The Pirates Laffite

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The Pirates Laffite Page 33

by William C. Davis


  Pierre Laffite had alerted the Spaniards in May of the General Jackson's anticipated departure and destination, as well as her expected escort—more than enough time for Sedella and Morphy to warn Havana to watch Boquilla de Piedras and Vera Cruz. However, Laffite s information seems to have done little to help interdict the traffic into and out of Galveston, such as Mitchell's. Indeed, on November 25 one of Aury's privateers, the Jupiter, took Spanish vessels so close to the mouth of the Mississippi that Patterson responded to Morphy's protest by sending two ships to hover meaningfully outside the pass into Galveston until Aury's prize court returned the vessels to their owners.21

  Authorities also tried to more effectively prevent unlawful privateers from fitting out. On September 5 Captain Job Northrop brought in the Spanish schooner captured by Duncan's General Jackson just before the Firebrand incident. The schooner Mexicain had been herself a Spanish privateer, but when Northrop stopped at Boquilla along the way he got Mexican letters of marque for her and a commission as a lieutenant in the insurgent "navy" for himself.22 Unfortunately, she was in abominable condition and nearly worthless. Northrop sold her to François Deglanne, who wanted to have her refitted into a hermaphrodite brig to go out as a privateer once again, probably to sail with Aury. He turned to Dominique, then at loose ends in New Orleans, and hired him both to oversee the work, and to take her out as captain. Over the next several weeks Dominque did the job, incurring on his own behalf a debt of $1,061.25, but after reimbursing him only $580, Deglanne would pay no more. Dominique placed a lien on the vessel itself for the remainder of his expenditure. In his petition he was coy, saying that the expenses were incurred only for "objects of travel," but when finally she was sold in December she brought only $176.84 even after Dominique's work. 23 Sedella and his friends watched her refitting carefully, relieved at Dominique's financial and legal discouragement.24 In fact, it left him entirely out of the privateering enterprise for the next three years.

  When it came to stopping the privateers on the seas, however, Patterson enjoyed limited success. Aury's Galveston privateers were better armed and equipped than their predecessors on the Gulf. The Jupiter came and went as she pleased, armed with three large cannon, fifty muskets, forty cutlasses, twenty pistols, and a quarter ton of gunpowder. Amigoni commanded a new vessel, the Patriota, carrying a crew of seventy to man five big guns, eighty muskets, seventy cutlasses, and forty pairs of pistols. The Hidalgo sortied out of Galveston in November armed with nearly two muskets per crewman.25 More powerful than the rest was the General Arismendi, carrying six heavy cannon, sixty men, eighty muskets, sixty cutlasses, and eighteen pistols. Guy Champlin had fitted her out in New Orleans under the watchful eyes of district attorney Dick, who knew he intended to violate the neutrality laws by privateering, but could not stop him.26

  Patterson and Duplessis did try to stop the privateers from smuggling illicit goods, but to mixed effect. The navy began to cooperate with the customs officials in stopping Aury's privateers and scrutinizing their commissions carefully when they came up the Mississippi. Officials usually found the papers correct, "or as much so as the officers at Galveston know how to make them," Rollins wryly observed.27 On September 26 the inspectors below Fort St. Philip saw Captain Job Northrop's privateer the Independence at anchor under the new Mexican colors. Northrop raised anchor and tried to stall inspection by letting the vessel drift downstream while he raised sail, all the while protesting that he was trying to bring his ship about to let an inspector aboard. When the official finally pulled his barge alongside and boarded, he immediately discovered two large boxes of muskets. Northrop admitted that he knew they were illegal but said that he needed the business. He then occupied the inspector with conversation until the boats had drifted so far that the inspector found himself at a dangerous remove from the fort. There was nothing for him to do but board his barge and return, with Northrop yelling after him that he was sorry for not complying with instructions, but that "he had entered into business that he was determined to go through with at all hazards," and that "imperious necessity compeled him."28

