Mad Science: The Nuclear Power Experiment

by Joseph Mangano

  Other slogans featured in the nuclear revival have no basis in fact. One is that nuclear power would allow America to lessen dependence on foreign sources of energy, mainly petroleum from the Middle East and other nations. This sounded good as the price of gasoline approached $4 a gallon and a series of Middle East political struggles that threatened US oil interests emerged. But the reality is that nuclear power can only be used for electricity, and oil is the source of only about 2% of US electricity. More nukes would do nothing to lessen American dependence on foreign oil.

  Another distortion worked into the pro-nuclear argument is that nuclear power was a “renewable” source of energy. This logic assumed that nuclear waste could be reprocessed, and uranium reused as fuel. But reprocessing had experienced major safety problems in the US and the several other nations that attempted it, and actually had been rejected by most countries with nuclear plants. Moreover, even if reprocessing was attempted, the enormous amount of waste products except for uranium-235 and plutonium-239 would remain, and have to be permanently stored. Finally, the title of “renewable” nuclear power ignored the fact that the supply of uranium was a finite one, and would eventually run out, as opposed to solar and wind power.

  As the pieces of the nuclear repackaging movement were put together, momentum changed. Permanent shutdowns of existing US reactors halted after January 1998. License extensions sped up, as did uprates, and capacity factors soared. The amount of nuclear power produced by reactors jumped 39%, from 577 to 800 million kilowatt hours between 1990 and 2010. But this was only enough to keep the nuclear share of the nation’s electricity consumed at just over 19%. And from 2007 to 2010, the amount began to decline slightly, as production from the existing 104 reactors slipped (US Energy Information Administration). To truly succeed, the nuclear revival had to put its most important component into action – building new reactors.

  This was not going to be easy. The last formal order for a new US reactor had occurred in 1978 (the last order that was not cancelled was in 1973). The nuclear hierarchy took their ideas back to the bankers in hopes of getting financial support for constructing new reactors. But lenders have long memories, and even in relatively good economic times, their answer was the same – no money for new reactors. They listened to the arguments from the industry, but saw a potential Trojan horse that would produce yet another financial bath. No lending firm wanted to be first. As John Kennedy of Standard and Poor’s explained, “A first-of-its-kind facility always costs more.”

  The nuclear industry needed a Plan B, and that was to get support from government. But before they could do that, they needed a plan, and they needed to promote the plan before entering the halls of Capitol Hill. President Bush served as the head cheerleader. In addition to numerous remarks and written statements about building a new generation of nuclear reactors, he made the first visits by a sitting President to a US nuclear power plant since Jimmy Carter rushed to Three Mile Island in 1979. Bush went to the Calvert Cliffs, Maryland plant in 2005 and to the Limerick plant in southeast Pennsylvania the following year. At Limerick, Bush toured the plant in a white hard hat, and explained the party line behind new reactors:

  Nuclear power helps us protect the environment. And nuclear power is safe. For the sake of economic security and national security, the United States must aggressively move forward with construction of nuclear power plants. Other nations are.

  The NEI called for forty-five new reactors to be in operation by the year 2030. This number was cited by high-ranking politicians such as Senator John McCain, the 2008 Republican nominee for President. Others went beyond the NEI; Senator Lamar Alexander declared that 100 new reactors were needed by 2030, which would more than double the current capacity. In a strange poker-like action, the stakes were raised even more in 2010, when a bill sponsored by Alexander and Congressman Devin Nunes (R-CA) introduced a bill that would allow 200 more nuclear reactors by 2040.

  The utilities announced plans to build new reactors at specific sites. By 2008, there were thirty-four new reactors proposed at twenty-three sites, the large majority in southeastern states, where the population was increasing fastest. Some were new sites, but most were reactors to be added next to existing units. Local reactions to proposals for new reactors were generally positive. Many public officials liked them because they brought in tax revenue. Many local residents liked them because they offered new jobs.

  The industry had been working Congress strongly since 2001, especially since the White House and both houses of Congress were controlled by Republicans (although the industry counted many friends in the Democratic Party as well). Finally, in 2005, Congress enacted a law that included $18.5 billion in federal loan guarantees backing new construction. In case of default from a reactor not being completed, the lender would get its money back – from taxpayers. Congress also extended the Price-Anderson Act was for twenty more years, ensuring that nuclear utilities could purchase insurance against meltdowns by limiting their liability.

  The change in Presidents from Bush to Obama didn’t stop the nuclear industry from pushing for more federal largesse. And while Obama had expressed some concerns about nuclear power during the 2008 campaign, and cut funding from the Yucca Mountain waste repository in Nevada after assuming office, his Energy Secretary Steven Chu became a strong supporter of new reactors. In 2010, Obama’s proposed budget included $36 billion more in subsidies for construction of new reactors (which was rejected by Congress). The nuclear revival had all pieces in place in an all-out effort to build new reactors, but the effort would soon sputter.

