A Spitfire Pilot's Story: Pat Hughes: Battle of Britain Top Gun

by Dennis Newton

  The British defences were heavily punished. Results in the air for the Luftwaffe showed that, while providing close escort for the bombers was unpopular with the fighter pilots, it had been successful in creating difficulty for the British to break through. The downside was that although bomber losses had lessened fighter losses were correspondingly higher. The Luftwaffe had lost thirty-eight aircraft to RAF Fighter Command’s twenty-two.

  Damaging for the RAF was the defeat of the Defiants. They had been revealed again to be useless as front-line, anti-bomber day fighters. Worse still, there were signs of a serious rift developing between the British commanders. Keith Park was highly critical of 12 Group’s inability to back up his 11 Group.

  An event occurred overnight that would have great significance later. In the evening the Luftwaffe continued its pressure by sending over more than 150 bombers to various targets in Kent, Sussex and Surrey. Some were directed to bomb Rochester and the Thameshaven oil tanks. Because of a mistake in navigation, bombers instructed to hit the oil tanks strayed over London and dropped their bombs on the city itself. Adolf Hitler had specifically ordered that London was not to be bombed. This, the first raid on the British capital since 1918, although unintended, set in motion a chain of events that would completely change the course of the battle.

  On Sunday 25 August, fine weather continued over southern and eastern England. The Luftwaffe continued its tactic of flying formations of planes along the coast and making occasional feints to keep the RAF on its toes, but this time it did not initiate any major raids. All the squadrons of 11 Group had to be held at ‘Available’.

  It was not until mid-afternoon that a change in the enemy’s pattern of operations was detected. Ventnor RDF picked up several groups of aircraft building up west of Cherbourg Peninsula. It reported a raid of over 100 aircraft approaching Weymouth Bay. So that the previous day’s mistakes would not be repeated – the defending fighters being caught too low – the squadrons at Tangmere, Exeter, Warmwell and Middle Wallop were scrambled as early as possible.

  There were actually over 300 German planes in the air. As they arrived over Weymouth, the German force split into three major formations to target Portland, Weymouth and Warmwell.

  The Portland force was met by twelve Hurricanes of 87 Squadron across from Exeter and twelve Spitfires of 609 Squadron. The Hurricanes attacked the bombers while the Spitfires took on the fighters. John Curchin sent a Messerschmitt 109 down in flames.3 Meanwhile, 234 Squadron was held back to patrol over Middle Wallop in case the airfield was a target. It was not touched.

  Only seven bombers managed to reach Warmwell but they did cause heavy damage by hitting two hangars and the sick quarters. They also scored an unseen tactical success with almost all of the telephone lines being severed – communications would not be restored until midday the next day – and again the presence of an overwhelming number of escort fighters effectively reduced bomber casualties. Of the twelve planes lost by Luftflotte 3 only one was a bomber.

  After dark, 103 aircraft from RAF Bomber Command carried out raids on Germany and France. For half of these the nominated target was Berlin. The previous night’s bombing of London had provoked Prime Minister Winston Churchill into ordering an immediate reprisal raid. It was a hasty and ill-conceived attack involving return flights of up to eight and nine hours for the bomber crews. On reaching the target, they found Berlin covered by thick cloud, making bombing highly inaccurate. Most crews saw no results because of the murk below. Records for that night indicate that just two people were slightly injured. On their homecoming flights, the bombers encountered strong headwinds that particularly affected the Hampdens which were operating at the furthermost limit of their range. Six were lost, three of them running out of fuel and having to ditch into the sea.

  However, like the bombing of London the previous night, despite the raid’s lack of military success its political consequences would be far-reaching.

  Weather conditions were still good for flying the following day, Monday 26 August, and the Luftwaffe continued flying bogus sorties up and down the English Channel to keep the RAF guessing. The first real raid was directed against Biggin Hill in Kent and Kenley in Surrey at 11 a.m. It crossed the coast north of Dover. While the main group continued westward, a small force broke away and bombed Folkestone. At the same time, a few Me 109s carried out low-level strafing attacks on targets of opportunity in East Kent and others shot up the Dover balloon barrage.

