A History of the Roman World

by Scullard, H. H.

  The protectorate system gradually broke down in Greece, and ties of friendship and temporary alliance soon hardened into permanent alliance, which meant Roman leadership in external affairs. After 187 Roman policy deteriorated, but even after Pydna an attempt was made to patch up the old system. The Romans tried to uphold a protectorate in Macedonia, as in Illyria, by deposing the king and breaking up national unity. But their brutal treatment of Aetolia and Epirus revealed their attitude. The punishment of Corinth showed clearly what a Roman protectorate meant when the Greeks still refused to set their own house in order. In Spain too, methods of policy deteriorated. Neither of the two departures from the protectorate system, the formation of the provinces of Macedonia and Africa, was caused by the desire to annex. In Macedonia, where Roman patience was exhausted, annexation seemed the only method of securing peace; local conditions were changed as little as possible. The destruction of Carthage was caused by misplaced jealousy and fear. The creation of the province was a measure of self-protection, whether necessary or not. Only some 5,000 square miles were annexed, of which a large part was assigned to seven free cities which paid no taxes to Rome. Indeed, the Romans seemed desirous of maintaining a protectorate system wherever possible, as later, after the Jugurthine War. The policy of annexation was due less to the senatorial nobility than to the military captains of the last century of the Republic. But protection meant in fact control. Equal alliance and friendship could not be maintained between two parties of such different weight. The kings of Asia Minor were virtually client kings. It has been seen that Rome was slow to intervene in the east and that the initiative was often taken by the Greeks themselves, but insensibly the Romans came to dominate their friends and allies as effectively as their subjects; and the fault belonged as much to the suicidal folly of the Greeks and to the deterioration and weakness of the east, as to Rome. But to measure the decline in Rome’s policy it is only necessary to consider first the brave declaration of freedom to Greece in 196, and then the smouldering ashes of Corinth, Carthage and Numantia, or the crowd of princes and envoys that waited obsequiously in the lobby of the Senate-house.

  The change in Roman policy is sometimes attributed to the growth of a capitalist class in whose commercial interests Rhodes was humbled in 167 and Corinth and Carthage were sacked in 146. Little evidence can be found in support of such a proposition.9 The stipulation in Rome’s treaty with Ambracia in 189 requiring exemption from port dues appears unusual; the clause in the constitution of the Macedonian Republics, restricting the exportation of timber and the importation of salt, was probably designed to protect Macedon; the request of Rhodes in 169 for permission to buy grain in Sicily may imply some control by the Senate over the Sicilian market, but even supposing such control was permanent, it was more probably exercised for political than for commercial motives. The Romans declared Delos a free port when handing it over to Athenian control; their motive, however, was probably political, to punish Rhodes, and the inscriptional evidence shows that, although Italian merchants benefited, Orientals benefited still more. The destruction of Corinth aided Delos, but the Romans would hardly have undertaken its destruction to benefit Italian merchants so indirectly; and the motives which led to the overthrow of Carthage were probably political. The Romans took few measures to aid their merchants and did not trouble to keep the seas free from pirates. Many Italians went to the provinces to seek their fortune in trade or business, partly because of agricultural depression in Italy; a capitalist class was created; and trade followed the flag. But there is little evidence to show that such classes were influential enough to mould Roman policy or to shape the political decisions of the Senate. The equites and the merchants of southern Italy reaped, but it was the Senate that sowed.

  Roman policy, guided by political rather than commercial or economic motives, deteriorated partly because of an increasing tendency to exploit the provinces and theatres of war.10 In theory the burden imposed on the provincials was not severe; as a general rule, instead of giving their lifeblood like the Italian allies, they merely paid some form of tax, either a tithe as in Sicily or a fixed tribute (stipendium) as in Spain, Africa and Macedon. Notwithstanding the Spanish mines, it is doubtful whether the revenue from Spain paid for the cost of occupation, and in such warlike provinces the task of administration must often have seemed thankless. The annexation of Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica was advantageous since they were fairly peaceful and supplied the Roman market with corn. But while in theory the administration might be beneficial to Rome and fair to the provincials, in practice much depended on the character of the governor, who with the tax-collectors could fleece the provinces if he wished. It must be remembered that his position was unpaid, that he had had to bear the cost of reaching office and that, if a praetor, he was probably hoping to obtain the consulship on his return to Rome. Roman society was becoming more luxurious and a political career involved increasing expense. The Senate in theory discountenanced cruelty or oppression in the provinces, since disorders caused trouble and expense; but in fact the governor, far from its watchful eye, had to be allowed considerable rope – and he did not often hang himself. Further, it would increase his future electioneering prospects if he adopted a lenient attitude towards the Italian merchants and businessmen who invaded the provinces, and to whom, whether as individuals or as partners in, or agents of companies, the Roman government found it convenient to farm the collection of harbour dues and the tax on pasturage. In the provinces that paid a fixed stipendium, which could have been collected direct by the governor’s quaestor, publicani were still able to collect the secondary taxes and the revenues from public lands and mines; they could also do business for local governing bodies which were responsible for the collection of taxes. A governor would seldom wish to offend the agents of the great companies at Rome.