  With virtually all of the existing nuclear plants headed for approvals from the NRC to operate for sixty years, at a high capacity factor of about 90%, it was now time for the new reactors to take hold. But after a decade of hype, lobbying, and government action, new nukes are as big a question mark as they ever were.

  President Obama made one move when he authorized $8.3 billion in loan guarantees, nearly half of the total pot of $18.5 billion – to build two new reactors at the Vogtle plant on the Savannah River in Georgia. Obama’s proposal to add $36 billion more in loan guarantees was never passed; and with the federal deficit expected to continue at all-time highs for the foreseeable future, many doubt whether any more funds will be forthcoming from Congress.

  As of April 2012, the NRC lists twenty applications for new nuclear plants (thirty-four reactors) that the Commission has accepted. All of these are just letters of intent from utility companies, and the real work has yet to be done. Of the twenty plants, all but four were applications from 2007 and 2008.

  But this upbeat NRC list does not show that numerous proposed new reactors reactors have either been delayed or suspended.. In addition, five more new reactors that once were in the NRC sights are now cancelled or being revised. As of 2012, the only new reactors that appear to be making any substantial progress are the two new units at the Vogtle plant in Georgia – not a very good record, over a decade after the idea of building many new US reactors was first introduced.

  The biggest factor in the revival’s slump was the cost of building new reactors. As the renaissance began, industry leaders optimistically declared that it would take only $2 to $3 billion to build a new reactor. But as time went on, and discussions with private and public lenders became more serious, this number soared. In October 2008, the Energy Department released a statement declaring that to build the twenty-one reactors (at fourteen plants) for which it had received applications would cost $188 billion – a staggering $9 billion per reactor.

  Stephen Thomas, an energy studies professor in London, declared that a new reactor at the Callaway plant in Missouri would exceed $10 billion. A spokesperson for Ameren, the company hoping to build the Callaway reactor, clung to a figure of $6.7 billion, far below the official Energy Department estimate. But even some industry leaders succumbed to the reality that new reactors would be very costly. Thomas Piquemal, chief financial officer for Electricité de France seeking to build a
new reactor at the Calvert Cliffs, Maryland plant (with Unistar in Baltimore), estimated $10 billion would be needed to add the reactor.

  While banks stopped lending money for new reactors in the 1970s, the financial crash of 2008 made a difficult task far worse. Bad loans for real estate, and the collapse of the real estate market would have destroyed the banking system without the $700 billion bailout from Congress. Although they survived, banks became extremely tight in lending additional funds to any institution or individual – especially unreliable customers like nuclear utilities.

  The sleight-of-hand around the cost issue was no longer effective: and now the idea of paying $10 billion to construct a new reactor, which would not produce any revenue for at least a decade, was not palatable to Wall Street. Congress did throw in $18.5 billion of loan guarantees for new reactors. But it wasn’t about to commit to hundreds of billions, which is what would be needed if the forty-five new nukes proposed by the NEI or 100 new units envisioned by Senator Alexander were to be built. The historical record of cost overruns was well known – the first seventy-five US reactors cost over three times as much to build as originally projected. And the record on default wasn’t very good either, with over half of nuclear reactors ordered never having operated. Obama’s plea for $36 billion more in federal loan guarantees in 2010 fell on deaf ears on Capitol Hill, and was not included in any appropriations bill.

  The cost issue was never going to be overcome, and even the nuclear utilities knew this. One example of this is the proposal to build a new reactor at Calvert Cliffs, which would create the largest US reactor by far. The project, jointly managed by Unistar (a spinoff of the Baltimore-based Constellation Energy) and Electricité de France, was in line for $7.6 billion in Federal loan guarantees. But the federal Office of Management and Budget asked Unistar/EDF to pay just $880 million up front as earnest money, to encourage the project to go forward. The utilities balked, arguing that they shouldn’t be mandated to pay a dime, and plans for the new reactor were shelved late in 2010.

  While high costs alone would have been enough to stagger the momentum of the nuclear revival, there were other factors. Addressing the problem of what to do with the huge amount of waste was also glossed over in the pro-nuclear hype; the permanent repository at Yucca Mountain and reprocessing spent fuel would comprise the solution. But these were old ideas riddled with massive safety problems. And when it came time to take action, policy makers would not take the plunge. In 2010, Obama killed any additional funding to construct Yucca, and Energy Secretary Chu organized a Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future to study this and other matters – essentially restarting a process that had begun over half a century earlier. Reprocessing high level waste could never get past the ghastly experience at West Valley, New York in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Progress to build a reprocessing center at the Savannah River Site in South Carolina was very slow, and in April 2011, a panel of scientists from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology issued a paper concluding that reprocessing was not needed.

  The economic stumbling block for new reactors is partly a result of health concerns. What makes nuclear reactors so expensive to build? There are many physical parts involved that must be made of strong and durable materials – so that these complex reactors can withstand the intense heat to avoid a meltdown, and limit routine emissions. Reactors employ many people, a large proportion of whom must be well trained and educated – again, so that reactors can operate as safely as possible. Reactors have strict security programs to prevent any acts of sabotage that would imperil the health of workers and local residents. Finally, reactors must abide by a long list of safety procedures and are subject to a bevy of regulations during the construction and operation phases – once again, to reduce any errors that might release radiation, in low or high amounts. Thus, high costs of reactors are due substantially to the health and safety concerns posed by these dangerous machines.

