War of Nerves
Page 47
59 Saunders experimented on himself with DFP: Toy, Phosphorus Chemistry in Everyday Living, p. 198.
59 DFP mainly regarded as a harassing agent: Clarke, The Silent Weapons, p. 45.
59 Division 9 of National Defense Research Committee: Jeffrey K. Smart, Command Historian, U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., “Oral History Interview: Elmer H. Engquist, February 26, 1993,” transcript, p. 1; Johnston, A Bridge Not Attacked, p. 218.
59 Test of DFP on U.S. soldiers: Roger McCoy, “Ohioans Volunteered for Secret Chemical Warfare Tests During World War II,” The Columbus Dispatch, February 14, 2005.
60 President Roosevelt’s warning: ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, pp. 10–11.
60 Ambros recommendation to increase production capacity: Rolf-Dieter Müller, “World Power Status through the Use of Poison Gas? German Preparations for Chemical Warfare, 1919–1945,” in Diest, ed., The German Military in the Age of Total War, p. 197.
61 Level of Tabun production: CIOS, “War Gas Production and Miscellaneous Chemical Warfare Information, Anorgana G.m.b.H., Germany” (Secret), file no. XXVII-34, item no. 8, July 25, 1945, Appendix 1, “Production of War Gases in Germany” [NARA, RG 319].
61 Establishment of a second labor camp at Dyhernfurth: Groehler, Der lautlose Tod, p. 286.
62 Dr. Karl Brandt: FIAT, “Report on Chemical Warfare Based on Interrogation and Written Reports of Jürgen E. von Klenck” (Secret), December 6, 1945, pp. 20, 29.
62 People’s gas masks: BIOS, “Interrogation of Certain German Personalities Connected with Chemical Warfare,” Final Report no. 542, item no. 8, October 1946, p. 23 [NARA, RG 319].
62–63 Kuhn discovery of Soman: Ibid., pp. 4–7; BIOS, “Interrogation of Professor Ferdinand Flury and Dr. Wolfgang Wirth on the Toxicology of Chemical Warfare Agents,” Final Report no. 782, item no. 8, BIOS Trip no. 1610 (undated), pp. 12–13 [NARA, RG 319].
CHAPTER FOUR: TWILIGHT OF THE GODS
64 Invasion of Normandy (Operation Overlord): Hastings, Overlord, p. 34.
64–65 Gen. Omar Bradley quotes: Bradley, A Soldier’s Story, p. 279.
65 Postwar report by Ochsner: Hermann Ochsner, “U.S. Army Chemical Warfare Project: Bericht über Produktion von K-Stoffen, Raumexplosionen und Raumbränden, P-004a,” Dokument 69, in Brauch and Müller, eds., Chemische Kriegführung—Chemische Abrüstung, pp. 217–236; Ochsner, History of German Chemical Warfare in World War Two, Part I: The Military Aspect, p. 19.
66 German decision not to use nerve agents in V weapons: BIOS, “Interrogation of Gen. Lt. Ochsner” (Secret), Final Report no. 187, item no. 8, December 5–6, 1945 [SPRU].
66 July 20, 1944, plot against Hitler: Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, pp. 1048–1054.
67 Ley plan for the use of Tabun: Groehler, Der lautlose Tod, p. 311.
67 Speer conversation with Ley: Speer, Inside the Third Reich, p. 413.
67–68 Conflict over N-Sto f at Falkenhagen: FIAT, “Report on Chemical Warfare Based on the Interrogation and Written Reports of Jürgen E. von Klenck, Also Comments by Speer and Dr. E. Mohrhardt” (Secret), December 6, 1945, pp. 8–11 [SPRU].
68 Speer testimony at Nuremberg: Speer testimony on June 21, 1946, International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, pp. 527–530.
68 Speer message to Keitel: Groehler, Der lautlose Tod, p. 311.
68–69 Schieber meeting on November 2, 1944: “Aktenvermerk über die K-Stoff-Besprechung beim Amtschef des Rüstungslieferungsamtes, Staatsrat Dr. Walther Schieber, am 2. November 1944,” Dokument 54, in Brauch and Müller, eds., Chemische Kriegführung—Chemische Abrüstung, pp. 192–195.
