

  2. THE WAR IN ITALY

  Meantime Rome had successfully weathered the storm in Italy. After the recapture of Tarentum in 209 the people were eager to make a final effort to end the war in Italy. The energetic Marcellus was elected consul for the fourth time for 208; his colleague, T. Quinctius Crispinus, had served under him at Syracuse. The two consuls encamped near Hannibal and it looked as if they might risk a battle. But while out reconnoitring they fell into an ambush; Marcellus was killed and Crispinus was mortally wounded.4 In this unimportant skirmish Rome lost one of her best generals; it would be hard to replace the energy and dash of Marcellus, who alone seemed ready to cross swords with Hannibal. No further effort was made to renew the projected offensive, especially when news came that the commander at Tarentum had been defeated near Petelia, and later that Hannibal had driven off a Roman force which was besieging Locri. But the year was more successful abroad than in Italy. Laevinus, returning from a naval raid on the African coast, had defeated a Carthaginian squadron and captured 18 ships, and Scipio had won the battle of Baecula.

  But news soon reached Rome that Hasdrubal had left Spain and was wintering in Gaul. True, Scipio was wisely keeping at bay the two other Carthaginian armies in Spain, but Hasdrubal might soon arrive in northern Italy with some 20,000 men. It was too hazardous for the Romans to attempt to check him, as they had tried to check Hannibal, at the Rhône, or even in the plains of northern Italy. Instead they must concentrate on central Italy and at all costs prevent him coming south to join Hannibal. The consuls elected for the critical year of 207 were C. Claudius Nero, who had served at Capua and in Spain, and M. Livius Salinator, who after conquering the Illyrians in 219 had withdrawn from public life. The legions, which for the last three years had dropped to twenty-one, were raised to twenty-three. While Nero held Hannibal at bay, Livius was to counter Hasdrubal’s arrival.

  By the end of May Hasdrubal had crossed the Alps, probably by the same pass used by his brother, and reached the Po valley, where he raised his numbers to 30,000 by recruiting Gauls. After failing to take Placentia, which would have been of great value, he advanced south in the summer when the fields of central Italy would provide corn for his troops and forage for his horses. As in 217, the Romans stationed two legions under Terentius Varro at Arretium in Etruria and two more under a praetor Porcius at Ariminum in the east; but they improved on the previous plan by placing Livius south of the two advance armies near Narnia, where he could support either according to Hasdrubal’s movements. When it was clear that Hasdrubal was making for the Adriatic coast and the Via Flaminia, Porcius gradually withdrew while Livius hastened to join him, so that Hasdrubal found the united force of four legions awaiting him at the Metaurus.

  Meanwhile Hannibal did not attempt to join his brother in northern Italy, and risk losing Bruttium, his only base in Italy. Instead the brothers hoped to meet in central Italy. Hannibal moved slowly northwards to Grumentum, where he found Nero and four legions.5 Here, and again at Venusia, skirmishes took place which Roman tradition magnified into victories. Faced by four legions and with two more behind him at Tarentum, Hannibal could not advance beyond Canusium without serious risk. But events played into the hands of the Romans, who learned from the capture of Hasdrubal’s despatch riders that the brothers intended to meet in Umbria. Claudius Nero then took a momentous decision. Leaving four legions to watch Hannibal he determined to join Livius in the hope of defeating Hasdrubal with their augmented forces and of returning to his southern command before Hannibal had realized his absence. He marched with 6,000 infantry and 1,000 cavalry along the coast road, which was shorter and where provisioning was easier, amid enthusiastic aid from the loyal population. At the river Metaurus he entered Livius’ camp by night, having covered 240 miles in six days according to the pro-Claudian tradition. In the morning a double bugle-call rang through the Roman camp and Hasdrubal knew that two consular armies lay over against him.

  The Romans had encamped probably south of Fanum and the Metaurus where they could cover the coast road and watch the Via Flaminia without being forced to fight on the level ground near Fanum, where Hasdrubal had in vain offered battle to Livius. The arrival of Nero changed the situation. In face of superior numbers Hasdrubal could not force the coast road. He must either withdraw to northern Italy and await events, or stake all on marching inland along the Via Flaminia in the hope of joining Hannibal further south but with the risk of finding himself between two Roman armies. It is not certain which plan he favoured, but probably he chose the bolder one; he had before him the example of how Hannibal had successfully thrown himself between Flaminius and Servilius at Trasimene. In any case, Hasdrubal withdrew by night up the Metaurus valley, where he was overtaken by the Romans before he could cross the river. He was forced to fight. He posted his Gauls on a steep position on the left and massed his other troops and elephants on the right where he hoped to break the Roman line. But Nero, on the right wing, finding he could not engage the Gauls because of the ground, led a force round to support Livius on the left and thus outflanked the enemy. Seeing the day was lost Hasdrubal charged into the thick of battle and died fighting. ‘And it would not be just to take leave of this commander without one word of praise,’ wrote Polybius, who in a fitting tribute esteemed him a worthy son of Hamilcar and a worthy brother of Hannibal.6