  The “not in my backyard” mentality was another factor in the failure of the nuclear revival to generate momentum. Despite years of relentless publicity, only about half of Americans welcomed the idea of a new nuclear plant near their home. (The previously mentioned support of new reactors from residents near existing plants amounted to only a small portion of the population.) The figure was an increase over the previous generation, but still not the strong majority that would translate into extensive political and financial support. Actually, the reticence of many to be located near a nuclear reactor was a holdover from the days when reactors were proposed for large cities. Proposals such as the one to build the Ravenswood reactor just across the East River from the United Nations in New York City frightened many – including the highly pro-nuclear regulators at the AEC. Now all reactors are at least thirty miles, often more, from America’s large urban areas.

  Another reason for the failure of the nuclear revival was that in the minds of many Americans, it was impossible to separate nuclear weapons from nuclear reactors. The original Eisenhower-era effort to promote atomic power for “peaceful” purposes was well-intentioned, but could never completely eliminate the fact that reactors used the same uranium fuel as weapons; uranium atoms split in the same way as in bombs created very high heat; created over 100 radioactive cancer-causing chemicals (waste products), as do weapons; and routinely released a portion of these chemicals into the environment and the food chain, as do weapons. The idea that a reactor was essentially an atomic bomb that created electricity remained in the minds of many Americans, long after Hiroshima and Nagasaki and long after atomic bomb testing had ended.

  Finally, the length of time needed for the nuclear revival to blossom, especially that needed to build new reactors, may have hurt its chances. As the nuclear industry made a huge push in the decade after 2000 just to hold on to its 19% share of the US market, other forms of electricity boomed. Wind power capacity in the nation jumped nearly sixteen times, from 2,539 to 40,180 megawatts from 2000 to 2010. Wind power now accounts for 2.3% of electricity in the US, according to the American Wind Energy Association. The Energy Department published a report in 2008 predicting that by 2030, wind could feasibly produce 20% of US electricity. The 20% figure is, coincidentally, just higher than the nuclear portion today.

  Solar power also grew rapidly in the early years of the twenty-first century. The number of new photovoltaic solar installations in the US leaped from 79 to 878 between 2005 and 2010, and construction of several solar farms in sun-baked Southern California far larger than any prior solar plant were in progress. By 2007, solar capacity in the US was 8,775 megawatts, well below wind power but still rising rapidly, and over four times greater in 2009 compared to 2000. Other renewable forms of energy, such as geothermal and tidal power, show similar promise, although these haven’t made as great an advance as wind and solar.

  Constructing new solar and wind plants has proven to be much faster and much less expensive than new nuclear facilities. Moreover, there are no environmental risks to wind and solar power, and it draws from renewable sources, while world uranium supplies will eventually run out. Natural gas plants are also faster to build than nuclear plants; and while there are environmental risks, they give off just over half the greenhouse gases that coal plants do, making them somewhat helpful, at least in the short tern, in reducing the effects of climate change. Supplies of natural gas are also ample, at least for now. In the past decade, generation of electricity from natural gas soared 80%, compared to 9.5% for all sources, raising its share of the US electrical market from 15.5% to 25.4%, as the table below shows.

  Source: Energy Information Administration. US Net Electric Generation by Energy Source, 1999–2009. From Monthly Energy Review, April 2010. www.eia.doe.gov.

  Perhaps the architects of the nuclear renaissance hadn’t realized that with demand for energy growing steadily, speed was essential for the revival to be successful – or the effort would lose out to other energy sources.

  The nuclear revival was already stumbling
in the spring of 2011. The prospects were becoming increasingly likely that the “renaissance” would be a matter of keeping old reactors going as long as possible, and that few or no new reactors would ever be built. But in March 2011, the news that at least four reactors at the Fukushima plant in Japan were experiencing meltdowns arrived in the living rooms of Americans. The images were powerful, and almost didn’t need spoken or written words. Workers dressed like space men measuring radiation levels, explosions at reactors, and tangled metal parts strewn across damaged reactors were highly disturbing images that brought many back to thoughts of Hiroshima, Three Mile Island, and Chernobyl.

  The images were not only focused on what would happen to the Japanese, but to Americans, as the radioactive plume drifted from Japan to the US in just days, and began showing up in the food supply. The week after the meltdowns began, the ABC program World News Tonight began with anchor Diane Sawyer sitting in front of a picture of a glass of milk, with a caption “Is America’s milk safe to drink?” below it.

  The American people responded. An ABC News/Washington Post poll just after the Fukushima disaster found that only 35% would support construction of a new nuclear plant within fifty miles of their home – down from over 50% just fourteen months earlier. Analysts poured out stories examining whether the nuclear revival was dead, with numerous quotes from experts. One of these was Jeff Kueter of the George C. Marshall Institute think tank: