A History of the Roman World

by Scullard, H. H.

  9 MILITARY IMPERIALISM. This was the view of Wilamowitz and of De Sanctis (SR, IV, i, 26) who made Scipio Africanus the prime mover. It has been revived more recently by E. Will (Hist. pol. du monde hellen., ii, 116 ff.), who however makes Sulpicius Galba, not Scipio, the villain. But see T. Frank, Roman Imperialism, ch. xiv and Amer. Hist. Review, 1912/13, xviii, 233 ff. and De Sanctis, 26, n. 58.

  10 PHILHELLENIC POLITICS. See G. Colin, Rome et la Grèce de 200 à 146 av. J. C. (1905); T. Frank, Roman Imperialism, ch. viii. Criticism by Holleaux, CAH, viii, 158 f.; E. Badian, Titus Quinctius Flamininus (1970).

  11 FEAR OF PHILIP AND/OR ANTIOCHUS. It has often been said, e.g. by Mommsen, that Rome’s desire for quiet neighbours was a cause of the war, yet Mommsen himself admits that Philip was not a real danger to Rome. However, others have judged differently: thus R. M. Errington (The Dawn of Empire (1971), ch. x and Athenaeum 1971, 338 ff.), who rejects the Syro-Macedonian pact, has emphasized alleged activity of Philip against some Illyrian territory and supposes that senatorial distrust or fear of Philip was the basic cause of the war.

  The relevance of Illyria is doubtful. At the conference of Nicaea in November 198 Flamininus ordered Philip to ‘hand over to the Romans those parts of Illyria of which he had become possessed since the Peace of Epirus’, i.e the Peace of Phoenice in 205 (Polybius, xvii, 1, 14; cf. Livy, xxxii, 33, 3). These places probably did not include the territory of the Parthini nor were they within the Roman protectorate (as Briscoe, Livy, xxxi–xxxiii, 54 f. argues). Rather, they will have been lands which had no previous connection with Rome (cf. Walbank, Polybius, ii, 551). There is no reference to encroachment in Illyria in the Roman ultimatum to Philip in 200, while attempts to find references to such places in the annalistic tradition are not conclusive (e.g. they need not (pace Briscoe, loc. cit.) be among the socii in Livy, xxx, 26, 2; cf. xxx, 42, 5; xxxi, 1, 9). The importance of Illyria in general has also been stressed by Badian: senators who knew Greece would realize that ‘Illyria would only be safe when Macedon had been humbled’ (Foreign Clientelae (1958), 66). Rome’s ultimatum was designed to this end, which could be achieved either peacefully if Philip accepted or by war if Philip rejected it. Without legal justification Rome extended her traditional practice, took her new Greek ‘friends’ under her protection, and delivered the ultimatum on their behalf, but in order to serve her own purpose which was conditioned by fear and hatred of Philip.

  Others prefer to stress fear of Antiochus (in combination with Philip) and accept the attractive theory of Holleaux, expounded in Rome, la Grèce et les monarchies hellénistiques au iii e siècle avant J.-C. (273–205) (1921) and in CAH, viii, 156 ff. (Holleaux’s papers are collected in Études d’épigraphie et d’histoire grecques, vols i–v (1938–57); see especially vol. iv, Rome, la Macédoine et l’Orient grecque). Holleaux argued that the effective cause of the war was the Senate’s sudden realization of this joint threat which was revealed when the Pergamene and Rhodian envoys reported the kings’ pact at Rome. Philip’s action in rebuilding his fleet (on this threat see G. T. Griffith, Cambr. Hist. J., 1935), with which he had gained Caria and the Rhodian Peraea and defeated the Rhodians at Lade, might well seem a direct threat to Rome, now that he was backed by Antiochus, and the possibility of a Syro-Macedonian invasion of Italy might appear foreshadowed. A. Passerini (Athenaeum, 1931, 542 ff.), who attempted to refute Holleaux’s theory, with less plausibility maintained that the Rhodian embassy emphasized the danger of Philip’s supposed intrigues with Carthage. The suddenness with which the Senate changed from an abrupt refusal of the good opportunity to intervene in Greece offered by the Aetolian embassy of 202 to an almost feverish effort to precipitate war two years later suggests the emergence of a critical new factor, and that is best explained as knowledge of the pact and fear of its implication.

  The Romans will have had a further grievance against Philip, if he had allowed Macedonian troops to support Hannibal in the battle of Zama as recorded by Livy (e.g. xxx, 33, 5; xxxi, 1, 9). These men however do not appear in Livy’s description of the battle itself, nor in that by Polybius (e.g. at xv, 11, 1). The tradition is supported by J. P. V. D. Balsdon, JRS, 1954, 34 f. and by J. Briscoe, Livy xxxi–xxxiii (1973), 55: Balsdon suggests that the Macedonum legio were mercenaries who were present in Carthage in 202 but did not take part in the battle. However, the story is likely to have been invented by Roman annalists who wanted to show that Rome’s hostile attitude to Philip in 201 was justified on account of his earlier alleged support of Hannibal.

  12 CAUSES OF THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR. Many suggested causes have been discussed above, but three recent general surveys may be mentioned here: B. Ferro, Le origini della II guerra macedonica (1960; on which see A. H. McDonald, JRS, 1963, 187 ff.); J. Briscoe, Commentary on Livy xxxi–xxxiii (1973), 36 ff. and R. Werner, ANRW, I, i, 501 ff. (with some preliminary discussion of imperialism in general; cf. L. Raditsa, ibid., 564 ff.); Briscoe naturally concentrates on the Livian tradition concerning Rome and Macedon in the years 205–200, which was severely attacked by Holleaux but has more recently found a champion in J. P. V. D. Balsdon (JRS, 1954, 30 ff.) who argues for its general reliability, but E. Badian (Foreign Clientelae, 62 ff.) has not been persuaded in general. Despite some weaknesses in it, Holleaux’s thesis is regarded as still the most satisfactory by F. W. Walbank in a valuable survey, ‘Polybius and Rome’s Eastern Policy’, JRS, 1963, 1 ff. In general Polybius, as expounded by Walbank, regarded Roman imperialism as the result of ‘natural’ ambition, sharing the common Greek idea that it is a natural tendency of imperial states to expand. This, combined with his belief in the intrusive activity of Tyche (Fortune, Chance, Providence?) sometimes led him to conclusions which conflicted with his rational analysis of motives and causes; when conflict arises we should follow Polybius’ detailed analyses rather than be misled by his superimposition of a general pattern which may be further from the truth. Cf. Walbank, Polybius (1972), 164 ff. and ‘Political Morality and the Friends of Scipio’, JRS, 1965, 1 ff.

  13 CLASS STRUGGLES IN GREECE. Fustel de Coulanges (Questions historiques (1893), 121 ff.) advanced the view that the upper classes in the Greek states supported Rome and that Rome’s varying policies in Greece were influenced by the internal class struggles there. This idea has been widely held, though challenged by A. Passerini (Athenaeum, 1933, 309 ff.). It is probably true that the Romans favoured the upper classes in general, but only if and when this did not impinge upon their own interests, which they often conceived as best served by the preservation of a balance of power during the incessant internal quarrels that vexed the Greek states. The ‘Greek resistance’ to Rome was obviously determined by those who at any given time had political control in their own individual cities or leagues. J. Deiniger, Der politische Widerstand gegen Rom in Griechenland 217–86 v. Chr. (1971), argues that until Pydna a pro- or anti-Roman policy was decided by internal rival political leaders with little reference to the desires of the people as a whole, whose influence was brought to bear only in the final Achaean revolt (147/6) when members of the upper class supported the lower. Though this view is perhaps too simple (cf. R. M. Errington, JRS, 1973, 249 f.; J. Briscoe, Cl. Rev., 1974, 258 ff.), the relevant ancient evidence is usefully collected. Cf. also p. 515 n. 14 below.

  14 THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR. See Kromayer, Schlachtfelder, ii, De Sanctis, SR, IV, i, F. W. Walbank, Philip V (1940). On Philip’s strategy cf. Kromayer, 3 ff., De Sanctis, 44 ff.

  15 THE CAMPAIGNS OF 200–198. See the three works cited in previous note, together with N. G. L. Hammond, JRS, 1966, 39 ff., for various views of the topography, especially of the Aoüs valley. For the campaign of 198 see also A. M. Eckstein, Phoenix, 1976, 119 ff., who limits Flamininus’ military and diplomatic skill and thinks that he turned south-east after Aoüs for reasons of supply not of diplomacy.

  16 FLAMININUS’ TERMS. Cf. T. Frank, Roman Imperialism (1914), 161, n. 29. Since the terms were more sweeping than those offered in 200, Flamininus could hardly have ma
de these additions on his own initiative.

  17 FLAMININUS. Polybius was fairly critical of Flamininus, and Livy suppresses some of these criticisms. Various assessments of Flamininus’ policy and ambitions have been reached: see H. H. Scullard, Roman Politics, 220–150 BC, edn 2, (1973), index s.v. Quinctius; J. P. V. D. Balsdon, Phoenix, 1967, 177 ff.; E. Badian, Titus Quinctius Flamininus: Philhellenism and Realpolitik (1970, University of Cincinnati); J. Briscoe, Latomus, 1972, 22 ff. and Commentary on Livy xxxi–xxxiii (1973), 22 ff. For his family and early career, Badian, JRS, 1971, 102 ff. Balsdon is more favourably disposed to Flamininus than is Badian, who thinks that on occasion he was ready to sacrifice principle and even Rome’s interests to his own personal ambitions (though he emphasizes that Flamininus should be judged by the standards of his own day). Badian’s study is an astringent corrective to attempts to ‘whitewash’ Flamininus; he would even question the extent of Flamininus’ personal culture. But however much or little Flamininus shared Greek culture, he certainly showed respect for it and this must have helped his dealings with the Greeks, even though few would now suppose that his policy was based on ‘sentimental’ philhellenism.

