The Pirates Laffite

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The Pirates Laffite Page 19

by William C. Davis


  On September 7 Laffite enclosed the letter in another missive to Blanque, noting that Lockyer's ship still sat at anchor in sight from his house, and was now joined by two others. Jean had held no further communication with Lockyer, waiting for instructions from Blanque.86 "We have hitherto kept on a respectable defensive," Laffite added, but then dropped the hint that "if, however, the British attach to the possession of this place, the importance they give us room to suspect they do, they may employ means above our strength." If the British warships were there to carry out Percy's threat to destroy Barataria if Laffite refused to aid them, as Jean suggested, then the enemy would have a foothold at the back door to New Orleans. This being the case, Jean suspected that Claiborne and the military might now be very receptive to receiving intelligence from him, even at the cost of a favor to Pierre.87 Then, perhaps within hours of writing to Blanque, Laffite saw the Sophie and the other vessels raise anchor and sail out of sight. Lockyer had gotten tired of waiting, though Jean could not know whether this meant a reprieve from danger, or that Lockyer was going to inform Percy that Laffite was playing with them and it was time to attack. 88

  By this time Blanque had received Jean's first package, and by his own account he thought this a "strange communication" from Laffite. After he read the documents he immediately determined to turn them over to Claiborne.89 Meanwhile he sent a verbal message back via Laffite's courier, a Mr. Rancher, telling Jean to remain calm and do nothing until he heard more from Blanque or from the governor.90 Blanque's response probably took two or three days to reach Grand Isle, meaning it arrived on or about September 10. But the perfunctory message would have been far overshadowed when a pirogue came down the bay that day and Pierre Laffite stepped ashore and into his brother's arms.

  It required but a few minutes for Jean to inform his brother of the past week's events. Both quick thinkers, they now dealt with the shift in circumstances caused by Pierre's escape. Jean's requests from Blanque were now moot, of course. In effect, they had given the authorities information for nothing. The information was of little value, for there was nothing in the Lockyer papers not already known in New Orleans, but now they had nothing with which to bargain. Meanwhile Percy might send a force to destroy Barataria at any time in the next few weeks, and they could not ignore the rumors coming out of New Orleans that Patterson was preparing to do the same thing. They needed time, and Pierre came up with a new carrot to dangle before Claiborne and the American authorities.

  The Baratarians would offer to defend Barataria against a British attack if it came, and in return Jean would ask Claiborne for a cessation of the prosecutions against them, which implied a halt to Patterson's intended attack as well. This plan was brilliant in its way, for the governor was not necessarily to know that in effect the Laffites were offering nothing. Jean already accepted, and as much as admitted to Blanque, that he could not defend Barataria against a British attack. He had several privateers in the harbor and three hundred to five hundred men at any given time, but this was no match for English warships. But of course the British might not come. If they did not, then he would have forestalled Patterson's attack at no expense to himself, and he could still leave for the Mexican coast when ready. If the British did come, he could try to stop an attack by sending out word accepting their terms, which he had conditionally accepted already. In the worst case, if the British proved intractable, he could simply evacuate earlier than he intended and move to the Calcasieu or the Sabine.

  Pierre wrote a letter to Claiborne the same day, and once more resorted to flattery, telling Claiborne that he had been elected governor thanks to his merit and the esteem of the people. Then he portentously broached a matter "on which may depend the safety of this country." Offering to restore to Louisiana "several citizens, who perhaps in your eyes have lost that sacred title," he proffered the Baratarians "such as you could wish to find them, ready to exert their utmost efforts in defence of the country." Asserting the strategic importance of his position on Grand Isle, he offered to defend it, asking in return that the current prosecutions and indictments against him and his men be quashed, and that a general pardon be granted for all they had done in the past.