  Northrop indeed seemed driven by this necessity. A month later he had four prizes, fat with merchandise, off the south pass of the Mississippi, though he knew that the authorities were aware of him and determined to prevent him from landing his goods. Rollins marveled, "I cannot conceive what Capt Northrop is doing on these coasts." When his inability to unload his goods frustrated some of his men to the point that they refused further service with no prospect of profit, Northrop landed thirty of them on Grand Isle and in lieu of payment, gave them watches and other merchandise to try to sell on their own.29 Later when Patterson sent two of his little vessels, the Bulldog and the Tickler, after Northrop, Rollins told Duplessis that "he might as well have ordered two sheep to take a wolf."30

  Patterson's newfound energy may have been spurred by unexpected repercussions of Aury's Galveston enterprise. Slaves were disappearing from New Orleans, and many believed former Baratarians were stealing them for a Galveston slave mart. Editor J. C. de St. Romes of the Courier complained that some of these thieves walked among the townspeople by daylight and no one dared to denounce them. He called for the militia to step in, or New Orleans should steel itself to "be exposed to all the horrors of Fire, Pillage and Murder.:"31 Unfortunately, St. Romes's attack cut too close to some of the insurgent leaders, and in the Gazette they struck back by accusing him of insulting Mexican patriots.32

  At the end of July the king in Madrid had approved the deal Pierre had struck for a pardon and payment in exchange for information, and by December Pierre was feeding news of yet another plot to Sedella.33 Besides what he gave them on Aury at Galveston, Pierre kept his handlers informed of new designs on an old target, Pensacola.34 For some time the "associates" had been raising men and money for a Pensacola strike in case the insurgents in Mexico were unable to reassert themselves. In that event, their resources would be better spent establishing a privateering port in Florida. In late November news came that the Mexican insurgency was all but finished.

  On January 2, 1817, the "associates" held a meeting with Livingston, Grymes, Duncan, Beluche, Peire, and Pierre Laffite among those present. They decided that Aury's corsairs should rendezvous at an offshore island while their "army" sailed and rowed in barges to make a joint land and sea attack on Pensacola. With the perpetually hopeful Peire in command,35 they would plunder the town, especially of slaves. It was perhaps coincidental that two days later Pierre bought a slave woman from Marie Louisa Villard for $500 and the same day sold her for $900, but he may have needed the quick profit for investment with the "associates," or because Jean needed $1,000 for his purchase three days later of a nineteen-year-old black male whose labor might be needed in the days ahead.36 Pierre also filed a civil suit against his sometime associate Gambi to recover the $250 loaned to him six months earlier.37 Mina, meanwhile, was in Galveston, but in January 1817 the "associates" sent Sauvinet there to pose the Pensacola idea and ask him to come to New Orleans to discuss his cooperating in the venture. Mina was interested, and made the voyage east. Even before he arrived, Laffite or someone got to Morphy the idea that Mina was going to hit Pensacola, and that the "associates" had promised financial backing to Mina's emissary Noriega y Guerra Mier on that basis. 38 Morphy warned Governor José Masot in Pensacola to be on his guard. Masot commenced preparations for defense, and in both Pensacola and New Orleans rumors flew that Florida was to be the next privateer center after an attack by forces massing at Galveston.39

  Even before Mina reached New Orleans on February 22, the "associates" split into two factions. Those motivated by fast gain favored the Pensacola raid as a quick grab. Other "associates" with some commitment to the Mexican independence movement and an eye to long-term profits argued for a commitment to Galveston. If the Tampico operation was no longer viable, then the "associates" should consolidate and enhance their Galveston foothold into the center of a new insurgency.40 For his part, Mina quickly re
ad the situation. After a flurry of meetings he left disillusioned, concluding that "it was merely a mercantile speculation." The "associates" offered resources that he thought "niggardly," and on usurious terms.41 On March 1 Mina departed for Galveston, committed to the original joint operation with Aury and his fleet, despite his rancorous recent history with Aury.