69 Destruction of chemical weapons documents: Harris and Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing, p. 138.
69 Volkssturm: Hunt, On Hitler’s Mountain, p. 188.
70 Evacuation of Dyhernfurth: Groehler, Der lautlose Tod, pp. 9–10.
70–71 Murder of labor camp inmates: Ibid., pp. 10, 284.
71 German raid on Dyhernfurth: Ibid., pp. 10–11; Gellermann, Der Krieg, der nicht stattfand, pp. 175–176; Duffy, Red Storm on the Reich, pp. 128–132.
72 Hitler order of February 1945: Groehler, Der lautlose Tod, p. 11.
73 Goebbels response to the firebombing of Dresden: Ibid., p. 314; Gellermann, Der Krieg, der nicht stattfand, p. 178.
73 General Guderian statement: Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, pp. 1097–1098; Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler, p. 123.
73 Evacuation of Falkenhagen: FIAT, “Report on Chemical Warfare Based on the Interrogation and Written Reports of Jürgen E. von Klenck; Also Comments by Speer and Dr. E. Mohrhardt” (Secret), December 6, 1945, pp. 11, 14.
74 Klenck’s burial of documents in Gendorf: FIAT, “Report on Chemical Warfare Based on the Interrogation and Written Reports of Jürgen E. von Klenck, Also Comments by Speer and Dr. E. Mohrhardt” (Secret), December 6, 1945, pp. 25, 34–35.
74 “Scorched earth” policy: Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, pp. 1102– 1104.
75–76 Speer plot to assassinate Hitler: Speer, Inside the Third Reich, pp. 430–431; Trevor-Roper, The Last Days of Hitler, pp. 122–125.
76 Hitler’s fear of being captured alive: O’Donnell, The Bunker: The History of the Reich Chancellery Group, p. 110fn.
76 Speer quote about Hitler: Speer, Inside the Third Reich, p. 431.
76 Hitler said “If the war is lost . . .”: Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, p. 1104.
77 Keitel order to evacuate chemical munitions: “Befehl des Chefs des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht über die Evakuierung von Kampfstoff-Munition vom 30. März 1945,” Dokument 57, in Brauch and Müller, eds., Chemische Kriegführung—Chemische Abrüstung, pp. 197–198.
78–79 Evacuation of Tabun-filled munitions, loading onto barges: Groehler, Der lautlose Tod, pp. 12–14.
79 U.S. air raid on German town of Lossa: Groehler, Der lautlose Tod, pp. 6–8; Gellermann, Der Krieg, der nicht stattfand, p. 181.
80 Captain Hemmen tour of chemical weapons depots: Groehler, Der lautlose Tod, pp. 14–15; Gellermann, Der Krieg, der nicht stattfand, p. 182.
81 Hitler’s birthday (April 20, 1945): Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, pp. 1107–1112.
81 Evacuation of nerve-agent weapons to Lake Chiemsee: Gwynne Roberts, “Hitler’s Deadly Secrets,” Sunday Times (London), February 22, 1981, p. 14.
81–82 U.S. shelling of German barges: Major General Alden H. Waitt, “Why Germany Didn’t Try Gas,” Saturday Evening Post, vol. 218, no. 36 (March 9, 1946), p. 138.
82 Hitler’s suicide: Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, p. 1133.
82 “Wotan” quote: Ibid., p. 1100.
82 Hitler was living in a fantasy world: John Ellis van Courtland Moon, personal communication, February 29, 2004.
CHAPTER FIVE: A FIGHT FOR THE SPOILS
83 T Forces: Colonel Harry A. Kuhn, “German Technical Information,” Chemical Corps Journal, January 1947, pp. 12–14.
83 Mobile microfilm teams: U.S. Army Military History Research Collection, Senior Officers Debriefing Program, “Conversations between Lieutenant General Andrew J. Boyle and Lieutenant Colonel Frank Walton,” vol. 1 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: U.S. Army Military History Institute, 1971), p. 13.
83 Establishment of CIOS: Hunt, Secret Agenda, p. 7.
84 Lieutenant Colonel Paul R. Tarr: Major Bernard Tannor, “Cml C Intelligence in European Theater,” Chemical Corps Journal, vol. 1, no. 3 (1947), p. 40; Bower, The Paperclip Conspiracy, pp. 94–95.