  18 CYNOSCEPHALAE. De Sanctis (SR, IV, i, 86 n.) roughly follows W. M. Leake (Travels in Northern Greece, iv (1835), 457) who places the site between Sulpi and Dulvatan: Kromayer places it some six miles further west. See also Walbank, Polybius, ii, 576 ff. and W. K. Pritchett, Studies in Ancient Greek Topography, vol. ii (1969), 133 ff.

  19 DANGER FROM THE NORTH. This threat is minimized by Holleaux, CAH, viii, 177.

  20 THE AETOLIAN CLAIMS. When the Aetolians asked for the return of four cities which Philip was willing to concede, Flamininus contended that three of them could not be handed back according to the terms of the Romano-Aetolian treaty of 211 (see p. 499 n. 16 above) which he claimed they had abrogated by making a separate peace in 206: even if the treaty was still valid, he asserted that their request contradicted its terms. The issues are uncertain and Flamininus may have been guilty of sharp practice, but in any case his refusal naturally angered the Aetolians, who had played an important part in the battle of Cynoscephalae.

  21 PEACE. Polybius, xviii, 33–9; 44 ff.; Livy, xxxiii, 11–13; Plutarch, Flam., 9. See especially De Sanctis, SR, IV, i, 90 ff. Livy, (xxxiii, 30, 6) adds that Philip’s armaments were limited and that he was not to engage in foreign wars without Rome’s consent. This is probably an annalistic invention to try to justify Rome’s interference later: see E. Taübler, Imperium Romanum, i (1913), 230.

  XII ROME AND ANTIOCHUS

  1 GREEK CITIES IN ASIA MINOR. On the Greek cities of Asia Minor and on Rome’s treatment of them see D. Magie, Roman Rule in Asia Minor (1950), especially ch. iv and the Notes in vol. ii where many matters are discussed in detail relevant to the present and following chapters. See also E. Badian, ‘Rome, and Antiochus: a study in Cold War’ (Cl. Phil., 1959, 81 ff. = Studies in Greek and Roman History (1964), 112 ff.). The annalistic tradition (Livy, xxxii, 8; 27) that Attalus appealed to Rome against Antiochus’ invasion in 198 has been rejected by Holleaux (Klio, 1908, 273 ff.), but is defended by Bickermann (Hermes, 1932, 47) and Badian (Cl. Phil., 1959, 82 f.).

  2 ROME AND THE AUTONOMY OF GREEK CITIES. When the Romans based their policy of intervention in Greece upon a proclamation of ‘freedom’ for the Greek cities, they were using a word with a long and somewhat ambiguous history. Freedom or autonomy had been a catchword of the kings who succeeded Alexander the Great. Although in theory it meant complete sovereignty (and in practice it sometimes did, as at Rhodes), it often in fact involved only a privileged status granted to cities by kings rather than real independence. Theoretically it involved the continuance of the city’s constitution, the absence of a garrison and immunity from regular taxation, but in practice it generally fell short of such concessions (cf. e.g. ‘those of the autonomous cities which formerly paid tribute to Antiochus,’ Polybius, xxi, 46). It was this royal conception of freedom in the main that Rome adopted vis-à-vis the cities of the Hellenistic world (cf. A. H. M. Jones, Anatolian Studies presented to W. H. Buckler, 103 ff.).

  That intervention on the principle of autonomy was justified was not denied by e.g. Philip of Macedon. At a meeting of the Achaean League (200–199) he counterattacked Roman charges not by refusing to admit the validity of such intervention in principle, but by asserting that the Romans had no right to act upon such a principle in view of their treatment of the Italian Confederacy, especially of Rhegium, Tarentum and Capua. To this charge the Roman envoy put up a spirited reply (see Livy, xxxi, 29–31).

