Far more interesting, it seemed, was Latour's oral representation of the Laffites' propositions, and José Cienfuegos granted the brothers' wish for a fully empowered agent in New Orleans. Morphy, while energetic, had been a minor official, with almost no prior experience. Felipe Fatio, however, was a career operative with credentials. He had been in Havana when Latour arrived and presented his report on March 26. Fatio received his orders in April, and with them sufficient funds to pay the Laffites, Picornell, Sedella, and other friends in New Orleans $100 a month.16 He was to contact the Laffites through Sedella, or at least to get in touch with Pierre, and determine their sincerity. Cienfuegos wanted to know as much as possible about the Laffites, including their moral character, the attitude of the community in New Orleans toward them, their influence if any, their financial condition, and their vessels. Once satisfied, Fatio was authorized to promise them that they would be "greatly compensated" in return for useful information and action. That done, Fatio was to listen to the brothers' plans, evaluate and rank them by importance and practicability, and then adopt those he deemed suitable as well as an agent whom he trusted, being wary of Picornell. Having selected the man, Fatio could employ him on a stipend. All disbursements of funds were to be noted as coming from a cover fund called the "Commission of the Royal Services." 17
Fatio took office the day after his arrival on May 6, and that evening sent word to Sedella to bring the Laffites to him. When they met on May 7 Jean told Fatio that his observations of the men at Galveston under Aury and Mina convinced him that they had "no other patriotism, other virtue, other object, other plan than that of making themselves rich, than that of robbing and murdering, under the pretext of Independence, every Spaniard they might encounter, in order to make, if they could, a quick and great fortune."18 Jean said he would bring his diary from the voyage to Galveston to Fatio the following day. He gave Fatio his latest news on Mina and Aury, and added that he believed Aury's (incorrect) suspicion that Perry was an American agent hoping to engineer Texas independence in order to hand it to the United States. Before the meeting adjourned Fatio promised to have a schooner ready to take their plan and his recommendation to Havana and Cienfuegos.
One subject they did not address was the rumored plot for a slave rebellion. Fatio proposed that they could simply expose it and its authors by public letters sent to the East, but the brothers adamantly opposed the idea, first because it would expose their undercover work, and second because it might actually endanger their lives. It may have been nothing but a ruse in the first place, of course, and in time the Spaniards concluded that it had been a hoax from the start. They preferred to blame it on Ariza, whom the Laffites said revealed it to them. It could just as easily have been their own scheme, to raise a specter so dread that Havana would do what they wanted and send a representative. Now that Fatio was here, and with money in his pocket, they no longer needed the ruse, if ruse it had been. 19
Clearly the brothers were feeling out Fatio, otherwise they would have brought Jean's diary and their plan to this first encounter. Yet they left Fatio feeling comfortable, and the following evening the Laffites and Sedella called on Fatio to turn over Jean's diary and a draft of the plan he and Pierre had formulated. The scheme must be implemented immediately, they urged, before conditions changed. If carried out expeditiously, their proposal could end privateering once and for all.
Fatio saw the sense in their plan and their urgency, but did not commit himself. First he spoke with one or two others familiar with Galveston and spent several days making discreet inquiries into the Laffites' "moral and public conduct" since they started their Barataria operation in 1810. Reports said they were humane and generous with Spanish prisoners. Fatio was no fool. He knew that the Laffites acted in self-interest, and that they could harbor deception while pretending to be friends. Nevertheless, he thought they had to see that the benefits of being honest with him far outweighed the reward of duplicity. In their favor also was the fact that so far everything they had given Sedella had turned out to be true. Sedella had known them for a long time, and he vouched for their sincerity, adding that "from the time they first offered their services," they had complained about the sloth of the government to act on their intelligence.