  Victory was complete; Rome had won an open battle in Italy for the first time during the war. The first serious attempt to reinforce Hannibal had failed. The relief was tremendous and the effect on Rome’s prestige in Italy instantaneous. The battle of Metaurus was a decisive moment in world history; it was Rome’s ‘Crowning mercy’. But had the result been otherwise, it would scarcely have ended the war. Rome, that had stood so much, could surely have braced herself for one more shock when the tide of war was turning in her favour elsewhere. But the joy at Rome was unbounded. Hastening back to the south, Nero, a member of the grim Claudian house, flung Hasdrubal’s head into his brother’s camp at Larinum. Thus learning the bitter news, Hannibal was forced to withdraw to Bruttium, unaided and alone.

  The war in Italy began to hang fire and the centre of interest shifts to Africa, which the Romans were preparing to invade. In 206 the legions were reduced to twenty. Although there were thirteen in Italy itself, the consuls still feared to attack Hannibal, but the next year, while preparing for his African campaign, Scipio snatched Locri from Hannibal’s grasp. At the same time the Carthaginian government made one last attempt to help Hannibal and to keep Scipio in Italy. Mago sailed from the Balearic Isles and captured Genoa, where he received reinforcements from Carthage.7 This danger of a fresh invasion from the north was met by stationing armies at Arretium and Ariminum, as in 207. But Mago could not yet take the offensive; the Gallic tribes, abandoned by Hannibal and remembering the fate of Hasdrubal, were lukewarm, and it was a slow task to organize the hill tribes of Liguria. At
length in 203 Mago advanced into the Po valley with some 30,000 men. One legion had been sent to Genoa, two more held the Boii at bay, while four advanced from Ariminum against him. After a serious engagement Mago withdrew wounded to the coast, where he found orders to return to Carthage, but he died on the voyage.

  Meanwhile Hannibal had been holding on desperately in Bruttium like a lion at bay. Reinforcements from Carthage in 205 had been driven to Sardinia by a storm and there captured. Gradually one small town after another was wrested from Hannibal and he was even worsted in a skirmish near Croton, according to the Roman claim. All hope of success in Italy was dead; he could only try to prevent reinforcements being sent to Scipio who had invaded Africa, where success after success was reported. Finally, in the autumn of 203 he received orders to return home to defend Carthage. Having kept together a loyal army for fifteen years in an enemy’s country, undefeated, he at last evacuated Italy more sorrowfully than an exile leaving his native land. He had failed in an attempt to which he had devoted his life. Yet all was not lost, and he must have felt some eagerness in the thought that he was going to face in battle the most brilliant general Rome had produced, and that when they parted the fate of the civilized world would be decided.

  3. THE ROMAN OFFENSIVE IN AFRICA

  On his return from Spain Scipio was elected consul for 205 amid great popular rejoicings, although he was not granted a triumph, which as a mere privatus cum imperio he could not claim. It was now well known that he wished to carry the war into Africa. When the Senate discussed the allocation of provinces, strong opposition to Scipio’s African project was led by Fabius; but finally a compromise was reached by which one consul should command in Sicily with the right to sail to Africa if he thought fit. As Scipio’s colleague, P. Licinius Crassus, was Pontifex Maximus and could not leave Italy, Scipio had clearly won. But he was still further checked; he was given the command of only the two legions in Sicily, who were the disgraced survivors of Cannae. However, he raised 7,000 volunteers and the Italian allies supplied corn and material for the fitting out of 30 ships, so that he had a good nucleus with which to forge a weapon to strike at Carthage.

  Fabius’ opposition to Scipio’s schemes was based on politics and strategy. Politically, he represented a class which did not look beyond Italy for Rome’s future. Such men tried to stem the tide of Hellenism which was flooding Rome and wished to finish the war with all speed and to heal the wounds it had inflicted on the countryside of Italy.8 The other view, as represented by the Scipios, was that a purely Italian policy was obsolete and that Rome must become a Mediterranean power. The military views of the two parties varied correspondingly. The object of the Fabians was ‘limited’: Hannibal was to be forced from Italy. Scipio’s object was more ‘absolute’: the crushing of Hannibal and Carthage. He thought Rome would never be secure until Carthage was humbled and fettered – though not destroyed: the cry ‘delenda est Carthago’ had not yet arisen. The strategy of each party represented its aims. Tactical inferiority forced on Fabius a defensive strategy, which had won him the title Cunctator. But a strategy of exhaustion seldom wins a war. Fabius could only hope that the war might ‘fizzle out’ and Hannibal retire. He could never conquer Carthage. But Scipio by his tactical reforms did not fear to meet Hannibal in the field and could use a strategy of annihilation. To defeat Hannibal in Italy might terminate the war, but Carthage would remain a danger. Hence he determined to disregard the enemy’s main forces, strike at their base and so force Hannibal to return to Africa to fight the decisive battle. And this policy won the day.

