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The Pirates Laffite

Page 36

by William C. Davis


  There is little doubt that Pierre held the upper hand on the island by the time he sent the brig to New Orleans. "I am like the Chief and father of Galveston," he told his brother. If their "friends" wanted to own Galveston Island, he could make it theirs. If they wanted it abandoned, he could accomplish that, too. Typical of the double game the Laffites played now, those "friends" could have been the "associates" or the Spaniards.43

  Finally, on July 28 Aury wrote a letter to Herrera announcing that he was leaving. He disclaimed responsibility for what happened on the island after he left, declaring that any acts by those put in power thereafter would be unlawful, for they would occur without his sanction as governor.44 That day Pierre either paid his last bribe to lure away more of Aury's men or else gave a party when the commodore announced his decision to leave. Pierre bought from Champlin a "pipe" of white wine, more than one hundred gallons, to fuel the celebration.45 Three days later Aury sailed away, hands washed of Texas and Mexico forever, his course set for Florida to seek new fortune.

  While Fatio and the Laffites readied their enterprise, a steady parade of privateers sailed in and out of New Orleans. The Hotspur was in the trade, along with the Mexican Congress, the Couleuvre under Deveze, the Marie and the Rover, as well as the Alonzo,46 Some of the goods being brought into New Orleans from Galveston had been shipped from Philadelphia and other eastern ports, intended to secure and enhance Aury's establishment. While Aury was absent convoying Mina and foundering at Matagorda, however, the shippers found no one at Galveston to take possession or pay, and so brought tons of cargo into New Orleans. Sugar, liquors, beef, pork, musket and cannon shot, as well as tar, turpentine, pitch and resin, varnish, and 11,500 board feet of lumber—the necessaries for building a village—came in aboard the Alonzo.47

  The volume of the traffic left the customs people asking Washington for instructions on how to deal with the vessels plying the Galveston trade, especially when known former offenders were taking an interest. The collector of customs in the Bayou Teche district had an inkling that "one Dominique a Frenchman that was in Prison in New Orleans in the winter 1814 & 15 for smuggling" was trying to outfit another ship, and asked if "he has not forfeited the Privilege of owning or commanding vessels under the Revenue Law."48 The new and sudden challenge to the slave trade ban posed by Galveston also raised questions. Beverly Chew learned of the large collection of slaves at Galveston and suspected that the Laffites would soon establish a slave mart somewhere on the west bank of the Sabine, just outside American authority. Early in June there were reports of a number of Louisiana planters on their way to Galveston to buy slaves, and later in the month, as Pierre was beginning his espionage work on the island, the navy dispatched the USS Boxer to the mouth of the Sabine to try to intercept the buyers when they came back with their illicit purchases. Officials frankly confessed little optimism about success.49

  In fact, the legitimate slave market in New Orleans was glutted at the moment, with as many as 650 slaves available in July, and Champlin would sell his cargo to a middleman at very advantageous rates. That summer Pierre charged seventeen blacks to the brothers' account with Champlin and Adams for $4,500, less than half what he could expect to realize from Louisiana planters even in a temporarily glutted market. 50 Champlin had more Africans left, and sailed for the Louisiana coast. He anchored on the coast off St. Mary's Parish late in July, probably off Belle Isle, intending to run his slaves up the Atchafalaya to Bayou Teche. Instead, as his pirogue or launch made for shore, it swamped in the surf, and Champlin drowned.51 Within days of his death Chew in New Orleans knew that Champlin had been selling slaves to the Laffites, Sauvinet, and others, but doubted that his revenue officers could either find or stop them. Chew was exasperated.

  By the end of August, however, he had depositions from Ducoing and Garros to add to Espagnol's in supporting his denunciation of the Aury-Laffite government to the secretary of the treasury. He also, thanks to Espagnol, had a copy of the articles drawn up in Galveston on April 15. He had been for some time sending lists of offending vessels to Dick for seizure and legal action, and the revenue officers were doing their job even though the court often failed them. Chew believed that "these steps of the Officers of the port have irritated the Barratarian Gent, and their connexions in a high degree."

