Atheist Mind, Humanist Heart

by Lex Bayer

  •

  If

  we require starting assumptions

  (from P3)

  let us assume

  (P5)

  i) the existence of an external reality, and

  (P6)

  ii) trust in our five senses (flawed and limited as they are) for perceiving reality, and

  (P7)

  iii) trust in language, logic, thought, and the intellect as tools for analyzing and describing reality

  (P8)

  and let us define

  truth as an accurate description of the external reality

  (P9)

  •

  If

  i) we trust in our five senses for perceiving reality, and

  (from P7)

  ii) truth is an accurate description of the external reality

  (from P9)

  then

  we can make observations about truths in the reality

  (P10)

  •

  If

  we trust in logic for describing reality

  (from P8)

  then

  we can trust in mathematics and the laws of probability

  (P11)

  •

  If

  i) we make observations about truths, and

  (from P10)

  ii) we trust in mathematics and the laws of probability

  (from P11)

  then

  we can infer beliefs about the probabilities of future events from multiple past observations, which is inductive reasoning

  (P12)

  •

  If

  i) we trust inductive reasoning as a tool for discerning truth, and

  (from P12)

  ii) the scientific method is a formalized method of inductive reasoning

  (P13)

  then

  we can trust the scientific method as a tool for discerning truth

  (P14)

  •

  If

  i) we trust in inductive reasoning as a tool for discerning truth, and

  (from P12)

  ii) inductive reasoning is based on a person’s past experiences, and

  (P15)

  iii) different people have different experiences

  (P16)

  then

  beliefs of observational truth are based on subjective experiences

  (P17)

  •

  If

  i) we infer beliefs about probabilities of future events from past observations, and

  (from P12)

  ii) truth is an accurate description of the external reality

  (from P9)

  then

  beliefs are probabilistic approximations of truth

  (P18)

  •

  If

  i) beliefs of truth are based on subjective experiences, and

  (from P17)

  ii) people’s sets of experiences change over time, and

  (P19)

  iii) beliefs are probabilistic approximations of truth, and

  (from P18)

  iv) more data are more representative of reality

  (P20)

  then

  i) people’s beliefs can change over time, and

  (P21)

  ii) their assessment of truth can improve over time

  (P22)

  •

  If

  i) we trust in mathematics and the laws of probability, and

  (from P11)

  ii) the probability of multiple beliefs all being true is never greater than the probability of just one of those beliefs being true

  (P23)

  then

  a theory dependent on a larger number of beliefs is less likely to be true than one based on a smaller number of similarly probable beliefs, which is Ockham’s razor

  (P24)

  •

  If

  we trust in mathematics and the laws of probability

  (from P11)

  then

  it would be an inaccurate view of reality to believe you hold a winning lottery ticket before the results are announced, which we call the folly of the lottery ticket

  (P25)

  •

  If

  i) we can trust our five senses for perceiving reality, and

  (from P7)

  ii) our senses have not perceived God’s existence, and

  (P26)

  iii) Ockham’s razor is a useful tool for evaluating multiple hypotheses, and

  (from P24)

 
iv) believing in God is dependent on a large number of other beliefs such as the supernatural and violating the laws of physics, and

  (P27)

  v) there are an infinite number of qualities a supernatural God could possess, and

  (P28)

  vi) believing in any particular quality out of an infinite set of qualities would be equivalent to the folly of a belief in a winning lottery ticket choice

  (from P25)

  then

  there is no basis for a belief in God

  (P29)

  •

  In summary, we can use the following framework for forming beliefs of truth:

  (P30)

  i) we trust in inductive reasoning, and

  (from P12)

  ii) we trust in the scientific method, and

  (from P14)

  iii) Ockham’s razor is a useful tool for evaluating multiple hypotheses, and

  (from P24)

  iv) beliefs are based on subjective observational experiences, and

  (from P17)

  v) beliefs are probabilistic approximations of truth, and

  (from P18)

  vi) beliefs change over time, and

  (from P21)

  vii) beliefs become more accurate over time, and

  (from P22)

  viii) there is no basis for a belief in God

  (from P29)

  •

  If the above framework when tested

  i) has no internal contradictions, and

  (P31)

  ii) makes useful predictions about reality

  (P32)

  then

  i) we can accept the starting assumptions as valid, and

  (P33)

  ii) we can accept the framework for forming beliefs of truth about reality as valid

  (P34)

  •

  If

  we accept the framework for forming beliefs of truth about reality as valid

  (from P34)

  then

  we can answer the question, “What can I believe?” by referring to the framework for forming beliefs of truth about reality.

  (P35)

  How Ought I Behave?

  •

  If

  I “ought” behave in an objectively correct way

  (P36)

  then

  there exists an objectively correct way for me to behave, which we will call universal morality

  (P37)

  and let us define

  moral truth as an accurate description of that universal moral reality

  (P38)

  •

  If

  we accept our earlier framework for forming beliefs of truth about reality

  (from P34)

  then

  we can use the framework to evaluate the existence of a universal moral reality

  (P39)

  •

  If

  i) we trust our five senses for perceiving reality, and

  (from P7)

  ii) our senses have not perceived the existence of a universal morality, and

  (P40)

  iii) there is an infinite number of potential universal moral codes, and

  (P41)

  iv) believing in any particular moral code out of an infinite set of moral codes would be equivalent to the folly of a belief in a winning lottery ticket choice

  (from P25)

  then

  there is no basis for a belief in a universal moral reality

  (P42)

  •

  Even though there is an infinite number of potential universal moral codes, let us consider the two general categories they commonly fall under:

  (from P41)

  i) decreed by God (such as religious codes), or

  (P43)

  ii) decreed by humans, whether by:

  (P44)

  a) a leader appealing to authority

  (such as the Code of Hammurabi), or

  (P45)

  b) a philosopher appealing to reason

  (such as Kant, Bentham, or Rawls), or

  (P46)

  c) the consensus of a population

  (such as the moral zeitgeist), or

  (P47)

  d) the notion of duty

  (P48)

  •

  If

  there is no basis for a belief in God

  (from P29)

  then

  there is no basis for a belief in a universal moral reality decreed by God

  (P49)

  •

  If

  i) any particular universal morality decreed by a human is influenced by past experiences, and

  (P50)

 
ii) past experiences are subjective

  (from P17)

  then

  any universal morality decreed by a human is inherently subjective and so not objectively correct

  (P51)

  •

  If

  i) there is no basis for belief in a universal moral reality, and

  (from P42, P49,P51)