Finally on May 24 he concluded to recommend their plan to Cienfuegos at face value. "Nevertheless," he told Cienfuegos, "I shall not cease to be on guard constantly; and if, unfortunately, I should observe any contradiction between their promises and their conduct, I shall be able to end the evil at its source." Fatio believed that the plan was the only way "to uproot at one blow the evil that we have so long been suffering; since to go on now and then taking one boat or another would in no wise end the life of this hydra, which would be born again of its own blood." Better yet, "the taking of Galveston is so easy in the present circumstances, without the need for losing even one man on one side or the other," Fatio advised, "and the leaders who live there are all dependent upon No. 13," Pierre's code name. He agreed that Pierre would take the Devorador to Galveston at once to get the latest information, and he would send a schooner to Soto la Marina to gather intelligence on Mina and Aury if possible. Fatio was not blind to the hazards involved. The Laffites were betraying a score and more of people in New Orleans, and a number of privateers, any of whom might be happy to see them dead if their betrayal were discovered. Fatio, too, felt the danger to his own life, and warned his superior that secrecy was paramount.
As for the Laffites, Fatio wanted them close to him, no doubt for speed of action as well as to keep an eye on them. Latour might be sent east to discourage more filibuster groups from forming there, but Fatio did not want either of the brothers sent that far away unless absolutely necessary.20 Meanwhile he gave the brothers countersigns with which to identify themselves to Spanish agents as friends and disbursed to them the funds they said were necessary to put their plan into action. At last the brothers felt Spanish coin in their hands. Two days after their second meeting with Fatio, Marie Villard suddenly paid off the $1,120 mortgage she owed on the house at Bourbon and St. Philip.21
In April the brothers had a credit balance of over $13,000 with Champlin and Adams, probably proceeds from Pierre's last shipment to Boquilla de Piedras or investment by the "associates" into the Galveston enterprise. The day of their first meeting with Fatio the brothers deposited another $2,000 in specie, probably a reimbursement to Jean for his voyage. A week later they deposited another $650. 22 Then on May 22 just before Fatio wrote to Cienfuegos informing him of his decision, the Spanish agent paid "No. 13" $4,000 as an "installment" for Pierre's voyage to reconnoiter Galveston and Matagorda.23 Two days later the brothers deposited another $2,020 in gold with Champlin and Adams.24 Meanwhile Jean reclaimed the bond he had posted for his modest drawback for the cargo of wine and other things he had taken to Galveston.25 Any dollars that could be raised from any source were urgent now. To provide the fast schooner that the plan required for running to the Mexican coast and doing courier duty, the Laffites sold Fatio their own little prize goleta the Antonio Bonifacia for $3,000.26
During these busy days the brothers outfitted the Devorador for Pierre's trip, drawing heavily on their balance with Champlin. Born in New York, Champlin was a sometime planter on the Mississippi, a smuggler, a ship chandler in New Orleans, and a privateer closely tied to Aury. Now he left most of the New Orleans business to partner Adams while he sailed his corsair in search of prizes.27 Adams sold the Laffites $1,157 worth of ship's biscuit, thirty barrels of pork and thirty of salt beef, two sacks of coffee beans, six cases of salted cod, three barrels of mackerel and forty-two of potatoes. There was also sugar, cooking oil, three barrels of onions, four barrels each of cider and vinegar, as well as mustard, pepper, and a barrel of cheese, all testimony to the monotony of shipboard fare for corsairs, with only the onions and cider to stave off scurvy. The men must have their drink, too, and thus the Laffites stowed aboard six cases of red wine and six white, and a dozen cases of brandy. Antic
ipating the vagaries of weather and bottom that often required a vessel to cut its anchor cable, they loaded eighteen lengths of cable as well. This left room for Maire to take on five passengers and their baggage, men to add to the Laffites' cadre of loyal followers at Galveston. On May 27 when Adams totaled the debits against the Laffite balance, the cost of outfitting for the trip came to $4,248.06, a little more than Fatio's installment. The passage for the five men and their equipment added another $1,175 to the voyage. 28
A couple of near slips caused some minor concern. In the middle of the month several prizes condemned by Ducoing's admiralty court came into New Orleans for sale, and Fatio filed libels on behalf of their owners. Lafon and merchant John B. Laporte were particularly interested in the prizes, however, and applied to go before Judge Hall to prove that the authorities under which these ships had been condemned at Galveston were legally appointed and commissioned by Aury. Espagnol was in town and Lafon asked him to testify on their behalf, yet in spite of being owed $1,200 by Lafon, he declared that if put on the witness stand he would tell the truth of the illegality of Aury's and now Laffites government. Quite possibly Fatio or Jean Laffite had had a word with him and money changed hands.29 Meanwhile Jean almost caused a problem. The transactions with Champlin and Adams were aboveboard, but Jean stumbled when his sometime partner Duparc tried to import a shipment of thirty-seven small pivot guns or swivels, of the sort mounted at the prow of a pirogue, for the enterprise. They came from Galveston and were improperly cleared through customs in order to avoid paying duty. It would have been ironic if the whole enterprise had foundered because a foolish effort to save perhaps $400 in duty resulted in a court case.30 Once a smuggler, always a smuggler, it seemed. The case would dog Laffite for years, but it did not in the end impede outfitting the Devorador.