  Scipio began to train his new army in Sicily where his Hellenic sympathies and conduct won him ready support. His seizure of Locri from Hannibal had an unfortunate sequel, for Pleminius, the governor whom he left in charge, spent his time plundering the unhappy Locrians, and thus gave Fabius a chance to criticize the absent Scipio. A senatorial commission, headed by Scipio’s cousin Pomponius, was sent to conduct an enquiry. Pleminius was condemned, but when the court began to investigate Scipio’s Hellenic manner of life, he skilfully turned the tables by impressing them with his own military preparations. The Board, which had come to criticize, remained to bless, and in the spring of 204 the expeditionary force, numbering perhaps 30,000 men, set sail for Africa amid great enthusiasm.

  Scipio landed according to plan at Porto Farina near Utica, which he hoped to capture as a base. He was soon joined by Masinissa and his cavalry, the young Numidian prince with whom he had wisely negotiated in Spain, but not by Syphax, whom Hasdrubal had won to the Carthaginian cause by giving him his beautiful daughter Sophonisba in marriage. After a slight cavalry success Scipio advanced to Utica and encamped on the hill behind the town. Meanwhile Carthage in alarm prepared for a siege and sent out desperate appeals for help to Syphax and Hasdrubal; the latter’s son, Hanno, was busy recruiting. But Masinissa decoyed Hanno’s squadron past some hills to the south-west of Utica at the Tower of Agathocles, while Scipio lay ambushed behind them. Suddenly Scipio’s troops burst forth over a flat saddle of the hills and fell on Hanno’s flank, while Masinissa wheeled round and attacked in front. After this victory Scipio pressed forward the siege of Utica by land and sea, but winter came on and the town still resisted. Threatened by Hasdrubal and Syphax, Scipio withdrew for the winter to a sharp headland projecting into the sea which was later known as the Castra Cornelia.

  The first season’s campaign had been somewhat unspectacular and Scipio was driven to an awkward position. His initial caution, however, was quite justified and has been compared with that of Gustavus Adolphus when he landed in Germany. He had wisely refused to contemplate an attack on Carthage before winning an adequate base. During the winter Syphax attempted to negotiate peace on the terms that Carthage should evacuate Italy, and the Romans Africa. Though Scipio had no intention of accepting conditions which would offer Rome no compensation for all her sufferings, he prolonged negotiations in order that his envoys might pay frequent visits to the enemy’s quarters and obtain detailed topographical information, for Syphax and Hasdrubal were encamped during the winter on two adjacent hills; these formed the southern termination of the ridge which in the north ended at the Castra Cornelia, some six miles away.

  In the spring of 203 Scipio broke off negotiations and renewed the blockade of Utica. When the enemies’ suspicions were lulled, he launched an attack as sudden as his dash on Cartagena. One night he marched under cover of the hills against the enemies’ camps, which he learnt were made of osier and reed. While he himself held back, Masinissa surrounded Syphax’ camp and Laelius set fire to it. When the Carthaginians in Hasdrubal’s camp, thinking the fire was accidental, rushed out to help, Scipio fell on this camp also. The two enemy leaders escaped, but a large part of their armies was destroyed. Polybius believed that no other disaster, even if exaggerated, could compare with the horror of this night. For the Romans success was complete. Instead of being confined to a narrow peninsula, Scipio had taken the offensive and with practically no loss had crushed superior forces.

  At Carthage alarm prevailed, for Scipio was not only renewing the siege of Utica but now commanded the open country. Yet the bolder counsels of the war party predominated and it was decided to recruit a fresh army out of Scipio’s reach. Within a month of the disaster Hasdrubal and Syphax had mustered some 20,000 men at the Great Plains (near Souk el Kremis) on the upper reaches of the Bagradas, seventy-five miles from Utica. They were still gathering strength in the quiet of the desert when suddenly Scipio struck. Leaving part of his army to continue the siege of Utica, he set out with some 12,000 men in light marching order, and in five days camped opposite the enemy. Trusting in their superior numbers and local knowledge the Carthaginians unwisely determined to fight; guerrilla tactics would have been safer. Thinking that they had Scipio within their grasp, they advanced to battle, with their Celtiberian mercenaries in the centre, the Carthaginians on the right wing, the Numidians on the left. Scipio placed his infantry in the centre in the usual three lines
, the Italian cavalry on the right wing, Masinissa’s horse on the left. At the first encounter the enemy’s wings gave way and exposed the flanks of the centre which stood firm. Under cover of the first line the two rear lines of the Romans turned into column, half to right and half to left, and marched out to encircle the Celtiberians, who were cut to pieces. It was a great tactical victory. Not only were Scipio’s troops more flexible, but he had used his legionaries (not merely the cavalry) to outflank the foe; at the same time the enemy’s centre was not merely held at bay, as at Ilipa, but was actually engaged. Scipio could now do what Hannibal had done at Cannae; he had trained an army to meet the master tactician.