  "I am the stray sheep, wishing to return to the sheepfold," he went on. "If you were thoroughly acquainted with my offences, I should appear to you much less guilty." He had never sailed under any flag except Cartagena's, he protested, adding disingenuously that "my vessels are perfectly regular in that respect." Indeed, he would have brought his prizes into New Orleans if he could have, since they were lawful, but he stopped at that, saying, "I decline saying more on the subject." Should Claiborne refuse his offer, he concluded, "I declare to you that I will instantly leave the country, to avoid the imputation of having co-operated towards an invasion on this point, which cannot fail to take place, and to rest secure in the acquittal of my own conscience." Laffite did not offer to aid in the defense of New Orleans, or to join the American army, or to do any other service where needed, but only to defend Grand Isle. 91 What remained to be seen was whether the shepherd was willing to let these black sheep join his flock.

  TEN

  The End of Barataria 1814

  How speed the outlaws? stand they well prepared,

  Their plunder d wealth, and robbers rock, to guard?

  Dream they of this our preparation, doom'd

  To view with fire their scorpion nest consumed?

  GOVERNOR CLAIBORNE had the Laffites on his mind even before the moment, probably the morning of September 7, when Jean Blanque asked for an audience.1 The diplomatic situation created by the privateers had only gotten stickier as General Andrew Jackson sought to defend Mobile and southern Alabama, which were made particularly vulnerable by the Spanish occupation of Pensacola and East Florida. Jackson feared that affronts to Spain's neutrality could make the Spaniards amenable to the British using Florida as a base for an attack on Mobile and, ultimately, New Orleans. Early in July reports conjectured that the British would launch an invasion from Apalachicola.2 At the same time Jackson upbraided Governor Gonzalez Manrique of Florida for allowing the British to land men and guns in their effort to inflame the Indians against the Americans. Manrique countered by noting the "scandalous notoriety" of the United States harboring "the piracies of Lafite and his party, at Barrataria." Their enterprise, he suggested, could be seen as sufficient reason to help the British make war against a nation so indulgent of violations on Spain's commerce.3

  Thus Jackson had been delighted when Claiborne informed him of Pierre Laffite s capture, though several weeks elapsed before Jackson wrote to Manrique to declare that "Monsieur Le Fitte, commander of the band of pirates, was arrested some time ago and now is being prosecuted for the enormous crimes, piracies, and complaints which there have been against him." That, he suggested, should be proof enough of American good intentions, and he went on to challenge Manrique for providing a haven for American deserters and English renegades who raided American communities. Manrique was swallowing none of that, however. Advised by his friends in New Orleans, he shot back that Pierre had been arrested for the Stout killing and not for his attacks on Spanish ships, "and that for his piracies and enormous crimes he is now at liberty to return to his honorable occupation, that of the vilest of pirates."4 Meanwhile in New Orleans, Fray Sedella had pressed steadily with Claiborne for legal action to be taken against the Baratarians, though this put him at risk of retaliation from the smugglers, or so he thought.5 The governor, in turn, persistently took his case to the military authorities. In mid-August he wrote to General Jackson that "the Pirates and Smugglers who have so long infested the shores of Barataria ... Are still in force and, in the daily violation of all laws human and divine." His legislature would not authorize the means to deal with the problem, and he begged the United States to do so. Patterson had told him he was disposed to act, and Colonel George Ross of the 44th United States Infantry was in accord.6 By the beginning of September, General Jackson was every bit as anxious
as Claiborne, Patterson, and Washington to make an end of the Baratarians.

  The growing focus on the Laffite problem was about to produce results. On July 8 Secretary of the Navy William Jones had sent Commodore Patterson a direct order to break up the Grand Isle operation.7 To that end, Jones assigned to him the armed schooner USS Carolina, which arrived in New Orleans in mid-August. Patterson feared that the British naval presence in the Gulf would make it unsafe to take his little fleet on a sortie, but then he learned that enemy warships were moving toward Mobile, and this gave him an opportunity. 8 By the beginning of September Patterson had his expedition ready, expecting it would take no more than a fortnight.9 At the last moment, though, one of his brigs lost a mast, necessitating repair. On September 4 Patterson expected to be able to leave in two days, his anxiety heightened that day by the news of Pierre Laffite's escape from jail.10