84–85 British inspection of Raubkammer Testing Site: Groehler, Der lautlose Tod, pp. 323–324; Major General Alden H. Waitt, “Why Germany Didn’t Try Gas,” Saturday Evening Post, vol. 218, no. 36 (March 9, 1946), p. 138.
85 British capture of German Tabun munitions: Wiseman, Special Weapons and Types of Warfare, vol. 1: Gas Warfare, p. 150.
85–86 Analysis of “th
ree-green-ring” bomb by Porton chemists: Chief Superintendent, Chemical Defence Experimental Station, Porton Down, “German 250 Kg. bomb—3 Green Rings,” Ptn/1371 (V.4256A), May 4, 1945; Lieutenant Colonel P. R. Tarr, Chief, Intelligence Division, Chemical Warfare Service, European Theater of Operations, Report No. 3816, “Porton Report on German 250 Kg Bomb—Three Green Rings,” May 23, 1945 [FOIA].
86 D. J. C. Wiseman quote: Wiseman, Special Weapons and Types of Warfare, Vol. 1: Gas Warfare, p. 152.
86–87 Interrogation of German chemical weapons experts: BIOS, “Interrogation of German CW Personnel at Heidelberg and Frankfurt” (Secret), Final Report no. 41, item no. 8, undated [NARA, RG 319]; BIOS, “Interrogation of Gen. Lt. Ochsner” (Secret), Final Report no. 187, item no. 8, December 5–6, 1945; BIOS, “Interrogation of German CW Medical Personnel” (Secret), Final Report no. 138, item no. 8, August–September 1945; BIOS, “Examination of Various German Scientists” (Secret), Final Report no. 44, item no. 8, undated [NARA].
87 Interrogation of Schrader: CIOS, “A New Group of War Gases” (Secret), file no. XXIII-7, item no. 8, April 23, 1945 [SPRU]; Foreign Office, “Gerhardt [sic] Schrader,” August 30, 1945 [PRO, FO 1031/105].
88 Ambros in Gendorf: DuBois, The Devil’s Chemists, pp. 5–7; Hunt, Secret Agenda, p. 7.
88 Tarr interrogation of Ambros: FIAT, “Detention of Dr. Ambros,” FIAT E 254-82 (AMBROS) [PRO, FO 1031.86]; Bower, The Paperclip Conspiracy, p. 96.
88–89 ALSOS interview with Kuhn: Goudsmit, ALSOS, pp. 80–83; Groehler, Der lautlose Tod, p. 329.
89 Increases in CWS budget: Harris and Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing, p. 116–117.
89 CWS Development Laboratory at MIT: Jeffrey K. Smart, Command Historian, U.S. Army Chemical and Biological Defense Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., “Oral History Interview: Elmer H. Engquist, February 26, 1993,” transcript, p. 1 [FOIA].
90 Coombs and Sauer analyses of Tabun: Captain Robert D. Coombs and First Lieutenant Charles W. Sauer, “Investigations on MCE and MFI” (Secret), Chemical Warfare Service Development Laboratory, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, September 27, 1945 [FOIA].
90 German Tabun-filled bombs shipped to United States: Major General William N. Porter, Chief, Chemical Warfare Service, Memorandum to Commanding General, Army Service Forces, Subject: “Enemy Agent Munitions, LE-100 (Taboon)” (Secret), SPCWM 471 ASF, May 29, 1945 [FOIA].
90 No. 1 Porton Group: Carter, Chemical and Biological Defence at Porton Down, pp. 55–57.
91 Large buried cache of microfilmed documents: Groehler, Der lautlose Tod, p. 322.
91 Soviet capture of Dyhernfurth and documents: JCS, Joint Intelligence Group, Report, “Intelligence on Soviet Capabilities for Chemical and Bacteriological Warfare,” Annex B, JIC 156/12, 1952, pp. 15–16 [NARA, RG 218].
91 Volfkovich and Kargin trips to Germany: Krause and Mallory, Chemical Weapons in Soviet Military Doctrine, pp. 114–115.
92 Ocean dumping of German chemical weapons: E. J. Hogendoorn, “A Chemical Weapons Atlas,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 53, no. 5 (September– October 1997), p. 39.
