The Burning of Moscow
Page 10
But as the Russian retreat continued, Rostopchin became annoyed by Kutuzov’s evasive response to his questions on what would ultimately befall the city. In a letter on 31 August Rostopchin argued that there should be no discussion of whether it was better to save the army or the city: ‘Our armies have been raised and deployed to defend our realm; they should have defended Smolensk and now must protect Moscow, Russia and our Sovereign.’ He spoke of the political importance of Moscow to the Russian nation: ‘Every Russian now assumes that our forces [are] concentrated at our [former] capital and justly considers Moscow as the nation’s bastion. With its fall, the fetters that bind together popular opinion and strengthen the throne of our Sovereign would be broken …’84
Rostopchin was probably surprised by the commander-in-chief’s letter of 3 September suggesting the possibility that Moscow itself might be threatened: ‘I shall fight a battle in the present position,’ wrote Kutuzov from near Mozhaisk. ‘If, however, the enemy begins flanking me, I shall have to retreat in order to block his approach to Moscow, and if I am defeated there too, I shall go close to Moscow and will defend the capital there.’85 The governor was naturally alarmed by this prospect. ‘Moscow is in a rather dangerous situation. Our army is thirteen verstas away from Mozhaisk while the French have already occupied Gzhatsk,’ he wrote on 5 September, his letter revealing his misgivings about Kutuzov’s claims ‘that he intends to fight a battle and pursues no other goal but to defend Moscow’.86
Rostopchin eagerly awaited the news of the battle at Borodino. In the late afternoon of 7 September Kutuzov informed him that ‘[we are engaged] in the bloodiest of battles but so far all goes well. With the Lord’s help the Russian army did not yield a single step, though the enemy had significant numeric superiority.’ The letter made no mention of the Russian setbacks or of the commander-in-chief’s intention to retreat back to Moscow, but instead requested ‘as many reinforcements as possible’ because ‘tomorrow, I hope, placing my trust in God and in Moscow’s hallowed saints, I shall fight the enemy with new forces’.87 Rostopchin later recalled that the courier who delivered this letter also informed him of the capture of the King of Naples, Joachim Murat (in fact, it was the French General Bonnamy). The governor immediately prepared another bulletin to share these glad tidings with the Muscovites. ‘[Napoleon] will be defeated again, and the accursed one and his accomplices will perish through famine, fire, and sword,’ he assured the ‘greatly delighted residents of Moscow’.88 A thanksgiving Te Deum service was held in the Uspenskii Cathedral inside the Kremlin, while wild pealing of church bells could be heard throughout the city.
The bells were probably still ringing when Rostopchin began receiving Kutuzov’s new missives that gradually revealed the true situation at the front. Kutuzov once again spoke about the heavy fighting of the previous day89 but he also mentioned the Russian retreat for the first time:
Your Illustrious Excellency will agree that after the bloodiest battle that lasted 15 hours our army as well as the enemy’s could not but be in disarray, and due to the losses suffered on this day the position occupied previously became larger than needed by the army. Therefore, when we do not speak of glorious victories, but the goal is the destruction of the French army, I decided, while spending the night on the battlefield, to retreat for about six verstas from Mozhaisk [towards Moscow]. Having regrouped the troops, having reinforced my artillery and become strengthened by the Moscow Militia, with my sincere hope for the Almighty Lord’s help and the proven immense bravery of our troops, I shall see what I shall be able to undertake against the enemy.90
In another letter Kutuzov once more sought to allay Rostopchin’s increasing suspicion by claiming an outright Russian victory at Borodino: ‘After the bloodiest battle that took place yesterday, in which our troops naturally suffered heavy casualties commensurate to their courage. Although the battle was completely won [author’s emphasis] by us, my intention is to hold out against the enemy in another possibly decisive battle near Moscow to inflict serious damage on the adversary who has already sustained great losses.’91
Four days after the battle, Kutuzov still swore that ‘in spite of the bloody battle [at Borodino], my troops have retained such respectable numbers that we have enough forces not only to withstand the enemy assault, but even to get the upper hand’.92 Throughout these days Kutuzov continually wrote to Rostopchin requesting transports, horses, ammunitions, alcohol, tools and other provisions necessary for the army,93 without once discussing the future of Moscow.