  The day after Pierre's escape, Claiborne ordered two divisions of state militia to be ready to march and to muster at Baton Rouge October 1. This had little or nothing to do with Barataria, and more with the beginning perceptions that New Orleans might be a British target after Mobile, if not before. But it was amid the flurry of activity among officials in New Orleans that Jean Blanque appeared at Claiborne's quarters asking for an audience.11 When they met, Blanque handed the governor the packet of correspondence he had received from Laffite, and immediately tried to disassociate himself from the Baratarians by protesting curiosity as to why Laffite sent it to him when he had "no acquaintance with Lafite." Still, he told the governor that he knew on reading the documents what he should do with them. Claiborne read the letters in Blanque's presence, and then at Blanque's request returned to him the one addressed from Jean to Blanque, Blanque likely thinking he might need it later to establish that he was only an intermediary.12

  Here was a pretty quandary. Commodore Patterson was ready to launch his expedition, and now Jean Laffite confirmed that the British had solicited the Baratarians' assistance. While this could have added urgency to Patterson's enterprise, the governor's understanding from Jean's letter to Blanque was, as he put it, that Laffite felt determined to "take no part with the English."13 Laffite's sending the material to Blanque suggested that if he learned anything more of British intentions, he could be willing to pass it on to Claiborne. Yet Laffite had not explicitly offered aid to the Americans, and the only thing Jean asked for, his brother's release or relief, had been attained with no further need of the deal he proposed. Indeed, Claiborne even thought there was room for doubt that the correspondence proposing the bargain was genuine.

  Dealing with the Laffites could have advantages, however, and to discuss what should be done Claiborne that day summoned the informal "Board of Officers," with whom he consulted on matters relating to the defense of Louisiana. The board consisted of Commodore Patterson, Colonel Ross, collector Dubourg, and Major General Jacques Villere, commander of the state militia. Claiborne put the packet of materials before them, along with his views. "Lafitte and his associates might probably be made useful to us," Claiborne said, but he added his doubts about the propriety and wisdom of "using men of such desperate character in any manner." Caught in his indecision, Claiborne confessed some doubts about Patterson's expedition. "I begin to think it would be advisable, for the present, to postpone it," he said.

  Patterson disagreed emphatically, and argued that his orders to attack Barataria left him no alternative. Moreover, he confessed his own anxiety to get at them at last.14 Unsaid, though certainly a part of his thinking, was the fact that he and his men would be entitled to share the proceeds of sale of whatever his expedition captured in the way of vessels and merchandise. He stood to profit considerably if his raid were a success. Money mattered to Patterson, who was married to the daughter of George Pollock, director of the New Orleans Branch of the Bank of the United States, and the Orleans Navigation Company. Patterson had already engaged an attorney to represent him in the anticipated prize cases to come.

  Ross agreed that the raid had to go on. He, too, would share in any contraband seized. Then the question arose of whether the documents were genuine, or simply a ruse to try to negotiate Pierre Laffite's freedom. 15 Claiborne at first thought them false, as did Patterson, Ross, and Dubourg. Apparently Villere disagreed, however. Later that day Claiborne met with former collector Pierre Duplessis, who had seen Jean's signature before and confirmed that the one on the letter to Lockyer was genuine, which satisfied the governor.16

  The weight of the argument to strike Barataria ran against Claiborne. They no longer had Pierre as a guarantee that Jean would honor a bargain, and Jean had not offered anything concrete. Moreover, as Ross pointed out, the letter to Lockyer "shews Lafites acceptation," so for all they knew the smugglers would cooperate with the enemy.17 That decided it. Indeed, if anything, the meeting hastened the launch of the expedition. The next day, September 8, Claiborne wrote to General Jackson, sending him copies of the documents and expressing his own ambivalence, while Ross notified the general that the expedition would be leaving soon.18

