A History of the Roman World

by Scullard, H. H.

  6. DELENDA EST CARTHAGO

  The African question had long evoked much thought at Rome, until out of ugly suspicions and rumours of war there gradually crystallized two opposing policies. As is well known, whenever Cato was asked his opinion in the Senate he used with untiring importunity to add: ‘I am also of the opinion that Carthage should cease to exist.’ He is also said to have emphasized the dangerous proximity of Carthage by dramatically displaying in the House a ripe fig which he declared had been gathered at Carthage only three days before. But while the old man, obsessed with this one idea, was inciting the warmongers, P. Cornelius Scipio Nasica, a noble of considerable weight who had twice been consul, supported the Carthaginian cause, traditionally on the ground that fear of a strong political rival was a salutary discipline for Rome; but his motives are more likely to be found in a different political outlook combined with a more generous spirit. Neither party immediately gathered enough strength to win a political victory, and the scales remained balanced: in 152 Cato could arbitrate against Carthaginian interests, while the next year Nasica forced Masinissa to draw in his horns. But suddenly the Carthaginians threw themselves into the scales – on the wrong side. By attacking Masinissa they had given their foes in Rome the pretext they were seeking. And amid the cries of ‘Punica fides’ which rang so pleasantly in Cato’s ears, the more generous voice of Nasica was drowned.

  The cause of the Third Punic War was, as Appian rightly states, the infringement of the Zama treaty by Carthage when she attacked Masinissa. Livy, following the patriotic efforts of Roman annalists to justify their city, declares that Carthage had prepared for war against Rome since 154 and that the Senate was very long-suffering. But if Roman ambassadors or spies saw hoards of munitions in Carthage, these were being prepared to settle accounts with Masinissa, not with Rome. There were, however, causes more deep seated than the juridical case which Rome used as a mere pretext. Some have supposed that economic factors were at work; but the view that commercial jealousy affected Rome’s policy and that the Senate was influenced by vested interests has not met with favour. Political motives, however, were more potent. During his visit to Africa, Cato had been deeply impressed by the apparent prosperity of Carthage; he feared a possible revival of Rome’s old enemy, especially when by paying the last instalment of the war indemnity in 151 the Carthaginians were seemingly less dependent on their conqueror. But the need for precautions against a Punic revanche were reinforced by misgivings about the growing strength of Masinissa, who having encircled Carthage might next covet the city itself. Suppose that the new Numidian kingdom, which had already upset the balance of power in Africa, should absorb Carthage, and that Masinissa, no longer content to play the role of watch-dog, should begin to growl at his master. Fear and hatred increased at Rome and men only awaited the opportunity.18

  Nor had this been long delayed. By attacking Masinissa the Carthaginians gave the war party in Rome a pretext, a justa causa. Learning that troops were being levied in Italy they hastily condemned their military leaders to death, and then sent to Rome to complain of Masinissa and to shift the blame on to the shoulders of the condemned leaders. At this a Senator bluntly asked why they had not condemned the officers at the beginning of the war. On asking how they could atone, the Carthaginians were told that they must satisfy the Roman people, but the nature of this satisfaction was not defined, so that while Carthage debated Rome completed her preparations. Early in 149 Utica deserted Carthage and surrendered unconditionally to Rome. War was declared on Carthage, and a force of perhaps 80,000 men crossed to Utica: M’. Manilius, a well-known orator, commanded the land forces, while his philosophically-minded colleague, L. Marcius Censorinus, was in charge of the fleet. Among the military tribunes was P. Cornelius Scipio Aemilianus, who three years later destroyed Carthage. Meanwhile, when five deputies arrived in Rome to announce that the Carthaginians had decided that their only hope of safety lay in unconditional surrender, they found that war had been declared and that the consuls had already sailed.