  More than seventy British fighters were scrambled to intercept. Spitfires of 616 Squadron from Kenley were suddenly bounced by thirty Messerschmitts. The squadron was taken completely by surprise and its two weavers were shot down. Overwhelmed by the odds, five Spitfires were lost.

  The Defiants of 264 Squadron were hard hit again. While taking on a formation of twelve Dorniers over Herne Bay they were jumped by the escorting Me 109s. Two Defiants were shot down, a third crash-landed and a fourth was badly damaged but managed to land safely.

  This time, the Defiants of 264 Squadron and the Spitfires of 616 Squadron were not sacrificed in vain because their engagements had drawn away the German escort fighters. Hurricanes and Spitfires from other squadrons were able to break into the main bomber force, inflicting casualties and turning it away from Biggin Hill. The Germans jettisoned their bombs as they withdrew towards France.

  The second German raid was in the early afternoon with orders to attack the Essex airfields at Hornchurch and Debden. Judging by its size and direction that the attack would be very heavy, AVM Park again requested 12 Group to cover his northern airfields, and ordered up all of his own available squadrons. Park’s squadrons engaged the escorts early and succeeded in drawing them away from the bombers, leaving many without cover.

  The bombers split into two groups. One group of forty Do 17s and forty Me 110s headed for Debden while the remainder turned towards Hornchurch. As each proceeded to its target, more British fighters pounced and the flak became heavier. The harassed Me 109s were already running low on fuel and began turning back. The Hornchurch force found itself virtually without cover and several Dorniers were shot down. Realising they would be cut to pieces if they continued, the entire formation wheeled around and withdrew. The other Dorniers heading north for Debden met heavy flak too and also ran into a barrier of defending Hurricanes and Spitfires. They too were obliged to turn back, except for a dozen or so that did manage to reach the airfield. This two-pronged attack had been foiled.

  Meanwhile, Park was furious that Leigh-Mallory’s 12 Group had failed again to protect his airfields. Spitfires from Duxford that were meant to cover Debden did not arrive until long after the Dorniers had gone.

  At 4 p.m. Luftflotte 3 despatched fifty Heinkel He 111s against Portsmouth and Warmwell aerodrome in Dorset. Escort was provided by over 100 Messerschmitt Me 110s and Me 109s. Park’s 11 Group sent up five squadrons while AVM Brand scrambled another three from his 10 Group.

  234 Squadron took off from Middle Wallop with Pat again as Cressy leader. Once airborne it was ordered to Portsmouth. Thirty minutes later, over the south of the Isle of Wight, the Spitfires met eight Me 109s at 16,000 feet but they could also see another group of thirty others about 2,000 feet higher up and three miles behind. Were the eight in front intended as decoys?

  Pat ordered his section into line astern and attacked the leading eight, all of which appeared to have red spinners. The Messerschmitts immediately split up into sections of two. Pat closed in on the leading pair until he was a distance of fifty yards from the rear machine before he pressed the button on his spade grip for five seconds. The 109 caught fire under the concentrated deluge of .303 bullets and plunged down vertically.

  The leading Me 109 had meantime gained height quickly but Pat was fully prepared for it as it attacked him from above. When he turned tightly to face it, the German fighter immediately dived away. Pat followed. As it pulled out of its dive, Pat caught up and fired a long burst from dead astern. The Messerschmitt started to burn but
still managed to keep flying. Although he was now out of ammunition, Pat continued to follow and a few minutes later he saw the pilot bail out. The German pilot splashed down near what appeared to be an auxiliary launch. It was painted dark grey and blue and opened fire at Pat’s circling Spitfire. At the same time it moved to recover the man in the water. Pat climbed away to return to Middle Wallop but then spotted more Me 109s heading towards him fast. They were probably low on fuel and intent on reaching home. As the gap between them closed rapidly, one Messerschmitt fired a snap burst from maximum range but missed. Pat could not reply. They loomed up in front and then hurtled past on their way back to France.4

  While this was happening, three squadrons of Hurricanes and Spitfires intercepted the German bombers and, after shooting down at least four Heinkels, succeeded in turning them back.