  Meanwhile the message Blanque had sent to Jean via Rancher may have included a promise that the government would not take action against the Baratarians immediately—though whether that was Claiborne or Blanque speaking is uncertain.19 What little Rancher was able to report upon reaching the island may have prompted Pierre's "stray sheep" letter to Claiborne. When the brothers were together Pierre exercised the greater authority, and now he wrote to Blanque endorsing Jean's actions and promising that he was "fully determined to follow the plan that may reconcile us with the government." He enclosed his letter to Claiborne, leaving it to Blanque's judgment whether it should be delivered.20 By this time Blanque had received Jean's September 7 letter, with the captured Havana letter enclosed, which Blanque thought shed "some light on the situation of the English as much as he [Laffite] could furnish." He immediately put it into Claiborne's hands.21 The accumulating evidence began to argue that the Laffites were sincere in their disavowal of intent to aid the British. Pierre's September 10 letter to Claiborne could not have made it any more explicit. But by the time the governor got it two days later, Patterson and Ross had launched their expedition hours earlier and it could not now be called back even if Claiborne had had the authority to do so.

  At 1 A.M. on September n, Patterson loaded seventy men under Colonel Ross on three barges above the city, then floated downriver in the darkness to avoid detection—a failed effort since the next day it was well known in New Orleans that the expedition was under way, with no mystery as to its objective. Morphy sent word of it to Havana, along with his conviction that "now there can be no doubt that the Baratarians rob every ship without distinction." There was, he said, no alternative to driving them permanently from their lair.22 By daylight Patterson had reached English Turn, and by the next day joined the Carolina at Plaquemine. Patterson stopped at Fort St. Philip the following morning, and rendezvoused that afternoon with the USS Sea Horse and six gunboats at the Balize.23 He spent more than a day there in final preparations. Finally on the evening of September 15 the flotilla sailed through the southwest pass and into the Gulf. No doubt Patterson delayed sailing until after dark in hopes of slipping past prying eyes, and to time his arrival at Grand Terre for just after dawn.24 However, he was convinced that word was already on its way to the Laffites. More than that, he fully expected that when he struck Grand Isle in the morning, the smugglers would fight to the last.25 Meanwhile mere hours after Patterson left Morphy realized that something was going on. He had news that the Petit Milan was at Plaquemine—which it was not—and there was a Spanish armed vessel then in New Orleans that he hoped could go out to take Gambi's corsair. The port authorities would not let her leave, however, and he thought that suspicious. He believed it was because they did not want anyone interfering with the Petit Milan, but more likely it was because Patterson did not want any competition when he went after the privateers.26

  It had been an eventful ten days on Gra
nd Isle since Lockyer's visit. The Sophie had not returned, though the Laffites might still have expected her if the British honored the fortnight Jean had asked for. Meanwhile several other vessels arrived. On September 9 the Moon of November under Captain Thomas Frank came in for repairs after taking a Spanish brig loaded with wine and Spanish rum.27 The Cometa was still there, her owner Lorenzo Oliver having paid her ransom, and he and four helpers were hard at work readying her to leave.28 The Harlequin, a Spanish pilot boat formerly named the Experiment taken on a voyage out of Vera Cruz, was in port fitting out.29 Gambi had finished fitting out the Petit Milan, which he had bought from the Laffites, and would be leaving soon for another cruise.30 Dominique was there, too, now without a command other than the little felucca that had brought him, Humbert, and the others from Mexico. Though an independent privateer, Dominique was generally understood to be acknowledging orders from the Laffites.31 The Cartagenan privateer schooner Militia was moored to the shore, half full of water where she had been run ashore to prevent her sinking, her rigging removed and stored in a Laffite warehouse, awaiting repairs. The men had just finished pumping out her hold on September 15.32

  All told perhaps four hundred men were on the island, in addition to a substantial number of merchants and buyers.33 Precisely when the Laffites learned of the Patterson raid is unclear. Nothing in the brothers' September 10 letters hints at knowledge of an impending attack, but they must have learned of it very soon thereafter. A careless word from one of the principals after the decisive September 8 meeting of Claiborne's council could have reached Grand Isle within forty-eight hours, and news of Patterson and Ross's movements at any time after that.34 In any event, there were few secrets in New Orleans.

 

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