Once more the brothers had to adapt to rapidly shifting circumstances. They did not wish to fight, and did not likely consider doing so. Most of the men on Grand Isle were ordinary sailors who signed on as privateers hoping to make a swift and risk-free profit by taking defenseless merchantmen. When they encountered an armed vessel willing to fight back, they as a rule weighed their chances and sailed away. Most had never experienced a fight, and certainly not as an organized force. And, in light of the recent near mutiny over Lockyer, Pierre and Jean could not be confident that the men would follow them if they tried to command a defense. There was no fort, contrary to rumor in New Orleans, and only three cannon mounted on logs rather than proper carriages. 35 If La Diligent had been posted aground as a battery ship, she was gone now, most likely dismantled for her rigging and equipment. The privateer ships then in port mounted about twenty guns of varying calibers, and the Laffites' men had plenty of small arms, muskets, and cutlasses, but one man among them believed that "they had not men enough to man the privateers & fight their guns if they had had a mind [to do it]" unless some of the shoppers from New Orleans were willing to take a hand at fighting.36
Then, too, while one smuggler maintained that in August Jean had referred to the three cannon as being there "to receive the Americans when they arrived,"37 it was generally assumed among the Baratarians that their leaders did not want to come to blows with the United States. French patriotism aside, defending a base they intended to abandon would simply have been a waste of lives and resources.38 When word came of the Patterson raid, one Baratarian heard Jean Laffite remind his captains that he "had always said he never would fight against the Americans."39
The captains agreed that escape was their best option. But when the officers of the Laffite ships remonstrated with the brothers that they should sail immediately for Cartagena, the Laffites refused. Jean at least professed faith that Patterson would not attack after Jean's offer to defend Barataria against the British. Indeed, he expected at any moment to get instructions from Claiborne to that end. However, he gave no orders for those working for him to stay, but rather told men and officers alike that they were free to take what prize goods were theirs. The contraband belonging to the Laffites he made little attempt to hide, since a sale was already scheduled. 40
By September 15 a fair concourse of potential buyers was on Grand Isle, and most of the cargo from the Cometa and other recent prizes was ashore in the warehouse, stored west of the island on a point of land called Chenier Caminada, or strewn on the beach for sale.41 Even the houses of the few permanent residents of Grand Terre were host to buyers for the occasion.42 The Laffites' plan had been to sell as much as they could as quickly as possible, then get their seaworthy ships out of the bay to safety before Patterson and Ross arrived.43 Any unsold goods were supposed to be concealed inland.44 In the end the Laffites managed to sequester only a large quantity of pistol flints and perhaps some gunpowder.
The men on Grand Isle were eating breakfast about 8:30 on the morning of September 16 when they saw the fleet's sails on the horizon.45 The Laffites had left everyone but their crews to their own devices, and panic ensued. Some men wanted to escape into the bayous. Others wanted to make sail if they could, while a few called for them to stand their ground and fight. The buyers from New Orleans immediately fled in their pirogues, though not before leaving some incriminating papers behind.46 Some of the privateers were flying Cartagenan colors, and at about 9 o'clock they started forming their vessels in what appeared to be line of battle near the entrance of the harbor.
Pierre and Jean left the privateers to make their separate decisions. Calling as many of their crewmen to them as would rally, the brothers abandoned their merchandise and boarded pirogues. They could not risk Pierre's recapture. They had close associates in the sparsely settled areas of St. Charles Parish, known locally as the German Coast. They rowed up the bay into Little Lake, past the Temple, then up a bayou to Lake Salvadore. From there the Bayou Des Allemandes or other waterways, routes they had used for smuggling, led to the marshy wilderness of the German Coast interior, where they would be secure. 47 Behind them they left a disaster.
