Finally on March 30 Laffite rowed across to Mina's ship. He delivered some letters from New Orleans and asked about the coming expedition, which opened the floodgate of Mina's frustration. News from Mexico suggested the time was ripe, but he had been held up too long by the wasted trip to New Orleans. He may not have offered the details of his problems with Aury, but there would have been no concealing them. Alert to any means of gathering news, Laffite asked Mina his Mexican sources in case they should prove useful for his own intelligence gathering. Then he went ashore to see Aury, who had no hesitance about unburdening himself The moment Mina arrived back in November he tried to take over everything, Aury complained. But Herrera had appointed Aury governor, and he would not yield to anyone. Aury told Laffite that he had settled the dispute with Mina and finally they had made an uneasy peace. 60
On shore Laffite found a community that had grown to about 120 cabanas with plank walls and sailcloth roofs for the officers and even cruder reed and wattle huts for the men, in addition to a coffeehouse, dry goods stores, and a few other commercial establishments.61 The men traded with the local Coushatta Indians, and a few dozen women and a few children were now on the island. For those who could read, Herrera's press turned out a few issues of a newspaper, the only one then published in all of Texas.62 Aury's and Mina's men still lived in two camps, however, and Laffite would have visited both.63 When he spoke to the men ashore, Laffite no doubt heard a different and less self-serving story than Aury's. In Mina's absence, Aury and Perry had fallen out when the governor announced that the harbor at Galveston was not suitable and that he would move to Matagorda without waiting for or notifying Mina, and without taking Mina's men. Perry refused to take this command without Mina's consent, and Aury ordered Perry's arrest on March i. Perry's men rose up and threatened to storm Aury's headquarters if he did not release their commander. Aury ordered his own men to arms in front of his quarters, backed by a fieldpiece, and only a spark was needed to ignite a battle. When Perry's men won Mina's commanders over to their side, however, Aury understood that he would be unwise to persist. Aury agreed to meet in parlay, at which the leaders decided that Mina should command all land troops, and Aury the maritime men and ships. By the time Aury ordered the Bellona to open fire on Mina, the men on the island were thoroughly displeased with Aury.64
On April i and 2 Maire landed Laffite's and Espagnol's cargo, as well as consignments including sixteen kegs of vinegar and four casks and twenty-two cases of wine. Laffite was too busy to attend to the necessary paperwork, and so someone signed for him two days later to certify the delivery, and again had to cross out Bolador and insert Devorador on the form. Aury's judge of the admiralty court, John Peter Rousselin, approved the documentation on April 8, adding that "we also declare, there is not a consul or public agt. of the U. S. of A. or American merchants now residing in this place."65 The date was significant, for Rousselin was now the only remaining "authority" on the island, a sort of professional secretary for revolutionaries after witnessing Herrera's credit authorization for Toledo the year before.66 Mina's new intelligence suggested that the mouth of the Santander River, near Soto la Marina 150 miles north of Tampico, was a better place to land on the Mexican coast, and he decided to start his campaign there. Perry would go with him. Aury, if only to rid himself of the troublesome pair before moving on to Matagorda, agreed to transport them.