  When Mina reached Galveston late the previous November, Aury, feeling threatened by Mina's title as a general, for eight days refused to allow Mina to bring his command ashore. When he relented and Mina's men landed, Aury revealed that he had barely enough supplies to feed the 200 men on his ships and Perry's 160 ashore. Mina's 140 men would have to subsist on the salt pork, beef, and bread they had brought with them, or the oysters and fish they could buy from passing fishermen. In a tense atmosphere, Mina's men established a separate camp to the east of Aury's. In time Aury consented to provide for Mina's men, but the two leaders could not agree on their next act. Mina hoped to lead his men in a landing at Matagorda, an advance inland to Bexar, and then a march into Mexico. Aury disagreed, wanting to lead the naval expedition against Tampico. The two quarreled inconclusively until Sauvinet arrived on his embassy and Mina left for New Orleans to consult the "associates." 42

  Meanwhile anxious Spaniards had been keeping an eye on the growing settlement. The information gleaned by one spy, Antonio Aguirre, proved especially accurate. By December 22 he had the outline of the plan,43 and by February 17 the Spanish commander in Texas, Joaquin de Arredondo, knew with some certainty that "the freebooters that are in Galveston Bay, armed and with seventeen pieces of artillery" intended to land at Matagorda to attack the province.

  Arredondo even found out that one of Aury's men, Captain Francisco Rouquier, was issuing passports on Aury's behalf.44 More than that, however, Aury was able to commission as many privateers as he wanted thanks to the printing press Herrera had provided. In February Aury commissioned the Musquito under a Captain Graque, who immediately tried to introduce a cargo of illegal slaves into New Orleans by sailing into the port and claiming the blacks as crewmen, a ruse that did not fool Duplessis or the court. In March, while squabbling with Perry, Aury recommissioned the Independence, alias the Hotspur, under Captain Northrop, with letters of marque from his own regime. The ship was destined for a short cruise before she was seized by Duplessis on April 24.45

  Soon Duplessis's complex attitude toward smugglers got him removed from office, however, and replaced by the Virginian Beverly Chew, an important businessman and political leader. Chew wanted smugglers out of business. "The most shameful violations of the slave act, as well as our revenue laws, continue to be practised, with impunity, by a motley mixture of freebooters and smugglers, at Galveston, under the Mexican flag, and being, in reality, little else than the re-establishment of the Barataria band," he complained to Secretary of the Treasury William Crawford. He believed that the privateers took mostly Spanish vessels but were not entirely discriminating, and when they sent the vessels to New Orleans for sale under the Mexican flag they followed the old Baratarían practice of changing their names. Morphy repeatedly tried to reclaim the ships for their owners, but though the cases went to the court and the privateer captains could show no evidence that Galveston was a part of the Mexican Republic, still the privateers generally won their prizes. He feared that without a substantial strengthening of the revenue service Aury's corsairs could not be countered. 46

  Someone in New Orleans was even more interested than Chew in the affairs at Galveston. Pierre Laffite, and possibly Jean, was surely present at the meetings held with Mina in February. Now he knew of the rift between Mina and Aury, and between the "associates" and each of them. Pierre sensed that this moment of disunity was the perfect time to disrupt the filibusters. Neither Sedella nor Morphy had the authority or the resources to act, however. Boldly, the Laffites engaged Latour to be their embassy to Havana, where he was going to deliver his report of the Arkansas exploration. On February 26 they gave Latour a letter to José Cienfuegos, recommending Latour to the captain general. Emphasizing—indeed, exaggerating—their intimate knowledge of the Texas coast, they reminded Captain Cienfuegos that their information had always been accurate in the past. They reminded him, too, that time and the distance to Havana were their enemies, as well as the hazard of their letters being intercepted and compromising "the indispensable mystery that must surround this matter." They added concern for their safety, as well they should have.