92 British confiscation of Tabun bombs: U.K., Chiefs of Staff Committee, “Note on COS(45) 400(0), Disposal of German Chemical Warfare Stocks,” June 19, 1945 [PRO, WO 193/712]; UK, Combined Chiefs of Staff, “Disposal of German Chemical Warfare Stocks: Memorandum by the Representatives of the British Chiefs of Staff” (Secret), C.O.S. 883/2, August 20, 1945 [NARA].
92 Contingency for possible use against Japan: G. B. Carter and Graham S. Pearson, “Past British Chemical Warfare Capabilities,” RUSI Journal, February 1996, p. 62.
92–93 Transfer of Tabun bombs to Britain (Operation Dismal): Sloan, A Tale of Tabun, pp. 38–43.
93 Creation of FIAT: Kuhn, “German Technical Information,” p. 12.
93 “One gets the idea that if the IG had not been fortunate enough to stumble . . .”: BIOS, “Interrogation of Professor Ferdinand Flury and Dr. Wolfgang Wirth on the Toxicology of Chemical Warfare Agents” (Secret), Final Report no. 782, item no. 8, undated, p. 8 [NARA, RG 319].
94 None of the physiologists admitted involvement: BIOS, “CW Investigation (BIOS Trip 1703),” September 5, 1945 [PRO, IFO 1031/105].
94 “It does seem a matter for serious doubt . . .”: BIOS, “Interrogation of Professor Ferdinand Flury and Dr. Wolfgang Wirth on the Toxicology of Chemical Warfare Agents” (Secret), Final Report no. 782, item no. 8, undated, pp. 7–8 [NARA, RG 319].
94 Klenk interrogation: FIAT, “Report on Chemical Warfare Based on the Interrogation and Written Reports of Jürgen E. von Klenck, Also Comments by Speer and Dr. E. Mohrhardt” (Secret), December 6, 1945.
94 FIAT interrogation of Ter Meer: Sloan, A Tale of Tabun, p. 34.
94 Human experimentation by Wimmer and Hirt: Bower, The Paperclip Conspiracy, p. 96.
95 Ambros transfer and disappearance, Tarr telegram: FIAT, “Detention of Dr. Ambros,” FIAT E 254082 (AMBROS), undated [PRO FO 1031/86]; Bower, The Paperclip Conspiracy, pp. 96–97.
96 Hirschkind meeting with Ambros: Letter to Otto Ambros from W. Hirschkind, Dow Chemical Company, Western Division, Walnut Creek, Calif., dated July 21, 1967, available online at www.carr.lib.md.us/∼stevenba/dowambro.htm.
96 Ambros protected by French government: FIAT, “Detention of Dr. Ambros”; Bower, The Paperclip Conspiracy, p. 97.
96–97 Schrader internment at Dustbin: Major E. Tilley, Memorandum to Lieutenant Colonel P. M. Wilson, Subject: “Schrader,” April 9, 1946 [PRO FO 1031/105 50146].
98 IG Farben trial: “The Farben Case, Military Tribunal VI, Case 6,” in Nuremberg Military Tribunal, Trials of War Criminals Before the Nürnberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, vol. 12, Nürnberg, October 1946–April 1949 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953).
99 “He is wily . . .”: FIAT, “Detention of Dr. Ambros.”
99 Ambros defense: Anonymous, “Zum Tode eines Giftgasenthusiasten,” Pfalz-Forum, no. 3 (October–December 1999), pp. 25–29.
99 Peter Hayes quote: Hayes, Industry and Ideology, p. 367.
99 Statistics of IG Farben trial: Plumpe, Die I.G. Farbenindustrie A.G., pp. 746–759.
100 Ambros sentencing: Groehler, Der lautlose Tod, p. 331.
100 DuBois book: DuBois, The Devil’s Chemists.
101 “the Russians know that we possess this gas”: Air Staff, Royal Air Force, “Note on the Potential Value of Nerve Agents as C.W. Agents,” September 6, 1947 [PRO, AIR 20/8730].
101 Planned modification of Tabun bombs: Chiefs of Staff Committee, Chemical Warfare Sub-Committee, “Chemical Warfare Reserve Policy, Note by the Air Ministry,” CW(52) 9, July 30, 1952, p. 2 [PRO DEFE 41/157].