  By this formal act of surrender (deditio) Carthage had atoned for her breach of the Zama treaty and thus deprived the war party in Rome of any excuse for prosecuting hostilities. But at the same time she had put herself completely at the mercy of the Romans: she had given them a blank cheque, and if they cared to insert ‘delenda est Carthago’ she could hardly complain. But it was the calculating and almost diabolic manner in which the Roman diplomats played their cards that roused the passion of the Carthaginians and the disgust of a large part of the civilized world. For in the Senate the Punic ambassadors were told that they would be allowed to retain their freedom, laws, territory and other property, both public and private, provided that they surrendered three hundred noble hostages and obeyed ‘such commands as should be imposed on them by the consuls’. It was significant, as a certain Mago pointed out at Carthage, that no reference was made to the city, but it was too late to retract, and the hostages were duly handed over. Still keeping their real mission secret the consuls demanded the surrender of all arms and weapons; 200,000 panoplies and about 2,000 catapults were obediently given up, though the Carthaginians ventured to point out that they could not protect themselves against their erstwhile general Hasdrubal who had escaped execution and had collected 20,000 troops. The grim reply was that Rome would provide. Next, thirty leading citizens were ordered to go to Rome to hear the Senate’s final orders. At long last the consuls announced the Senate’s decision: the inhabitants must evacuate Carthage, which would be destroyed; the could settle where they liked provided that it was ten miles from the sea.

  The Romans had skilfully attained their object, whether Carthage submitted or not. For if she refused she would thereby break the agreement made at the moment of her deditio and thus give them the legitimate excuse to proceed by force of arms. That Rome was technically correct is probable; she had skilfully used two pretexts, the infringement of the Zama treaty and of the act of deditio, to enforce her will. True, there might be room for more than one interpretation, the Romans regarding the act of deditio as a unilateral agreement, the Carthaginians as a bilateral. But nothing except the plea of expediency can excuse the deceit with which Rome first obtained hostages, then disarmed the city and only finally announced her real intentions. The shrewd historian Polybius, who was indirectly involved, shows clearly by his conduct that he regarded the surrender of Carthage as the end of the war; but he misjudged either the intention of the Senate or the fury of the Semite.

  7. THE FALL OF CARTHAGE

  Carthage with magnificent, if blind, resolve refused to submit. When the Roman consuls had sternly rejected an eloquent appeal for mercy, voiced by Banno, all the pent-up passions of hate and fear and despair were let loose in the city. Amid scenes of wild confusion the gates were closed and the walls manned. The slaves were freed and two generals elected: the exiled Hasdrubal was prevailed upon to forget the past, while the defence of the city was entrusted to another Hasdrubal, a grandson of Masinissa. A request for a month’s truce was rejected by the Romans. Within the city all toiled night and day, the very temples being used as workshops for the manufacture of fresh arms. The walls were strengthened, supplies were received from Hasdrubal who controlled the open country, and though most coastal cities rebelled like Utica, the subject Libyans remained loyal. For some time the consuls waited patiently for the unarmed city to surrender. Meanwhile Masinissa caused slight anxiety. It was a grandson of his that was organizing the defence of Carthage, and the king himself, who saw the fruit of his ambitions now snatched from his grasp, was somewhat cold when asked for assistance; when later he proffered it, he was told abruptly that the Romans would let him know when they needed help.

  At length Manilius and Censorinus moved against the city with their army and navy (summer 149). But they found that they had a harder nut to crack than they had anticipated. The walls of Carthage were well-nigh impregnable and her natural position was very strong. The city lay on the southern half of a peninsu
la which projects from the west into the Gulf of Tunis; its northern flank is protected by steep hills. South of these hills were the suburbs of the city, called Megara, then the Byrsa hill on which lay the citadel, next the lower ground with the market place and harbours, and finally beyond the southern walls a sandy spit of land which formed a bar across the inland lake of Tunis. The isthmus connecting the peninsula with the mainland was narrow, and across it ran the triple fortifications of the western wall of the city, which was forty-five feet high and thirty-three broad.19 On the north of this isthmus Manilius encamped in order to cut off reinforcements from the interior, while Censorinus was stationed with the fleet on its southern shore by the lake of Tunis. After a vain assault from this isthmus, a regular blockade was instituted, but in the summer the unhealthiness of the stagnant lake forced Censorinus to move across the sand-bar to the sea, where his fleet was damaged by the Carthaginians. After he had returned to Rome to hold the elections, the enemy attacked by night the camp of his isolated colleague, Manilius, and the situation was only retrieved by the skill of Scipio.