At 10 o'clock, with a light wind behind him, Patterson moved in to attack. Half an hour later he saw signal smoke columns rising along the coast, probably to alert men inland, perhaps the Laffites, that the attack had come. Soon a white flag went up on one privateer schooner, and then the stars and stripes on its mainmast, and for good measure a Cartagenan flag on the topping lift. Patterson ran a white flag up his mainmast to signify that he would not fire unless fired upon, but then he saw two of the privateer vessels aground set ablaze. This meant the smugglers were destroying valuable prize goods, and at once he raised a signal to attack—at the same time running up a large flag that proclaimed "Pardon to Deserters," since he thought men once serving in the United States Army and Navy might be among the Baratarians.
Two of Patterson's gunboats ran aground on the sandbar outside the pass, as did the Carolina, but the rest passed over and crafts from the grounded vessels started rowing into the bay, only to see the privateers abandoning their ships and fleeing in small boats in every direction.48 Dominique joined a few others and put out in his little felucca hoping to reach New Orleans, but before he could get out of the pass Patterson's gunboats were coming in. One opened fire on him, and he had to run aground and try to flee in a pirogue.49 Gambi tried to warp the Petit Milan to safety by letting out a cable to men in boats and having them row her into deep water, but the cable broke and the boats scattered, leaving the Petit Milan adrift.50
Quickly the attackers boarded and saved a burning schooner that mounted one twelve-pounder and four smaller cannon.51 By noon Patterson had possession of six schooners, one felucca, a brig, a prize, and two armed schooners that were captured with their crews still aboard, their guns ready and matches lit as if they had intended to use their cannon. 52 Then commenced the mopping up. The bay was full of fleeing pirogues. The soldiers and sailors began taking prisoners in number, including Dominique and Joseph Martinot, whom they brought directly to Patterson. The commodore personally searched the captives, taking from Martinot $700 in bank notes, his knife, and a telescope. To Martinot s protests that he was only there to get his vessel afloat, and that he had legitimate goods stored in a Laffite warehouse, Patterson turned a deaf ear. He had Martinot's Cometa burned since she was not yet seaworthy, and later made an inventory of her rigging in the warehouse, but denied all knowledge of Martinot's other cargo. He had come to serve his country and to make a handsome profit, and he was determined to do both.53
Patterson was not the only one plundering. It was systematic, and extended to everything from the merchandise on shore and in the warehouse to the pocket contents of the men and merchants, including four gold doubloons and $50 in bank notes in the trunk of an ailing merchant staying in one of the civilian homes.54 Once secure ashore and with the smugglers on the run, Ross's soldiers began burning about forty houses, most of them badly built and thatched with palmetto leaves.55 Ross also torched emptied warehouses, signal towers, two schooners, and a brig.56 The whole affair lasted no more than a few hours. When it was done, Patterson and Ross began to tally their captures, and they were impressive.
First there were the privateer vessels. Twenty-seven ships had been in the bay that day, several of them recent additions to the Laffite fleet. Most were not worth keeping, nor did Patterson have enough men to crew them all, so he burned several. He kept the Laffites' Dorada and Misere; the ninety-ton Harlequin, which now sailed under the Laffites' friend Laurent Maire; the ninety-ton Surprise, a prize taken the previous spring by the Dorada and fitted out for privateering; Gambi's fifty-ton Petit Milan; a thirty-ton felucca called the Fly belonging to the Laffites; the Comet of seventy-five tons; the fifteen-ton felucca Moon of November; and the Laffites' Amiable Maria57
Then there were the dry goods bags of medicinal herbs and flowers, bags of anise seed, boxes and barrels of antimony and
bluestone, bags of gum, anchors, bars of iron, barrels of glassware, more than ten thousand gallons of wine, seventy-five demijohns of spirits, ships' sails, a ship's cable, boxes of soap, glass tumblers, a lot of German linen, hundreds of silk stockings, poplin sheeting, sewing thread, coffee, bales of paper, cocoa, rope grass bales, window glass, duck canvas, and more—all the real plunder of pirates rather than the doubloons and jewels of fiction.58 The flour taken ran to 163 barrels, and that had been Jean Laffites own goods.59 The Santa Rita had aboard her cloves, coffee, cinnamon, 17,200 cigars, sherry, Málaga wine, 769 gallons of brandy, raisins, candles, 483 pounds of chocolate, cocoa, and more. Just the duty being evaded on such a cargo amounted to $10,776.39. The President carried sherry, black pepper, and brandy, and the Petit Milan had more sherry, rum, and candles.