  Thus, although the provincial system was theoretically fairly sound, it was open to abuse by unscrupulous governors. The abuses increased in the years after 146 until they reached their climax in the governorship of a Verres, but that they were not unknown in the earlier part of the second century is clear from the appeal of the unhappy Spaniards in 171. Little was done to counter the disgrace until, by a Lex Calpurnia de repetundis in 149, a permanent court was established to try cases of extortion. Jurors were empanelled by the praetor from the Senate and the court was more expeditious than the cumbersome tribal assembly; yet as corrupt governors were judged by members of their order, the verdict might not always be unbiased. But there was a brighter side to the picture; extortion, at any rate during the earlier part of Rome’s imperial career, was the exception rather than the rule, and most magistrates were men of honour. Polybius wrote that ‘if a single talent is entrusted to a Greek statesman, ten auditors, as many seals and twice as many witnesses are required for the security of the bond, yet even so faith is not observed; while a Roman official or diplomat who handles vast sums of money keeps faith through the mere moral obligation of the oath he has sworn… amongst the Romans the corrupt official is as rare as the financier with clean hands among other people’ (vi, 56; he also admits a deterioration of Roman character, xviii, 35; xxxi, 25).

  3. THE SENATORIAL OLIGARCHY

  In the classic description of the Roman constitution in his sixth book, Polybius concludes that it contained three fundamental principles, monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, which were excellently mingled and balanced: the consuls represented regal power, the Senate aristocratic, and the people democratic. (Polybius, vi, 11–18. One may compare the English Cabinet vis-à-vis the Crown, Lords and Commons.) Such was the theoretical distribution of power, but in fact it was the Senate that drove the chariot of state and seldom did the magistrates or people try to kick over the traces. The Senate had come out of the Hannibalic War with flying colours and its functions widened with the extended scope of Roman policy. The increasing complication of judicial affairs could have been met by establishing paid jurymen from the people, as at Athens, but instead the peop
le allowed the Senate to appoint judicial commissions to deal with matters that concerned the safety of the state and to supply the jury when the first quaestio perpetua was established. The Senate’s control of the chief military commands, of finance and of foreign policy, was unquestioned till the time of Tiberius Gracchus; any objections raised by the people, as when they refused to declare war on Philip in 200, were generally overruled. It also took over from the people the right to prorogue a magistrate’s command, and occasionally it dispensed with the use of sortition in assigning duties to magistrates. The extent of its powers will be seen best by considering its relations with the people and with the magistrates.

  Between the Lex Hortensia of 287, which had asserted the sovereign authority of the Roman people, and the close of the Hannibalic War, the voice of the people was heard occasionally. The democratic leaders of the new nobility may have urged the people to decide on the Mamertine alliance, while part of the Senate procrastinated, and the people stiffened up the terms imposed on Carthage after Aegates Insulae. The popular leader Flaminius enjoyed a striking career despite senatorial hostility, and when the Hannibalic War broke out the people were inclined to question the leadership of the Senate and to elevate their own nominees to command the armies. Flaminius, Minucius Rufus and Terentius Varro were not perhaps the military fools that the aristocratic tradition has depicted, but they were unfortunate. After their defeats the people acquiesced in the Senate’s direction of the war and only once again expressed their will forcibly, this time more wisely, by electing Scipio Africanus to the Spanish command. The prestige which the Senate thus won by its conduct of the war remained unshaken in the next century. The people were now willing to acquiesce, since their own representatives, the tribunes, could keep an eye on proceedings in the Senate. Also much of the legislation of the second century was carried through the tribal assembly by tribunes; this was due partly to the frequent absence of the consuls abroad, but it had the effect of keeping the people busy and giving them the impression that they were the main legislative body, whereas probably most of the measures had already been shaped in the Senate. Until the end of the Spanish wars little protest was heard from the people.

  Beside encroaching on the judicial and indirectly on the legislative functions of the people, the Senate also won over their magistrates. The tribunes, who had originally been outside the Senate, were gradually absorbed into it and became an instrument of the senatorial oligarchy, for among the ten there would normally be some partisans of the Senate. They gained the right, perhaps by the Lex Hortensia, of convoking the Senate, and they gradually became in effect magistrates of the populus and not merely of the plebs, the office being held between the quaestorship and praetorship; thus a tribune, Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, intervened at the trial of the Scipios to help one of the old patrician families. One function of the tribune was that of public prosecutor. But the Senate, jealous of outstanding personalities, was often quite as interested as the people in calling magistrates to book, so that in the second century we find tribunes undertaking prosecutions in their own or senatorial interests rather than on behalf of the people. As cliques developed within the Senate, members of one faction would use this method to attack their rivals; Cato, for instance, is said to have been prosecuted forty-four times and he probably returned blow for blow by using the services of tribunes. Such prosecutions would often be dropped during the proceedings when once the political object had been attained, and generally some tribune could be found to veto his fellow. Another symptom of the decline of the tribunate was the use made of it by ambitious young men, who, lacking other means of attracting notice, would attack prominent men for personal or party ends, and so gain notoriety and impress the electorate. Occasionally tribunes may have tried to oppose the will of the Senate; such an attempt may have led to the Lex Aelia et Fufia, which gave magistrates the right to obstruct plebeian assemblies by announcing unfavourable omens (obnuntiatio) (c. 150 BC). But in the main the tribunes had become tools of the Senate.11

