The Pirates Laffite

by William C. Davis

  The discouraged delegation left, but Marigny and committee member Joseph Ruffignac decided to call on Judge Dominic Hall. Informed of the logjam caused by the proceedings of his federal district court, Hall saw a way out of the problem. "I am general in these circumstances," he told his visitors, and then he outlined his campaign. The legislature was in session in the city. He told Marigny and Ruffignac to get before it immediately a resolution asking the federal court to suspend its action against the Baratarians. Once that passed, the judge could attend to the criminal proceedings under way for federal crimes. "I will immediately give my orders to the District Attorney of the United States."112

  Marigny and Ruffignac acted with dispatch, as did the legislature. The same day it passed a resolution that acknowledged the critical need for experienced seamen at the moment as well as the fact that many of the Baratarians were willing to enlist but feared prosecution. The resolution asked Jackson to "proclaim amnesty" for any who were now in service or enlisted within thirty days, with the promise that the legislature would petition the president for a full pardon of all who served their terms faithfully. The resolution also asked Claiborne to petition Grymes to enter nolle prosses in the pending cases of those like Dominique who were already in confinement and under indictment.113 This would allow for the release of those willing to enlist.

  In fact, Grymes did not get the chance to enter the nolle prosses because the next day, December 15, Hall simply recessed the federal court until February 20, 1815, citing the current emergency. 114 Grymes could enter the decisions not to prosecute later. By now everyone knew of the talk about a pardon in return for volunteering. Grymes may even have heard from the attorney general that the president favored such a scheme, and so he would not object to Hall's recess. The legislature, meanwhile, had always been sympathetic to the smugglers. In proposing his "campaign," therefore, Hall no doubt assumed that the prosecutions postponed would never be resumed.

  Coincidentally, just hours before Hall recessed the court, word arrived of disaster. On December 12 outposts had sighted the enemy fleet approaching Lake Borgne. The only thing to deter the armada was a small squadron consisting of five of Patterson's gunboats under Jones. Two days later the British overwhelmed and captured Jones and his vessels, leaving a clear road to New Orleans. Jackson got the news late that night or early on December 15. Patterson met with Jackson and expressed the severity of his manpower shortage. He had not enough men to crew properly his two warships, the Carolina and the Louisiana. Meanwhile British regulars were only sixty miles away. Jackson declared martial law on December 16.

  Naturally he met with Governor Claiborne before doing so, and Claiborne cooperated by mustering all the local militia not yet under arms. In their meeting Claiborne or Jackson raised once more the subject of the Baratarians. Now even Jackson knew he needed them. Hall had removed the federal impediment to his accepting their services, and the legislature could be expected to follow in kind. Something else also influenced the general. Only a few days earlier, on December 10, he had written to the secretary of war to complain that he had insufficient arms for the men then volunteering, and virtually no gunflints.115 Gunflints were quirky. A flint might last for weeks, or it could shatter on the first fire. If Jackson did not have sufficient replacements immediately at hand when a fight came, he might as well not have the soldier who held the weapon. Now, probably through Livingston, he learned that the Laffites had thousands of gunflints as well as other useful supplies, and were willing to hand it all over in exchange for pardon for good conduct in his army. 116

  That was enough. The general consented that those men in confinement who agreed to take arms to defend New Orleans could be released, and the governor said he would issue a proclamation to the smugglers in hiding. The next day, December 17, Claiborne published a call for them to come forward, announcing that Jackson would join with him afterward in petitioning the president for a full pardon for every man who did his duty.117 On December 18 the legislature passed an act suspending for 120 days all bankruptcy proceedings, civil suits, and collection of debts, and placing a moratorium on new civil suits.118 This provided another layer of immunity for the smugglers.

