The Pirates Laffite

by William C. Davis

  The Onís protest put its finger on just one of the reasons that the initial Gutiérrez-Humbert plan came to nothing. Everyone knew about it. Moreover, typical of the short-range thinking of most of the filibusters, they soon discovered that money was a problem. Even the merchants on the council who subscribed personal funds wound up unable or unwilling to meet their obligations. That probably did not apply to the Laffites, since their contribution would have been the vessels and crew to carry the expedition. 35 Nevertheless, the council had little choice but to postpone their grand plan. Meanwhile the experience of a Laffite privateer suggested an alternative approach.

  The passengers of the Amiable Maria watched "with a lot of pain in our hearts" as Jean Laffite supervised the dismantling of their taken vessel, removing her equipment and landing her cargo. Morphy was quick to send word to Apodaca of the capture of the Amiable Maria.36 The import of the rich prize could not be overlooked. While Humbert and Gutiérrez bumbled about in search of money, the Laffites could finance their own operation against Tampico or elsewhere. The Laffites learned the same lesson, but applied it differently, for soon a new plan emerged. This time Humbert would sail with a few score men on two of the Laffite goletas, to command the men in action if they attacked a city by land, and the Laffites would have at least three more vessels available in Barataria to join him if necessary. The corsairs' chief mission would be to prey on more of the Havana-Vera Cruz trade, especially money ships bringing soldiers' pay to the mainland. Once they had captured enough to meet the needs of the grander overland expedition, the original plan of April could be revived.

  Men and events stopped them. Morphy feared that the resources of the privateers were sufficient that they might launch the attack even if Humbert and Gutiérrez could not deliver their end of the men and money. He knew from observing Humbert and Gutiérrez that this gang, or "pandilla" as he called them, was ineffectual. "They are always resolved to carry out their diabolic plans," he commented to Apodaca, "without considering all the big problems they have to overcome in order to fulfill them." But the Baratarians were another matter, for he saw firsthand in New Orleans how effective they could be, and how substantial were their military resources. By late May he believed the privateers were ready to start on their own by hitting Tampico and preying on Spanish money ships bound for Vera Cruz. 37

  Morphy had likely already taken steps to meet this eventuality. He contacted Patterson about his concerns, and the commodore told Morphy that he would keep a ship cruising Lake Borgne to stop the pirates from using that avenue to New Orleans, and would place at least one cannon, if not a whole battery, on shore to help.38 In addition to the damage being done to customs revenues and the continuing entreaties of Governor Claiborne, Patterson had reasons to find the privateers inconvenient. Following the defeat and abdication of Napoleon that spring, Spain was once more a neutral nation, and the privateers' attacks on Spanish shipping caused diplomatic problems. Patterson was obligated to protect neutral commerce in American waters, making every Laffite prize an embarrassment.39

  Other events converged to stop the plan. On April 30, after years of dithering, the grand jury called by the district court issued the first of what would be a series of indictments for piracy, this one against a close Laffite associate, Manuel Joachim. It was the testimony of Andrew Whiteman that made the case, and he was testifying against many others, including both Laffites.40 Meanwhile the number of seizures and surveillance increased by late spring, and authorities were becoming more resourceful at finding prize goods that the Laffites hid in the homes of friends, especially in the Faubourg Marigny section of New Orleans where most of the San Domingue refugees settled.41

  Of course the prizes still came in. Dominique and his Tigre brought in a modest one at Cat Island early in May, and two or three more came into Grand Isle. Walker Gilbert believed that most of the population along the lower Lafourche were in motion toward the coast to participate in the Amiable Maria sale, or to do some illegal business with British ships briefly landing in order to trade goods for supplies.42 The Laffites' Dorada brought a prize loaded with dry goods into Barataria that month. Meanwhile Gambi and his Philanthrope, apparently following the revised plan for funding Humbert's campaign, took two prizes off Tampico in May and brought them to Grand Isle on June i. One was filled with silver ingots, and both with cocoa and more dry goods, all of which the Baratarians landed and sold to yet another concourse of buyers from New Orleans. Unlike the Laffites, Gambi paid little attention to the welfare of captured crew and passengers. He kept them for four weeks in what one described as "the most cruel situation," before he sent them home in one of the prize vessels.43