  This is why Latour would outline orally their "quick and infallible" plan, "the result of a long and profound reflection," for stopping Aury and Mina. Latour would be able to elaborate on the details. They even got Sedella to suggest that when Latour arrived in Havana, he be allowed to disembark his ship secretly to avoid being seen and recognized. Père Antoine could already testify that supposedly confidential correspondence between Spain and the United States was circulating freely in New Orleans, and few secrets were kept.47 The brothers claimed that during his visit in the East, Jean had been approached by representatives of most of the insurgent movements, who had begged the Laffites to coordinate their efforts. The brothers told Latour that Jean had shown a "simulated acceptance" in order to penetrate the plans further. The Laffites promised that they could discover all for Spain, and did not "request anything in return." They would be, they told Latour, "sufficiently paid by serving humanity's cause." Pierre offered to meet with the authorities in Havana to develop plans to put down the rebels, but as that seemed impossible, he asked for a special agent to deal with him in New Orleans. Once the agent arrived, the brothers would insert him into the councils of the plotters so that he could learn firsthand their schemes before the Laffites made plans for their disruption. The agent must have the authority and money to take action quickly and definitively.48 Sedella added his endorsement of the Laffites and their plan. "They are capable of obtaining to our favor the most difficult and hard enterprises," said Père Antoine.49 No sooner was Latour on his way and Mina departed than the brothers decided that Jean Laffite would sail for Galveston under the guise of a mercantile voyage, but while there evaluate the men in charge and scout the military resources on the island. The trip should take no more than a few weeks, and could yield big results for Spain. It might also offer huge rewards for the brothers Laffite. With both brothers now working for Spain, Pierre became Number 13- uno and Jean Number 13-dos.

  Sometime between his return from Arkansas and January 1817, Jean had formed a loose mercantile "partnership" with Vincent Duparc, probably for the sole purpose of trading with the "associates" and Galveston, or to provide a front for the brothers' surveillance work.50 Between March 7 and n, on the only occasion on which Jean Laffite filed proper documents with the customs house, he declared his intention to take two cases of Bordeaux red wine, two cases of white wine, and three dozen loose bottles of claret to Galveston aboard the Devorador. He and Duparc had imported the wine from France in January. As for the Devorador, her captain happened to be Laurent Maire, the same man who had been a crewman on the Laffites' La Diligente four years before, and more recently captain of Dos Hermanos.51

  The Devorador was probably the vessel that Pierre bought at the urging of the "associates" for courier duty with Galveston, and Pierre likely changed her name for this voyage, for on several of the customs documents now and later Jean, Duparc, and Maire all first wrote in the name the Bolador, then crossed it out to substitute the Devorador:52 Coincidentally, of course, El Bolador had been the name of the vessel that may have helped inaugurate the Laffites in the illegal slave business in 1810.53 Laffite and Duparc would not be the only merchants with a cargo on the Devorador. Four days earlier Raymond Espagnol shipped aboard her some eight casks of wine, and both he and Laffite and Duparc claimed from the customs collector the drawback, or refund due them, of import duties paid when the goods arrived originally in New Orleans.54 The law allowed for a drawback when such goods were exported again outside the country, and this was the reason for Jean Laffite breaking habit
and observing customs laws.55 Doing so got him a refund of $162.71.

  Maire cast off on March 16 with Jean Laffite, Espagnol, John Ducoing—who hoped to join Champlin's privateer the General Artigas—and a few other merchants aboard.56 They entered the Gulf on the morning of March 20, and almost at once met with the Bellona, an Aury privateer coming from his settlement. The two ships hove to, and from the Bellonas captain Laffite heard a bizarre tale of chaos at Galveston. Four days before, as Mina and his ship approached Galveston on his return from New Orleans, Aury sent orders to the Bellona to open fire on Mina. The captain did so, but Mina refused to be driven off, and shortly thereafter Aury allowed him to come ashore. The captain had left immediately and knew little more.57

  Three days later Laffite sighted Galveston, probably for the first time. The Devorador joined six other privateers and prizes anchored outside the bar. The vessels were under flags of Mexico and Buenos Aires, the prizes loaded with beef and tallow, logwood, farm tools, and $13,000 to $14,000 in silver. John Deveze commanded one of them, perhaps the same Flying Fish that he had captained for Pierre a few months before. If Jean paid close attention, as surely he did, he noticed that here the vessels could anchor very close together, but only go through the pass one at a time.58 Laffite stayed aboard his ship for a week, watching as other privateers came and went: one commanded by Johnny Barbafuma, another out of New Orleans run by a Captain Neps, and the large frigate Campechana carrying several thousand muskets and a number of cannon and other military equipment.59

 

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