Pierre intended to set sail May 26, in Fatio's words, to gather "the final accounts which we need to execute the stroke safely." Before going he gave Fatio the designs of the insurgent flags of Mexico, Venezuela, and Buenos Aires so that the Spanish vessels in the plan could copy and fly them as they approached Galveston. 31 Iturribarria had arrived in New Orleans by May 15, and committed revolutionary that he was, he spoke of publicizing the shambles at Galveston. He knew that rich prizes were being taken by Aury, but the money was not getting back to New Orleans to fund the revolution. "If there are no funds there are no soldiers," he wrote to Durieux. Though Iturribarria was on good terms with the Laffites, who had done him favors in the past, his discouragement could inhibit the assembly of privateers and threaten to compromise the Laffite-Fatio plan.32 Added urgency came when the Laffites learned on May 13 that the "associates" had word of a Spanish fleet sailing from Vera Cruz, bound for Havana and thence to Spain. That meant the Gulf would be less protected for weeks or months to come, and this was the time to sail for prizes.33 Then came late word that a disgusted Aury had left Galveston on May 18 and moved to Matagorda. This called for a last-minute adjustment making Matagorda the target and delaying Pierre's departure until June 3.34
Pierre usually left the sailing to his brother, but Jean remained indisposed for some time.35 The elder Laffite was also clearly the one in charge, and he needed to appraise conditions on-site. Fatio may even have insisted on it. Jean, the more experienced at ship outfitting, was now entrusted with preparing and supplying the Antonio Bonifacia in New Orleans. He needed to have her ready to sail at a moment's notice before the end of the month.36 Jean Laffite also had personal business to attend to in New Orleans, among other things raising $700 by selling a slave that he had bought from his Arkansas acquaintance Notrebe.37 When the Devorador finally sailed, Jean assured Fatio that if Spain did as the brothers said, she would "have no enemies to fear in this part of the world."
Pierre set sail on June 3, and may not have stopped at Galveston, knowing that Aury had left. By June 14 he and the Devorador were at Matagorda, and what he found surely encouraged him. The impetuous Aury had wrecked most of his fleet on sandbars as he entered the harbor behind Matagorda Island, and those that got in found they could not get out again. That was only the first disaster. By June 15, while Pierre was still off Matagorda, the Spaniards had assembled enough soldiers that they could march to meet Mina. Mina and Perry fell out, and Perry led some of his men away, only to be surrounded a few days later by sixty men commanded by a Spanish lieutenant who demanded their surrender. Perry refused, and took his own life to avoid capture. 38
Meanwhile Mina's base at Soto la Marina was besieged and surrendered on June 15, leaving Mina isolated from support by sea. All he could do was march his men inland until they found a band of rebels, whom they joined, Mina's dreams of personal conquest and liberation disintegrating like those of so many of the filibusters before him. Laffite would not learn of this for some time, but meanwhile there was Aury and his battered fleet at Matagorda. On June 12 a Spanish frigate and accompanying gunboats blockaded Aury's vessels and fired on them in their anchorage, and may still have been doing so when the Devorador hove in sight.39 By the time Pierre arrived, a frustrated Aury was already getting those he could extricate back to sea and setting off for Galveston. Champlin's ship was among those stuck in the bay, and Pierre bought a bunch of crabs that Champlin's men had passed the time netting. Pierre also leased a brig of Champlin's as a dispatch boat and sent it to Galveston with orders to stop only briefly before going on to New Orleans to take word of the latest developments to Fatio as promised. When Pierre's dispatch reached New Orleans on about July 12, Fatio gloated that Aury was in a "rat-trap." All they had to do was take him.