  Matters had changed by the time Gambi brought in these prizes. Within days after Gambi's arrival the cross-purposes, miscommunication, and organizational ineptitude of the filibuster leaders upset their plans once more. Gutiérrez announced on June 7 that he and Humbert intended to leave New Orleans for Barataria, then sail with several ships for the anticipated attack on Matagorda. But Gutiérrez never left the city, probably thanks to news that Toledo had a mere 120 men on the Sabine, and Robinson even fewer, with no cooperation between the two camps. This and maneuvering by Morphy, plus Picornell changing allegiances so suddenly, convinced Gutiérrez as of June 10 that the revised invasion plan was compromised. Undaunted, Humbert went to Grand Isle. He arrived at Barataria early that month, and there found Dominique in port after an eventful and embarrassing cruise.

  Youx had returned to cruising the Mexican Gulf coast after delivering the prize to Cat Island early in May. Running under Cartagenan colors, he passed Nautla, some seventy-five miles north of Vera Cruz, and there saw signals from the shore that were intended to get him to land. Instead he continued on his way toward Vera Cruz, only to run into an armed British merchantman that chased him back past Nautla two days later. The Englishman opened fire and brought down one of Tigres masts, then sent two boats to board her, but the privateers fought them off and the ships separated. Unfortunately Dominique allowed his crew to celebrate their narrow escape rather intemperately, and everyone aboard got so drunk that they accidentally ran the crippled Tigre ashore near Nautla. Word of their situation reached Nautla soon enough, and before long Dominique saw a schooner approaching his beached corsair.

  In it was Ellis P. Bean, the man who had signaled Dominique from shore several days earlier. General José Maria Morelos of the Mexican revolutionary junta had engaged Bean to acquire arms in the United States for his insurgency, and to aid and encourage the several competing filibuster plans for invading Texas, which would make his own task of defeating Spain in Mexico that much less difficult. Bean had raised something approaching $10,000 from wealthy patrons, but on reaching the coast at Nautla he had been unable to get anything better than a little schooner to take him to New Orleans. This was why he tried to signal Dominique to his aid, but now he went to Dominique's. The Tigre had to be abandoned. Bean transported the privateer crew to Nautla, where they made his schooner more seaworthy, and then they sailed to Grand Isle. Jean Laffite welcomed Bean ashore and entertained him generously, then gave him a guide for the journey through the bayous to New Orleans. In the process Laffite learned that Bean had money for arms, and that there was more to be had.44

  Humbert probably arrived at Barataria before Bean left, and what he learned would have encouraged him. The Mexicans could raise enough money to buy substantial arms, and that promised good business for the Laffites and their merchant associates in New Orleans. Morelos was anxious to cooperate with Texan ventures, which appealed to Humbert. Rather than act on their own as filibusters, with all the attendant risks of Spanish and American retaliation, perhaps Humbert, the Laffites, and their cohorts could legitimize their several ambitions under the aegis of the Mexican rebel regime, which included a congress and all the other forms of a working government. For the Laffites, the Morelos insurgency could offer legitimacy on the high seas, while his army afforded protection of any privateering base the
Laffites established on the Mexican coast. This base would be essential, for even with Mexican letters of marque, the Laffites and their brethren risked prosecution in the United States if they operated out of Louisiana in taking neutral Spanish ships.