  Now when Chew learned of men heading for the Sabine with money to buy slaves, he sent a party to arrest them, intending to attack the receiving end of the trade if he could not get at Galveston. But he wanted the navy to stop a reestablishment at Galveston, "otherwise the Bay will no longer be safe for any flag." Currently armed vessels came into and left the lower Mississippi as they pleased, and some armed boats committed robberies in sight of Fort St. Philip. He counted eleven private armed vessels under either Mexican or Venezuelan colors in port just on August 30 alone. He needed more revenue officers and ships, and more inspectors all along the coast. In Washington, Secretary Crawford was amazed by Chew's complaint. He was sure the navy had more than sufficient muscle to put down the pirates without the revenue service needing to build a virtual navy of its own for the task. "I cannot conceive why they are not employed in destroying the Pirates in that section of the Union," Crawford wondered of the navy. 52

  While complimenting Chew for his dedication to duty, Crawford told him that additional naval patrols ought to be sufficient to curtail the illicit slave traffic.53 To that end, Washington authorized Patterson to borrow money from the United States branch bank to add another vessel or two to patrol the coast.54 It was a faint response, and failed to address the new inland avenue of slave distribution.

  Onís continued his campaign to gain the cooperation of authorities in Washington. Everyone was sympathetic. No one did anything.55 In fact, the privateers had become so impudent that they had an attorney preparing a memorandum to complain to the United States Treasury about the revenue officers and to ask Washington to permit the privateers to import their booty on the grounds that they made large cash outlays to acquire it.56

  At least Chew was not the only man in New Orleans with problems at the moment. On July 7 the district court indicted Jean Laffite, Lafon, and Duparc for failure to pay import duty in the matter of the pivot guns. Duparc claimed to be their legal owner and denied any intent to evade customs, but the court required the three to post a bond of $2,225, the goods' appraised value. The court also seized the pivots and ordered Jean and the others to appear before the bench on July 19 to show cause why the pivots should not be condemned. On August 5 Jean and Lafon presented themselves at the customshouse to give their notes as sureties for Duparc, and there the matter rested. In fact, it would not come to a final settlement until 1826, after all three were dead, when the court went after Lafon's estate to collect the unpaid sureties and nine years' worth of 6 percent interest. 57

  Money remained a prime concern for Jean as he prepared to relieve the pressure on Pierre. Late in July he acted as agent in yet another slave sale for one of his Arkansas acquaintances, but within days thereafter he was on his way to Galveston.58 By that time Pierre's situation was critical. On August 16, almost four weeks after sending his letter to Jean, he expected that the Independence should have returned with provisions. Now his supplies were exhausted, and he was forced to buy goods from incoming privateers at high rates, and on the brothers' credit. He had to borrow money from one man passing through in order to pay cash for some necessaries. Meanwhile his health and the scabies-like itch had not improved either. He needed Jean's help, and soon. Unless resupplied, he could be forced to abandon the port.59

  Fortunately Fatio gave Jean another $1,400 on August 14, which Jean immediately began spending on provisions.60 Fatio's payment was especially welcome because Champlin's assets had been frozen pending the settlement of his estate, and now Jean could not charge goods despite a credit balance with Champlin and Adams of $2,879.56. Jean made no attempt to conceal his activity. Chew remarked at the end of the month that "Lafitte is now purchasing a large quantity of pr
ovisions, and the first cargo will soon sail."61

  However, Jean kept encountering delays. Fatio would not re-lease enough money, then by late August protested that the bad weather season was upon them and the warships could not risk the voyage. Meanwhile Cienfuegos had decided that the time was not right and wanted to know more details of the plan. The Spanish fleet was simply too small and too overtaxed to take the kind of risk Jean was proposing. Fatio and Laffite met frequently, and finally Fatio agreed to authorize purchase of enough provisions and materials to hold Galveston while they awaited a more definitive decision from Havana. 62 Fatio gave Laffite $2,658 during the last week of August and the first week of September, and Jean ran up debts to the sum of $14,465, half of which was the cost of the two supply ships purchased for the venture. He told Fatio that he had to take out a mortgage on the house at Bourbon and St. Philip to raise another $2,800 on his own, and incurred considerable debt on the brothers' credit with the expectation of reimbursement, which may have been true or may have been a typical Laffite untruth to impress Fatio with the urgency of the situation and Jean's commitment to the cause.63