101 Sea dumping of Tabun bombs (Operation Sandcastle): J. O. C. Livesay, Memorandum, “Disposal of German Nerve Gas Stored at Llandwrog” (Secret), February 12, 1954 [PRO, AIR 20/8734]; Inspector-General, Royal Air Force, “Report on Visit to No. 31 Maintenance Unit—Llandwrog” [Disposal of German Nerve Gas Bombs Under Operation Sandcastle], Report No. 538 (Confidential), May 3, 1956 [PRO, AIR 20/8730]; Sloan, A Tale of Tabun, pp. 56–82.
102 Pentagon strategists drew up plans Kevin Sullivan, “U.S. Planned Chemical Attack on Japan,” Guardian (London), August 6, 1991.
CHAPTER SIX: RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
103 New construction at Edgewood Arsenal: U.S. Army Edgewood Arsenal, “An Introduction to Edgewood Arsenal” (brochure), September 1973 [SPRU].
104 CWS assessment of Tabun: War Department, The Adjutant General’s Office, Washington, D.C., Memorandum, Subject: “New German Gas, MCE, Preliminary Report,” June 19, 1945 [FOIA]; Jess W. Thomas, Protection A forded by Gas Mask Canisters Against Dimethylamino Cyano Ethoxy Phosphine Oxide (MCE), Technical Division Memorandum Report (Secret), CWS, Technical Command, Edgewood Arsenal, Control No. 5004-1127, September 12, 1945 [FOIA].
104 Development of production process for Tabun: Chemical Warfare Service, “Item No. 1445, Subject: CWS Project Program for Fiscal Y
ear 1946” (Confidential), June 15, 1945 [FOIA].
104 Static testing of Tabun-filled munitions at Edgewood: U.S. Army Chemical Corps, Memorandum to the Chairman, Chemical Corps Technical Committee, Subject: “Chemical Corps Project Program for 1948” (Secret), June 16, 1947 [FOIA]; U.S. Army Chemical Corps, Research and Development Project Card (New Projects), “Munitions for G-Series Filling” (Secret), Project No. B10.5, 4-04-15-05, March 18, 1948 [FOIA].
105 Adoption of U.S. nomenclature for G Agents: Colonel J. H. Rothschild, Chief, Technical Division, CWS, “Symbols for German C.W.S. Agents,” October 16, 1945 [FOIA]; Major James E. McHugh, Executive, Training Division, CWS, “Symbols for German C.W.S. Agents, Comment No. 2,” October 17, 1945 [FOIA]; Colonel J. H. Rothschild, “Symbols for German C.W.S. Agents, Comment No. 3,” October 23, 1945 [FOIA]; Colonel J. H. Rothschild, Memorandum to the Commanding General, A.S.F, Subject: “Adoption of Symbols for Chemical Warfare Agents,” December 28, 1945 [FOIA].
106 Establishment of U.S. Army Chemical Corps: Russell, War and Nature, p. 177.
106 Project A1.13-2.1: Memorandum to the Chairman, Chemical Warfare Technical Committee, Subject: “Establishment of Project A1.13-2.1, GB Plant, Process Development” (Secret), CWTC Meeting no. 1, March 28, 1946 [FOIA].
106–07 Soviet dismantlement of Dyhernfurth production line: Krause and Mallory, Chemical Weapons in Soviet Military Doctrine, pp. 117–118.
107 Origins of Beketovka plant: Sonia Ben Ouagrham, “Conversion of Russian Chemical Weapons Production Facilities: Conflicts with the CWC,” The Non-proliferation Review, vol. 7, no. 2 (Summer 2000), p. 51.
107 Captured German scientists: U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Washington, D.C., Intelligence Staff Study, “Soviet Research and Development Capabilities for New Toxic Agents” (Secret), Project no. A-1735, July 28, 1958, pp. 6–7 [MHI].
107 Soborovsky: Author’s interview with Vil Mirzayanov.
107 Tabun mentioned in Military Chemical Textbook: U.S. Department of the Army, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2,, Intelligence Staff Study, “Chemical and Biological Capabilities in the Soviet Union and Satellites” (Secret), Project no. 7082, January 16, 1953, p. 5 [MHI].