  That was all it took. Dominique and virtually all the other men in jail at the Cabildo walked free. Jackson gave Livingston orders to issue a pledge of allegiance to them and then accept all into the militia, where they were amalgamated into several of the volunteer companies of Louisianans already under arms.119 The men hiding outside the city began to come in as well, and Marigny averred that "the Baratarians hastened to us from all quarters."120 In the end, as many as four hundred of them took the oath, and 7,500 flints were turned over to Jackson's quartermaster.121 What Jackson and Claiborne and the rest could not yet know was that Washington had already concluded it would take much the same approach with the Baratarians. Livingston's October 24 letter to the president probably won him over, though it would take more than a month, and surely more information from others, before Madison came to a decision.122 At President Madison's direction, Attorney General Rush's letter of December 10 informed Claiborne that if the governor approved, the United States attorney would be instructed to divide the pending piracy indictments into "proper" and "improper" cases for application of clemency. The attorney would enter nolle prosse decisions before the court, and then promise pardon or aid in applying for presidential pardon in return for service during the invasion and good conduct thereafter.123 Secretary of War Monroe asked Rush to inform Claiborne that he, too, felt disposed toward lenience.124 Rush's letter would not reach New Orleans until a week or more after the jail doors opened, but when it came it more than validated the authorities' course of action.

  The Laffite brothers appeared in New Orleans no later than the morning of December 22. As of December 15 reports put them in hiding some eighty miles south of Baton Rouge, probably either on the lower Lafourche or else in the vicinity of the inn they used at Brashear City. General John Coffee, then at Baton Rouge, had asked Jackson if he should send men out to try to take the brothers, not to mention the $200,000 they supposedly had secreted nearby. Coffee actually did send a detail to look for a warehouse near Baton Rouge in which the Laffites were believed to have clothing and other desperately needed articles, but then Jackson ordered all outposts into the city after the Lake Borgne defeat.125 The report that Coffee got of the brothers' whereabouts was probably mistaken, however, for they were close enough to New Orleans to learn of Claiborne's proclamation almost immediately. Two or three days after it was made, about December 20, they summoned their followers and friends to the LaBranche plantation, where Jean spoke to them about the clemency offer and encouraged them to rally to the defense of the city.126

  The Laffites met with Jackson within hours of their arrival in New Orleans.127 On December 22 Jackson gave Jean a safe conduct pass signed by Judge Hall and Marshal Duplessis, and sent him to help defend Louisiana.128

  ELEVEN

  The Fight for New Orleans 1814–1815

  That for itself can woo the approaching fight,

  And turn what some deem danger to delight;

  That seeks what cravens shun with more than zeal,

  And where the feebler faint can only feel—

  ANDREW JACKSON'S sound instincts made up for his lack of formal training or extensive practical experience. The bulk of the Baratarians were men accustomed to being commanded, and he wisely concluded to keep most of them in separate companies under their own officers. Thus Dominique became captain of a militia company on December 23, and even men such as Gambi became enlisted in his ranks, all of them promised eight dollars a month for their service.1 For the Laffite brothers, however, Jackson had other plans.

  In the fashion of ancient conquerors who married a local woman in every vanquished province in order to bind its people to his regime, Jackson gave volunteer appointments on his staff to representatives of virtually every faction in New Orleans—Livingston and Claiborne representing their cliques, Sauvi
net from the merchants, Humbert standing for the French Napoleonic segment of the community, and Anaya, Toledo, and Ellis P. Bean from among the filibusters and revolutionists. None save Humbert had any military skill or experience. What the Laffites had to offer was their knowledge of Barataria and the lesser traveled water approaches to New Orleans, and their role as a visible representation of the commitment of the Baratarians and a symbol to the substantial part of the Creole community that sympathized with the smugglers.

  In short, the Laffites were one of the minor political realities of Louisiana, and now Jackson addressed that reality and bent it to his purpose. He did observe one distinction, however. Whereas Livingston and some others received genuine appointments as aides, others held more honorary or supernumerary positions, acting in the main as couriers. This was how he would use the Laffites. There would be no ranks, no need for uniforms or the trappings of officers, though Jean, in particular, had commanded in a fashion more men that most of the officers in the growing army. It may have been oversight. It may have had no meaning whatsoever. It may just have reflected Jackson's lingering suspicion of the corsair leaders, and an unwillingness to accord to these two "hellish banditti" the honorable station of soldiers, officers and gentlemen.