  By late August Pierre could hold out no longer. He left Galveston, arriving in New Orleans on or before September 1. No doubt the brothers conferred, and with Fatio, who told Pierre of Cienfuegos's desire for more information. Frustrated but resigned, Pierre dispatched a report to the captain general that did not skimp in deploring the lost opportunities, nor in blaming sloth and carelessness. Fortunately Pierre still had a spy inside Aury's command keeping him informed of the commodore's plans for Florida. Now, however, they must adjust their schemes yet again.

  Pierre proposed that he and Jean reestablish Galveston, capitalizing on the trust they enjoyed from corsair captains across the Gulf and those working for the insurgencies at Buenos Aires and elsewhere. He believed the brothers could be fully in control by the spring of 1818, with a well-established base that would attract others until virtually the whole of the corsairing fleet of the Gulf would be there, ripe for the taking.

  But Pierre must be able to get the word to the corsairs at sea quickly, as soon as they finished "weaving our web," if they were to get the captains lined up. "Some funds are necessary," he emphasized, but Spain would profit manyfold for its investment. If Cienfuegos did not want Galveston reestablished as a port, he should say so now, in which case the brothers would take their own measures in dealing with corsairs and prizes that fell into their hands. He and Jean had a number of men in New Orleans ready to work for them, some of whom had been their followers in 1814 when they rejected the British offer. Pierre could not help but refer to that as "a period that, without flattering ourselves, brings us honor, by virtue of our conduct and repulses of the brilliant propositions that they made to us to help them in the conquest." Cienfuegos already knew of the Laffites' aid to the Americans, but Pierre pointed it out now as an example of the fact that "there is no one in the world that can make us break our word."

  The Laffites were about to send the Carmelita loaded with provisions and other goods to reestablish Galveston, and they had a brig that would be very useful in transporting more men and matériel. Thus far their expenditures more than doubled what Fatio had paid them, however, and he was doling out smaller and more infrequent amounts. They had bought much of the goods on two months' credit, and sold the brig leased from Champlin for $13,000. Pierre appealed to Cienfuegos to trust their sincerity and provide the money they needed. Even after the lost opportunities to date, if only they had sufficient money they could "execute the most beautiful political and military operation that has been conceived until now, since discovery of the Antilles." The "associates," unaware of Mina's whereabouts or plight, were still hoping to hear from him, and Laffite warned that if they got reinforcements to him, Mexico could be in real danger. A secure Galveston could help deter that, of course. "When we see ourselves in a position to give this great stroke," Pierre boasted, they would be able to hand over Humbert, Gutiérrez, Mina, and the rest to Spanish justice. However, Pierre advised the captain general that if the Laffites delivered the leaders to Cienfuegos, it must be on the understanding that they were not to be executed. Otherwise, he said, "no one in the world would be able to bring us to serve the cause of kings." Meanwhile, fearing Aury would return to Galveston if he learned of the Laffite plan, Pierre urged Cienfuegos to neutralize him at Amelia Island. Pierre confessed more personal fears, too, for he believed the longer they delayed, the more inevitable it became that the Numbers 13 would be discovered. The insurgents' followers would surely kill them if they were found out, he argued. 64

  The Carmelita, captained by Lafon, sailed on September 1, with Jean Laffite aboard.65 When she reached Galveston a few days later, the community had been deserted. Another vessel loaded with provisions and building materials, Laporte's Franklin, stayed at anchor for a time, then returned to New Orleans early in October.66 Lafon remained at anchor off Galveston, however.67 Jean Laffite had brought with him about forty of the old Baratarians, "to consolidate his force and maintain himself master of that place," said Fatio. Number 13-2/720 would turn the island over to Cienfuegos whenever he wanted it, but Pierre advised that they wait until the new plan was well in effect in order that "the harvest will be complete." Fatio felt some unease. He knew the brothers resented not having been paid for their expenses, let alone a profit. Fatio believed they acted in good faith, but he did not delude himself. The Laffites enjoyed enormous authority in the privateering and insurgent community. "The knowledge they possess makes them capable of performing everything they have offered," he told Cienfuegos a few days after Jean departed, but "as enemies they would be most dangerous."68 He could not pay what the brothers demanded, yet feared putting Pierre off too long could be dangerous. Spain was stringing them along, but it should not cut them loose just yet. Should they feel insulted or abandoned, they could easily make their Spanish associates the first victims of their wrath. Pierre's offer to go to Cuba with his family to meet with authorities, and even to be held as hostage for the brothers' redeeming their promises, did not allay a hint of suspicion.69 Fatio would be vigilant.70 Chew, too, knew of Jean's arrival at Galveston, and of his plans to start the community anew. Both Chew and Fatio would be watching.71