There was also a lot of money. Patterson's men found $668 in Spanish cash on the Petit Milan, $6,255 on the President, and another $1,641 on the Santa Rita.60 They took gold and silver coin and paper banknotes of an indeterminate amount, though one money belt alone had $1,249 in specie.61 The paper notes of several New Orleans banks were ample evidence that city denizens had come to the island to make purchases. Another cache contained sixteen plates of silver bullion, sixty-two pieces of silver, and $564.43 in Spanish milled dollars. Equally valuable metal came in the form of the artillery seized, for besides what was on the captured ships, there were eight cannon of varying size, all useful to the navy.62 All the raiders missed were the hidden gun flints.
Patterson gained useful information among the prize goods. In the papers seized were letters of several New Orleans merchants of good standing, documentation of their business with the Laffites that the court could use to institute prosecutions. 63 More useful was the paper, found aboard the Dorada, that listed the signals used between Grand Isle and approaching privateer vessels.64
Considering that the ships might bring as much as $5,000 each for the larger vessels when sold at public auction, the bounty from the raid would be considerable. Later estimates placed it as high as $500,000—an obvious exaggeration, but it may have run to $200,000.65 The prize tally went higher on September 20 when a strange sail appeared on the horizon. The Carolina gave chase at a distance of five miles, but soon closed the gap, at which point the other vessel opened fire and the Carolina returned it. Soon the quarry ran aground outside the pass and broke her rudder. The Carolina could not get close, but the gunboats on the bay side of Grand Isle opened fire across the island and in half an hour the chase struck her colors. Patterson's men boarded and found her to be the General Bolivar, formerly the Atalanta, operating on a letter of marque from Cartagena dated the previous December.66 After having been chased at the Balize by a British squadron, the General Bolivar had mistaken the Carolina for an English warship, which was why she opened fire.67 Aboard her Patterson's sailors took $4,753 worth of goods, not to mention the vessel herself, which would bring another $5,813.68
On the afternoon of September 23 Patterson had his booty loaded aboard the eight prize vessels he would keep, and set sail for New Orleans. The schooner Moon of November escaped one night along the way, but by October 1 he had the rest safely in the city, and the loss of one small prize did not dampen Patterson's pride.69 While it stood the Baratarían community had been "alarming from its extent, indiscriminating in its character, and deplorable in its consequences and effects," he declared.70 The Laffites might have escaped, but he had taken Dominique, who some mistakenly believed to be the second-in-command. Public reaction was muted, thanks to the sympathy the smugglers enjoyed, but some professed pleasure. "The expedition has resulted very fortunately," one New Orleanian declared within hours of learning the news, "and will be the means of giving considerable strength to our naval station." 71
Between the signal columns of smoke and the hundreds of smugglers, privateersmen, and customers fleeing through the bayous, the Laffites surely learned the extent of the disaster within twenty-four hours. They must have heard or seen some of it in the distance as they fled. Likely they had brought with them little money, since the sales were in process when the attack came. If they truly believed that their offer would forestall Patterson's expedition, then the loss of their ships and goods came as a shock. If La Diligente was still afloat somewhere, probably under a different name, then she was safe for the time being, and they knew from experience, they would need only a few prizes brought in to their anticipated Mexican base to recover their fortunes. The damage to their prestige, however, was another matter. The Baratarían enterprise was never more than a loose conglomeration of disparate types, men of a hundred allegiances, some of whom submitted to the Laffites' administration only because it brought them profit. Now Jean and Pierre were fugitives, their empire—and with it their bargaining power with Claiborne and the Americans—gone.