  On the matter of how to use the Laffites, Latour and Livingston could have made useful suggestions. Latour had worked with General Wilkinson a few years before in preparing maps of the water approaches to New Orleans.2 As Jackson's chief engineer, Latour explained to the general that seven possible water avenues offered an approach on New Orleans, one of them being the smugglers' route from Barataria.3 It might not have been a practical pathway for a major army with its artillery and impedimenta, but over the years the smuggler pirogues had moved several tons of goods up the bayous. If the British used the same route, they could at the very least move enough men and perhaps light artillery to open a second front on Jackson's flank while the main army occupied him before the city.

  Here was where the Laffites should be used. Major Michael Reynolds commanded eighty men posted on Bayou St. Denis south of the city. On December 22 Jackson sent Jean Laffite to Reynolds carrying orders to lead fifty men to the Temple, with their artillery, while the remainder stayed at Bayou St. Denis long enough to fell trees into it to obstruct boat passage before joining their comrades. Learning either from Latour or the Laffites of the strategic importance of the position on Little Lake Barataria that commanded access to the bayous leading to New Orleans' back door, Jackson wanted Reynolds to fortify himself on the slight elevation. The general promised to send three fieldpieces to strengthen the spot, and even advised Reynolds to try to stretch a chain across the bayou just below him to retard any boat approach. Jean volunteered to show Reynolds the way and inform him of geographical features affecting the placement of his men and arms. Jackson showed some sensitivity to the fact that the soldiers might not appreciate having a smuggler in their midst, ordering Reynolds to protect Laffite from "Injury and insult." More to the point, Jackson did not want Laffite to remain at the Temple longer than necessary. As soon as Reynolds learned what he needed to know, he was to give Laffite a safe conduct pass and send him back to Jackson. 4

  While Jean was off on this errand, Pierre remained in or near New Orleans, and was consulted by Jackson and Livingston on matters such as the bayous and plantation irrigation canals in the vicinity. The British finally launched their campaign on December 16, the same day Jackson declared martial law, but it was not until well after dark six days later that the boats transporting the Redcoats reached the mouth of Bayou Bienvenue at the western extremity of Lake Borgne. They were within a dozen miles of the city, and they had gotten there entirely undetected. The next day they turned southwest through a cypress swamp and picked a path along a canal leading to General Villere's plantation. Finally they came out of the swamp and saw ahead of them the way to the Mississippi and New Orleans. From this point northwestward toward the city the Mississippi posed a barrier on the left, the swamps a barrier on the right, and one thousand yards of good level ground filled in between. On that they would advance, and on that Jackson would have to try to stop them.

  Later that day Jackson learned of the enemy's stolen march on him, and a flurry of activity ensued. Thousands of citizens fled the town for fear it might fall in a few hours. At the moment Pierre was apparently four miles north of the city at Fort St. John, where Bayou St. John, one of his old smuggling routes, flowed into Lake Pontchartrain. In aid to his old nemesis Commodore Patterson, he was helping Dominique and Beluche emplace batteries with which they were to hold that approach. Jean, of course, was still on his way to the Temple with Major Reynolds. Now Jackson got a message to Patterson that he planned to make a surprise assault that evening and needed him immediately, leaving the Baratarian artillery companies to finish their work. Jackson may also have asked specifically for Pierre, anticipating that he would need Laffite's knowledge of the ground. When Patterson and Laffite reached Jackson, the general initially kept Pierre with him, along with Livingston and several other volunteer aides. Livingston told Pierre that he had decided not to send his family off in the sudden exodus, but had a carriage waiting at his house. Apparently expecting that he would be with Jackson on the fighting line, and that Pierre would not, he asked the smuggler to get his wife and child to safety should the enemy break through the lines and endanger the city.5

  But Pierre Laffite would be with the army and in harm's way. Either on his initiative or by Jackson's direction, Pierre went that afternoon to the extreme left of the American line where it met the swamps. He and Denis de Laronde would act as guides for General John Coffee as he advanced that night. Jackson had others who knew the ground along the swamp as well as, and probably better than, Pierre—among them de Laronde, who lived in the area. In fact, the Laffites scarcely used the waterways this side of New Orleans. Still, the Laffites had a reputation as masters of the hidden backways of Louisiana. Locals said that the bayou country known to the brothers was otherwise habitable only "by alligators and wild ducks." 6 Very likely Jackson attributed to the Laffites much greater wilderness wisdom than they possessed, and both brothers were accomplished at overselling themselves.