Mina set sail April 7, he and Aury taking all the island's cannon with them. Looking on, Jean Laffite counted about three hundred men on the ships, while Aury had left behind between thirty and forty of his followers, including Louis Durieux in charge and Rousselin, who was to continue the sham admiralty court and prize condemnations and then forward them to Matagorda.67 Aury gave no orders for the rest of his people to leave Galveston, but his intentions were clear when he ordered most of the huts and buildings burned.68 What he did not bargain for was that Jean Laffite had other plans. Before him lay the perfect opening for a coup. Aury's leaving was not the end of Galveston, Laffite told Rousselin and the others. In fact, Aury had been disavowed by the "associates," who were now backing the Laffites. If these few men on the island transferred their allegiance to him, Jean could promise them more men to reestablish the port and a steady flow of supplies from New Orleans.69
Jean Laffite simply took over Galveston on April 8.70 Recognizing that Durieux might command some loyalty from the few remaining men of Aury's, Laffite offered him sufficient persuasion to shift allegiance, and then appointed him colonel in command of the military forces, such as they were, with Antoine Pirroneau as his adjutant. Laffite turned Rousselin, too, and made him collector of customs. Jean's associate Ducoing, whose brother was Espagnol's business partner in New Orleans, he appointed judge of the admiralty court. Espagnol would act as secretary The Laffites' old lieutenant Jannet, conveniently in port, became commander both of the port and of the island's "navy."71 A week later on April 15, after Lafon arrived with the Carmelita bringing Iturribarria with him as Herrera's deputy, Laffite arranged for a meeting in Lafon's cabin. Iturribarria administered an oath of allegiance to the Mexican republic to Durieux, and Durieux then swore in the rest, Lafon acting as secretary of the meeting. Significantly, they made no provision for a marshal or officer of the law. They all knew how irregular their proceeding was, establishing a government on behalf of a defunct insurrection on territory it did not control, and on territory to which the United States held claim. Yet past privateering experience, and hopes for its future here, left them somewhat obsessed with the show of legality. They all signed a memorandum justifying their action, as one said "to make it authentic" and to ensure that "at all times it will be legal and valid." Having no seal of the insurgency, they made do with a small nondescript seal.72
Thus Laffite, noticeably absent from either office or participation in the meeting, put the semblance of official sanction from the Mexican junta on the operation. Meanwhile he had acquainted himself with the men still on the island, consulted with Espagnol—whose coming on the Devorador was now clearly no accident—and waited for a few privateers to come into port to lend more muscle. By April 14 the General Arismendi and a few others had arrived. 73 Three days later in a meeting aboard the Jupiter the privateer captains agreed to bring in prizes for admiralty hearing and condemnation. From the proceeds of their first prize sales Rousselin should withhold a percentage to turn over to Colonel Durieux for the support of the soldiers and equipment necessary to defend the establishment. Thereafter from each month's proceeds Rousselin should withhold a sum for the following month's expenses, so that they would be steadily funded in advance. Any surplus left after paying the captains and crews their shares was to be applied to relieving the debts of the Mexican Republic incurred prior to April 5, but only those debts owed to men then living on the island—a neat artifice to ensure that no money left Galveston. The officers of the government, as well as Captains Jannet, Jean Guerre, Denis Thomas, Joseph Place, Colonel Savary, and several others, approved the terms on April 20.74
Jean Laffite and his associates had created something new in the New World that went far beyond the loose Baratarian operation. Galveston was to be a civil-military community conducted by and for privateers, and funded voluntarily from their prizes. As its own leaders admitted, the forms observing fealty to the Mexican junta were mere sham. Ducoing would make it clear that Galveston's object was "capturing Spanish property under what they called the Mexican flag, but without any idea of aiding the Revolution in Mexico or that of any other of the Spanish Revolted colonies." In fact, he for one did not believe a Mexican Republic existed any longer, and regarded Galveston as having no lawful connection with any government.75 The Laffites intended that they and their followers would become a law unto themselves.
SIXTEEN
A Season of Treachery 1817
Such were the notes that from the Pirate's isle
Around the kindling watch-fire rang the while:
Such were the sounds that thrill'd the rocks a
long,
And unto ears as rugged seem'd a song!