Kutuzov’s letters perplexed Rostopchin, who years later denounced them as an ‘outright deception’.94 He felt his hands were tied in the absence of clear instructions from Kutuzov, who had become his superior once the military operations entered the Moscow province. Even with the Russian army on the outskirts of the city, Rostopchin continued to assure Muscovites that the city would be defended and as late as 13 September his officials called upon local landowners ‘to remain calm and not to take any precautions to protect their properties’.95 Unsure of what Kutuzov intended to do – fight another battle or abandon the city – Rostopchin approved requests to remove the most precious state property, documents, etc., while writing once more to Kutuzov, asking him to give straightforward instructions on what to do next. ‘Kindly inform me whether you have a firm intention to halt the enemy’s advance on Moscow and to defend this city?’ he inquired. ‘I will take measures depending on your response: either by arming everyone and fighting to the last man, or by evacuating all civilians and joining you with all military resources that I possess. Your answer will prompt me to decide …’96
Kutuzov, of course, was in a difficult position: he well understood that Moscow could not be defended but neither could he publicly announce his intention to abandon the former capital of the empire. So, in effect, he chose to keep Rostopchin out of the loop. The Moscow governor, known for his impulsiveness and intrigues, might jeopardize the military operations. Kutuzov could imagine the logistical nightmares that might result from the governor’s offer to move ‘all military resources’ towards the army, which was moving in the opposite direction. So, instead of clear instructions, he sent laconic and evasive responses informing Rostopchin that his suggestions for protecting Moscow were sound and should be considered, just not at present …97
Rostopchin’s anxious behaviour during these days is understandable, given that he had grown so used to playing the fine role of leader of popular sentiments that the necessity to relinquish that role and abandon Moscow without any heroic display took him unawares. Everything he had done in the previous months was aimed at assuring the populace that Moscow would be defended. He effectively staked his own reputation on this, and surrendering the city without a fight was too bitter a pill to swallow. In a letter to the emperor, Rostopchin explained that ‘prior to 7 September I did everything I could to calm down the residents and enthuse their spirits but the army’s continued retreat, the approach of the enemy and numerous wounded who had arrived [in Moscow] and filled all the streets, caused shock and disbelief’.98 He probably felt the ground slipping away from under his feet, and uncertainty about the commander-in-chief’s actions and the future of Moscow clearly exasperated him. ‘My heart bleeds to see now the unfortunate possibility of the enemy entering the capital,’ he lamented on 10 September. The fall of Moscow ‘would bring dishonour upon Russia, which would be worse than death’.99 Deep inside his heart, he should have known that the dreadful moment was coming but he seems to have refused, till the last moment, to believe that Moscow would indeed be abandoned. If major government offices were removed in late August, this was done at the demand of officials, to whom the count yielded only reluctantly. After weeks of steadily mounting pressure, Rostopchin was clearly beginning to feel the strain.100 Searching for scapegoats, he concentrated on the foreigners: ‘The foreigners here cannot be damped down,’ he reported on 10 September. ‘Just yesterday one of them openly called for an uprising, describing various things that B
onaparte would do here, and berating His Majesty the emperor. Because of the extraordinary circumstances, the people are angry and are not satisfied with my leniency towards the foreigners, thus the day after tomorrow I shall have that foreigner hanged with the help of a horse cart for the disturbance.’101
Bestuzhev-Riumin testified that the news of the Russian army’s retreat produced a ‘terrible tumult’ among the people. ‘Thoughts, souls and the very existence of Moscow were all in disarray,’ recalled Glinka.102 Wounded officers and soldiers, streaming into Moscow, were accompanied by hundreds of fearful peasants, who declared that the French were advancing everywhere, ruthlessly plundering and burning villages. Rostopchin felt compelled to calm this popular tumult and his new proclamation resorted to even greater embellishments. He claimed that the Russian army passed though Mozhaisk only because it intended to join up with the reinforcements moving toward it: ‘It has now taken up a strong position where the enemy will not attack it.’ The governor assured Muscovites that