  Scipio again displayed conspicuous ability when during the winter Manilius led two unsuccessful expeditions against the Carthaginian forces near Nepheris, some twenty miles south-east of Tunis. He was once again in the limelight when the aged Masinissa, now on the point of death, asked that the grandson of his friend Africanus should arrange the future of his kingdom; Scipio decided to divide Numidia between the king’s three sons and thereby averted the danger which a united Numidia had presented. Trusting in his increasing fame and popularity, Scipio then returned to Rome to seek office, while the consul of 148, L. Calpurnius Piso, with the admiral L. Hostilius Mancinus, arrived in Africa to take over the command. Warned by their predecessors’ failures against Hasdrubal and Carthage, they attacked the towns which still remained loyal to Carthage, but they achieved little. Consequently the Carthaginians regained confidence: they were in touch with the Mauri in the west and with the pretender Andriscus in Macedonia (p. 260), while Masinissa’s sons were no longer sending help to the Romans. Further, Mancinus had got into difficulties. Having landed on the coast north of Carthage, near Sidi bou Saïd, he had penetrated into the suburb Megara, but was cut off in a perilous position. His urgent dispatches to Utica for help arrived only just in time. Scipio, who had that very evening returned to Africa, succeeded in rescuing him the next day.

  In Rome there was such dissatisfaction with the conduct of the war that when Scipio intended to stand for the curule aedileship, he was nominated and elected consul by the people on account of his military record, though he was under the legal age and had not held the praetorship. The opposition of the consul in charge was swept aside by a tribune, and when Scipio’s colleague C. Livius Drusus demanded that the provinces should be allocated by lot, another tribune intervened. As at the election of his adoptive grandfather, the constitution had to give place to the will of the people; like the Spartans after Leuctra they said: ‘Let the laws sleep today.’ Even old Cato went so far as to quote Homer and praise a Scipio by bluntly admitting that Aemilianus was ‘the only sage among the flitting shades’. Among the companions who accompanied the new consul to Africa were the historian Polybius and the younger Laelius, whose father had accompanied the elder Africanus.

  On his arrival in Africa, which was not a moment too soon to rescue Mancinus, Scipio at once determined to starve out the beleaguered city by an unbroken blockade. But while he was busy re-establishing the lax discipline of his army, Hasdrubal, who had been recalled, had taken up a strong position on the isthmus before the western wall of the city. Scipio encamped opposite; then in order to win control of the isthmus, and thus to cut off Carthage from the mainland, he made a night attack on the north-west corner of the walls. Some 4,000 men penetrated into Megara; this caused such a panic that Hasdrubal hastily fled from his advanced post into the city (spring 147). Scipio, his immediate object thus achieved, extricated his men from the suburb, where they were finding the ground very difficult, and then constructed a double line of earthworks right across the isthmus, close to the city wall. Hasdrubal’s only reply was to mutilate his Roman prisoners and throw them from the walls.

  Carthage was now entirely cut off from supplies by land, but occasionally a ship succeeded in running the blockade by sea. To complete his cordon Scipio established his fleet and many soldiers on the sand-bar south of the city; from here he began to construct a mole out to sea across the entrance of the Punic harbour. When the Carthaginians saw this work progressing they feverishly built fifty warships from old material and cut a new channel from the inner harbour eastwards to the sea. The high walls around the arsenal screened their actions, so that the Romans were astounded to see this new fleet put to sea. The Punic commanders, however, foolishly waited to test its quality instead of taking the Romans by surprise. Three days later an engagement was fought off the harbour; the Romans finally prevailed, while the enemy either tried to re-enter the narrow entrance of their harbour or else were driven on to the quay and destroyed. After a desperate fight Scipio established himself on the quay where he fortified a position commanding the harbours. Carthage was now completely surrounded. Her last hope was thwarted during the winter when Scipio defeated a small force at Nepheris and captured the town. The Libyan tribes hastened to surrender to Rome. The final agony of Carthage was at hand.