THE NEW REGIME'S first prizes—two vessels, the Petronille and L'Enrequita—came in with Champlin's General Artigas on April 7, just after Aury's departure. Aboard them were 287 slaves. Champlin's business partner, New Orleans merchant Christopher Adams, had bought an additional three hundred slaves from Aury just before his fleet sailed.1 These unfortunate blacks were now the inaugural merchandise of an illicit slave trade that would see thousands smuggled from Texas to Louisiana thanks to the supply the privateers could provide and the organizational genius of the Laffites. Ducoing held sham admiralty court proceedings aboard Lafon's Carmelita for the time being. When a prize came in, Ducoing simply examined her papers and made a pronouncement of condemnation. Espagnol then drafted a condemnation order, and the formality was done. They kept no court records.2
Jean Laffite prepared to leave immediately after that April 17 meeting of the privateer captains. So much had happened unexpectedly in the last ten days that he had to return to New Orleans quickly to report to his several masters: Pierre, the "associates," and Sedella. He needed to consult with his brother on just how to position themselves in the days ahead. The "associates" could perhaps be induced to provide credit for building up the Galveston establishment. The Spaniards, of course, would want to know the particulars of Mina and Aury and to hear the Laffites' proposal on how to capitalize on the situation. Before leaving, Jean arranged that Lafon would bring him information if anything happened on the Texas coast in his absence, and though he could not know it, Spanish authorities in Texas had half a dozen soldiers dressed as civilians on their way to the bay to keep their own watch on Galveston. 3 Laffite also authorized someone on the ruling council to make necessary purchases from Champlin's agent on the island by charging them to the Laffites' account.4
Even the Devorador experienced difficulty in the pass or anchorage, for Laffite had to buy a new anchor and some anchor cable from Champlin before he could leave.5 Then contrary wind held the Devorador outside the bar for a day, during which three more corsairs and one prize came to anchor beside her, giving Jean an opportunity to study once more the depth of the water above the bar. Vessels had to anchor outside and wait for a pilot to come bring them one at a time through the pass.6
By April 22 Jean was back in New Orleans, unwell—as he had been for some time—but soon at work with Pierre on a scheme to present to the Spaniards for taking Galveston with the bay full of corsairs and prizes, and thus close off further supply of men and material to Aury and Mina. Jean wrote a note to Sedella telling him that he had talked with Mina, "who told me things of great importance." Jean said that Mina even asked Jean to accompany him on his expedition. This may or may not have been true, for the Laffites never figured in Mina's plans before this, and any invitation now would have been ad hoc and spontaneous. "I was unwilling to consent," Jean told the priest, "having the intention of reestablishing a new government in Galveston."7 The brothers now proposed that Spain provide a corvette, a brig, one or two schooners, and a pair of gunboats, all to sail singly in order not to attract attention and then rendezvous in the harbor at Pensacola no later than July 15. If necessary the corvette, brig, and one schooner could achieve the same end, the schooner being vital for reconnoitering and messenger service. Meanwhile, by the end of June one of the brothers would have returned to Galveston to determine the total strength of corsairs and crews, as well as prizes, and to send back weekly reports of arrivals and departures. At the same time another schooner should be sent to Soto la Marina to determine Mina's situation and the progress of his campaign, if any, while stopping at Matagorda to assess Aury's position and strength there. Then the schooner would return to New Orleans with its intelligence, and the Laffites would dispatch it to Pensacola with final instructions. If they acted quietly, no one would know what they were doing until it was all over.
The brothers' fleet would sail to Galveston with the corvette and brig flying the flag of Spain beneath the colors of the Mexican insurgency, a sign that they were prizes. Then the gunboats and a schooner, their presumed captors, would approach the bar flying the Mexican checkerboard. Jean knew from observation that a pilot would be sent out to bring them over the bar and through the pass, and once they were inside the bay the few men there should easily be overwhelmed by a landing party. Indeed, in designating the leaders he left behind, Laffite may have purposefully chosen men whom he knew would not be effective in a crisis. The corvette and brig should be carrying cannon and men to arm and crew another brig that Jean believed would be anchored outside the bar.