  As well as Pat’s brace of Messerschmitts, Bob Doe, Bill Hornby, Pat Horton and Edward Mortimer-Rose had all accounted for one Me 109 apiece, and better still there had been no losses.5

  That night, the Luftwaffe carried out scattered raids around Bournemouth and Coventry, and approximately fifty bombers made a sustained assault on Plymouth. The bombing lasted for seven hours but RAF Mount Batten, located on Plymouth Sound and home to 10 Squadron RAAF, was not damaged. Many bombs fell into the Sound itself but none of the Sunderland flying boats moored there were hit.

  Across in Cornwall at St Eval, a decoy aerodrome had been constructed and several German bombers were attracted to the spot by a false flare path. They dropped sixty-two bombs onto open heath.

  Tuesday morning broke dull and hazy. Central and eastern England had light rain with cloud in the English Channel and haze over the Straits of Dover. No major raids developed. Action by the Luftwaffe was devoted to small attacks and photographic reconnaissance missions mainly from Southampton to Portsmouth by single aircraft at very high altitude to assess the damage done so far.

  Taking advantage of the lull, AVM Park issued more instructions to his controllers. He began by thanking AVM Brand’s 10 Group for its help in covering the Portsmouth area but then followed up with an attack on 12 Group for its lack of cooperation. On two occasions when 12 Group had been requested to cover 11 Group’s aerodromes, they had failed to do so and the airfields had been bombed. He directed that from now on 11 Group controllers were to put their requests for 12 Group’s assistance to the Fighter Command controller. These orders brought the friction between himself and AVM Leigh-Mallory into the open. Leigh-Mallory fostered the idea of operating a large wing against large-scale enemy raids instead of using Park’s tactic of sending squadrons up singly or in pairs. In fact, Park’s tactics were the result of necessity. He simply did not have time to assemble three or more squadrons into a wing before vectoring them after the enemy – an enemy that would already be spreading out in various directions. This big wing argument would be expressed with increasing bitterness as the battle progressed.

  The German tactics of splitting their formations once they passed the English coastline were difficult to counteract because they consistently confused the defences as they spread out. The outward-facing RDF could no longer track their progress. From then on the defences had to rely solely upon reports from the Observers’ Corps. It became practically impossible to guide defending fighters onto the enemy formations the further they dispersed. Often up to two-thirds of the fighters did not manage to engage. Park instructed his squadron leaders and flight commanders who did make contact to pass a proper sighting report back to their controllers before they engaged.

  Another warning issued by Park was not to engage in battle unless there were bombers in the enemy formation. The RAF could not afford to lose fighters and pilots wastefully in fighter versus fighter combat. When battle was joined, ideally the higher performance Spitfires were to engage the escorting fighters while the Hurricane squadrons attacked the bombers.

  With over 80 per cent of the Luftwaffe’s Messerschmitt Me 109s now concentrated in the Pas de Calais area under Kesselring’s command, there was always a likelihood that raids from this direction could be fighter sweeps to be avoided.

  In the evening scattered enemy raids came in from Cherbourg. The RAF replied with patrols by Blenheim night fighters, two-seater Defiants and even single-seater fighters. At Middle Wallop, 234 Squadron’s pilots with night-flying experience were rostered for ‘cat’s eyes’ patrols in their Spitfires. Spitfires, and to a slightly lesser extent Hurricanes, were not good for night fighting. Flames from the engine exhaust stacks in front could too easily render the pilot’s night vision almost useless and some felt that they had an uncomfortably long landing run which seemed even longer at night.

  Every evening underlined the ineffectiveness of the British night defences. On 28/29 August, out of five Blenheim night-fighter squadrons that flew more than eighty sorties, only one Blenheim even sighted an enemy raider. The pilot pushed the throttles wide, manoeuvred into position behind the German bomber and fired a long burst. The startled bomber immediately dived away. It was too fast for the poor old Blenheim to catch. All the night-fighter pilot could do was watch as it quickly melted into the dark.

  Liverpool received the first of four consecutive night raids. It was the city’s heaviest attack so far and the dock area suffered widespread damage. There were more than 470 casualties.