[Kutuzov] says he will defend Moscow to the last drop of blood and is even ready to fight in the streets. Do not be upset, brothers, that the government offices are closed; things have to be put in order, and we will deal with villains in our own way! When the time comes I shall want both town and peasant lads and will raise the cry a day or two beforehand, but they are not wanted yet so I hold my peace. An axe will be useful, a hunting spear not bad, but a three-pronged fork will be best of all: a Frenchman is no heavier than a sheaf of rye.103
Rostopchin’s suggestion that fighting might occur in the streets of Moscow further inflamed passions in the city. Some Muscovites seemed to have lost hope upon hearing this and in the ensuing ‘murderous disorder’ people began ransacking taverns and fights broke out in streets. By noon ‘an enormous crowd had gathered near the Spasskaya Gates of the Kremlin, largely comprised of drunken men who were ready for any rowdiness.’104 Others became animated by patriotic fervour, so that theatre actors volunteered for military service and one noblewoman offered to raise a ‘squadron of amazons’!105 On 12 September the crowds were actively discussing the governor’s latest proclamation that ‘Moscow is our mother. She has nursed, fed and raised us. In the name of Holy Mother, I call upon all of you to rise in defence of our Lord’s temples, the city of Moscow and all of Russia.’ Rostopchin called upon the people ‘to arm yourselves, each man as he can, come on foot or on horseback; take three days’ supplies with you and assemble beneath the holy cross and banners at the Three Hills’. He promised to join this host there so ‘together we shall extirpate the wretches. Glory shall be the reward of those who fight in the contest! Eternal memory awaits those who fall! And those who evade their duty shall receive retribution on the Day of Judgement!’106
The following day (13 September) a large crowd of factory hands, house serfs and peasants, with some officials, seminarians and gentry mingled in amongst them, had indeed gathered in the early morning at the Three Hills, brandishing pikes, scythes, pitchforks, axes and clubs. ‘There were tens of thousands of people so that the distance of [2–3 miles] was so densely packed that even an apple could not fall to the ground.’107 Waiting for Rostopchin’s appearance, the crowd worked itself up to a feverish pitch of patriotic excitement and chanted ‘Long live our father. [Emperor] Alexander!’ Having waited for the governor for most of the day, the multitudes gradually became convinced that they had been forsaken and that Moscow would be abandoned. They dispersed all about the city, spreading ominous news and disorder. Meanwhile, this day being a Sunday, Archbishop Augustin held a mass at the Cathedral of the Assumption in the Kremlin. ‘The church was packed with people,’ a witness described. ‘I can truthfully say that I have never attended a divine service at which every heart seemed to be so universally disposed to pray or where a more religious spirit prevailed … The pontiff himself officiated with the most touching sincerity, and at the moment when, raising his eyes to Heaven, he pronounced in a voice filled with emotion the words, “Lift up our hearts and given thanks unto the Lord”, the eyes of all present filled with tears and turned spontaneously towards the only consolation of the afflicted.’108
But where was the governor on 12–13 September? His daughter Natalya Narychkina later wrote that he ‘busied himself with different important matters’ – but going to the Three Hills was apparently not among them. Indeed, Rostopchin had never intended to go either to the Three Hills or to the mass. Speaking to Sergei Glinka, the editor of the nationalistic Russkii vestnik, who had to walk for miles to the governor’s palace because he had been unable to hire a carriage, Rostopchin noted that ‘nothing will come of this business on the Three Hills’, and remarked that the broadsheet’s main purpose was to ‘make our peasants understand what they are to do when the enemy comes to Moscow’.109 The governor clearly wanted to stoke up the bellicose ardour among the remaining Muscovites, hoping that the people would undertake what the army refused to do.