Once Galveston was in their hands, they would keep the schooners and gunboats in the harbor, attracting little or no attention, while the corvette and brig or brigs remained at anchor outside, posing as prizes. As corsairs approached, Jean could signal the armed ships to take them one at a time, which could be done "without firing a single shot" by a few men and only a couple of cannon thanks to the narrowness of the pass and the fact that most privateers only mounted one or two guns themselves. The Laffites stressed in their proposal that they wanted at every cost to avoid violence. Bloodshed had never been an intentional feature of their operations, and many of the privateers they would take were friends and former associates whom they might hope to employ. Privateer captains currently warned crewmen that capture by Spain meant instant death, as indeed it could. The Laffites, however, wanted every captured crew to be informed while being taken into port that they were to be offered service for Spain, and thus they need not resist or fear reprisal. That way "the desperate valor of the corsair crews will be dispersed," and each vessel captured would augment the forces to take the rest as well as Spain's naval force in the region. In such a fashion the Laffites' force could capture every privateer and prize, starving Mina and Aury of forces and supplies while the goods taken from the prizes funded the Laffite plan. Galveston taken, and Aury forced to abandon Matagorda, privateers still at large would be discouraged from continuing their trade on those shores, and the "associates" and other outfitters would lose heart. No privateer base on the Gulf coast would remain. Unsaid in the Laffites' proposal was the probability that Galveston would then be theirs to use as their own private base, backed by the power of the vessels Spain had lent them. Indeed, as if to establish the legitimacy of the rump government he'd left behind him, Jean gave to a local editor for publication a statement of the busy commerce of the port yet in its infancy. It was also a way of announcing generally that privateers had a new place to bring their prizes for a quick and favorable adjudication by the "admiralty court," followed by a speedy sale. "The affair has turned out perfectly well for us," Jean declared. "Moments are precious, and there is no time to lose." 8
In fact, Jean Laffite believed their plan was perfect. Just then Latour asked him to go back to the East to take up their efforts of the past year with men planning filibustering voyages, but Laffite knew he had more important work before him here and now. Indeed, he wanted Latour to persuade the men in the East to join with them. "I am at the head of an operation a thousand times more honorable than the one they have projected," he said. He had little doubt that he could sway them in person if he had to, being like his brother Pierre, convinced of his craft at persuasion. They would be doing a great boon for humanity.9
As the Laffites completed their plan, Lafon arrived with news. After a hard voyage Aury abandoned Mina at Soto la Marina on April 21, and on May 4 returned to Galveston to learn of the coup. The ruling council invited him to sit in on its deliberations, and he did, but only to make it clear that while he did not have the strength to resist what had taken place in his absence he would not countenance their actions, nor give up his now meaningless power as governor, by acknowledging the council's legitimacy. The council repudiated his claims to rule, and the meeting broke up indecisively with Aury going back to his ship to sulk. Aury's presence, with his commission from Herrera, compromised the authority of Laffite's council under Iturribarria's endorsement
, and yet the council's refusal to take directions from him made him a cipher.
Lafon told Jean that he expected the impasse not to be broken. Aury tried to resume power, identifying himself as governor of Texas on May 7 when he took $5,000 from Nicholas Aiguette in payment for a commission for a new privateer, the prize the Diana, but the council ignored him and Ducoing continued to act as admiralty judge for about a week.10 Aury ordered him to sign an oath of loyalty but Ducoing refused, and also refused to condemn Lafon's prize the Evening Post when he found her papers to be in order—probably a Laffite loyalist's pretext for defying Aury. Vicente Garros took over after Ducoing resigned on May 8, and condemned the prize. Henceforth Garros's decisions would not be influenced by genuine papers aboard the prizes, because the captors did not risk letting them be seen in the court. Rumors soon reached New Orleans that when merchants from the city bought prize goods from the privateers, the corsairs would not take hard cash for fear of being robbed by their own associates, and instead preferred bills of credit on the city's banks. 11 Meanwhile, Ducoing had condemned prizes brought in by Champlin, Beluche, Lafon, and Sauvinet, and business was brisk, with eight corsairs and prizes at anchor.12
Latour had been in Havana for some time, presenting his report and the proposals of the Laffite brothers of New Orleans, whom he described as "merchants of that city," though the Spanish authorities knew well enough who and what they were.13 Before long copies of the report were on their way to Onís and Apodaca, as well as to the governors of Texas and neighboring provinces.14 None seemed to take its warning of American expansion seriously. Onís thought it a good exercise, but one offering nothing new.15 The report did not reach Mexico City until July, and Madrid did not see it until November 1818.
The Pirates Laffite Page 34