  SEVENTEEN

  Deadly Friends 1817–1818

  Slight are the outward signs of evil thought,

  Within—within—'twas there the spirit wrought!

  Love shows all changes—Hate, Ambition, Guile,

  Betray no further than the bitter smile.

  EVEN AS JEAN LAFFITE sailed west along the Louisiana coast toward Galveston, information that he and Pierre passed to Fatio helped discomfit Aury yet again. When he left Galveston in July, Aury sailed to Old Providence, an island off the east coast of Colombia, where one of his corsairs informed him that the revolutionary juntas of Buenos Aires and Chile had empowered him to take both Old Providence and Santa Catalina islands on their behalf. He raised the flag of the insurgencies and proclaimed himself a governor once more, then sailed on to Florida.1 When Aury reached Amelia Island on September 15, an adventurer named Gregor McGregor had occupied the place, but had left on September 4 in a huff.2 Colonel Jared Irvine had taken over from McGregor, and Aury simply pushed Irvine aside upon arrival. He raised the Mexican insurgent flag, and prepared to make the island a base for privateering. A week later he had a dozen ships in the harbor.3 Nevertheless, the United States was not about to risk Florida going from a Spanish colony to a Mexican one. By early December even the British knew that President Monroe would take action, and later that month American forces occupied Amelia Island. Aury gave it up without a fight. He went to Charleston, then Jamaica, and wound up on Old Providence in July, where he would operate for the rest of his brief life. 4

  The British ambassador in Washington expected Monroe to move against Galveston as well, noting that a squadron of four ships—consisting of the corvette John Adams, the brig Prometheus, the schooner Lynx, and another vesse
l—had been ordered into the Gulf of Mexico.5 Indeed, the day that Charles Bagot sent his report to London, Monroe issued a state of the union message in which he said that he intended to suppress the pirates at Amelia and Galveston. Significantly, he referred to Galveston as being "within the limits of the United States, as we contend, under the cession of Louisiana," not failing to get in a subtle complaint about Spain delaying the boundary negotiation.6

  The week after his message, Monroe told the secretary of war to notify the military to be ready for orders. When Captain John D. Henley of the navy asked for 150 soldiers and officers for a joint operation against Galveston, General Andrew Jackson agreed, and on the last day of the year General Robert Butler, in command of the Division of the South at Nashville, Tennessee, ordered men from the United States Army garrison at New Orleans to be ready to march "to suppress the military establishment" at Galveston Island.7 When Henley and the squadron led by the John Adams got Florida without a fight, though, Monroe decided to cancel the Galveston movement. American soldiers were now occupying Spanish Florida, and one diplomatic crisis with Spain was enough for the moment. They could address Galveston later, especially since Monroe had some hope of getting Texas peacefully through the Onís negotiations. In the interim, if the privateers on the island were a thorn in Spain's side, so much the better.

  While all of this played out, Pierre Laffite remained in New Orleans, where even small sums became important until Fatio honored his promises. On November 10 Pierre sold a slave of Jean's to raise $1,000, then paid out $900 of it two days later to buy another, all to net $100. 8 But then he learned of something that could make information from the Laffites very valuable again. For some time Spain had feared an attempt by exiles from the former regime of Napoleon to create a new empire in Texas or Mexico where Napoleon could resume his destiny. Joseph Bonaparte was in Philadelphia at the center of all such intrigues.

 

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