At 6am110 on 13 September the governor set out ‘to confer with [Kutuzov] in order to adopt, in conjunction with him, such means as will lead to the extermination of our enemies. We shall rip the living breath out of them and send them all to the devil.’111 Upon reaching the Russian army, then deployed near the Poklonnaya Gora, the governor saw soldiers digging entrenchments on top of the heights, while officers argued ill-temperedly among themselves; everywhere was an atmosphere of ‘great disorderliness’.112 Seeing the Moscow governor, ‘the accursed Kutuzov’, as Rostopchin privately described him,113 politely greeted him and took off to one side for a long, private conversation, which, Rostopchin claimed with hindsight, ‘showed the baseness, timidity and the indecision of [Kutuzov] who was named the Saviour of Russia even though he did nothing to deserve it’. But at the time Rostopchin was glad to see that Kutuzov agreed with his suggestion to defend the city and declared that ‘it had been decided to give battle to Napoleon at the very spot where we now stood’. He even assured the governor that ‘if necessary, he would fight on even in the streets of Moscow’114 and asked him to ‘come back with the Archbishop and the two miraculous images of the Holy Virgin … to pass in front of the army, with the clergy at the head, reciting prayers and sprinkling soldiers with holy water’.115
Kutuzov’s orderly Prince Golitsyn was present at this conversation; he recalled that ‘after the usual mutual compliments, [Kutuzov and Rostopchin] spoke about the defence of Moscow and agreed to fight and die at the walls of the city’. This was a charade. By then Kutuzov knew very well what was in store for the city. He believed that the fall of Moscow would halt the Grande Armée’s further advance as Napoleon would seek a political resolution to the war. The Russian army needed this precious time to receive reinforcements and regroup to enable it to fight on. Rostopchin’s arguments to the contrary would have made no difference for Kutuzov. In fact, the governor’s talk of Moscow’s possible destruction only alarmed the general, who regarded the city as a pawn on his strategic board. The Grande Armée ‘is akin to a stormy torrent,’ he observed, and Moscow ‘is the sponge that will absorb it’.116 Kutuzov would naturally have rejected any suggestions that might jeopardize his own designs and Rostopchin’s idea of destroying the city before the enemy captured it, as he told Eugène of Württemberg, would have particularly caused him alarm. So he did his best to ‘confuse and mislead Rostopchin over his actual intentions’,117 assuring the governor that the city would be defended. Golitsyn recalled that ‘Rostopchin departed thrilled and delighted, but he failed to notice the surreptitious implications of Kutuzov’s assurances and arrangements. Kutuzov could not reveal before time that he intended to abandon Moscow, even though he hinted at this during his conversation with Rostopchin.’
But Golitsyn seems to be mistaken here – Rostopchin’s own writings suggest that he left highly disappointed, while General Yermolov believed that the governor was not deceived by Kutuzov’s statements, noting that ‘although he pretended to be calm and secure, in reality Rostopchin was the last to believe [Kutuzov�
��s] statements’. Moreover, the sight of the weary army could not have been encouraging, while conversations with officers would have sown many seeds of suspicion in Rostopchin’s heart. Upon encountering General Yermolov, Rostopchin took him aside for a private conversation. The governor did not hide his suspicions that Kutuzov was reluctant to defend Moscow, and his parting words particularly struck the general: ‘If you abandon Moscow without a battle, you would soon see it burning in flames behind you!’118 Similarly, upon seeing Prince Eugène of Württemberg, who was on terms of close familiarity with Kutuzov, Rostopchin told him, ‘If I were asked what to do, I would say, “Destroy the city before you surrender it to the enemy.” This is my opinion as a private individual but as the governor responsible for the well-being of the capital, I cannot give such advice.’119