  Between them, Humbert, the Laffites, and perhaps Bean decided that a chastened Dominique would carry Humbert to the Mexican coast in an unarmed Laffite felucca. His intentions were not yet entirely clear to the Spanish authorities in New Orleans.45 Sedella, for instance, believed that Dominique was taking Humbert to Tampico or Vera Cruz bent on a pillaging raid.46 Sedella passed the information along to Apodaca in Cuba using as a secret courier the merchant Francisco Brunetti, whose three-year-old mulatto daughter Silvania Catherina would fourteen years hence marry Pierre Laffite's son Martin.47

  However, Humbert's real intent was to meet with leaders of the insurgency and to obtain a commission to legitimize his Texas intentions, letters of marque for the corsairs involved in his plan, and some immediate profit to finance their efforts. The last they would achieve by Dominique taking along a cargo of several tons of gunpowder to sell to the rebels. On June 19 Humbert landed at Nautla, where he first posed as an envoy from the United States in order to make contact with the insurgent leaders. In fact, there were two rival leaders, Ignacio Rayón and Juan Rosains, and each had sent a representative to see Humbert. He met with both of them, José Antonio Pedroza and Juan Pablo Anaya. Each sought to take Humbert to his leader, especially after Humbert falsely presented himself as a United States agent authorized to discuss an alliance with the junta. His cargo of gunpowder was also most attractive, and even more so was his promise that other Laffite ships including the Dorada and Gambis Philanthrope would be coming with more.48

  On July 12 Anaya struck first when he gave Humbert a passport allowing him to travel inland to meet with Rosains.49 While Humbert was gone, Anaya and Dominique sold the gunpowder for $5,000 and a variety of silver and gold jewelry. On hearing that the Rayon faction had taken control of the congress and ordered his arrest, Anaya decided it was time to leave Mexico. He manufactured for himself a bogus commission as emissary to the United States, then virtually kidnapped his enemy Pedroza, put the money and jewelry aboard Dominique's felucca, and set sail as soon as Humbert returned, reaching Barataria about the first of September. On their arrival they met Bean, who joined them for the trip to New Orleans. Dominique dropped them off in the city on September 6 and returned immediately to Grand Isle, for he had learned disturbing news on reaching Barataria.50 During their absence the landscape had changed dramatically for the filibusters, for the progress of the American war with Britain, and most of all for the Laffites, beginning not least with the fact that Pierre Laffite was in jail.

  NINE

  Patriots for a Price 1814

  Is this my skill? my craft? to set at last

  Hope, power, and life upon a single cast?

  Oh' Fate!—accuse thy folly, not thy fate!

  She may redeem thee still, not yet too late.

  SUGGESTIONS OF A stiffening attitude by federal, state, and local authorities earlier in the year proved to be no aberration, but representative of a genuine resolve at last to attack the problems posed by Louisiana's smugglers, privateers, and outright pirates. On April 30, 1812, Louisiana became a state, and in 1814 Claiborne ceased to be an appointed territorial governor with amorphous powers when Louisianans elected him their first state governor. He had long complained of the embarrassment the Baratarian enterprise brought on the area, and more specifically of the Laffites since Holmes's arrest of the brothers brought them to his attention. The April 7, 1813, legal case brought against them for violation of the revenue and neutrality laws made no mention of piracy. These were misdemeanor charges, and nothing came of them. Though under threat of arrest, the brothers continued to operate at large, merely showing circumspection when they made their sporadic nocturnal visits to New Orleans.

  By the summer of 1814 the flagrant flouting of the revenue laws by the virtual bazaars at Grand Isle and Cat Island had become well known throughout the Mississippi Valley. "The smuggling at Barataria has greatly injured all honest traders," opined a newspaper in St. Louis, Missouri. Nor was there any question in the public mind who oversaw the enterprise, though the brothers were sometimes merged into one, for the journal added that "in consequence of his [Laffites] piracy and smuggling, a great variety of goods are very cheap here." 1 Both Jean and Pierre were constantly at Barataria now, and most visitors agreed that they directed the operation. Jean, referred to as "the younger," exercised the greater overall command of the men and personally supervised the auction sales and the collection of the money from the buyers.2 "There was always a great collection of people on shore of whom Lafitte the younger had command," one privateer observed.3 Mariner William Godfrey agreed, reporting, "There were two persons named Lafitte who appeared to command the people on shore, the chief command being in the youngest person of that name."4