  That evening Pierre and de Laronde led Coffee's eight hundred men to their launch position on the swamp side of Pierre Lacoste's plantation. They were Jackson's left flank, and their mission was to drive the British right flank back on the Mississippi while Jackson and the main line occupied the British front. At 7:30 they heard Patterson's Carolina begin a bombardment of the enemy line, and then Jackson launched his attack. Coffee went forward shortly before 8 P.M., and pushed the enemy back all the way to the Villere plantation. Then he shifted his line to the right and started forcing the Redcoats toward the river as ordered. Through it all, Pierre Laffite was near Coffee, who noted the smuggler's courage in action, and more than once asked him for advice on the ground.7

  Coffee penetrated into the enemy camps before darkness, fog and mounting confusion left him unsure of his position, and unable to tell what had happened to Jackson's part of the line. Meanwhile Jackson had halted the attack after pushing as far as he could with the main line. It had been a qualified success. Jackson had stalled the British advance and severely upset the enemy, buying himself several days' time, but he decided that his lines were too weak and exposed. He concluded that on the morrow, Christmas Eve, he would withdraw his army two miles to the Rodriguez canal, positioning his lines behind the ditch with the river guarding his right flank and the swamp his left. There he would make his stand.

  After the army moved into position, Livingston called on Pierre Laffite once again. Livingston felt uneasy about Bayou Bienvenue. It was still navigable—with difficulty, to be sure—to a point well in the rear of Jackson's new line where only a few hundred yards of admittedly dense cypress swamp would separate an approaching enemy from the Americans' unprotected left rear. The British had already used the bayou in one embarrassing surprise. Another could be fatal.
Livingston consulted with Sauvinet and Pierre Laffite. Sauvinet agreed that the bayou presented a weak spot, adding that he thought the ground on its west bank fronting the swamp was firm enough that soldiers could maneuver on it as much as half a mile in the direction of Jackson's flanks.

  Laffite disagreed, however, and he knew the waterways better. He suggested that Jackson extend his line on the Rodriguez canal as far to the east as possible, and where the canal ended at the edge of the swamp, put his men to work digging an extension well into the bog. The British might be able to march along the bank of the Bienvenue, but Pierre was convinced that the swamp was impassable and would thus protect Jackson's left flank completely.8 Livingston passed this advice on to the general, and the army did, indeed, extend its line a few hundred yards into the swamp.

  Now Jackson consolidated his forces, calling in Dominique and Beluche to take command of two twenty-four-pounder fieldpieces on the right of his line at the levee, protecting the river road to the city. They arrived December 28, and soon Jackson added a thirty-two-pounder to their care. Eventually Dominique and Beluche commanded Battery Number 3, situated about 150 yards from the river, supporting the part of the line held by the battalion of Major Jean Baptiste Plauché, in which some of the Baratarians enlisted.9 The men used cotton bales seized from a vessel then in the river to build a barricade. As it happened the bales belonged to the cranky merchant Nolte. His complaints proved unavailing.10 A French aristocrat then in New Orleans remarked on the general's wisdom in affirming pardon in return for the Baratarians' services. "That is a very politic stroke," said the Chevalier Anne Louis de Tousard, anticipating that the Baratarians would prove to be of "great assistance." 11 Still, perhaps out of mistrust, or more likely out of awareness that artillery could be critical in the coming battle, Jackson thereafter took special interest in the Baratarian gunners, often visiting them in their positions.12