  In the spring of 146 Scipio gave orders for the final assault. While Hasdrubal fired the southern part of the harbour where he expected the attack, Laelius succeeded in piercing the wall further north on the seaward side of the inner harbour. Hence he advanced to the marketplace, while the defenders fled to the Byrsa hill. For six days and nights the Romans fought their way step by step up the hillside amid the houses which they burned and destroyed one after another. On the seventh day the citadel surrendered and 50,000 men and women came forth to slavery. A final stand was made in the temple of Esmun by 900 Roman deserters, together with Hasdrubal’s wife, who, unlike her husband, disdained surrender and perished amid the flames of the temple. For ten more days the fires of Carthage burned; the ruins were razed; a plough was drawn over the site; salt was sown in the furrows; a solemn curse was pronounced against its future rebirth; Carthage had been destroyed.

  The cities which had remained loyal to Carthage were destroyed; those, like Utica, which had embraced the cause of Rome, were declared free and received territorial concessions. The rest of the land which Carthage had controlled at the beginning of the war was made into the new Roman province of Africa, the boundaries of which were marked out by a vast fosse. His work done, Scipio Aemilianus returned to Rome to celebrate his triumph and to follow the example of his grandfather by adopting the name of Africanus (Minor).

  The fall of Carthage evoked varied comments in the Greek world. Some men commended the Romans for their statesmanlike policy in removing a perpetual menace; others believed that they had been corrupted by lust for power. Some contrasted the earlier civilized methods of Roman policy with their present stratagems and deceits; others again denied that they were guilty of treachery or injustice. But few can read the account of the fall of Carthage given by Appian, who followed Polybius closely, without a feeling that Rome also had fallen from her pristine greatness. Rome’s conduct may have been juridically correct, but she was forgetting those moral qualities which had made her great. Even the order to abandon the city of Carthage might have been anticipated, for others such as the people of Falerii and Ligurian and Spanish tribes had been moved from their homes; and as Rome itself was more than ten miles from its port, the agriculturally-minded Senators would be less prepared to consider that the future they proposed for Carthage was unduly severe. It was rather the callous and calculating way in which the order was enforced, together with the nervous bullying which had originally goaded Carthage into retaliating against Masinissa, that casts a shadow over Rome’s good name. The horrors of the siege excite pity, but they are not unparalleled in the history of the ancient world. Sci
pio might weep over the burning city, but his thoughts were rather brooding over the mutability of human affairs and the possible fate of his own city as he quoted the lines of Homer:

  MAP IV

  That day shall be when holy Troy shall fall

  And Priam, lord of spears, and Priam’s folk.

  And though, in another poet’s vision, Hannibal had arisen to avenge Dido, the fall of Carthage was not avenged and Scipio’s fatalistic fears were not realized until centuries later the Vandal brought the Imperial City to her knees; and then the flourishing Carthago rediviva of the Empire followed her imperial mistress under the spear of the barbarian.

  XV

  ROMAN POLICY AND THE GOVERNMENT

  The real government of Rome during the second century was the Senate, the instrument of the nobility, whose power rested on custom and not on law. We must first consider what policy this governing authority pursued in home affairs, towards the old Confederacy; and secondly, its foreign policy and provincial administration. Then we must examine the basis of the power of this senatorial oligarchy, its control of all branches of public life, the cliques into which it was divided, and the tendencies which these represented.

  1. HOME POLICY

  By the Lex Claudia of 218 (p. 169) senators were forbidden to own ships other than small ones to transport the produce of their estates. A sharp distinction was drawn between land and trade, between the governing and commercial classes. A senator could get round the law by allowing his freedmen to trade for him or by loans on bottomry, but in the main the distinction remained real. During the strain of the Hannibalic War the government, which relied largely on private enterprise for supplies, had to excuse from military service three companies of nineteen men who supplied the Spanish army on credit (215). Two of the contractors scuttled their ships, which had been filled with rubbish, and demanded compensation from the state which had undertaken responsibility for sea-risks. Despite the Senate’s desire to maintain unity at home, two tribunes brought a capital charge against them; during their trial their fellow-contractors rioted and used violence. The war thus helped to make the commercial classes conscious of their unity and importance.