  Yet Gambi also had influence.5 To some it appeared that Jean Laffite and Gambi shared control of the operation, while others thought Gambi was Jean's second-in-command.6 Some privateersmen acknowledged Laffites primacy by referring to him as "the Governor," while others used sailors' convention in calling him "the old man."7 Many merely addressed him by the nickname "Fita."8 Jean exercised some executive powers such as issuing and signing passports into and out of Barataria for visiting merchants and traders from New Orleans.9 He also imposed at least a few laws that he and Pierre conceived for all to observe. While the Laffites were in the business of selling illegal African slaves, they discouraged harboring runaway slaves. That was a legal offense that no real or pretended privateering commission could excuse, and only promised to alienate their planter customers. When Jean found a runaway in the Dorada's crew, or in the crew of a vessel belonging to Gambi or another privateer, he arrested the black for return to its owner.10 One story survived for years claiming that Gambi and some of his men felt aggrieved that Laffite rather than he commanded, and that Jean only cemented his control when he shot one of Gambi's followers for disobeying orders. 11 The story may have had a grain of truth, for Gambi's own vicious nature was well enough known, one Spanish agent warning Apodaca that Gambi was "the cruelest and greatest assassin among all the pirates."12 Some recalled Jean's rule as being absolute, and the punishment he imposed on rule breakers severe, but none of it seemed unjust. Most of all, in an enterprise of independent, unruly, quarrelsome, and basically criminal men, he kept order.13

  The smuggler community extended to perhaps forty huts and makeshift houses, most poorly constructed with simple roofs of thatched palmetto fronds. It was a fluid population, consisting primarily of the crews of privateers then in port, their occasional prisoners from prizes, and the visiting buyers from New Orleans. The only long-term residents were a handful of Laffite employees, for few employees were needed. The corsair crews did the work of off-loading cargoes, and often helped run the pirogues into the interior, from which they returned with provisions for the next cruise. A few vendors may have provided outlets for the crewmen to spend their shares, but stories that reached the outside of a thriving commercial community with billiard halls and the like were pure exaggeration. Life on Grand Isle was temporary and rude, of the sort men could create for themselves anywhere they stopped for a few days. Only the Laffites lived in an actual house, at the eastern end of the island overlooking the pass into the bay.

  The island had a few permanent residents—a Mr. Dugas, for one, and François Rigaud, who owned some of its land—and their relations with the privateers were excellent, neither interfering with the other.14 The privateers erected log signal towers in order to communicate with vessels seeking entry into the bay, and the Laffites built one or more warehouses for storing goods prior to auction. 15 Despite exaggerated reports of forts and artillery to protect the pass, they built none, though it is possible that they ran La Diligent aground to use as defensive battery, as was reported.16

  Few h
ad any illusion about the contents of the warehouses. Daniel McMullin spent enough time on Grand Isle to satisfy himself that summer that "Lafitte Vincent & all the others concerned with them were plunderers & smugglers."17 James Hoskins agreed that "they all appeared to this deponent to be robbers & smugglers," and John Oliver, who came to take passage aboard La Misere, frankly admitted afterward in remarkably similar language, that "Lafitte, Gambio & their associates appeared to be sea robbers & plunderers."

  "There was a great concourse of people at Grand Terre, sometimes as many as twelve hundred, buying, and selling prize Goods brought in, and supplies procured from New Orleans," one sailor found that summer. Less exaggerated eyewitness accounts put the number at a steady three hundred or four hundred people.18 When Laffite goods were seized en route to market by agents such as Gilbert, or confiscated from cache houses in New Orleans, the smugglers simply established other "warehouses" in the city's environs.19 People in New Orleans suspected that the customs agents did not want to put the Laffites out of business, for the agents were making too much money from their shares of the proceeds on the confiscated goods they seized.20