  Rome’s claim to extend this principle to the Greek cities of Asia Minor (cf. p. 260) was complicated by the fact that so many of these cities had at one time or another been subjected to foreign conquerors (e.g. Persia) and had temporarily been robbed of their freedom; in particular the political relationship of these autonomous cities to the kings of Syria has formed the subject of much discussion. Their status of freedom has sometimes been interpreted as a grant dependent upon the unilateral act of the monarch, and hence revocable and to be renewed at each accession: it was based on the conqueror’s right to dispose of ‘territory won by the spear’ (cf. E. Bickermann, Institutions des Séleucides, 106 f., 133 f.; Hermes, lxvii, 50 ff.; M. Rostovtzeff, Soc. and Econ. Hist. of Hellenistic World, e.g. 153, 525–30, 1343 n. 15, 1347 n. 25). The view of E. Bickermann (Rev. ét. gr., 1934, 346) that Alexander as conqueror of Asia arbitrarily gave autonomy to the Greek cities of Asia Minor has been refuted by W. W. Tarn (Alexander the Great, vol. ii (1948), 199 ff.), who shows that Alexander treated them as free allies and restored their original freedom which de iure they had never lost (these cities were not parties to the Peace of Antalcidas); he merely removed the obstacle of Persian rule and thus allowed the exercise of free rights which were still there. Those who accept this view will be less ready to follow Bickermann in his belief that Antiochus III laid claim to the possession of the Greek cities by right of conquest since they had formed part of the empire of Lysimachus. Rather, their independence which had been recognized by Alexander was confirmed by Antiochus I when he declared all Greek cities ‘free, autonomous and ungarrisoned’. This was the policy of Alexander’s successors, pursued in however an opportunist spirit, until it was abandoned by Antiochus III when he started on a career of active aggression (cf. D. Magie, The Greek Political Experience, 174 ff., Roman Rule in Asia Minor, 825 ff.). But theory and practice often varied, and although ‘there certainly was a difference between genuine freedom (independence) and bogus freedom (under royal protection), it depended on the de facto situation, and I question whether the kings ever gave it precise legal formulation – it was to their interest to maintain the ambiguity of the term ἐλευθεϱία’ (A. H. M. Jones, The Greek City, 315 n. 8).

  E. Badian (Foreign Clientelae, 69 ff.) has argued that ‘freedom for the Greeks’ is not a new idea in Roman diplomacy, but a development of her earlier methods (e.g. towards the Illyrian coast), and he shows how the idea developed between 200 and 196 (in 200 Philip was to stop attacking the Greeks, in 198 to withdraw from Greece, then in 196 came the full declaration). But see A. H. McDonald JRS, 1959, 149.

  3 NEGOTIATIONS, 194–193. See De Sanctis, SR, IV, i, 130. A diplomatic manoeuvre by Rome: see Holleaux, CAH, viii, 200. Spheres of influence: T. Frank, Roman Imperialism (1914), 171.

  4 SCIPIO AFRICANUS AND HANNIBAL. The story, given by Livy (xxxv, 14, 5) on the authority of a later Roman annalist, that Scipio was a member of the embassy and met Hannibal at Ephesus, must be dismissed. Scipio was, however, on a mission sent to Carthage in 193 and also travelled in the eastern Mediterranean (he made dedications at Delos and Delphi: Scullard, Scipio Africanus (1970), 285 f.), so it is just possible he might have met Hannibal, though not at Ephesus.

  5 HANNIBAL’S PLANS. On these and his relations with Antiochus see Kromayer, Schlachtfelder, ii, 127, whose views are supported by E. Meyer (Kl. Schr., i, 260 ff.; Meister d. Politik, 160 ff.) against the criticism o
f Lehmann (Delbrück-Festschrift, 69 ff.). De Sanctis (SR, IV, i, 143 f., 155) rejects Kromayer’s belief that Hannibal intended to carry the war into Italy. Groag (Hannibal als Politiker, 132 ff.) attempts to defend Hannibal’s war plan against Kromayer’s criticism, but his attempt is not convincing, especially in its assumption of the weakness of the Italian confederacy.

  6 NABIS AND PHILOPOEMEN. It is not certain that the conduct of Nabis was so black and of Achaea so white as our pro-Achaean sources paint it: cf. De Sanctis SR, IV, i, 133, 231. In any case the Romans wished to stop the fighting before it spread. On Philopoemen see R. M. Errington, Philopoemen (1969).

  7 ANTIOCHUS’ AIMS. See De Sanctis, SR, IV, i, 141 ff.

  8 THERMOPYLAE. On the topography see Kromayer, Schlachtfelder, ii, 134 ff. and Atlas, cols 42, 43; G. B. Grundy, The Great Persian War (1901), 257 ff.; W. K. Pritchett, Studies in Ancient Greek Topography (1965), i, 71 ff. Traces of the wall survive.

  9 LUCIUS SCIPIO. On the political intrigues behind these appointments Livy (xxxvii, 1–2) and Cicero (Phil., xi, 7; Pro Mur., 14) give slightly differing accounts. Cf. Scullard, Roman Politics, 220–150 BC, edn 2, (1973), 284 f. L. Scipio’s abilities are not generally rated very highly, but see J. P. V. D. Balsdon, Historia, 1972, 224 ff., for a more favourable assessment.