Meanwhile the Devorador remained at Matagorda a few days, during which Pierre bought a few barrels of white wine for his men, and two slaves from Champlin.40 Then the Devorador set sail for Galveston, probably in convoy with Aury's remnants. They anchored off Galveston a few days later to find Garros still acting as admiralty judge, which he continued to do until he left for New Orleans on June 30 with no named successor. 41 Aury had brought with him two shiploads of slaves, numbering close to seven hundred in all. One prize had three hundred blacks, most of whom were seriously ill by this time, and the callous commander simply cast the vessel adrift in the Gulf and abandoned them. The other cargo he had Garros condemn according to form. Added to the slaves left by Champlin in April, this made more than six hundred and fifty on Galveston Island, representing a substantial potential profit. More immediately, however, Aury tried to reestablish his government. Pierre did not resist as Aury replaced Jean's appointees, for it suited the brothers' plan to keep Aury at Galveston until the Spanish attack came. There would be opportunity aplenty to reestablish their officers once Aury was out of the way.
When he came ashore to make his camp a short distance from Aury's, Pierre walked up a pathway from the landing through the coarse grass to higher ground dotted with dense brush and a few trees. At high tide he found his site no more than six feet above the water, but generally secure, with a well nearby affording nasty but potable water. There Aury rebuilt a village of huts made of planks and sailcloth, while his men stuck poles in the ground and wove wattles and thatch into them for shelter.42 No sooner was he established ashore than Pierre began working subtly to undercut Aury's authority. It was not difficult. Aury's unbroken record of failure and high-handedness with his men made many ripe for conversion.
By mid-July Aury decided to abandon hopes for success in Mexico, and told Pierre that he intended to take his fleet to Amelia Island off the Florida coast to join with others seeking to take over that remnant of Spain's North American mainland. Pierre immediately paid a call on General Sarracin, who commanded some of the soldiers with the fleet, and after Laffite promised provisions for his men, the general agreed to keep his command after Aury left. The next day Sarracin moved his camp from Aury's to the site of Pierre's, a symbolic move that further demoralized Aury and the rest. That was only the first defection. Soon more than a dozen of the sailors came over to Pierre, and following them came Colonel Savary and fourteen of the f
ree mulattoes following him. After a month on the island, Pierre believed that Aury's men were so hungry he could buy them all if only he had provisions enough.
But by July 23 Pierre found himself running out of everything, "to which I am not accustomed," he told Jean. He had no choice, if he was to capitalize on his success to date, but to send the brig Independence leased from Champlin to New Orleans with a report to his brother and an urgent plea to send more supplies, along with a good store of drinkable water. Even should the brig be lost on the way due to bad weather, always a possibility now that the hurricane season was upon them, the risk was worth taking. Sending the ship directly to New Orleans had not been his original plan, but his destruction of Aury from within allowed for a shift in thinking.
Besides, he had promised passage to New Orleans to some men on the island defecting from Aury, including Iturribarria. Pierre was only too happy to send him back to New Orleans, as his departure would remove Aury's only vestige of legitimacy and a source of privateering commissions from the revolutionary junta. He also sent an appeal for Jean to come if he was over his illness, for now Pierre felt unwell, perhaps his old malady returning, aggravated by his labor and an attack of something akin to scabies. Pierre was also trying to conclude a deal with Champlin to buy the huge lot of slaves on the island, but had to negotiate through an interpreter since Champlin spoke only English and Pierre felt his command of the language unequal to the fine points of the deal despite his years in New Orleans. He felt that his brother's English was better. Besides, while he admitted that in slave dealing "there are some doubloons to be earned," he was more interested in their own plans, though he did not say whether he meant the brothers' private scheme or their undertaking for Fatio. No doubt expecting that Fatio would want to see his letter, Pierre declared that he was committed to Spain's cause, had given his word to see it to completion, and would do so even if it cost him his life. He had had as much success on the island as he could have hoped for, but he was willing to stay on until it was finished.
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