Before long, however, they learned of events in New Orleans that might give them an opportunity to bargain once more. The day before Patterson's attack, a group of citizens had held a meeting at Bernard Tremoulet's Coffee House on Levee Street opposite the public market. It was a popular meeting place, one sometimes frequented by Baratarians. On the first floor was an auction room, and on the second a well-stocked reading room with newspapers, maps and charts for mariners, and a small library of geography, commerce, and travel books. Pierre Maspero was about to take it over and rename it the Exchange Commercial Coffee House. 72
In addressing the meeting, which he apparently had engineered, Edward Livingston said it was imperative that those assembled maintain control of the Mississippi. If the enemy took Louisiana, they would lose their property, their slaves, even their freedom, and they might be forced at bayonet point to fight their fellow Americans.73 He proposed that they form a committee to dominate the governor if necessary and work with the army and navy in planning the defense of their city and state. In spite of Claiborne's mobilization of two divisions of the state militia ten days earlier, Livingston did not believe enough was being done, and clearly anticipated going around the governor to deal directly with General Jackson.
Like most community leaders, Livingston knew by this time at least the outline of the correspondence that Blanque had delivered to Claiborne, and had likely heard it virtually verbatim from Blanque himself, who was at the public meeting and had probably helped Livingston with its organization. And though Claiborne studiously kept Pierre's September 10 "stray sheep" letter out of public knowledge for several weeks, Livingston surely knew its contents from Blanque. Thus, Livingston knew what the public did not: The Laffites had offered to defend Barataria against a British advance. That they could not have done so was immaterial, as was the near impossibility of an enemy moving thousands of men and animals, let alone artillery, through sixty miles of lakes and narrow bayous in pirogues. (Indeed, the British do not seem to have considered Barataria as a route of invasion, nor did Jackson seem to fear it.)74 The point was that the Laffites had offered the services of a force of several hundred, and Claiborne and the local military authorities had answered that offer of assistance with a raid.75
Livingston may not have discussed the full purport of the Laffite correspondence, or even mentioned it at the meeting, but he did address the underlying significance of the papers.76
Ignoring the fact that Patterson and Ross took their orders from military higher authority and not from the governor, Livingston and other critics could conclude that Claiborne's allowing Patterson to attack Barataria risked driving the smugglers into British arms.77 Quite possibly someone, most likely Livingston or Blanque, raised the idea of approaching the Baratarians on the basis of Pierre's offer of September 10.
Before the meeting adjourned the assembly elected a Committee of Public Safety, with Livingston as chairman. Among the others picked to serve was Blanque, ensuring that the committee would be well apprised of the Laffite correspondence. Three days later, immediately after learning the result of the Patterson raid, the committee opened communication directly with General Jackson, providing him
with its assessment of the approaches the British might use in moving on New Orleans. They closed with the pass into Barataria Bay, noting that until lately it had been in the hands of "a number of Buccanee[r]s under the Carthiginian flag," and recommended that though vessels drawing more than ten feet of water could not enter the bay, a battery of artillery be placed on Grand Isle or Chenier Caminada for protection.78
The day after the committee wrote to the general advising defense of Barataria, Claiborne did virtually the same. After informing Jackson of the triumph, Claiborne added that the smugglers could return once Patterson left, and suggested that a military installation protecting Grand Isle and the Temple might be wise.79 He also expressed fears that some of the smugglers streaming into town, San Domingue blacks "of the most desperate characters and probably no worse than most of their white associates," would provoke a slave rebellion.80 Patterson, for his part, complained that on his return from Barataria he found the bayous around the city infested with fugitive smugglers and pirates. 81 Morphy was outraged, and complained to Apodaca on September 19 that "a great number of these villains have already found refuge at this city."82
The first report of the attack on Barataria had come in a September 19 letter written by Ross at Grand Isle, and appeared in the city press five days later.83 However, the details of the Laffite correspondence had not been publicized, and no mention of Pierre's September 10 offer printed. In a city in which so many felt sympathy with the smugglers and profited through their business, it would not be politic for Claiborne to let it be known that he had met their offer of assistance with the sword, even if it were not his responsibility. Livingston, however, thought there was still hope of enlisting the Baratarians. As a result, in subsequent sittings of the Committee of Public Safety, he repeatedly raised the prospect of bringing the stray sheep into the fold via a pardon in return for their assistance in defending New Orleans.84
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