  The war with Hannibal had two opposite results: it increased both the oligarchical power of the central administrative body, the Senate, and the dictatorial power of the executive magistrates. The need for continuity of command led to the suspension of the rule that forbade re-election to the consulship within ten years. During the war Q. Fabius Maximus, already twice consul, held the office three times (215, 214, 209), M. Claudius Marcellus four times (215, 214, 210, 208) and Q. Fulvius Flaccus twice (212, 209); they also held pro-magistracies. Even more revolutionary was the career of Scipio Africanus, who acted as proconsul in Spain for five years (210–206) and in Africa for three (204–201) and in the interval was consul (205); so that he was in command for ten consecutive years. Besides this threat to the annual magistracy, the principle of collegiality weakened; the complication of business involved a division of labour, and when regular governorships were established in the provinces collegiality abroad had disappeared in fact and in law. Indeed, the power of the consuls had grown immensely: they exercised semi-independent control in distant lands, they commanded large armies, they had to take decisions which determined the fate of countries, they dictated terms to subjects and allies. At home the use of the overriding power of the dictatorship had lapsed, so that the way was open for the ambitious general to aim at personal rule. But the kingly position won by Scipio Africanus after the battle of Zama engendered rivalry at home, and the jealous nobility found means to check the over-popular or over-ambitious general and to reduce genius to the level of mediocrity.

  There were many ways by which the influence of the magistrates could be checked. The use of lot in assigning provinces prevented an ambitious candidate from emphasizing to the electorate his suitability for a given appointment. There was a tendency to keep the consuls in Italy when possible and to use praetors and propraetors for duties abroad. True, the increase of provinces necessitated prorogation of command, and a further move was taken in that direction by the Lex Baebia which reduced the praetorships in alternate years from six to four, chiefly to allow praetors in Spain a longer command to avoid the waste of time caused by the long journey to and from Spain; this law was, however, quickly repealed. But prorogation did not become a danger because the Senate gradually took over from the people the right to decide the matter. Consequently, after 200 BC few commands were prolonged for more than one year; that of Flamininus (198–194) was exceptional. Similarly, the method of investing privati with imperium, which had been applied to Scipio Africanus and to his successors in Spain, was discontinued when the number of praetors was raised in 197. But the Senate’s strongest hold over the magistrates was gained by restricting re-election and establishing a fixed sequence of office. In the fourth century tenure of the consulship for two consecutive years and re-election to the same office within ten years had been forbidden, and before the Second Punic War it became necessary for a year to elapse between the tenure of the aedileship, praetorship and consulship. Though in wartime the rule had to be disregarded, a fixed order of office became customary. This was regulated by statute in 180, and a two-years’ inverval between offices probably was prescribed (Lex Villia Annalis).12 Office must be held in the following order: quaestorship, aedileship, praetorship, consulship. The aedile-ship was not an essential stage, but was sought after as it gave the chance of winning popularity with the mob by a lavish display of public games. The minimum age limit for office was also fixed, and ten years’ military service was a necessary qualification for the quaestorship; thus the consulship could not be reached before the age of thirty-four, or, if the aedileship had been held, of thirty-seven. Later the minimum age for the consulship was fixed at forty-two and re-election was forbidden (perhaps c. 150). Thus the Senate was able to curb undue ambition, and any danger to the constitution arising from the practical abolition of collegiality and from the powers of provincial commanders was averted.

  The Senate, the stronghold of the nobility, controlled not only the magistrates and people b
ut was itself controlled by an inner circle of nobles, the descendants of those who had held the consulship (or perhaps, in the third and early second centuries, any curule magistracy may have sufficed). Men outside this group might reach the quaestorship, but they seldom climbed much higher; when they succeeded in gaining a consulship they were acclaimed ‘new men’ (novi homines). The effective government was in the hands of some ten or twenty families. Of the 108 consuls between 200 and 146 BC only eight came from new families, and perhaps only four were strictly novi homines, two of whom were helped by aristocratic friends, Cato (195) by Valerius Flaccus, Glabrio (191) by the Scipios (the two others were Cn. Octavius, 165, and L. Mummius, 146). Sallust remarks that the nobility passed on the consulship from one to another.13 Of the 200 consuls who held office from 234 to 134 BC, 159 were members of twenty-six families, 99 of ten families. The old difference between patrician and plebeian had disappeared, and in 172 both consuls were plebeians for the first time, but a new exclusiveness had grown up. This was partly due no doubt to deliberate policy, but partly also to difficulties inherent in the nature of the Roman magistracy: a candidate must be wealthy and yet have no connection with trade, and it was difficult for him to attract the notice of the electorate if he was outside the charmed circle of noble families whose exploits were on all men’s lips.