  During the day, the few remaining Defiants of 264 Squadron left Hornchurch bound for Kirton-on-Lindsey. They were being withdrawn from day fighting and were led out by a twenty-year-old pilot officer, the only experienced man remaining. The effects of combat and stress were clearly evident.

  Across the Channel, German intelligence noted that the English fighters were avoiding combat and deduced that the RAF was weakening.

  Meanwhile, the night raids were having an effect on British industry which may not have been wholly anticipated by German planners. Almost 70 per cent of the towns along the flight paths of the bombers were placed on a ‘Red’ warning (raid likely or imminent). The sirens sent thousands of people to air-raid shelters and at the same time the lights of the factories, railway stations and the like were extinguished for lengthy periods of time. Industrial activity and production schedules were disrupted.

  On Friday 30 August, with weather conditions likely to remain fine for several days, the Luftwaffe chiefs were determined to intensify the pressure.

  13

  4 SEPTEMBER 1940

  With thirty-nine aircraft written off on the last day of August, Fighter Command suffered its heaviest losses in one day of the Battle of Britain so far. Despite this, aircraft attrition was not ‘Stuffy’ Dowding’s major cause for alarm. The output of Hurricanes and Spitfires for the month exceeded the projected estimates by 69 per cent. It was the loss of aircrew that was far more critical. This was Fighter Command’s most serious problem. Of forty-six squadron commanders who began the battle of Britain early in July, eleven had been killed or wounded. Of ninety-seven flight commanders, twenty-seven had been killed, twelve seriously wounded and seven promoted to take command of squadrons. To compensate, the training programme had been cut, volunteers had been obtained from other commands and Czech, Polish and Canadian squadrons, previously held in reserve, had been ordered into battle. Even so, Dowding and Park were coming to the dreadful realisation that they were not winning.

  With unrelenting pressure mounting day by day, the fight for survival was reaching its most dangerous period.

  For Desmond Sheen, Pat Hughes’ mate from Point Cook days, and the men of 72 Squadron, the first day of September was very busy. Because of the damage inflicted on Biggin Hill, the squadron was moved to Croydon while 79 Squadron stayed put for air defence.

  After being slightly wounded in an engagement early in December 1939, Sheen had spent a month in hospital before rejoining the squadron in January. The following April he had volunteered to fly ‘something very fast’ but secretive and been transferred to 212 Squadron, Photographic Development Unit. He found that this unique unit was equipped w
ith specially modified Spitfires for high-altitude photographic reconnaissance. It had been formed by the highly inventive, entrepreneurial Sidney Cotton, formerly of Queensland. He moved to France with a detachment attached to the AASF on 12 May 1940, three days after his DFC was gazetted. He recalled:

  I flew down to the south of France and Corsica with Sidney Cotton in his Lockheed 12 (uncamouflaged) … prior to PR operations over Italy … At Bastia we were met by bayonet-fitted rifles surrounding the aircraft as it was thought we might be Italians who had yet to enter the war … Operations over Italy started mid-May initially from Le Luc, a French fighter base not far from St Raphael and then from Ajaccio in Sardinia to give a bit more range. We were there when Italy entered the war and next morning found the airfield completely obstructed. With some difficulty we persuaded the French to clear enough for us to fly off back to Le Luc.

  The PR Spits … were stripped of guns, ammunition and radio, the weight being replaced by additional fuel tanks and cameras. They were normally flown at full throttle at around 30–32,000 feet, depending upon the tropopause as it was essential not to leave a persistent contrail. The average sortie was about two and a half to three hours and the longest I recorded being about three and a quarter hours at a maximum height of 34,000 feet.

  Minor physical problems were the cold, and we found that three loose layers of clothing were the most effective, and mild attacks of the bends were found at altitudes after a long period but nothing could be done about that. The special bubble hoods to facilitate downward vision were (predictably) patented by Sidney Cotton who was … quite a character.

  Another small problem in the south of France was that the airfields had long grass and with our fairly long take offs, grass tended to block the pilot head. The only solution was to fly the sortie without an airspeed indicator and thus burn up the fuel before landing.1